There is an Issa proverb that says: Even the jackal makes out his will before traveling across this country As the last place in Africa still ruled by French colonialism, the French Territory of Afars and Issas (FTAI) may look like a shocking anachronism in 1976(1) A hopelessly arid land of 23, 000 square kilometers with 130, -000 inhabitants, 85,000 of whom live in the city of Djibouti - that is the primary and decisive feature of this French colony. In reality, this demographic concentration in the main city constitutes one of the particular features that determine the social and political questions of the territory. Apart from its function as a part, Djibouti also has an international airport and is the terminal of a railway that links Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, to the sea; the railway is the decisive axis of the Ethiopian economy. In addition to this economic dimension, Djibouti and the FTAl represent a linchpin for French imperialism in its strategic aims in the region relating to the Indian Ocean, the Arabion peninsula, the route of the oil tankers from the ArabIranian Gulf, and the Red Sea. In spite of its desire to oversee half the planet from Djibouti, French colonialism has nonetheless managed to survive here only by dint of the most sordid tricks, the most important of which remain border rivalries and the ethnic fragmentation of this region of East Africa. During the nineteenth century, taking advantage of the opening of the Suez Canal, France hoped to make the port of Diibouti a rival of Aden. But this remained a pretenfious ambition. At the time of the arrival of the French, there were two ethnic groups in this region: the Afars, or Danakil, in the North and West (about three-fourths of the territory) and the Issas (a group related to Somali ethnic groups) in the South. The Afars and Issas had long been Muslims. Both groups are essentially nomadic and are assembled in "tribes" that are
DJIBOUTI • TURBULENT FUTURE by C. GABRIEL sorts of family clans. Nevertheless, the social organization and the relations among "tribes" varied among the two ethnic groups. (2) Almost exclusively engaged in pastoral activities, these populations did not satisfy French colonialism's need for a work force, particularly for the construction of the railway (1897-1917) and the port. This work was done partly by Arab workers from Yemen and Aden and above all by Somalis of the Issac group, which originates from what was then British Somaliland. This situation was quite favorable to French colonalism's policy of division. Moreover, the Afars and Issas were not restricted to the lands of the FTAI. There are about 250, 000 Afars in all, four-fifths of whom live in Ethiopia. All the Afar people, whether they live in Ethiopia or the FTAl, have their own internal structures, among which are the nineteen "great sultanates." The FTAl includes the sultanates of Tadjoura and Gobard, as well as part of the sultanates of Aoussa and Raheita. Afar society is very rigorously stratified into "age classes" within which certain tribes and notables are dominant. The Issas, on the other hand, belong to the larger, Somali group. The political unification of the great majority of this group was not realized until 1960, when the Republic of Somalia was created. Superficially, it can be admitted that the cohesion of the Somali group is weaker than that of the Afars. The Somali portion of the Issas tend their flocks in the FTAl as well as in Ethiopia and Somalia. When the borders were drawn between Ethiopia and the French and British colonies during the nineteenth century, the real interests of these populations were not at all taken into account. Neither the areas of human travel nor the limits of the sultanates were respected. Hence was born a profound resentment among the populations and a terrible confusion of ethnic and political questions.
DJIBOUTI The presence in Djibouti of a strong contingent of Arabs stimulated discontent among those people on the fringes of Afar or Issa nomadism who aspired to live on the resources of the port. Issa petitions were addressed to the governor demanding the withdrawal of foreigners, mainly Arabs. Before the second world war, the Arabs controlled a good part of port real estate. In 1946 the first representative council was "elected." Four Afars, three Arabs, and three Somalis, only one of whom was Issa, were members of the indigenous body. That same year, a Somali of the Gadaboursi group, which originates from then British Somaliland, was sent to the Council of the Republic as a representative of the territory. This situation fostered conflict between the Issas and other Somalis, while also creating the illusion that there was a community of interests of Afars and Issas against "foreigners. " Thus, a Club of Somali and Danakil Youth was formed in 1946; its slogan was "land to the Issas and Danakil (Afars). Its leader was Mahmoud Harbi, along with Hassan Gouled, the present head of the opposition, and Ali Aref Bourhan (an Afar), the present president of the council and a stooge of France. In 1950 an election was held; beforehand, the Issas had convinced Paris to redraw the electoral lines in such a way as to definitively weaken the representation of Arabs and non-Issa Somalis. Issa notables were then able to dominate the whole of indigenous political life. In 1953 Hassan Gouled (on Issa) was elected councillor of the republic, and in 1957 Mahmoud Harbi became first vice-president of the government council. Nevertheless, in 1958 when de Gaulle proposed his famous referendum on the French Community, Harbi campaigned for a "no" vote and waged a battle for independence. His appeal won only about 25 percent of the vote in a country in which electoral trickery is a permanent institution and a good part of the tribal notables cast votes for their entire family and clans. Moreover, (and this was a result of this very factor), a majority of Afars voted "yes." The French government later dissolved the territorial assembly and promulgated a new election law reducing the weight of the Issas. The adminisfration threw itself into a campaign to attract the Afars, who were still not very numerous in the city of Djibouti, and in 1959 it was an Afar, Ahmed Dini, who acceded to the post of vice president of the council; in 1960, another Afar,
Ali Aref, took over the post. In 1963 yet another new electoral law further strengthened the representation of the Afars in the territorial assembly. The colonial administration reigned as master in close liaison with the Afar chiefs and notables.
