STAGE
IN THE
ITALIAN
CRISIS by LIVIO MAITAN
The governmental crisis opened by the resignation of
Aldo Moro was a surprise given the attitudes taken during preceding weeks by the major political parties. The
Christian Democracy (DC), facing a rending internal crisis preparatory to its coming congress, did not intend to bring the government down. The PCI (Partito Comunista
Italiano - Italian Communist party) was of the same view, for the PC| believes that time is on its side. Even the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano - Italian Socialist party), which provoked the fall of the cabinet with an article published by its secretariat on December 31 and a resolution passed by the leadership on January 7, had decided to wait for its own congress and the congress of
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SOCIALE ITALIANO the Christian Democracy before moving to a settling of accounts on the government level. But the umpteenth Italian government crisis should not have surprised anyone, given the general situation in the country. In fact, the phase of deep imbalances and extreme conflict that started as long ago as 1968 has not at all come to an end. The recession that has been going on for the past sixteen months has not ended; the electoral results of June 15, 1975, with the success of the left and especially of the PCI, provoked and continue to provoke big political shakeups. In this context, the government remained in office only because no one had any interest in bringing it down. But when the PSI decided that the maintenance of the status quo was prejudicial to its tactical plans, that alone was enough for the fragile structure to come tumbling down immediately. The recession and June 15 The first point that must be synthetically analyzed is the prolongation of the great social and political crisis that opened in 1968-69. On various occasions the ruling class has sought to launch operations aimed at restabilizing the situation and even at actually reestablishing the pre1968 state of affairs, resorting to the most varied means and trying out diverse government formulas. (For example, there was the Andreotti government in 1971, the center-left governments of the beginning of the 1960s, later replaced by the center-right government, with the participation of the liberals, the Socialists being thrown into opposition.) But all these operations failed one after the other, even if a few ephemeral successes were registered. The great mobilizations of the working class, which have come one after another without interruption - even if
they were often defensive in character and wound up making rather limited gains - nevertheless proved at crucial moments that the relationship of forces continued to be favorable to the proletariat. The authority of the employers in the factories was not at all restored. On the more general political level, the bourgeois political parties, the Christian Democracy in the first place, suffered hard blows and fell into deeper and deeper crisis. The various institutions of the state apparatus functioned ever less effectively, registering increasingly less success in exercising the functions of repression and control that the bourgeoisie desired. (Ir is sufficient to recall the increasingly grave crisis of the judicial system, the ferment that has developed in the army, and even the events that have transpired in the police force, among some sectors of which the parties of the traditional left now have a not at all insignificant audience.) The radicalization of the working class, the other exploited layers of the population, and broad sectors of the petty bourgeoisie has not only not receded but has even been reflected electorally, as was seen on June 15. Finally, the introduction of the "representative structures" in the schools, which was called for by the so-called decreti delegati in 1974, in spite of the manifest diversions and the active support of the reformists, did not succeed in. "institutionalizing" the student movement, which has periodically merged with the struggles of the workers around specific issues such as the fight against fascism and fascist terrorism, international solidarity, elc., giving rise to massive mobilizations in the major cities and in hundreds of smaller cities. The generalized recession of the capitalist economy has hit the Italian economy hard. Full statistics for 1975 are not yet available, but the fall in gross national product should be on the order of 5%, with a decline in industrial production of about 10%. (In November 1975 industrial production was about 15% lower than in November 1974.) The rise in consumer prices slowed down compared to the rate of increase in 1974; nevertheless, it should still total about 15% for 1975 as a whole (the highest of any industrialized capitalist country except Britain). As for unemployment, the increase was smaller than in other countries (total unemployment stands af about a million and a half, according to approximate figures that are probably too low), but short workweeks have been introduced on a massive scale (400 million hours of short time in 1975 compared with 156 million hours in 1974, the last quarter of which was itself a period of crisis). What is worse, nearly everyone believes that the small signs of upturn that have oppeared will be of limited scope and probably ephemeral. (There have been classical instances of reconstitution of stocks, for example.) No upturn is foreseen before the second half of 1976, and recently there have been even more pessimistic predictions. Agnelli, for example, the owner of Fiat and the head of the organization of Italian industrialists, gave a speech on January 12 in which he expressed doubts that 1976 would be a year of upturn at all. He said, among other things, that "our company's long voyage through crisis is not yet at an end." Finally, the results of the regional and administrative elections of last June 15 have had profound consequences. First, the traditional workers parties have taken on leadership responsibilities in many more localities than in the past. (In some cases, these parties rule with the parficipation of representatives elected from the list of Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy), a coalition of Manifesto-PUP, Avanguardia Operaia, and smaller formations of the far left.) This has provoked big rifts in the system of bought-and-sold interests that has constituted and still constitutes an important element in the rule of the Christion Democracy and has accounted for the survival of minor formations like the PSDI (the Social Democratic party led by Saragat-Tanassi). Second, all the bourgeois parties - from the Liberals to the PSDI, and even the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano - Italian Social Movement, the fascists) - have been thrown into open crisis, a crisis that had already been developing for some time, with growing internal conflicts. This phenomenon has assumed the most telling manifestations within the Christian Democracy, with the fragmentation of the old ruling group, the overthrow of Fanfani (long-standing leader of the party), and the defeat of the best qualified candidates to succeed Fanfani. The present party secretary, Zaccagnini, who holds positions close to those of Moro and was considered by all the "historic" DC leaders as a transitional secretary (to hold the post only until the next party congress), is now building himself a broader base, insisting on making deep self-criticisms, condemning corruption and dishonesty, and calling for a radical overhaul of the party and a return to its "popular" origins. In a speech given on January 11 he said, "The onticommunism of the DC must not be confused with bourgeois anticommunism...