Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Panama: The Hour of Definition

· Inprecor no. 45, 4 March 1976 · pp 35-39 · 3,224 words

Latin America United States Cuba Armed forces and soldiers

DEFINITION

Created in 1903 as a result of an armed intervention by the United States, the Republic of Panama is more dependent on U.S. Imperialism than any other country in Latin America, if not in the entire world. Historically, the fate of Panama has always been fied to the existence of the canal, for the Hay-Buneau-Varilla Treaty, which authorized the United States to construct the canal and control the canal zone, came only a few days after Panama's secession from Colombia, Even today, the entire economic activity of the country is tightly linked to the canal. In fact, of the nearly 2 million people who inhabit the country's 75, 650 square kilometers, half are concentrated in the area of the canal, as is 80 percent of trade and 70 percent of industry -The rate of U.S. investment per capita in Panama is the highest in Latin America: $93 (the average rate throughout the continent is S50). And this figure does not include investment in the "canal zone, " where the per capita investment rate reaches $5, 6801 Although Panama has experienced the greatest economic growth of any Latin Americon country during the past ten years - 8 percent per year — this growth actually conceals increasing dependence, as is shown, among other things, by the fact that the debt of the public sector has reached 51, 000 million; if the debt of the private sector is taken into account, the national debt exceeds 51, 500 million. And this in a cour-try whose

PANAMA: by GERARDO SOLORZANO gross national product is 51,000 million. The situation is thus extremely serious. Imperialist military presence Since its creation, Panama has played a decisive role in imperialist strategy throughout the Latin American continent. In fact, in the Hay-Buneau-Varilla Treaty, which was signed on November 18, 1903, Panama ceded to the United States "in perpetuity" a ten-mile-wide strip for the maintenance, functioning, preservation, and protection of the canal. The United States rapidly moved to use the "canal zone" for other purposes and to control not only the canal but also the country itself. There have been many North American interventions into the political life of the country, particularly armed interventions: 1921, 1925, 1958, 1959, and 1964. But the American presence in the canal zone not only allows the United States to control the country economically and militarily; it also allows Washington to exercise close surveillance over the entire Latin American continent. The troops that collaborated in the overthrow of various governments in Central America (Nicaragua, Guatemala) left from bases in Panama. The "special forces" that collaborated with the Bolivian army in hunting down Che Guevara's guerrillas in Bolivia in 1967 and who fomented the coup in Chile in 1973 left from Panama. For all these activities, the United States has stationed more than 15,000 soldiers

35

PANAMA

(and 30,000 civilians) in the territory under its control; they are divided among the fourteen military bases that line the canal. In fact, 70 percent of the territory controlled by the Americans is occupied by military bases, and total U.S. military investment since their installation in the "canal zone" exceeds $5, 000 million.

It is in the canal zone that we find, among other things, the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA), better known under the name School of the Americas.

As of 1973, this "school, " established in the Fort Gulick base, had trained a total of 29, 328 soldiers of

Latin American armies (see table). As of the same year, more than 170 "graduates" of the School of the Americas were heads of state, ministers, generals, or chiefs of the secret services in their respective countries.

"School of the Americas" (USARSA) Aid* to Latin American Armies

(from its foundation in T946 to March 1973)

Number of

Country

Students

Argentina

565

Bolivia

2,679

Brazil

340

Chile

1,261

Colombia

2,105

Costa Rica

1,193

Cuba

291

Dominican Republic

804

Ecuador

2,373

El Salvador

773

Guatemala

1,366

Haiti

50

Honduras

1,726

Mexico

240

Nicaragua

4,119

Panama

2,472

Paraguay

844

1,907

Pero

Uruguay

647

Venezuela

2,846

TOTAL

29,328

*Figures of the USARSA

The school is divided into four departments: Command

Department (which trains military commanders and general staffs), Operations Department (civic action, counter-insurgency, jungle warfare), Logistics Department

(secret services, military police, medical aid, and supplies), and Technical Department. Pinochet, Leigh and company, among others, were trained in this school.(1) Fort Gulick is also headquarters for more than 1,000 members of the Eighth Special Action Forces, better known under the name Green Berets.