French identity cards were denied to some Issas on the most miserable pretexts of administrative processing.
This situation, aggravated by nomadism, led to an absurd imbroglio in which brother and sister had different nationalities and thus not the same rights. Young Issas who had always lived in the FTAl were refused French nationality and were thus denied any jobs in the administration, the essential sector of salaried Tabor. This mass of unemployed youth constituted the turbulent sector of a poverty-stricken urban population. Discontent was generally diverted by the fact that the French administration on the whole accorded French nationality and electoral rights to the great mass of Afars, even those who had lived in Ethiopia. Thus, conflict between the two ethnic groups, a genuine diversion of the masses, was liable to break out at any moment. This was topped off by the effects of the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, the widespreod corruption of indigenous leaders, and so on. When it was announced that de Gaulle would visit the territory in August 1966, a secret opposition committee including both Issas and some oppositional Afars was founded. While en route to Phnom Penh, where he was preparing to give the United States some lessons in decolonization, de Gaulle stopped in Djibouti, where he witnessed a murderous riot during which the demonstrating population was machine-gunned by colonial troops. One month later, the French government decided to propose a "referendum" on the future of the territory. The usual trading in influence, trickery, and the policy of attracting the Afar chiefs produced the usual results: The referendum came down to a simple arithmetical operation, the manipulated Afar group giving a victory to the "yes" vote. One figure sheds a good deal of light on these assertions: between 1958 and 1965 the Somali electorate increased 55 percent, while the Afar electorate increased 197 percent! Following the referendum, the indigenous political team led by All Aref stabilized its power to some extent, Ir went so far as to publicly call for the expulsion of all Somalis from public and private employment. Thus, the
1,200 Somall dockers were replaced by Afar workers. Somalis who had not immediately returned to their jobs in the administration after the referendum were laid off. And, in the supreme note of irony, the territory changed its name: It was no longer called "French Somaliland, "but instead "the Territory of Afars and Issas. "
The council elected in July 1967 included two Issa ministers.
Nevertheless, this terrible ethnic antagonism could not be maintained unfailingly as sedentarization and urbanization grew in Djibouti, as Somalia and Ethiopia bolstered the centralizing power of their state apparatuses, as poverty and repression remained the common lot of the populations. The opposition between the two groups must be interpreted in the light of objective facts. The
French presence, which created a centralizing administration, halted the clan war and placed all clans under the same tutelage, while still basing itself on the subjective rivalries and interests of the notables. French favors were successively bestowed upon the Arab and
Somali outsiders at the time of the construction of the railway, on the Issas from the end of the second world war until 1958, and on the Afars since that time. The period is now favorable to the emergence on the political scene of new generations of Afars and Issas, anti-
Massaua in Red Sea SUDAN Addis Ababa KENYA colonialist and ready to merge themselves into a common crucible of struggle. An agitated region The ethnic questions that partially fueled political life in the French Territory of Afars and Issas constitute but a sample of the incredible national and ethnic imbroglio of this whole region of Africa, and especially Ethiopia and Somalia. Obviously, the problem of borders relates above all to the battle over the division of economic resources. In 1952 the United Nations granted Ethiopia permission to attach Eritrea to its territory in the form of a federation, a decision that in 1962 was converted into a colonial and purely and simply repressive annexation. The ports of Massaua and Assab (in Eritrea) represent not unimportant props for Ethiopian trade. Nonetheless, for various reasons these ports are not af all prepared for significant investment. That is why Djibouti, linked to Addis Ababa since 1917, remains the essential outlet to the sea for the Ethiopian economy. Since the railway was completed, the future of the French Territory of Afars and Issas has virtually constituted an element of internal politics in Ethiopia. The railway became an Ethiopian company in 1959 and its headquarters was transferred to Addis Ababa. In the last analysis, Ethiopia can consider the French presence as a guarantee for its own interests.
