PRESENT CRISIS IN CHINA by GREG BENTON wrong to confuse the Maoist "rodicals" with the genuinely anti-bureaucratic forces active in 1966-68 as it would be to accept the characterization of Teng Hsiaoping as a "bourgeois restorationist. " Mao's original aim in the cultural revolution was to root out his critics from the leadership and wield power through his own "radical" faction. Achievement of this aim was thwarted by the independent evolufion of the Red Guard movement and the growth of a rival power base around Lin Piao, Moo's one-time ally, in the central military leadership. As a result, Mao's "radical" alliance was whittled down to its base in sections of the party apparatus, notably in Shanghai, and in parts of the cultural and press establishment. Mao's Bonapartist inclinations automatically ruled out the presence in his political entourage of anyone with genuine independent authority or prestige, whether in China or internationally. This was one more reason why the mass rehabilitafion of "pragmatists" like Teng Hsiao-ping became essential after 1972 as the movement to reconstruct the party and administration gof underway. Pressure to rehabilitate victims of the cultural revolution and to reduce "radical" influence also came from the regional military commanders, whose power grew considerably during the "mopping-up" stages of the cultural revolufion and after. The resulting marriage of the two factions was a shaky and even unnatural one. Throughout the past three years the two factions have vied with each other for ascendancy, and the bewildering pattern of events has been
CHINA complicated still further by the constant rise and fall of the mass movement.
The tenth party congress of August 1973 saw the sudden promotion to number three position after Mao and Chou)
of Wang Hung-wen, the Shanghai leader who had come to prominence as a "radical" after 1966. During the congress Wang raised radical slogans and put renewed emphasis on the role of the mass movement. Wang's slogans were partially implemented during the subsequent "Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius" campaign. Wail newspapers reported in Western China revealed widespread official corruption and other abuses, and a wave of strikes and demonstrations hit the country.
In January 1975 the National People's Congress met in
Peking. The keynote of the congress was unity and stability. "Radical" representation in the bodies set up by the congress was minimal, and Teng Hsiao-ping and his allies took most of the top posts. Mao himself was demonstrably absent. In February 1975 a new campaign was launched to "restrict bourgeois rights, " with the clear aim of pre-arranging the political outcome of the
National People's Congress. The campaign showed that even if Mao was not in position to prevent the rehabilitation of the "capitalist-roaders, * he had absolutely no intention of acquiescing in it. Unlike the nebulous "Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius" campaign, the new campaign raised inherently subversive issues such as material bureaucratic privileges, the presence of "bourgeois power-holders" in the leadership, and so on. Recent events confirm the suspicion that Teng Hsiaoping was a main target of the campaign. In the second half of 1975, after a renewed eruption of strikes and illegal mass organization in various parts of China, the campaign clearly lost momentum and the slogan of now a member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau, party vice-chairman, army chief-of-staff, and permanent stand-in for the dying Chou En-lai, appeared more and more certain to take over as prime minister when the time came. The announcement on February 8, 1976, that Hua Kuofeng had been appointed acting premier, Chou's old post, therefore created a sensation. Hua's appointment had all the appearances of a compromise. He has no national power base. He is not known as a "radical," and during the cultural revolution he came under ferocious attack from the far-left Sheng-wu-lien group in Hunan. Since Hua is minister of public security, his appointment may also represent a warning to would-be "trouble-makers" among the rank and file. Four days later, a press and wall-newspaper campaign began. Although as of this writing Teng has not yet been officially named, he is unmistakably the target of the offensive. The charges against Teng and the "rightists" include: *Launching an "economic typhoon" to "put economics first" or on a par with politics. On February 17 People's Daily accused the "capitalist-roaders" of "put10 ting on the same footing (1) the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat to combat and prevent revisionism, (2) the promotion of stability and unity and (3) the development of the national economy" (referred to as "taking the three instructions as the link");
*Sowing discord between the party and intellectuals and advocating that "scientific and technical units should be led by experts, " that the purpose of universities is to "train cadres and technicians, "and that "a good scholar makes an official" (People's Daily February 13);
*Reversing previous decisions, opposing the rapid ascent of young people, and recruiting personnel "without inquiring into the political and historical situation of the person to be appointed and his or her attitude towards the cultural revolution";
*Proposing the widening of the wage-scale from eight to twelve grades;
*Wanting reconciliation with the Kremlin;
*Opposing Mao's principle that "the party should command the army and not vice versa."
