document SRI LANKA With this issue we are completing publication of the political resolution adopted in December 1973 by the Revolutionary Marxist party, Sri Lanka section of the Fourth International. The first four sections of that resolution appeared in INPRECOR Nos. 0 and 1. These sections dealt with the formation of Bandaranaike's "United Front" government, the imposition of the State of Emergency in 1971, the legislative measures of the regime, and the repression directed by the government against the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front). In this issue we are publishing sections 6,8, and 9, which deal with the development of the parties that formed the 6. The situation within the united front The political hegemony of the SLFP over the LSSP and the CP in the United Front of the three purties was established at the time of the formation of the Front between them in 1968. The Common Programme was expressly declared to have been drawn up "in pursuance of the Bandaranaike policies. " It was also agreed that Mrs. Bandaranaike was to be the leader of the United Front, and that she was to determine the number of seats to be allocated to the LSSP and the CP, respectively, for contest by their candidates at the then impending general election, under the banner of the United Front. Express acceptance of the Common Programme by each candidate was a condition of nomination when the general election took place in May 1970. The SLFP won three times the number of seats that the LSSP and CP won together, on the basis of the distribution of seats contested by the United Front. Though the SLFP won an absolute majority by itself, with 90 seats (out of the total of 151), it still required the support of the LSSP, at least, with its 19 seats, to have the vital two-thirds majority that ensured the abolition of the Senate and the abrogation of the Soulbury Constitution, without violence to its provisions, and the establishment of a new Constitution. This fact gave the LSSP special political leverage with the SLFP within the 44
THE SITUATION governmental "United Front, " the state of the mass movement, and the building of our Ceylonese section. Two sections of the resolution will not be published in INPRECOR because of lack of space, section 5 on the economic policy of the "United Front" and the situation on the island and section 7, which analyzes the right-wing opposition to the regime. The resolution has been published in full as a pamphlet in Sri Lanka in three languages: Sinhala, Tamil, and English.
INPRECOR
United Front; and this was borne out by the appointment of
Colvin R. de Silva of the ISSP as the Minister of Constitutional Affairs. This leverage continues even under the new
Constitution, since any bill can be made law without challenge before the courts if it has a two-thirds majority, even if it or any provision of it is declared to be in conflict with the Constitution by the Constitutional Court appointed under it. The importance of LSSP support in Parliament for reactionary legislation, like the Criminal Justice Commission's Bill, for which a two-thirds majority was expressly declared to be essential by Felix Dias Bankaranaike of the SLFP when he presented it to Parliament in April 1972, was strikingly illustrated when a section of the CP refused to support the Bill.
The apparently close and continuing political relationship between the top leaders of the SLFP with that of the LSSP has been cemented by the continuing dependence of the former on the latter for the enactment of legislation that cannot be challenged successfully, or that can be made unchallengable, in terms, before the courts. It may be said, therefore, that the political dictatorship of the United Front in and through the Parliament rests upon the political relationship of the
SLFP with the LSSP.
The split in the CP(M), resulting from the failure of its traditional leader, S.A. Wickramasinghe, and its "youth" leader,
Sarath Muttetuwegama, and two other members of its parliamentary faction to vote for the Criminal Justice Commission's
Act, could not be healed thereafter. This was because a ma-
jority of the CP (M), reacting to the increasing alienation of the popular bases of the United Front from it, was not willing to submit to uncritical support of the increasingly reactionary and anti-popular measures of the United Front leadership, even though the sole representative of the CP (M) in the Cabinet,
Pieter Keuneman, appears to have been in general accord with that leadership. The split in the parliamentary faction became a split within the Party, when the S.A. Wickramasinghe wing gained complete control of the Central Committee of the Party.
