THE STAKES IN THE
JUNE 20 ELECTIONS by LIVIO MAITAN The new phase of the Italian political crisis, which led to the dissolution of parliament and the calling of early elections (scheduled for June 20) developed as a drama of several acts; the actors were all the major parties, performing before the backdrop of a social and eco nomic crisis that has continued to worsen. The Socialist and Christian Democratic congresses The first act, which occured in early March, was the congress of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI - Italian Socialist party). Under the pressure of the radicalizafion of its own electoral base, the PSI made a left shift at its congress, with relative internal homogeneity. (In spite of the emergence of several tendencies whose respective sizes were taken into account in the election of the new Central Committee, the political resolution was adopted unanimousiy-) After about fifty years of advancing a strategy of organic collaboration with the major party of the bourgeoisie (including at the government level), with the prospect of making partial reforms to rationalize the system, the
ITALY PSI has now been driven to question the system itself. PSI secretary Francesco De Martino explicitly rejected (although in vague terms not lacking in ambiguity) the possibility of the party's contributing to a restoration, difficult if not impossible anyway, of the traditional capitalist system, all of whose mechanisms have fallen into such deep crisis." The concluding resolution of the congress declared itself for "the strategic line of alternative to the Christian Democratic regime, a left alternative, which can occur only in the framework of a transition to socialism, gradually and with full respect for all the values of liberty and for the democratic and republican conquests that came out of the Resistance." These assertions were softened by the usual prociamations on the need for the broadest alliances and the acceptance of a clear place in the western world, (The formula deserves to be quoted in full, so that its crude eclecticism may be properly admired: "The PSI places itself within the framework of that complex of civic and human values that are called western, while nonetheless rejecting the economic system that prevails in the West, that is, the capitalist system. ") At the same time, De Martine rejected the proposal made by some delegates that the PSI ought to formally state that it would no
ITALY longer support any government coalition in which the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano — Italian Communist party) was not included in one way or another. Nonetheless, one important element remains, and that is that along with enunciating a new strategic perspective, the Socialists officially sanctioned the death of the centerleft. "The old policy, " the PSI resolution says, "s finisfied rorever; me center-left ir dorind and a new ahase is opening, one that has yet to be constructed.... The intermediary period has already opened, " The fact that the PSI buried the old option without concretizing a new one for the immediate future offered the Christian Democracy (DC — Democrazia Cristiana) and the government some room to maneuver. Thus, theoretically the congress of the DC, the second act in the drama, had an opportunity to take advantage of this. This congress threw harsh light on all the aspects of the crisis of the ruling party - and in front of millions of television viewers: the separation of the political apparatus from the very social forces it had traditionally represented; the division and fragmentation of the leading group, the extensive distrust of the "historic" leaders among the rank and file. The "forward-looking" group, led by Benigno Zaccagnini, who had taken over from Amintore Fanfani as party secretary after the DC
MORO CONFERRING WITH ZACCAGNINI defeat in the elections of June 15, 1975, managed to win a majority, but just barely (less than 52 percent of the delegates) -
This group has emphasized the need for overhauling the party, for a return to its original inspirations, proposing a vaguely radical-populistic theme not without some demagogic flavor. The DC, Zaccognini has said, cannot be "the moderate pole of the Italian political spectrum, the conservative party subject to the will of its bourgeois protectors, nor can it be the business committee of Italian capitalism, nor an organization purely and simply concerned with holding power." But above and beyond the varying terminology of Zaccagnini and
Fanfani, the DC congress confirmed rejection of collaboration with the PCI. Such collaboration, according to
Zaccagnini, would in fact not be "the start of a phase of transition, but rather a radical change, in the classic sense, of the social and economic system"; and, a more immediate danger: "Our fatalistic surrender, our
4 association with certain forms of collaboration, would give rise to a wave of transformation, generating the sort of careerist opportunism that is also feared by the best informed Communists. The consequence would be the crumbling of the intermediary forces of secular and democratic tradition, the inevitable precondition for a political crisis much broader than that registered with the Vanced was that of a special coffaborarion 25 vote. " Ther only concrete position adDC and the PSI. The only thing wrong with that proposal is that it comes a few years too late. Zaccagnini's victory, although narrow and achieved thanks to a bloc that included such broadly discredited personalities as Mariano Rumor and Colombo, was greeted with satisfaction by the promoters of the "historic compromise" (the PCI's proposal for a bloc with the DC). Reichlin, the editor of the PCI's weekly magazine, wrote: "The victory of Zaccagnini and the consequent strengthening of the popular and democratic character of the party, along with the rejection of the DC's role as moderate pole in the Italian political spectrum, is in truth no small thing." This article was dated April 2. Unfortunately for its author, the day before the DC had already dealt him a stinging disappointment: The
Christian Democrats in parliament had made a bloc with FOREION MINISTER RUMOR the fascists to pass a draft law denying freedom of abortion and had thus made a complete break with the Socialists inevitable. (The Socialists had enabled the Aldo
Moro government to remain in office by abstaining on votes of confidence.)
