PORTUGAL THE REVOLUTION INA STATE OF SIEGE by A. UDRY
"3. To demand that the maneuvers at the top cease once and for all and that there be no cabinet decisions before the soldiers in the units have been consulted; "4. To alert the soldiers of all units, calling on them to offer a firm and united response to any machinations aimed at weakening the progressive and revolutionary forces both inside and outside the barracks. " Thus, in a deformed and dangerous way, the dynamic of politico-social confrontation tended to be reduced to the battle around the commander of the Lisbon Military Region. Such a battle resulted in a military confrontation not effectively linked to the mass movement or even to the independent movement of soldiers. At the beginning of September in Porto, the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão - Soldiers United Will Win) had approached a similar problem - the removal of General Corvacho from the Northern Military Region - from an entirely different angle (see INPRECOR No. 35, October 9), an angle that permitted a stimulation of the organization of the soldiers themselves. Illusions and adventurism But to locate the meaning of the events of November 25 and 26 more exactly, it is useful to recall the fundamental characteristic of the current period. In fact, the whole specificity of the situation lies in the lack of synchronization between the extremely profound crisis of the state apparatus (especially the army) and the degree of development and centralization of embryonic orgars of dual power. Such a situation cannot persist for long. It has to be resolved either through a more or less partial restabilization of the state apparatus, or through a growing over toward a situation of dual power, 1 ромот, whatever the intermediary steps. In addition, the deep crisis of the state apparatus, which allowed a workers upsurge to go on without meeting any major obstacles, gave rise to illusions in the bourgeoisie's capacity for political initiative and, even more important, in the operational possibilities of the military hierarchy. We have stressed these illusions on many occasions. At the beginning of October, for example, we wrote: "The outcome of this confrontation (the government's attempt to occupy the radio stations), which turned out favorably for the working class, is part of a process of step-bystep revolutionary upsurge in which the workers have won victories without meeting any great resistance from the class enemy. This could create the false impression that the bourgeoisie is politically impotent and that it is definitively incapable of reconstituting a military striking force. This illusion fuels an ultraleftism that is translated into adventurism by the PRP-BR (Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revoluciondrias -Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades), which claims that it is now time for the revolutionary forces and the workers to pose the problem of an insurrection.' . . . If the far-left groups continue to play this game, they could well be caught in the same trap the German Communists fell into in January 1919. " (INPRECOR, No.35, October 9, p.29.) Once again, at the beginning of November, we pointed out:
"While the crisis in the army is extremely deep and while the progress of self-organization among the soldiers is important, in the present situation it would be erroneous and dangerous to believe that the disintegration of the army has gone so far that the hierarchy is incapable of taking any initiative. " (INPRECOR, No.37, November 6, p.4.) Although the crisis of the state apparatus did not allow the bourgeoisie to confront the mass movement head on (without risking civil war), it certainly did not prevent the success of a military conteroffensive against an adventurist operation of the type launched on November 25 and 26. In examining the initiative taken by the Tancos paratroopers on the morning of November 25, it is difficult to separate provocation, "mad adventure, " and the application of a plan. At about eleven o'clock in the morning they occupied the base at Tancos, the bases of Montijo, and the installations of the first air force region at Monsanto and took control of access to the Montreal base. They then demanded the resignation of Maraise Silva, air force chief of staff, who was responsible for the operation against Radio Renascença and is one of the leaders of the "hardline" wing of the hierarchy: Nevertheless, the links among these initiatives, the measures taken by various units to occupy radio (Emissora Nacional) and television stations, and the appearance on television of Durand Clemente, one of the heads of the former Fifth Divison, indicate that the elements of a "military plan" reminiscent of putschism were being applied on November 25, even if the Tancos paratroopers carried out this plan in a precipitous and disorganized manner. This sort of adventurism does not simply drop from the sky. For two or three months now, various centrist organizations, essentially the MES (Movimento de Isquerda Socialista - Left Socialist Movement) and the PRP-BR, as well as some radicalized sectors of the army, have been developing an adventurist conception that has taken the form of a putschist orientation, under the pretext of anticipating a "reactionary coup." A manifesto distributed on November 21 entitled "Manifesto of the Revolutionary Officers to the Soldiers, Sailors, Working Class, and Toiling People" and signed by Tome (the major of the Lisbon Military Police), Durand Clemente, and Matos Gomez stressed the imminence of a reactionary offensive: "We are now seeing a desperate reactionary escalation; the parties and officers of the sixth government are joining in attempts to crush the powerful popular offensive. " What is reflected here is the position of centrist organizations that confuse the desire of various sectors of the military hierarchy to carry out a reactionary coup, and even the preparation of the coup, with the establishment of the general conditions for doing so with any serious chance of success. The bourgeoisie is capable not only of preparing coups, but also of canceling them or postponing them; the fact is that it is impossible to artificially create conditions favorable to stimulating coordination and synchronization of the efforts of the major part of reaction.