We now have a unique situation in Ceylon for a Communist
Party, with a minority wing in the Government and a majority outside it, still supporting it politically, while both wings continue to maintain ties with Moscow. This reflects the equivocal relations of the United Front Government with the Soviet Government. The LSSP leadership has generally manifested complete loyalty to Mrs. Bandaranaike, and has worked in close liaison with the coterie of SLFP ministers, like Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Maithripala Senanayake and T.B. Ilangaratne, who, together with her, appear to be the controlling group within the SLFP. Despite undoubted differences of outlook and political tradition to begin with and consequent differences that must have arisen within the ruling SLFP/LSSP clique in the United Front Government, the hopes of a break up between them, on the part of Rightist political opponents of the Government, have not been realised. The main reason for this is that they are held together by political and social self-interest, and fear of the masses, especially after the killing and torture of thousands of youth in and after April 1971, and the ruthless attacks they have perpetrated on mass living standards and rights thereafter. Though there have been rumblings of discontent within the SLFP and the LSSP, especially amongst their youth sections, there is little reason to expect that any important Left currents will emerge from amongst them. This is because the memberships, as well as the youth sections of the two parties, are politically disoriented to a great extent and consist largely of opportunistic petit-bourgeois types, most of whom have been given or have acquired personal benefits or positions from or in the establishment. The workers amongst them are predominantly employees in the public sector, who hang behind their political leaderships, likewise mainly for personal protection or gain. In the matter of political corruption, there is now little to choose between the SLFP, the LSSP and the CP minority that shelters under Pieter Keuneman's ministerial wing. The relationships between the three parties of the United Front in the trade union arena reflect the state of affairs between them in the political arena, since their trade unions are completely subservient to the politics of the United Front Government. Cut-throat competition between the trade union leaderships of the three parties, however, prevails in several sectors, despite the political collaboration between them. The result has been a continuing decline in the strength and influence of the Joint Committee of Trade Union Organisations, controlled by the United Front. Its role is to serve as a sounding board amongst the organised workers for the leaderships of the parties in the United Front, besides being an instrument for promoting class collaboration amongst the workers, in accordance with the policies of the United Front.
6a. CP (Peking) wing and Peking The open and continuing political support given by the Peking regime to the United Front Government under Mrs. Bandaranaike gave rise to a situation in which the CP(Peking) wing under Shanmugathasan has ceased to have political significance in the mass movement. Following the breakaway of the Premalal Kumarasiri group, and the expulsion of Wijeweera and others in 1966, and several drop-outs thereafter, the rump of the CP(Peking) wing was left without any effective Sinhala cadre. The imprisonment of Shanmugathasan himself and most of the leaders of the Plantation Workers' Union led by the CP(Peking) wing, for more than a year after April 1971 paralysed that Party. Thereafter, the breakaway of the leadership of the Plantation Workers' Union, together with the veteran trade union leader, Watson Fernando, left Shamugathasan with no effective cadre at all, and no base of any importance in the trade union movement. In this connection, Maoists internationally, following the increasingly friendly links between it and the United States, and the denunciation of the JVP by that regime in the immediate aftermath of the suppression of the JVP by the United Front Government, has left Shamugathasan little chance of any new recruitment. It now appears that Peking's influence in Ceylon politics is directly exercised through its influence with the United Front Government on the basis of political, economic and military support for it. 8.The mass movement The shattering of mass illusions in the United Front Government, as a result of its attacks upon mass living standards and the continuing repression of democratic rights and civil liberties under the Emergency, has resulted in political confusion and demoralisation in the traditional left movement. It has become so disoriented and has degenerated to such an extent, under the circumstances, that it is no longer capable of any serious struggle against the capitalist class or the state, and can hardly be regarded as a Left movement anymore. However, there are considerable sections of the working class, particularly amongst its younger layers, as well as amongst the student and unemployed youth, who have not been imbued with the reformist outlook of the traditional Left parties, or have ceased to have such an outlook. The trade union movement has been largely confined to the urban and plantation proletariat. The rural proletariat and substantial sections of the urban proletariat employed in small establishments or even in large establishments on a casual basis have largely remained unorganised, with no legally regulated or legally enforceable terms and conditions of employment. Since unorganised workers, like the organised workers, have largely been imbued with a reformist outlook, they have looked to the parliamentary parties for improvements in their social conditions by legislative means. The organised workers have sought, in addition, to improve their terms and conditions of employment through trade union representations and struggles. Today, advancement by such means is no longer possible for the vast majority of the proletariat; nor, for that matter, is effective defence of existing living standards and rights posThe Essential Services Order, made and maintained under the Emergency regulations since March 1971, serves as an impor-