FTAI= French YEMEN ERITREA Territory of
Afars and Issas Assab Aden Gulf of Aden FTAI. Djibouti
SOMALIA Ogaden ETHIOPIA Things are of the same order from the Somali standpoint. In 1941 British Minister Lord Bevin raised the idea of • "Greater Somalia" assembling all the Somali ethnic groups scattered among Kenya, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Ogaden, British Somaliland, and Djibouti into a British protectorate. This idea was later taken up by Somali nationalist circles. In 1960, after the creation of the Republic of Somalia, which unified the Italian and British ex-colonies, these aspirations were used by the new state to bolster its credibility among the populations. Tension in the region increased rapidly. In 1963 and 1964 there were sharp clashes between the Ethiopian and Somali armies. An intervention by the Organization of African Unity in 1967 rendered the conflict more discreet. Somalia, a country of three million inhabitants, has only a small army and could not oppose the Ethiopian army, which is aided and trained by the United States and Israel. This situation later evolved. The Mogadiscio regime (Somalia) made a diplomatic turn toward the Soviet Union, obtaining enough military aid so that before the outbreak of the Angolan crisis, Somalia was the second largest customer for Soviet arms in Africa, after Egypt. With the announcement of a possible change in status for the French Territory of Afars and Issas, the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia heated up again. Ethiopia, which insists on denying the existence of the Eritrean nation and which is clinging to Ogaden, the
5
DJIBOUTI subsoil of which contains oil, now stands very close to French policy. For its part, Somalia is exhibiting firmness, relying on African diplomacy, which in its majority favors independence for the FTAI. The time of decolonization Portuguese decolonization and the departure of the Spanish from West Sahara makes France the last colonial power in Africa. Since the announcement of the independence of the Portuguese colonies, it has become obvious that Paris connot remain silent about the status of the FTAI. Most of the African states, even those that are closely linked to French imperialism, have turned toward support for the project of independence for Djibouti. At this time, the Ligue Populaire Africaine pour 'Independence (LPAl — African People's League for Independence), led by Hassan Gouled, came forward in the opposition. Ali Aref, a corrupt small-time politician who sees himself as a genuine feudal potentate, began suggesting that the LPAl represented nothing and was only a den of dangerous agitators funded by foreigners (presumably Somalis). The French government, essentially seeking to preserve its own interests, Initially put pressure on Ali Aref to at least hold out the possibility of a dialogue with the LPAI. A real weathervane, Ali Aref was the warmest advocate of remaining in the French Republic until the French govemment itself began to speak of a "process leading to independence." On May 22, 1975, Olivier Stir, French colonial minister, received some representatives of the LPAl, thus recognizing the representativity of the group. On September 12, 1975, reporting on an interview he had had with French President Giscard d'Estaing, Ali Aref stated: "In the future, our ambition is to peacefully integrate ourselves into the concert of nations which form our environment and with which we feel the need to cooperate fraternally and loyally. We are going to make new contacts abroad, in particular with the Organization of African Unity, with a view toward preparing the final stage in our political evolution. Nevertheless, this outward appearance on the part of the French government and Ali Aref does nof represent an abandoning of imperialist claims. The French army and police lose no opportunity to harass and imprison the militants of the LPAl or to repress the populations. On December 29, 1976, Ali Aref affirmed that Djibouti's accession to independence was irreversible. "The majority of the population, 90 percent of them, " he said, We want a military and economic guarantee from France "want this independence, but not at any price.. as well as a guarantee from the AU that our borders will be respected. " He further asked for the maintenance of a French military base, stressing that this military presence would not only guarantee the integrity of Djibouti but would also preserve equilibrium and peace in the region. Ethiopia and Somalia have since recognized the territory and have renounced any annexation, but Somalia has protested vigorously against a "neocolonial project" that would maintain an imperialist military threat on Its borders. The opposition In February 1972 the Union Populaire Africaine (African People's Union), an organization with a large issa majority, led by Hassan Gouled, Fused with the Ligue pour l'Avenir et l'Ordre (League for the Future and Order), which included Afars around Ahmed Dini Ahmed who opposed Ali Aref. The new group took the name Ligue Populaire Africaine (African People's League). Until 1973, this organization concentrated essentially on making electoral gains. But on the occasion of a decree