Timor (UDT), created by indigenous functionaries of the colonial administration, soon rallied behind its program the traditional village chiefs, the coffee planters, and the Chinese comprador
DECLARATION OF THE
UNITED SECRETARIAT
OF THE
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL bourgeoisie that dominated the island's trade. Its objective: the long-term independence of the colony within the framework of a federation with Portugal, a direct echo of Spinola's neocolonial project. The Democratic Association of the People of Timor (APODET) called for the attachment of this eastern part of the island to the Indonesian state. The western part of Timor had already been annexed to the Indonesian state at the end of the second world war, when Indonesia won its independence. APODETI, which expresses the political and economic interests of the Indonesian dictatorship, lacks any social base in this country, where the Indonesian language is less widely spoken than Portuguese. The APODET is maintained by subsidies from Djakarta. The Social Democratic Association of Timor (AST)
25
TIMOR emerged after the first victorious strike of the employees of the colonial administration. In September 1974 it transformed itself into the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). Lacking local political traditions, the intellectuals who founded this front drew their essential political references from the models provided by the African liberation movements against Portuguese colonialism: FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC. Calling for immediate and total independence, FRETILIN was initially based mainly on urban layers, but it soon acquired an influence in the villages, particularly because of the intervention of its literacy brigades and the politicization campaigns it conducted in the major local language, Tetum, as well as the aid granted to peasants in creating cooperatives. On November 28, 1975, FRETILIN proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.
And on December 7 Indonesian troops invaded the new state. In several hours they imposed their control over the capital, Dili. But they were not able to extend this control over more than one-third of the territory. The FRETILIN popular militias threw themselves into a protracted struggle against the forces of the Indonesian military dictatorship. Beyond the confrontation in Timor itself, it is neocolonial order in this region of Asia that has been challenged. The fall of Spínola and the Indonesian intervention led the UDT to demand independence. If then formed a coalition with FRETILIN for several months, hoping in this way to block the extension of FRETILIN's influence. Under the impact of the successes of FRETILIN, the pressure of the Australian and American secret services, and the pressure of oil companies looking for deposits, this alliance broke down in June 1975. On August 10, 1975, acting with the complicity of the Portuguese coIonial administration, the UDT fomented a coup in an attempt to annihilate FRETILIN. But FRETILIN was then joined by the majority of the Timoran soldiers of the colonial army. In September this period of civil war led to the victory of FRETILIN, the Chinese merchants and the Portuguese colonial authorities leaving the island. Subsequently, there was a regroupment of political forces favoring the passage of East Timor under the hegemony of the Indonesian dictatorship. The remnants of the UDT allied with the APODETI. From their bases on the Indonesian side of the border, they tried to organize incursions into the zones controlled by FRETILIN, with the material and military support of Djakarta. The Indonesian dictatorship took serious measures to assure their success, and Ali Murtupo, the chief of Bakin (the secret police), was named "officer for the East Timor acquisition project." But the weakness of Indonesia's allies - the APODETI and UDT - did not permit realization of the initial project of the leadership of the Indonesian state, which was aiming at a "quiet" annexation. The only solution became invasion. The Indonesian officers want to eliminate the threat of East Timor becoming both a base of support for opponents of their regime and an example for the peoples of the Indonesian archipelago subject to the terror of the central, Java26 nese power. In addition, they want to preserve the strategic value of East Timor, Adam Malik, the foreign minister of the Indonesian government, has recognized that "it is security and stability, both national and regional" that is at stake, the rise of struggles in East Timor reflecting both the final crisis of Portuguese colonialism and, at the same time, the ongoing realignment of forces in the Far East after the defeat of American imperialism in Indochina.
The invasion of East Timor by Indonesian froops on December 7, 1975, was falsely portrayed as a response to an appeal by four political parties of the country: the APODETI, the UDT, and two other formations slapped together for the occasion, Kota and Trabalista. The Indonesian forces plundered and sacked the capital. Numbering more than 10,000, the Indonesian troops were able to crush the FRETILIN forces, which retreated to the hills to wage guerrilla warfare. The struggle that has been launched promises to be a hard one, long and difficult for the population of Timor, for the invader commands material and military superiority. Only a social mobilization of the entire peasantry and of the urban workers and popular layers can lastingly defeat the Indonesian invasion. The liquidation of the existing property relations in the countryside is a precondition for this. The risk of being "closed up" in the half-island of East Timor is very great. That is why extension of the struggle to the part of the island under Indonesian domination acquires great importance, and this cannot be done without a mobilization of the peasantry to overthrow the existing order. In order to win victory the struggle now going on in East Timor will have to go beyond the limits of the program currently formulated by FRETILIN and fully respond to the interests of the social layers on which it is based. Born in isolation and without deep anti-imperialist political traditions, FRETILIN is a movement of national liberation that can find no third road between the neocolonial threat and the struggle for full national liberation, which can only be socialist. The mobilization of the masses constitutes a very important element in this struggle, which must be supported because if represents a link in the anti-imperialist struggle in the region and because it is fighting against an Indonesian military dictatorship that has not faced any opposition since it took power in 1965. The internafional dimension of the situation thus created in Timor must be utilized to denounce and isolate the Indonesian dictatorship. The Australian dockers have shown the way, boycotting Indonesian ships. Portuguese revolutionaries must organize the broadest solidarity in all forms to vigorously denounce the maneuvers of the Portuguese government, which are facilitating the imperialist operations. The Fourth International extends its unconditional support to the struggle FRETILIN is waging against the Indonesian invader, for the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, O