Also located in the "canal zone, " at Quarry Heights, is the headquarters of the United States Southern Command (Southcom), which is charged with coordinating

36 all military and secret service activity and with supervising all North American military aid programs in Latin

America, The Inter-American Air Force Academy, established in 1943, is located at Albrook Air Base, the U.S. Army Jungle Warfare School is at Fort Sherman, and the Cartographic School of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey (LAGS), which trains specialists in cartography useful in counterinsurgency, is at Fort Clayton. These are only a few examples of what the American presence in Panamanian territory represents for the United States military. Renegotiation of dependence The problem of the canal has been decisive throughout the history of relations between the United States and Panama. The various bourgeois governments that have successively held power in Panama since 1903 have always utilized the struggle for Panam nian sovereignty over the "canal zone" as a means of maintaining their leadership in the country, Thus, the revisions of the 1903 treaty made by the Arias-Roosevelt Treaty (1936) and the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty (1955) represented nothing but means by which the Panamanian ruling classes diverted attention from the exploitation to which the working classes of the country are subject and obtained from imperialism greater participation in the exploitation of the canal, the only beneficiaries of which were the ruling classes of both countries. Through their popular organizations the Panamanian masses have always fought against the foreign military presence on their soil. These struggles have always been emptied of their content by the collaboration of the Panamanian ruling classes with imperialism. The events of January 9-12, 1964, during which twenty-two Panamanians were killed by American bullets and more than 500 were wounded, were the product of the rise of popular struggles that had been brewing for many years and of the disappointed hopes of recovering the canal. The only immediate result of these events was the opening of new negotiations with the United States over the problem of the canal. The outcome of these negotiations was the draft treaty of 1967, which was rejected by the Panamanian government under popular pressure, for it maintained the presence of the United States and its control over the canal in other forms. The failure of the negotiations and the deterioration of the political situation within the Panamanian bourgeoisie led to the military government in 1968; this government took up where the previous bourgeois governments had left off on the subject of recovery of the canal. In fact, the millitary government had made the problem of the canal its hobby horse in maintaining power and winning support among the popular masses on the basis of the anti-Yankeeism that has always been deeply felt by the masses. Thus, the Torrijos regime lent a new spirit to the international policy of the Panamanian state, making the problem of the canal

its driving lance in international bodies and organizations. The aim: Make the United States concede greater Panamanian participation in all matters concerning the canal. This nationalist position, typical of the military reformist regimes, allowed the Torrijos government to lend itself the image of a progressive regime among internafional public opinion, going so far as to call itself "revolutionary.* Is there any need to demonstrate that it was in fact nothing of the kind, despite the sanction given it by Cuba? US INFANTEYMEN RETURN TO BARRACKS IN CANAL ZONE AFTER EXERCISES Military "reformism" Brought to power in 1968 through a coup that overthrew the government of Arnulfo Arias (representative of the interests of the traditional oligarchy), which had been installed only eleven days before (in October), the officers had taken advantage of the crisis of hegemony of the local bourgeoisie. The repression against the progressive popular groups was not long in coming: the student movement, the trade unions, and especially the entire class of toilers became targets of persecution. During the first year of the military government, arrests, deportations, and disappearances of leaders of left organizations reached their height. Then, during the period 1970-71, with the adoption of the strategy of the military reformist regimes, the National Guard (the armed forces of the country fried to become an instrument of social and political reorganization. To do this the National Guard was compelled to alter its relations with the various political sectors of the country and felt the need to incorporate some of them into the govemment. At the end of 1970 the Military Junto established relatively close relations with the Partido del Pueblo Panameño (PPP - Party of the Panamanian People, the pro-Moscow Communist party) within the framework of a thought-out policy of neutralizing the popular masses, an organized and disciplined sector of which was represented by the PPP. And in fact, the accord between the officers and the PPP had the anticipated effect of demobilization. It practically, although temporarily, put an end to the popular resistance to the military regime that had been provoked by the government's policy during the first year after the coup. The