of the Constitutional Council on November 28, 1973, sanctioning a policy of electoral fraud, it decided to give up any electoral competition. In February 1975 the group Action pour la Justice et le Progrès (Action for Justice and Progress), a pro-Giscard formation (1), joined the League. After that, the African People's League adopted the name Ligue Populaire Africaine pour ['Independence (African People's League for Independence). Since November 1974, Hassan Gouled had been waging a campaign for negotiated independence. The LPAl has won recognition from bath the OAU and the Arab League. In France, the LPAl is supported and aided by the reformist opposition, mainly the Socialist party, to which the LPAl seems closely linked. The LPAl constitutes a peculiar political formation. Although led by a team certain of whose members (such as Hossan Gouled) are dubious old politicians, it now rests on a genuine interethnic mass base, which lends it the role of a quasimass organization in the suburbs of Djibouti. Neither of the two armed groups, both of which are based abroad, can claim such a base. The Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS - Somali Coast Liberation Front), which was responsible for the kidnapping of about thirty French children from a schoolbus, is generally under the influence of the Somall government. This influence may intensify if we are to believe the current rumors that the group's former leader is now in prison in Mogodiscio and that he has been replaced by a successor who is closer to Somali positions. As for the Movement de Libération de Djibouti (Djibouti Liberation Movement), which is supported and aided by Ethiopia, it has now been reduced to issuing appeals that conform to the pro-French policy of Addis Ababa. For the immediate future one thing is certain: The French government will not be able to avoid a dialogue, even if indirect, with the LPAl. This organization, reformist, would most likely be satisfied with a liberal program. In addition, generally speaking, the geographical and social configuration of the French Territory of Afars and Issas broadly limits the possibilities for a guerrilla campaign waged through infiltration. The overall situa-
tion is determined by what happens in Djibouti, and only an organization deeply implanted among the urban population will be able to assert itself against the colonial power. The crisis of French imperialism In spite of the current concessions and operations, the French government's attitude toward Djibouti more generally goes back to imperialist policy throughout this region and particularly in the islands of the Indian Ocean. The repression is as important as the strategic interests involved. Djibouti is a military garrison of about 7, 000 men since the latest events. In "normal times" about 6,000 soldiers are stationed there, along with a squadron of F-100 combat aircraft, some troop transport forces and helicopters, and a naval force. This apparatus is integrated into the French military array in the Indian Ocean, along with the island of Réunion (2, 000 men) and the island of Mayotte. Since the situation in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) has resulted in the withdrawal of French troops from that country, Djibouti has become the decisive nub of this whole apparatus. Because of this and because of the independence of the Comoro Islands, the French government has relied on the bourgeoisie of the island of Mayotte to provoke a spontaneous "self-determination" of the populations of this island in favor of remaining French. All this represents one aspect of imperialist repression. The other aspect is even more sordid. After the riots of 1966, an electrified barbed-wire barricade, reinforced by a minefield and watched from above by observation towers, was constructed around the city. This barricade isolates the capital from the rest of the territory. The aim is to prevent thousands of Issas who were expelled from the city in 1966 from returning. To get through the barricade you have to be white or else be able to prove French nationality. The troops regularly open fire on people trying to pass through. Legally, these deaths are identified as "accidental. " In June 1968 Omar Osman Mabeh, head of the opposition, was sentenced to death on charges of having committed an attack. (3) More than half of the jury designated to try him were Europeans, and not just any old Europeans. Included were the director of the industrial credit national bank, the director of Shell, a large importer, the director of maritime shipping, and the head of general affairs for the colonial administration. Up to now, Ali Aref has been able to maneuver, He has received implicit support from Ethiopia in exchange for strangling the rebellion of Sultan Ali Mirah, an Afar chief, against the authority of the Ethiopian state. In addition, he has been content to reject the LPAl as "nothing but foreign agents" linked to Somalia. But the crisis of French colonialism is not limited to the small territory of Djibouti, and the French bourgeoisie consequently finds itself compelled to make compromises in order to dam up a process that would eventually threaten the island of Réunion and the Antilles.