As if this was not enough, a few days later Zaccagnini the "overhauler" accepted Fanfani's resounding re-entry onto the political scene with his election as president of the party's National Council, which at the same time designated a leadership within which the victors of the congress stand in a minority. (They are already in a clear minority in the DC fractions in the two houses of parliament.) As a final touch and a way of demonstrating that the DC had resolved to defend its own boys to the very end, the Moro government, with one foot already in the grave, reconfirmed the controversial Petrilli as president of the IRI (Istituto per la Riconstruzione Industriale - Institute for Industrial Reconstruc-
tion, the public industry sector). This Petrilli was responsible for having appointed and supported the notorious Crociani, another leader of the industry controlled by the state, who has been denounced as having had his snout in the Lockheed trough, In sum, the Christian Democratic congress of mid-March created an even more muddled situation for the party and did not at all open the way to possible new developments. Although this was clear to everyone, the leaders of the PCI nevertheless made a desperate effort to get the DC and its government to make at least some partial corrections that would enable a cabinet crisis and the consequent early elections to be averted, In fact, the PCI leaders continued to prefer that the legislature serve through to the end of its normal term, for that would have offered them the possibility of consolidating their June 15 successes, broadening their direct and indirect collaboration with the DC in the regional, provincial, and municipal administrations, furnishing additional concrete proof of their "sense of responsibility," and in the final analysis, laying the basis for their smooth entry into some future governing majority. In order to do this PCI secretary general Enrico Berlinguer proposed a pact of all the "constitutional" parties (that is, excluding only the fascist Movimento Sociale ItalianoDestra Nazionale, Italian Social Movement-National Righf) on the basis of an emergency programmatic accord. But the DC answered with its umpteenth rejection. The parliamentary debate promoted by the Moro government itself was the final act of the drama. It was a purely formal affair having the tactical aim of throwing the onus for the fall of the legislature onto everyone else. But this maneuver was lost in the void. The parliamentary formality was greeted by general indifference, the participants simply going through the motions like people whose thoughts were already elsewhere. But things are otherwise with the electoral compaign, which is now well under way. Given the coverage that has appeared in the international press, there is no great need to recall that the acts of this political drama unfolded parallel to an economic tragedy of alarming proportions. As Moro confirmed in his last speech as head of the government, the first few signs of an economic upturn had begun to take shape in the recent period. Industrial production for the corresponding period in 1974, and the figure for the corresponding period last year, and the figure for the first two months of 1976 was 3.6 percent higher than the corresponding period of 1975. But the new rise of inflation had been under way even before that, and it was running at a rate unforeseen by even the most pessimistic estimates, thus compelling the government to take a series of restrictive measures that threatened to strangle the upturn at its very birth. The devaluation of the lira with respect to the dollar — in part caused and in part accompanied by speculative operations of all stripes — has already contributed and will contribute still more during coming months to a new dizzying rise of prices. (On January 20 the lira was quoted at 685690 to the dollar; as of this writing the rate of exchange stands at 900 to the dollar.) The other aspect of the situation, the social crisis, has not at all eased but has even worsened, Workers struggles have continued uninterrupted, with partial strikes, general strikes, strikes by the most important categories of workers, powerful street mobilizations. The battle around the new contracts of the major categories has lasted much longer than the preceding periods of conflict in 1969 and 1972; the central dispute of the metalworkers, which had gone on for seven months, ended only on May 1. Nevertheless, a question is posed in regard to these struggles: Have the present struggles exhibited a level of combativity comparable to that of 1969, the highest point of workers mobilization in recent years? Have there been instances in which the rank and file has outflanked the bureaucratic leaderships or not? The answer cannot be given in terms of an abstract comparison but must take account of the difference in context. In 1969 the struggles were more concentrated in time, and in this sense they sometimes assumed a more explosive character than the present struggles. Outflanking of the leadership was more frequent and more visible during the 1969 struggles. But it must immediately be
5