"guerrilla" movements were eliminated and the major cadres of the MLN-29-X1 were forced into exile. (2) Thus, the National Guard tried to establish an economic and political program corresponding to the role the international division of labor accords Panama as a fransit zone and as an economy that has historically developed on the basis of supply of services and financial circulation. The ground was cleared for making Panama an international financial center (3), for "modernizing" the structures of national production within the framework of "developmentism" (desarrollismo). The most aggressive capifalist sector was favored to the detriment of the traditional sectors. This situation favored the sectors in which work is not very stable and simultaneously weakened the labor force used for temporary work. Capital investments were oriented toward the most dynamic sectors, while at the same time a new labor code permitted an increase in the number of members of the trade unions, within which the state exercised a more direct control. The relationship of forces favorable to this operation was maintained by the influx of capital into the country The nationalist policy of the military regime led by General Omar Torrijos corresponds to the new relationship of forces structured around the crisis of hegemony of the ruling class. The realization of the reformist project requires a popular base; the government was to build its popular support on two pillars: First, a broad mass of peasants, dispersed, lacking in political organization, and without any class program. The organization was created by the government in 1972 with the formation of the Asamblea de Representantes de Corregimientos (Assembly of Corregimientos Representatives). (4) Second, a well-defined party organization (the PPP) that controls the leading workers cadres in work centers of relatively low productivity. The petty-bourgeois origin of the PPP leaders facilitated the party's relations with sectors such as the state bureaucracy or the intellectual and student milleu. Role of the student movement The student movement is one of the most active sectors on the political scene. In fact, there has been a tradition of student struggle in Panama for several years. This classic manifestation of the petty bourgeoisie is linked to the problems inherent in a society with an "underdeveloped" economy and a dependent political structure. At certain times, all the contradictions of society may be summed up in the mass of students. During the years 1972-75 the student movement did not go through a strong development. This was due both to the repression if suffered during the early years of the regime and to the profound division caused by the dynamic stimulated by the most "modernist" sectors of the dependent bourgeoisie.

PANAMA The bourgeoisie's project was implemented by the govemment by basing itself on the student sector grouped around the Federac ión de Estudiantes de Panamá (FEP - Student Federation of Panama), controlled by the PPP. The FEP was charged with mobilizing support for the class project of the bourgeoisie in accordance with the pact established at the end of 1970. Nevertheless, in September 1974 the leadership of the FEP abandoned the PPP. Since then, it has increasingly become an organization in the service of the military regime and hence in the service of the interests of the bourgeoisie. Its unconditional support to the government led it to leave the contradiction that defines c lass relations under capitalist society out of its analysis. By rejecting this fundamental and-classic contradiction, it sought to justify its new positions by identifying new enemies. These new enemies were not class enemies but rather enemies of the "revolutionary process directed by General Torrijos, " an abstraction that seeks to establish a false relation between the real and the concrete. Their tactical alliance with one faction of the ruling class became an alliance with the strategic objectives of that faction. Repression begins With the first serious signs of political crisis - no treaty with the United States, 25 percent increase in the cost of living, international economic crisis - the reaction of the ruling sectors was directed against those sectors that appeared most critical of the regime: the class enemies of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the most coherently manifested expressions of critical sectors did not appear among the organizations of the working class itself. The organization of the proletariat is a permanent process and its contradictions are not resolved so long as class society is not liquidated. In the context of this process, what the groups with fascist tendencies (such as the leadership of the FEP) proposed was the destruction of groupings critical of the regime and capable of giving an impetus to the class organization that would counterpose socialist revolution to reactionary violence. They attacked the organizations that, despite many difficulties, were working with the exploited classes in their battle to organize themselves politically. Hence their repeated attacks on the organizations active at the university (especially in the law school) and certain high schools (Instituto Nacional, for example) in the struggle for a crifical, combative, and independent student movement. (5) Hence also their aftacks on the communication media that identified with popular struggles and all those who were acting in defense of the interests of the working class in one form or another. And we must not overlook their armed attack against militants of the PPP last October.