Although the economic crisis has been extremely tragic for the French Territory of Afars and Issas, Ali Aref has been content to assert that the economic situation is rather healthy and to add, "My chauffeur makes more than a Somali general. " (Agence France-Presse, January 20) Can such a puppet serve for very long as the main political tool of the French government? On February 23 Ethiopia let it be known that it would favor an agreement between All Aref and the LPAI. Effectively, the new Ethiopian regime is confronted by a centrifugal process throughout its entire territory. The armed struggle in Eritrea has enabled the People's Liberation Forces and the Eritrean Liberation Front to gain control of the countryside and penetrate the cities. The government's "agrarian reform" has driven the feudalists to rebel against the regime and galvanized the peasant masses to struggle for deeper reforms. The Afars led by Ali Mirah are in rebellion, Somalia has laid claim to Ogaden, and so on. Since Ethiopia is a basic axis of imperialist strategy in eastern Africa and since the Djibouti affair constitutes a credibility test for the local regimes, it is understandable that French colonialism should assume an important task in maintaining the equilibrium of the imperialist system as a whole. The demand for the immediate independence of the French Territory of Afars and Issas, with the complete and unconditional withdrawal of French troops, must be a central slogan for the French workers movement. On February 10, 1976, in an action revealing of both the crisis in the army and the crisis of imperialism, a soldiers' committee at a French air base published a communiqué denouncing the sending of draftees to Djibouti. This communiqué declared, among other things, "We are not destined to serve French imperialism. and to repress a people struggling for their independence. •.. The soldiers' committee calls for support to the struggle of the Afar and Issa peoples for their independence." That is an example that should be followed. February 25, 1976 FOOTNOTES:
1. As far as off-continent Africa is concerned, France also maintains its domination over the island of Réunion and the island of Mayotte in the Comoro archipelago.
2. Of the 130,000 inhabitants of the FTAl today, there are about 11,000 Europeans, 8,000 Arabs, 50,000 Afars, and 60,000 Somalis, of which 45, 000 belong to the Issa groups, and 15,000 to the Gadabouri, Issag, and Darod groups. But not all these people benefit from "French nationality." Thus, there are 3,000 "French citizens" among the Arabs, 47, 000 among the Afars, 24,000 cmong the Issas, and 6,000 among the other Somali groups.
3. Pardoned, he was released in March 1975 under the pressure of a FLS commando group that had taken the French ambassador to Somalia as a hostage.
7
France is no exception among the various capitalist countries that have entered the long period of recession that has been analyzed in several issues of INPRECOR Thus, in spite of a recession and an exceptional volume of unemployment, inflation has continued at a high rate and, even though the upturn has barely begun, prices are soaring again and the balance of payments is worsening. Although the upturn will inevitably be a weak one, the workers will insist on making up what they have lost during two years of recession. The resolution of the contradictions accumulated during thirty years of capitalist expansion does not lie behind us but well ahead of us. It implies notably intensified inter-imperialist competition and above all increasingly severe confrontations between capital and labor. In spite of the significant development of industrial restructuring and investment that occurred under de Gaulle and Pompidou, the French apparatus of production and distribution remains relatively less concentrated than that of the major competitors of France. This is a severe handicap in French capitalism's asserting itself in the new international division of labor. Big capital ought to have every interest in transforming as rapidly os possible through regroupments and eliminations the large contingent of small shops, companies, and commercial establishments that are incapable of functioning at competifive costs and that stimulate inflation significantly. But this sector weighed too heavily in the dangerously low 51 percent of the vote received by Giscard d'Estaing in the 1974 presidential elections to be attacked too sharply. Moreover, the most conservative wing of the large employers hopes to utilize the Poujadist mobilization traditions of these layers in order to exert pressure against the reformist inclinations of some employers and the government. Thus, combat employers like F. Michelin, Joly (Babcock), Pinet (Industries Méchaniques of the Parisian region) have joined the political-professional movement of PME (small and middle-sized enterprises), the UNICER formed by Léon Gingembre, president of the PME. The employers and the government have to confront a workers movement seasoned by May 1968 and the exemplary struggles of recent years. They have fittle hope of winning a German-style contract for "social peace" from the workers and their major organizations. Moreover, the workers are that much less inclined to accept any "sacred union" during this crisis, since the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left, an electoral bloc of the Communist and Socialist parties) seems to them to be prepared, despite its difficulties, to take over from a policy that has been discredited. At the same time, a wind of liberalization, if not dissent, is blowing in all the institutions that have remained particularly ossified in