ITALY added that such cases of outflanking occurred mainly in the phose preceding the turn made by the trade-union leaderships, which decided during the summer of 1969 to "grab the tiger by the tail" and accepted the demands put forward by the rank and file that had previously been vigorously opposed (in particular the demand for equal wage increases for all workers). The bureaucracy then gradually succeeded in regaining a rather solid grip on the overall leadership. In addition, the economic situation at the time was such that the bourgeoisie was able to make rather important concessions. Also, the present situation is different in the sense that today, more than in 1969, the struggles have a national dimension. Even more: It is clear even to the less politicized sectors of workers that the solution to the key problems - unemployment and defense of living standards - is not possible purely on the level of trade-union struggles but requires a general political alternative. Because of this, instances of the ranks' outflanking the leadership become objectively more difficult, in spite of the fact that the bureaucracy has a more conservative attitude today than it did in 1969. But this does not mean that there are not tensions and constant conflicts between the bureaucratic leading groups and the masses and even within the bureaucratic groups themselves (in particular between the secretariats of the national union confederations, which are inclined to accept an incomes policy in practice, and some federations of particular cutegories, the metalworkers in the first place, which are compelled to take greater account of the mood of the rank and file and their own previous declarations). The friction between the masses and the bureaucracy has been expressed on two levels. First, some layers of workers have upheld, in some cases rather consistently, the necessity of putting forward more advanced demands both in relation to defense of employment and in relation to wages (thirty-five-hour week with no reduction in pay and 50,000 lire monthly increases for all). Second, and more generally, opposition has been manifested to any further reduction in the already modest platform of demands. These frictions and counterpositions have been reflected both in outflanking of the leadership on questions of methods of struggle (strikes prolonged beyond the official limits, tougher forms of struggle, very determined demonstrations inside factories, complete block of sales, demonstrations of citizens around objectives different from those desired by the bureaucracy) and in sometimes vigorous disputes with noted leaders who have been drowned out by boos while trying to give speeches. Such demonstrations have involved important sectors of workers in Turin, Milan, and Naples, but they have not been limited to these major centers. What occurred after the conclusion of the contract of the chemical workers is a clear indication of the state of mind of broad layers of workers and of the difficulty met by the union leaders in imposing their solutions.
The contract was concluded on a genuinely minimalist basis. On the much vaunted question of "control of investments, " which the bureaucrats had fried to make
6 the battle cry of the entire contract fight, the accord of the chemical workers completely exposed the mystification involved. The only commitment assumed by the employers' associations was to "annually make known to the unions, through appropriate meetings on a national level, the plans on overall investments relative to the industrial activity in question, with possible explanations on the most important specialized sectors and those concerning large geographical areas. " As for wages, the contract called for a 20,000 lire monthly increase effective immediately and another 5,000 a month as of the first of January next year. Given the rate of inflation, which is not at all compensated for by the present sliding scale, this increase amounts to a ridiculously low figure. Worse yet, the increase is included as "a separate element of remuneration, "which means it is not figured into the base pay and will consequently be lost in cases of absence from work, even for reasons of illness (the only exception is absence from work because of accident). In fact, even the leaders of the chemical workers union themselves quickly realized the difficulties they would run into. One of them shouted at Lama, the secretary of the union, who was singing the praises of the accord, "You go defend it in Marghera! " And in fact, in Marghera (near Venice) the accord was rejected by a large majority at Petrolchimica, one of the major Italian chemical companies. Nor was this an isolated case: in Marghera itself the example was followed in other factories, among them Fertilizzanti, while in the city of Brescia the accord was rejected at Caffaro; the Montedison workers in Castellanza rejected it, as did the workers of Sincat in Syracuse. The list could be continued. In the past there have also been instances of contracts being rejected, but never on such a sweeping scale and in such significant forms. There is not sufficient space here to fully describe the mass mobilizations that are continuing to unfold in Italy on various levels. If is enough to stress that the women's liberation movement has exploded during the past several months. This movement had already begun to take shape during the past few years, but it had not assumed the dimensions of a mass mobilization, not even during the fight around divorce in 1973-74. But now the situafion has considerably changed for the better. important demonstration took place on April 3 in response to the DC-fascist bloc against freedom of abortion. A myriad of feminist collectives participated in this action, an extremely combative one of more than 30,000 women who marched through the streets of the capital for hours. What was especially important was that the Unione delle Donne Italiane (LDI - Union of Italian Women), the organization in which the PCI has preponderant influence, was compelled to support the demonstration at the last minute, giving up its opposition to the feminist movement and the "extremists." (The immediate results of this turn were not exactly brilliant; the UDI contingent in the demonstration numbered a little less than a thousand.) One of the by-products of the extreme social and political tensions of these past months has been a new and