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SRI LANKA "it is with the younger generation that the regeneration of the left movement... now lies tant deterrent against strikes, since it illegalises any failure or refusal to work, whether individual or collective. This vicious Order has been invoked in some cases to justify mass dismissals in strikes, and also to dismiss individual workers. Nevertheless, industrial peace has been maintained under the United Front Government more by reason of the class-collaborationist and divisive policies of the traditional Left parties in the United Front than because of the Essential Services Order. In the government service and in state corporations, political apathy and inactivity is prevalent amongst all categories of workers. This is due, on the one hand, to disillusionment in the Government amongst the substantial majority of them, who supported the United Front at the elections. It is also due, on the other hand, to fear of victimisation for any form of active opposition to the Government, including indefinite suspension from work, without pay, on suspicion of "subversive" activity. In the state sector, furthermore, since trade unions of the United Front parties predominate amongst the workers, the latter are subject to control by the state managements with the collaboration of their trade union leaderships. In some instances, office-bearers of such unions are actually in the managements themselves, as directors of state corporations. The adamant refusal of the United Front Government to settle the sustained strikes of the well organised trade unions of technical officers in the Irrigation Department and of state and commercial bank employees throughout the country at the end of last year, and their ultimate defeats, served to bring home to the trade union movement the realisation that collective bargaining and democratic methods of settlement of strikes, even in important sectors of the economy or of the administration, could no longer be expected under the present conditions of crisis of the capitalist system in Ceylon. The chronic discontent that has prevailed amongst the low-paid masses of workers on the tea and rubber plantations has become more and more acute, due to the reduction of workdays per week and the rising cost of living. The monthly-wage demands of their unions have become more and more insistent, in consequence. The recent cut in the rice ration to only half a measure per week has aggravated the economic distress on the plantations more than in any other major sector, in these circumstances. Though the Ceylon Workers' Congress has been agitating both on economic as well as democratic demands affecting the preponderant majority of the plantation workers, who are of Indian-Tamil origin, and though the C. W.C. leadership is politically antagonistic to the United Front Government, at present, it is unlikely that it will be prepared to lead the plantation workers to a showdown with the Government and the plantation owners on their demands. Nevertheless, the deep-seated unrest that prevails amongst the plantation workers may well result in a major outbreak of the class struggle on the plantations, sooner than in any other sector of the economy, unless the United Front Government makes some kind of deal with the CWC leadership to prevent it. In the impasse in which the trade union movement now finds itself, and as a result of the substantial loss of confidence in the parliamentary process as a means of social amelioration for the masses, sections of the working class have already begun to recognise the necessity for the regeneration of the Left movement and the unification of the working class under a political leadership that will lead it in struggle for the defence and advancement of its interests as against those of the capitalist class and the state. The liquidation of the JVP, including the killing or imprisonment of large numbers of the student youth and the general conditions of repression that have prevailed since April 1971, have strongly inhibited the manifestation of revolutionary tendencies amongst the youth in the high schools and universities, where the JVP had exercised a powerful political influence. In the circumstances, the parties of the United Front now hold sway in the student movement on the university campuses; and, as in the trade union movement, strong rivalries
to combine against the CP (M) wing in elections to the student ism and even less of the LSSP(R). The "Healyite" group (Revexist between them. The LSSP and the SLFP wings have tended councils; but the latter holds a strong position in some campuses because of its critical attitude in relation to some aspects of the policy of the United Front Government. The widespread disillusionment with the United Front Government amongst the masses has resulted, to some extent, particularly amongst middle class layers, in a turn towards the UNP as the "lesser evil" of the former supporters of the United Front parties. Despite the victories of the UNP in several by-elections, in consequence, it still cannot be said that the United Front Government no longer commands political support from amongst the masses. Such support as it does have, however, is no longer enthusiastic. It is limited to certain sections of small property owners and sections of the state bureaucracy, as well as some sections of the working class, that have directly benefited from measures of the United Front Government in relation to them or from its political patronage. The disintegration of the Left movement that the LSSP and CP have led for a generation has left the masses not only politically confused, but virtually defenceless against the attacks made upon their rights and living standards in this situation. It is with the younger generation that the regeneration of the Left movement, as well as the revival of the class struggle, now lies. With approximately half the present population consisting of young people born after the Hartal of August 1953, even though the major set-backs that the mass movement has suffered under the United Front Government have still to be surmounted, there is every likelihood of revolutionary developments in Ceylon in the period ahead. 