Chou & Teng Other charges allege that Teng's self-criticisms after the cultural revolution were not sincere, that he organized the 1975 National People's Congress against Mao's wishes, that he attempted to suppress the news that Wang Hung-wen was vice-chairman of the party military commission, that he obtained "black material" to use against Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), and that he has advocated class cooperation and capitulation ever since the anti-Japanese war of resistance. On February 29 People's Daily accused the "capitalistroaders" (openly referred to as a "faction" rather than a "tiny handful") of "unscrupulously splitting the central committee" and warned that they wield "very great
power" in the party. Clearly, powerful forces are ranged behind Teng, not only in Peking but also in the provinces. The "rightist" formula of "taking the three instructions as the link" was used extensively in local agricultural conferences in late 1975 (al though Hua
Kuo-feng avoided using it in his own important speech on agricultural development). Wall newspapers in the provinces have reportedly broadened the attack to include local leaders. In the absence of retreats or compromises, the fighting could therefore easily engulf wide areas of the country. In such a situation, the role of the army would be decisive. The army, traditionally firmly subordinate to a unified political leadership, split as a result of the cultural revolution and was drawn into the factional vortex. During and after the crushing of the Lin Piao group, the regional commanders acquired unprecedented power and influence. The experience of the cultural revolution, together with the inherent conservatism of the military hierarchy, gave these commanders a natural inclination toward an alliance with the "conservative" pragmatists in the leadership. Recently the Shanghai party has energetically pushed the idea of a "workers militia" as a counterweight to this alliance, with varying degrees of success. A reshuffling of the regional commands has partly reduced the political influence of the military, but it is still significantly greater than in other workers states and could quickly re-emerge as an independent factor in the political situation, The fact that the principle of party confrol over the army has been raised as an issue in the present campaign may therefore have ominous implications for the future evolution of the power struggle. The exact role of Chou En-lai in the present crisis has yet to be clarified. The March 2, 1976, Le Monde reported posters in Canton criticizing Chou for having favored Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation. After Chou's death, the Japanese Sankei Shimbun published a remarkable document (subsequently reported by Tass on January 29) purporting to be Chou's "political testament"; copies were allegedly distributed to members of the Central Committee by Chou's wife, Teng Ying-chao. The main points of the document were: China's diplomacy should be based on proletarian internationalism and it should cooperate but not ally with capitalist countries. The party should observe the principle of democratic management "and never again make mistakes like the cultural revolution. " The economy should be managed by specialists; the emphasis should be placed on heavy industry, and the "workers, peasants, and intellectuals must be clearly aware of their mission. Recently many important documents initially made public outside China have been shown to be authentic. If Chou's testament is also genuine, it shows support for Teng's conceptions. The implications of the document are that Mao's present critics, like all his past opponents, also differ with him on relations with imperialism and the Soviet Union, It seems likely that the "radical" wing of the bureaucracy on domestic matters is often rightist on foreign affairs and the "conservative" wing is more prepared to consider united action with the Soviet Union. It is difficult to gauge the impact on the Chinese masses of the victories in Vietnam and Angola. The Chinese masses, of course, are kept in great ignorance on international questions. But it is hard to believe that these stunning reverses for Mao's line will not have some reverbations in the current political crisis in China. (On this point, see the revised English edition of Livio Maitan's book Party, Army, and Masses in China, New Left