BASTA MORIR E MOVIMENTO PER ABORTO LIBERAZONE S/ ALLA LEGGE DELLA FORTUNA DONNA rather considerable rise of terrorist actions and manifestations of violence. There have been many incidents of various kinds, but they may be reduced to the following types: acts of violence against industrial leaders or their instruments (the wounding of Theodoll, secretary of the state petroleum company, the wounding of Borello, division head of Fiat-Mirafiori, the attack on the headquarters of the federation of small industrialists in Milan); acts of industrial sabotage (arson at Fiat, both Mirafiori and Rivalta, at Motta and at Standa); attacks on the forces of repression (on carabinieri barracks and police stations in Rome, Milan, and other cities); attacks on trade-union and political headquarters (arson at the Sassari labor house, sacking of the offices of the PCI and other workers organizations); violence against militants of the left or the far left (the latest case being the attack by a fascist gang on some young people in Milan, resulting in the murder of the youth Ameroso); violence against representatives of the right (assassination in Milan of Pedenovi, MSl municipal councillor). It is obvious that all these incidents cannot be placed on the same footing. In many cases if was a matter of terrorist acts of the right, clearly identifiable and classical in a certain sense; in other cases they were manifestations of extreme left adventurism, but in most cases not attributable to the well-known groups like the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) or the NAP (Nuclei Armati Proletari - Armed Proletarian Nuclei). The action against Fiat division head Borella, for example, was claimed by an outfit that calls itself Formazioni Comuniste Armate (Armed Communist Formations). But the most striking and provocative incidents - such as the arson at Fiat or the assassination of Pedenovi - probably represent a new wave of the so-called strategy of tension, which had already been practiced as far back as in late 1969 (with the bomb planted in the Piazza Fontana in Milan) by for right groups aided by sectors of the state apparatus, particularly element in the secret services. The aim remains the same: to create an uncontrollable situation in the hope of provoking reactions hostile to the struggles of the masses and the workers parties among certain social layers of the petty and middle bourgeoisie and of fostering fascist or fascistic authoritarian initiatives, Whether or not such results can be achieved in the present phase is, of course, another What is at stake The June 20 elections are certainly the most important of the past thirty years. In a future article we will return to the positions of the various forces involved in the confrontation. But the stakes are already quite clear from the outset. "The elections, " wrote the April 11 Corriere della Sera, the country's leading bourgeois daily, "being a means of measuring the strength of the parties, will serve to establish the leading group that will have to resolve the problems that are now posed. ... One leading group is prepared: that of the Communist party. The traditional secular and Catholic leading group, on the other hand, is in full crisis and, in this sense, in a disadvantageous position. Nevertheless, this group benefits from a vast non-Communist electorate, which includes modernized and altered classes, and it has the support of the western world; what it needs to find is concord, inventiveness, and an ability to decide... The stakes involved ought to help it find these things, otherwise it is heading into difficult times. This could even be the last hurrah for those who constitute the present leading group. " For his part, Gianni Agnelli, boss of Fiat, declared: "What is important now is that all Italians make a definite choice about the context in which they wont to live. " (April 21) In his turn, a PCI intellectual wrote in the party's weekly Rinascita: "This year of 1976 may be compared only to the most terrible years of Italian history from the and of the first world war to the present, the years 1921 and 1943. We do not want a 1921, the year of the fascist advance, nor do we want Italy to have to suffer so many struggles and so much ruin before redeeming itself, as in 1943." Beyond the somber tones, the alternative may be posed in precise terms: Who is to govern? Is the old hegemonic bloc to continue to rule or will there be a rodical alternative solution? The leaders of the PCI are going through all varieties of contortions to escape this alternative, to avert the political polarization that is the consequence of the social polarization that already exists in the country. PCI member Lama, a top trade-union leader, recently made the following statement: "On the eve of this electoral campaign we want to avoid a conjunction, which would be extremely disturbing, of the aggravation of social tension and political tersion. This could bring about an explosive mixture capable of rendering the situation much more tragic. Instead, we want these elecfions to take place in an atmosphere of serenity in which