9. The party and our tasks The breakaway minority from the LSSP that formed the Party in June 1964, immediately after the break, had no proper political cohesion at the time. The only unifying factor that led to the break was the rejection of the decision of the majority of the LSSP to support the entry of the ISSPinto a coalition government under the leadership of the SLFP. Subsequent breakaways from the Party and individual drop-outs, during the period of almost a decade that has elapsed since the Party was formed, reduced its strength and its capacity to oppose itself effectively to the LSSP and the two CP's on the Left. The breakaway of the Karalasingham group in 1966, and their return to the LSSP following in the footsteps of Osmund Jayaratne, was partly due to their lack of confidence in the Party's capacity to wield any influence in the mass movement as against the then very much more substantial influence of the LSSP. It also indicated the incapacity of such people to break with the political habits and opportunist outlook that had become prevalent in the LSSP during the period of its degeneration into a parliamentary reformist party. The subsequent breakaway of the Edmund Samarakoddy group, shortly after the last Party conference in April 1968, and its lapse into virtual political oblivion thereafter, also indicates that many of those who broke from the LSSP were incapable of reorienting themselves to the mass movement in such a way as to remain politically viable and capable of building a revolutionary Marxist vanguard to lead it. The Party's prospects of development were damaged by the breakaways and drop-outs from its all too small ranks. The political slanders made against the Party publicly by the Edmund Samarakoddy group added to this damage, especially amongst young people in the Left who knew little of Trotskyolutionary Communist League) that was organised by other breakaway elements from the Party also contributed to political confusion about Trotskyism, the LSSP(R) and the Fourth International. Their newspaper propaganda has had some effect in Left circles in universities. They have no significance amongst the working class because of their utter sectarianism and virtual tailism behind the traditional Left parties in the United Front, whose leaderships they cali upon to break with the Government and lead the masses to the formation of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. Their revolutionism consists in little more than repeating this refrain and calling, parrot-like, for the "building of a revolutionary party" as an answer to any and every issue arising from the class struggle anywhere, without any actual involvement on their part. What seriously inhibited the growth of the Party, however, were the profound illusions that were created in the traditional Left movement by the political combination of the LSSP and the CP (M) in the SLFP-led United Front, established by those three parties when they were in the parliamentary Opposition to the UNP Government of 1965-1970. An important factor that militated against the growth of the Party amongst the youth, unknown to us during that period, was the development of the new revolutionary youth movement that came to public notice as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in 1970. Mass disillusionment with the United Front, and the tragic debacle suffered by the JVP in 1971, have materially changed the situation in the mass movement as regards the prospects of the Party's growth in the period ahead. The leading role that several Party members have played in the CMU and the development of that Union into a powerful mass organisation of all categories of urban workers in the private sector and in state corporations, in consequence, has been the main factor that has enabled the Party, small as it is, to become the only politically significant revolutionary group still functioning in the mass movement today. Interest in the Party has been heightened in the recent period, amongst those who recognise the role it has played in bringing the CMU to the forefront of the entire mass movement, in the defence of human and democratic rights under the dangerous and difficult conditions of repression maintained by the Government under the Emergency, following the bloody suppression of the JVP in April 1971. The defence of the JVP leaders charged before the Criminal Justice Commission, and the widespread publicity that the inquiry has received for well over a year, have also contributed in no small way to the growth of interest in our politics, particularly amongst the political prisoners and former adherents and sympathisers of the JVP. In the circumstances, whilst the prevailing political situation remains dangerous for the mass movement and difficult as yet for the rebuilding of the Left, the Party now stands in a position to organise a revolutionary Marxist vanguard capable of performing that task and of leading the mass movement forward, in due course, on the revolutionary Socialist The main propagandist task of the Party in the present period is to bring home to the Ceylonese masses the incapacity of the Ceylonese bourgeoisie, whether through a parliamentary regime in association with the traditional Left parties or otherwise, to maintain its rule on a democratic basis, or to resolve any of their basic problems, and especially the problems of unemployment and the high and ever rising cost of living. To perform this task effectively and to lead the masses towards the eventual overthrow of capitalist rule and the establishment of a Workers' and Peasants' Government under the lead-