Books, London. On Chinese foreign policy, see articles in INPRECOR, Nos. 2, 5/6, 20, and 37) What is probably being reflected is an increasing awareness on the part of sections of the leadership of the sterility of a line that designates the Soviet Union as "the main enemy, " which has nothing to do with the charges against these elements that they "preach recourse to foreign aid" and "favor imperialist or social-imperialist type modernization. " (People's Daily, February 29.) In domestic policy, the main charge against the "rightists" is that they favor professionalism as against class struggle. Similar charges have been leveled at other leaders in the past. Linked to the question of "professionalism" is the alleged proposal for a slight widening of wage differentials. (Note, however, than in autumn 1975 Teng readily associated himself with attacks on "дети 0703
CHINA high salaries for top state officials.) Despite the one-sidedness of the present "debate" and the improbability of many of the allegations, these two particular charges have the ring of truth. The background to this policy dispute is the ambitious modernization program announced by Chou En-lai in 1975, which in principle appears to enjoy the support of all sections of the leadership. The implementation of such a program would place tremendous strains on a country as poor and underdeveloped as China, all the more so if the present unfavorable evolution of the terms of China's world trade continues. It will also involve wage freezes and curbs on consumption in a period of rapidly rising output, a situation that breeds resentment and led in 1974-75 to strike movements across China. Obviously, inequality, privilege, corruption, and other symptoms of bureaucratic degeneration will exacerbate this contradiction and threaten the stability of society, as the cultural revolution showed. Mao's instinctive response to the deepening mood of unrest in the country was to launch the 1973-75 campaigns in an attempt to limit bureaucratic abuses somewhat. The proposals of Mao's opponents in the leadership are more classically Stalinist: to allow small increases in differentials and thus to create a narrow privileged layer to act as a cushion between the rule of the bureaucracy and the masses. Such proposals would be warmly welcomed by the lower-level bureaucrats, who were cowed and demoralized by the cultural revolution and were frequently arcused of deserting their posts in the face of mass pressure during the recent campaigns. The Maoist offensive against the "professionalist" principle has resulted in the partial re-emergence of various forms of workers control in Chinese Industry. Throughout the early 1970s press reports spoke of rank-and-file resistance to moves to "strengthen business management" and restore factory discipline. During the 1975 camto "occupy the superstructures, " workers" inspection teams were revived in Shanghai and elsewhere. On February 10, 1976, the Yugoslay press agency Tanjug reported the formation of "workers control teams, "although it made clear that such bodies had no real power over production plans or income distribution. Tight party control is apparently a common feature of all aspects of the present campaign. The formation of mass struggle organizations has so far been expressly forbidden. Red Flag (February 1976) called for the "strengthening of party leadership, so that the mass debate will develop in a planned manner, step by step." BBC-monitored reports from Wuhan (February 9) revealed that "since the debate began there has been no halting of classes or production, no organizing of liaison visits, and no erecting of mountain-strongholds during the movement." The marked totalitarian bias in recent campaigns contrasts sharply with the classical Maoist themes of equality and participation. The same Mao who in 1966 in12 spired the Red Guards with rhetorical references to the Paris Commune now eulogizes Chin Shih Huang, China's ruthless first unifier and a practitioner of the reactionary philosophy of legalism. Here Mao stands clearly to the right of his opponents, who despite their hostility. to proletarian democracy favor a certain measure of liberalization and differentiation in political, intellectual, and cultural life. (Since Chiang Ching lost her grip on cultural policy in 1973, many hundreds of new books and periodicals have been published, for the first time in several years.)