ITALY people can reason with their heads and not on the basis of emotions. We have every interest in avoiding head-on confrontations and in the parties' calmly reasoning out their programs, thinking about the things and the policies that we of the trade-union movement have called for in order to escape from the crisis. " We do not know whether Lama really believes what he says or whether he talks like this simply for tactical reasons. We would rather lean toward the former hypothesis. Nonetheless, the convergence of social and political tension is already a reality that no wishful thinking can annul. And for the vast majority of participants, the elections will be seen exactly as a head-on confrontation: between those who want June 20 to give rise to a new bourgeois government, the guardian of the status quo, and those who want the workers parties to take over the leadership of the country. That is exactly what is at stake. The far left As of this writing, the far left has not yet decided how it will relate to the elections. But there has been a rather deep change since the previous parliamentary elections (1972), In 1972 Lotta Continua and Avanguardia Operaia showed contempt for the elections and vacillated between abstentionism, even if not officially proclaimed, and toilending of the PCI. Only il Manifesto decided to participate with its own slate, but without lending its battle the content of a united fight of the for left as a whole. Today the understanding of the far left's need to make its presence felt in the electoral arena is nearly unanimous. In addition, the development of polemics during the past several weeks has shown that broad sectors have also come to understand the great importance that would be assumed by united lists of the whole far left. This is a position which the revolutionary Marxists upheld in 1972 and which they took up again on the occasion of the regional and administrative elections of 1975; but this position was most often met with skepticism and indifference, it not outright hostility. Lotta Continua (LC) was the first to take account of the situation and as long ago as February proposed a united far-left slate. But among the national organizations, the LC proposal was greeted favorably only by the
Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (GCR - Revolutionary Communist Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International. The Partito di Unita Proletaria (PDUP - Party of Proletarian Unity) responded with a sharp refusal, claiming that because of the radical differences in strategy an electoral bloc with Lotta Continua would be unthinkable. Avanguardia Operaia (AO) took a less radical, more flexible position, one better able to present difficulties for Lotta Continua. But faced with the actual choice, LC opted for a bloc with the PDUP under the name Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy), the name used by the AO-PDUP slates in the June 15, 1975, elections. But just when it seemed that the die
8 had been cast and that it was inevitable that there would be two far-left slates in the elections (Democrazia Proletaria and Lotta Continua), the debate over electoral policy spread throughout the far left, provoking deep differences in nearly all the organizations. The pressure for unity was manifested much more strongly than the PDUP had wanted or Avanguardia Operaia had expected. Avanguardia Operaia found itself more painfully divided and thus worked out a series of tactical operations aimed at either avoiding having to make a choice or at making it less traumatic. The substance of its position was: Total unity on the basis of a national accord is not possible (because the PDUP had refused); only local accords were possible whereby militants of Lotta Continua would be added to the Democrazia Proletaria slates. These local accords could be extended to a number of districts. Lotta Continua replied, correctly, that the only possible method was that of a national accord and proposed a meeting of AO, LC, the GCR, the MLS (Movimento dei Lavoratori per il Socialismo - Movement of Workers for Socialism), and a bloc of Maoist organizations. LC declared itself willing to enter the Democrazia Proletaria lists and to renounce the candidacies of members of its secretariat, but only on condition that the participation take place in all districts and that radio and television time be divided on a parity basis. Lotta Continua's position provoked a new wave of discussions and a varied range of interpretations. The PDUP, only after bitter disputes, responded by rejecting the accord with Lotta Continua, If PDUP maintains this position, there will in fact be two far-left lists, that of Democrazia Proletaria, with the participation of the PDUP, Avanguardia Operaia, the MLS, and minor groups of Maoist inclination, and that of Lotta Continua, with the participation of LC and the Italian section of the Fourth International. The choice of the revolutionary Marxists does not imply any change in their evaluation of the conceptions and basic orientation of Lotta Continua. It is determined by the observation that the responsibility for the failure to achieve a united project lies with the PDUP and by the fact that given the reality of two separate lists, the choice must be made on the basis of the greatest convergence on the central political questions in the current phase. This convergence between Lotta Continua and the GCR, while not an organic one, has occurred during the contract battles and now also on the question of the united far-left slate. In the framework of the common campaign, the revolutionary Marxists will wage a systematic electoral campaign, which they consider essential in this period. We will return to this point in future articles. The slogan on the crucial question of the government will be: For a workers government excluding all parties and representatives of the bourgeoisie, for a PSI-PCI government based on the trade unions and the other mass organizations. May 2, 1976
PORTUGUESE