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SRI LANKA ership of the proletariat, it is essential for the Party to point out the necessity for and actively engage in the building of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat capable of uniting the forces of the urban, rural and plantation proletariat at the head of a mass movement for Socialism in Ceylon. In the situation now prevailing, the Party should seek to build or to assist in the development and bringing together of political groups capable of being oriented in a revolutionary direction amongst the rural and plantation proletariat, developing and using the position it has gained amongst the urban proletariat in so doing. It is also important for the Party to endeavour to establish political groups, or at least to establish contact with such groups as may now exist or may come into being amongst the Tamil-speaking minority and amongst the student youth, that may be capable of becoming part of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard of the proletariat. In the performance of these tasks, the Party should specifically conduct propaganda and agitation on the following democratic demands: (1) The ending of the Emergency and restoration of all democratic and civil liberties, including the unconditional re lease of all political prisoners held in custody or convicted under the Criminal Justice Commission's Act or the Emergency regulations, and repeal of that Act as well as the Public Security Act and other repressive legislation. (2) Full citizenship rights for all state less persons of Indian origin in Ceylon, and no compulsory repatriation of any workers of Indian origin in the plantations and elsewhere. (3) Recognition of the Tamil language as an official language, as in the case of the Sinhala language, and abolition of all forms of discrimination against racial, religious or caste minorities. In relation to the United Front Government, the Party should continue to expose its true character and the treacherous roles being played by the LSSP and both wings of the CP(M) in relation to it. At the same time, it is essential that the Party should also expose the demagogic character of the propaganda of the UNP in relation to matters affecting democratic rights and the living standards of the masses of the people. Since the UNP seeks to mislead the masses into believing that the attacks made upon them by the United Front Government in these respects are in pursuance of policies that are determined by Marxist ideas of Socialism, in order to discred-
Editeur responsable: René Groslambert, 34 rue Nothomb, 1040 - Bruxelles Imprimerie spéciale de l'éditeur 48 it such ideas, and that it can give the masses a better deal, the Party should also explain the true nature of the role being played by the UNP in relation to the United Front Government. It should be pointed out that this role is essentially complementary, as both the UNP and the United Front Government are seeking to preserve bourgeois property relations and capitalist rule in Ceylon, though in different ways, at the expense of the masses. To the extent that they realise this only will they understand that their living standards and rights have been attacked both under the previous UNP Government and under the United Front Government due to the continuing deterioration of the capitalist system in Ceylon under both governments. In relation to the Federal Party and the Ceylon Workers' Congress, the Party should explain the impossibility of their securing the democratic rights of the Tamil-speaking people in the Northern and Eastern provinces and the workers of Indian origin on the plantations under a bourgeois government dominated by Sinhala bourgeois and petit-bourgeois political parties, whether it be led by the SLFP or by the UNP, or by a combination between them. The Party should also explain the nature of the Tamil United Front and the essentially complementary role that it is playing amongst the national minorities in relation to the policies of the UNP in the present situation. In relation to the defence of mass living standards and rights, the Party should continue to explain the necessity for and seek to mobilise and lead mass actions independently of the United Front parties and the Rightist Opposition parties. In this connection, the Party should continue to promote the formation of independent organs of defence of the rights and living standards of the people, such as People's Defence Committees, as well as united front activity between trade unions and other mass organisations, on demands that will serve to advance the class consciousness of the workers and to bring them to the understanding of the social necessity for the working class to take power, under the leadership of a revolutionary Marxist vanguard. Apart from its political activity in relation to the task of rebuilding the Left movement under a revolutionary Marxist leadership, it is essential that the Party should carry out systematic education on Marxism and the need for the adherence of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard in Ceylon to the Fourth International, as the struggle for Socialism in Ceylon cannot be carried forward effectively in separation from the revolutionary struggle for Socialism on a world scale.