• We will go down to defeat again if we are satisfied to be Christians only within the limits set down by the interests and prejudices of our bourgeois protectors." The contract battles and the abortion campaign Of all the problems that lie at the root of the prolongation of the Italian social and political crisis, three have assumed decisive weight during the recent period: the battles around trade-union contracts, the polemics around short- and medium-term economic measures, and the question of abortion. In the past the struggles for the renegotiation of nationa! trade-union contracts - which involve decisive sectors of the proletariat have marked crucial points in the political situation. In 1969 it was precisely during these struggles that the workers upsurge reached its highest point, with the emergence of a prerevolutionary situation. In 1972 (and during the first several months of 1973) these struggles were decisive in triggering the fall of the center-right government, the government in which the members of the Liberal party had been assigned important functions. Today, the progress and results of the battles now going on will in large measure determine whether the workers upsurge will continue and
ITALY reach levels even higher than those achieved in 1969 or whether, on the other hand, there will be tendencies toward an ebb (leaving aside the question of how extensive an ebb). If must be noted immediately that in spite of the growing wave of layoffs and the massive extension of short workweeks, the present recession has not had negative effects on workers combativity or on the political maturity of the proletariat and the other exploited layers. All the struggles of these past months, which have ranged from particularly tough workplace struggles to factory occupations (it is estimated that about a hundred factories are now occupied) and direct actions extending outside the factories, clearly testify to this. This very persistence of combativity and the fact that the bourgeoisie and its government are quite conscious of it explain why massive layoffs have on the whole been less numerous than in other countries of West Europe (not to mention the United States). Another significant element
MORO is that an organized movement of the unemployed has developed during past months, a movement linked to the trade-union organizations. In Naples, for example, this movement made a big contribution to defeating the demagogic maneuvers of the fascist and fascistic far right and has attained a high level of political maturity. (In the big demonstration of December 12 the most advanced speech, which called for reductions of the workweek and across-the-board wage increases, was given by a representative of the unemployed.) It must be added, however, that the attitude of the trade-union leaderships has acted as a powerful brake on these struggles and threatens to lead them into a dead end. From the very outset the bureaucratic leaderships imposed platforms that largely emptied the struggles of their content. In substance, they renounced the fight for the reduction of the workweek with no reduction in pay; they held the wage demands within very narrow limits (in general, between 30,000 and 35, 000 lire a 14 month, which is not much higher than the ceiling imposed by the government; they once again called for new investment programs, especially in the South, refusing to recognize the failure of this program during previous years. As for the forms of trade-union control and supervision of the companies' investment and employment decisions, the employers countered the trade-union leaderships' proposals with noisy protests only for demagogic tactical reasons. In reality, the trade unions did not demand much more than already exists. Second, the trade-union leaders exhibited great reluctance to commit themselves to the tough battles required by the situation. The contract struggles have thus been postponed, and the only show of force that has been organized up to now has been the big national demonstration that took place in Naples on December 12 (with about 200,000 workers present). By nature, however, such a demonstration can be only a means of pressure. And now the goverhment crisis is being used as a new pretext to postpone struggles, since, according to the bureaucrats, there can be no struggle when there is no opponent. The polemic around medium-term economic measures was the most immediate cause of the government crisis. The Moro government had approved a program calling for expenditures of 25, 000 thousand million lire during the coming three to five years; these funds were supposed to be used for reconverting and developing industry, for scientific research, for special aid to small and middle-sized industry, for subsidies for state enterprises, and for pump-priming in the South. At the same time, measures were to be taken to assure that workers laid off during restructurations and reconversions would receive up to 80 percent of their wages for five years. The representatives of industry were not hostile to this program, which undoubtedly would have helped them overcome some of their present difficulties. Nevertheless, some bourgeois press organs pointed out the limits of the operation. The Milan daily Corriere della Sera had spoken of "another wasted opportunity, " observing: "It will be difficult for this distribution of billions to go through free of the pressure of the relationship of forces and the pressure of those getting the money." Significantly, the PCI had reacted much more moderately than some of the bourgeois media, rejecting the designation of "wasted opportunity" and maintaining that the parliament would have been able to modify the government's proposals and make them acceptable. The spoilsports turned out to be the Socialists, who, annoyed at not having been consulted, attacked the proposed measures, calling them incorrect and totally insufficient. In the course of the crisis the Socialists worked out a project of their own, only the general lines of which are known so far. The plan calls for linking aid to companies to the maintenance of employment, for increasing compensation for short workweeks, for consultation of the trode unions on company policy, and for increasing the state share of social security. In theory, it is not excluded that there could be a compromise between this position and that of the government that has just resigned. Nonetheless, the development of medium-term economic projects still remains the most difficult prob-