Hua Will the present crisis deepen into a new cultural revolution, and will the Maoists establish their ascendancy in the leadership? The balance of forces at the top today is even more heavily weighted against the "radicals" than it was in 1966; without Mao's personal intervention the present campaign would never have got started. Wide sections of the leadership were traumatized by the cultural revolution, and Mao can no longer count on the automatic support of the military. (On this point see "Behind the 'Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius' Campaign, " INPRECOR, No. 10, October 17, 1974.) But since Maoism has always drawn its strength from the mass movement, in the struggle both for state power and for power in the party, is this not therefore on argument for Mao's initiating a new cultural revolution? Here a crucial new factor in the situation must be taken into consideration. The course of recent events indicates that the relationship between Maoism and the mass movement has changed qualitatively, and that ever wider
sections of Chinese society are prepared to break from the orbit of all wings of the bureaucracy and to strike out for their own independent interests. First, many of the recent campaign themes originated in the unofficial movement (see Western press reports for June 1974), where they were raised with a boldness and immediacy only distantly reflected in the official versions. Second, whereas working class political or strike action in past years has invariably developed in the shadow of the student movement or one or another section of the bureaucracy, the strike wave of 1974-75 was remarkable For its apparent independence from all outside influences. As in 1967, official denunciations of "syndicalism" reveal the emergence of independent trade-union-type bodies during these struggles. But while the 1967 Shanghai strike wave was defused by a combination of political persuasion by the Maoist leadership and internal divisions within the mass movement itself, the 1975 Hangchow crisis was ended only by the sending of 10,500 troops under Teng Hsiao-ping, after an unsuccessful attempt at political mediation by Wang Hung-wen. (Hangchow workers are clearly using the present campaign to vent their hatred for Teng. According to the February 28 Le Monde, the attacks on him in the city have reached an "astonishing volume. ") The growth in worker-peasant representation in leading party and state bodies since 1969 could acquire more than just token significance if independent mass action increases. The growing maturity and self-confidence of the Chinese working class is partly rooted in the rapid socioeconomic development of the country. The evident disenchantment with Mao's narrow conception of the anti-bureaucratic struggles springs from the failure of the cultural revolution to fulfill expectations, the seemingly unending series of cynical power struggles in the leadership, the growing secrecy and exclusiveness of the political "debate, "and Mao's obvious inability to hit upon a "radical" successor of any real stature in the country. At the same time, the partial relaxation of foreign military pressure on China has probably encouraged the process of internal differentiation. But recent events show that the chairman is still capable of responding to and stimulating the mass movement in a way unique among established ruling groups. Predictions about the course of Chinese politics are notoriously difficult, doubly so since the thought of "going to meet Marx" could easily embolden Mao to make some last dramatic gesture to confound his opponents. But for the reasons given above it seems that the campaign will remain more or less within official channels, particularly since the price of military intervention to restore order would almost certainly be an even further reduction of "radical" representation at the top. This explains why the present campaign is coming to a climax so quickly compared with the slow, step-bystep buildup of the anti-Liu campaign during the cultural revolution, Whereas the latter involved a genuine, although narrowly conceived, mobilization at the base, the former has up to now been strictly regulated from above. The official press has also broadly hinted that the door is still open for yet another "recantation" by the recidivist Teng, thus allowing for a retreat from all-out confrontation. Where does the erosion of their mass base leave the Maoists? The measures Mao is now proposing to combat "capitalist restoration" include theoretical study, "all-round dictatorship" (which means in practice the extinction of all elements of proletarian democracy), and the preparation of a handful of close confidants (including his wife and son-in-law) to succeed him -measures which, where not illusory, are downright reactionary in essence. But if a convulsion of the proportions of the cultural revolution failed to achieve this aim, then the present campaign is even more clearly doomed. The inability of the leadership to resolve or even substantially alleviate the controdictions of Chinese society revealed by the cultural revolution is now beyond all dispute. The political struggle that has broken out so soon after the death of Chou En-lai has so far remained largely on the level of the bureaucracy. The death of Mao, however, will signal the end of a historical period and will lead eventually to an explosion of pent-up social tensions. In such a situation, the emergence of groups and sectors of society mobilized independently of the bureaucracy will be of decisive importance. March 10, 1976
13
OF THE FIRST CONGRESS
CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY
BALANCE-SHEET OF THE A party