But the real interests of the working class are not modi-

Fied by the rightist deviations of the FEP and the PPP. 38

In spite of its relative weakness - a weakness that in the final analysis will not prevent it from being the motor force of the new society that will overcome the contradictions of class society — the working class gains strength in its struggle against the enemies it confronts in the course of its movement toward final emancipation. These enemies have been able to develop thanks to the interests of other classes that obscure the perspective of the working class and thanks to the absence of analyses of concrete situations, which leads to dogmatism and sectarianism and sometimes to the most aberrant opportunism. The bourgeoisie has fortified its strategy through its policy of military reformism. Because of the Bonapartism of the regime, the class struggle is masked by a policy of anti-imperialist demagogy, while af the same time capitalism increasingly penetrates into the very heart of Panamanian society. The historic struggle of the Parecovery. " Under the slogan of national unity the Bonanist party, tries at all costs to control the rise of struggles that in the final analysis result from an economic and social policy that increasingly strikes at the exploited classes and from the failure to reach a treaty with the United States on the question of the canal. On this subject it must be recalled that while the revolutionary organizations put forward the slogan of the total withdrawal of American military bases, the Bonapartist regime and the CP agree to the maintenance of three of these bases. Among the revolutionary organizations that have emerged from the rise of struggles, the Fracción Socialista Revolucionaria (FSR - Revolutionary Socialist Faction), o Trotskyist organization that arose in May 1975, is struggling for the development of a revolutionary vanguard on the basis of anticapitalism and anti-imperialism with a view toward the construction of a revolutionary party as an instrument of struggle for the overthrow of the capitalist system. The FSR, which came out of the student sector, has since developed its interventions among the workers, which has lent it an important role within the revolutionary vanguard in Panama. It recently held its first congress (in February), during which it adopted the name Liga Socialista Revolucionaria (LSR) and decided on the principle of affiliating to the Fourth International. The analysis made by the comrades of the LSR during their congress draws attention to the rightist turn now being made by the Bonapartist regime under its guise of left nationalism and to the repression that threatens to fall on Panamanian revolutionaries during coming months. We call upon revolutionary Marxists throughout the world to support the struggle of the Panamanian people for national and social liberation and to respond with active solidarity to any attack against the democratic rights of the workers and revolutionary organizations in Panama.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Six of the officers who carried out the September 1973 coup in Chile had graduated from the School of the Americas with the highest grades: the director of intelligence services, and the commanders of the second infantry division, the logistical support division of Santiago, the third infantry division of Concepción, the engineering school of Tejas Verdes, and the school of troops and special forces of Santiago (see New York Times, October 23, 1973). In addition, the four leaders of the junta received military training both in the United States and in the canal zone (see Newsweek, November 24, 1973).

2. MLN-29-X1: Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-29 de Noviembre - National Liberation Movement-November 29, an organization that came out of the fusion of several groups that had left the PPP in 1962; it fought the military regime for two years, using both urban and rural guerrilla warfare.

3. It should be pointed out that the currency in Panama is the American dollar. In addition, let us note that there are eighty-two foreign banks in Panama today.

4. The Republic of Panama is divided into nine provinces and one comarque (an administrative unit including several islands). Each province is divided into districh (there are sixty-four of these in all) and these are divided into corregimientos (which are sorts of municipalities). There are a total of 505 corregimientos in the country, and each has a representative in the Assembly.

5. These organizations are: Circulo Camilo Torres (CCT - Camilo Torres Circle); Guaykucho; Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER - Revolutionary Student Front): Fracción Socialista Revolucionaria (FSR — Revolutionary Socialist Faction).

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