lem today. While on the one hand it is indeed possible to find resources to stimulate an immediate upturn in this or that sector and even to achieve some results within several months, and while on the other hand the economists may give full vent to their fantasies about the more long-term prospects provided there is a vast reconversion and restructuring of the economy in the context of a reorganization of the world division of labor, it is more difficult to indicate concretely how it can be possible to guarantee an upturn of any real scope and how such an upturn can be maintained through the rest of the 1970s. This remains the most obscure point for Italy, especially as concerns the central problem of employment, which will probably go down again even if there is an upturn in the overall economic situation. Finally, the problem of abortion has become a burning one, both because it is now possible that there will be a referendum on the abolition of the existing repressive legislation and because a strong women's movement is developing around this question. The signatures needed to initiate the referendum have been collected, and the referendum should take place sometime during the next several months, unless the parliament votes a new law quickly (and unless the referendum is postponed by special parliamentary elections). A draft law is now under discussion, and violent polemics have already occurred. The PCI has reached a compromise with the DC: Abortion would no longer be considered a crime and would be allowed in some cases. Nonetheless, under the terms of the compromise, the demand of the women's movement, the far left, the Socialists, and the Radicals — the principle of free abortion on demand - would be rejected. (According to the PCI-D common draft, the decision. would be up to the physician on the basis of information provided by the woman.) Neither the PCI nor the DC wants a new referendum, while the church has thrown itself into the battle violently, demanding intransigence of the DC. It is clear that this conflict has already assumed the same weight as the battle around divorce; under certain conditions, it could have no less explosive consequences.
VIC CCIL MINISTER@ OR ESA Objectives of struggle of the working class In a context marked by the contradictions and tensions we have listed, it is not easy to predict what solutions to the crisis are possible. The Christian Democracy still favors a government based on a çenter-left majority (regardless of which parties would actually be represented in the government). The PCI - which for many months had helped the Moro government survive and just a few days ago recalled that all the important laws passed in the recent period have been approved with the votes of the PCI deputies in parliament - thinks it can take advantage of a continuation of the present situation and does not intend to commit itself to giving any more support to the government while remaining outside the government, In other words, the PCI is prepared to take further steps forward toward the "historic compromise, " but on condition that it enters the government. This demand, however, is directed more at the Socialists than at the Christian Democracy, for it is the Socialist party that has proposed that the Communists be drawn into the political leadership of the country, but without posing the question of the PCI's directly participating in the ministries. On the other side, everyone has so far come out against special parliamentary elections. The regular elections are scheduled for the spring of 1977) The impasse would thus appear to be total. Will the current government crisis result in a new edition of the center-left or in the acceptance of the currently rejected proposal for special elections? At this point, any answer to this question would be pure speculation. But what is certain is that the Italian social and political crisis will deepen further during coming months, and new violent conflicts, explosions, and powerful mobilizations will be possible. Revolutionary Marxists will work to make these struggles take on maximal scope and intensity, contrary to the plans of the bureaucratic leaderships. They will fight for these struggles' being waged on the basis of fundamental objectives: for the defense of employment and against the reduction of the standard of living; for the generalized reduction of the workweek to thirty-five hours with no reduction in pay; for equal across-theboard wage increases of 50, 000 lire a month; for the nationalization without compensation and under workers control of companies that go bankrupt or ask for state aid to avoid bankruptcy; for workers control over all aspects of labor relations; against the measures of restructuration and exploitation. They will fight for trade unionists and all the workers organizations to undertake coordinated actions to respond to the multinational corporations, which are taking the lead in the antiworker offensive. They will fight against the government crisis being used as an excuse to postpone mobilizations and struggles, and while they will not demand special elections, they will not allow the prospect of such elections to be used as a bogeyman. They will struggle against any bourgeois government or coalition between bourgeois parties and workers parties, believing that the objective for which the working class must fight is a government that excludes all representatives of the bourgeoisie and is composed of the parties and organizations that defend the interests of the working class, based on a anticapitalist program and expressing the struggles of the masses and the bodies that represent and lead the mass movement. January 15, 1976
The current situation in Angola has been presented to public opinion as the direct consequence of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The "détente" is said to be "in danger"; the Angolan masses are said to have been plunged, despite themselves, into a "fratricidal war, " having become cannon fodder for a conflict between two superpowers. Clearly, such a presentation of the "facts" fulfills a political function for the mass media. The point is to hark back to the good old days of the Alvor accords, when there was a coalition government and "peaceful" coexistence among the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA.* The partisan thrust of this sort of position becomes clear in the light of the campaign of the government of Zaire according to which "only the Angolan people must decide their fate, and according to the road already traced out by their leaders during the Alvor conference. " (Declaration of the Zaire press agency, AZAP, January 6.) To some extent, the internationalization of the