PORTUGAL Centrists and ultraleftists What do these revolutionary officers, most of them now arrested, in hiding, and hit by repression, propose to do today? Their response is unambiguous: "In face of this situation, the undersigned officers, conscious that their place can only be at the side of the workers, soldiers, and sailors in their struggle for emancipation, popular power, socialism, and national independence, consider that the only outcome for the Portuguese revolution lies in the establishment of a regime of revolutionary unity with an action program publicly defended before the popular masses with the central objective of the most rapid possible transfer of power to the workers organized in a structure that culminates in a National People's Assembly. ... The outcome of the crisis lies in the construction of a revolutionary regime based on a program of revolutionary unity founded on the ideas expressed in the COPCON document. " This manifesto appeared on the front page of the November 21 issue of the weekly newspaper of the PRP-BR. On November 10, this same PRP-BR held a press conference during which Isabel do Carmo declared: "For us, at this moment, there is no solution except armed insurrection. As all history shows, the bourgeoisie unleashes a civil war every time it wants to defend its interests. Fortunately, the forces of the right possess no army in Portugal. To get one, they must resort to mercenaries based in Spain or to the armes of the United States or NATO." (A Capital, November 10.) This position reflects the dominant orientation of the two largest organizations of the FUR (Frente de Unidade Revolucionária - Front of Revolutionary Unity), the PRP-BR and the MES (although the position is expressed much more cautiously in the writings of the MES), as well as of the sectors of the military around the signers of the manifesto. This ultraleft and adventurist orientation takes shape around several points: a) A considerable underestimation of the capacity for military initiative by the sectors controlled by the militarist hierarchy, which is combined, paradoxically, with a multitude of assertions about the imminence of the establishment of "an authoritarian regime that will assume fascist forms, that will rapidly resort to blood bath and terror in order that 'peace and discipline' may reign." (Revolução, PRP-BR weekly, November 17.) This latter assertion rests essentially on a simplistic conception of the relationship between the economic crisis and the establishment of "an authoritarian regime that will assume fascist forms. " b) A radical misunderstanding of the level of consciousness of broad sectors of the masses, of the grip of democratic illusions among significant layers of the working class because of the lack of an experience of dual power that would enable the legitimacy of bourgeois institu8 tions to be shifted to the organs of workers power, and an underestimation of the negative effects of the division of the working class and of the uneven development of struggles among various branches and regions. All this leads to the most impressionistic judgments about the conjunctural situation. For example, the MES declares: "The military, political, and economic conditions exist for the development of a popular offensive. From the military point of view, the right does not possess the soldiers to carry out a coup; from the economic point of view, the rising cost of living, unemployment, and the satisfaction of the most immediate needs are problems that cannot be resolved without a revolufionary regime; from the political point of view, illusions in bourgeois democracy, illusions in the reformists, are beginning to be clearly overcome and the workers finally understand that it will not be the politicians who will make the revolution in their name; only the masses through their organization and their struggle will be able to make the socialist revolution triumph. " (Poder Popular, weekly of the MES, November 5-11. On the basis of this analysis, the theme of the "popular offensive" is placed on the agenda, bolstered by the idea that the question of power has to be resolved before the bourgeoisie has created la professional army, constructed its repressive apparatus, and assembled the forces needed to crush us, to demolish all our efforts." (ibid.) It is obvious that such an orientation, even if it does not utilize the PRP-BR formulation on "armed insurrection, Implies seeing the revolutionary officers and the SUV as sources of a military instrument with which to resolve the question of the seizure of power, which is itself conceived of as a technical complement to the development of "organs of popular power" (which are, in fact, embryonic, non-centralized, organs of dual power). On this point, there is a striking analogy between the formula that serves as a govermental slogan in the manifesto of the revolutionary officers and the formulation used by the MES in its editorial in the November 19-25 Poder Popular: "We must create the conditions for the formation of a government of revolutionary unity that holds power until the creation of the National People's Assembly." c) The mistaken view of the real relationship of forces among the "revolutionary left" (which the PRP-BR and the MES consider to be subsumed by the FUR) is equalled only by the illusions in the Communist party. The MES claims: "It is not the 'revolutionary left" that is being dragged in the wake of the Communist party, but the Communist party that, since giving support to the COPCON document systematically at decisive moments of the struggle, has been dragged in the wake of the revolutionary left. At the moment, there is an important new aspect of the civilian and military situation, which is that for the first time a dispute is unfolding between the revolutionary left and reformism for the leadership of mass struggle on the essential fields, in the factories, the barracks, the neighborhoods, "and, above all, at the overall level of the political struggle of the working class and the toilers. " (Poder Popular, November 511.) In reality, since the beginning of October the Communist party has taken the initiative again, after
having been routed during August and early September. Further, there is no need to insist on the confusion of the MES on the subjecf of the strategic orientation of the CP, a confusion that explains the group's lack of understanding of the nature and limits of the tactical turns made by Alvaro Cunhal's party. Finally, one of the very characteristics of the revolutionary upsurge in Portugal is precisely the spontaneous, partially spontaneous, and semiconscious movement, which is expressed, among other ways, in the relatively low degree to which the workers are organized within the revolutionary and centrist groups; this is, however, combined with powerful capacities of initiative and self-organization among broad sectors. This latter feature of the rise of the mass movement has stimulated a process of self-intoxication among the centrist groups, in spite of (or perhaps because of their limited size. We would wager that after November 25-26, the MES will revise this position. d) An ultraleftist attitude toward the Social Democracy, which is expressed in formulas and a line analogous to those of the ultraleftist currents in the communist movement during the years 1921-23 and is even reminiscent of the policy of the Stalinized Communist International during the "third period. " The MES says: "Thus, the Social Democratic forces serve the advance of the fascist forces; consequently, we cannot separate our slogan 'Death to the ELP and those who support it" from the slogan 'Down with Social Democracy.' That, comrades, is why the MES says — and this is ever more correct and appears ever more clearly - that the Social Democracy is a phase in the transition to fascism. " (Poder Popular, November 5-11.) The classic themes of ultraleftism emerge here: gradual transition to fascism and the necessity of defeating Social Democracy in order to crush fascism. There is a risk that a direct confrontation with the state apparatus will flow from these types of assertions when it is simultaneously claimed that the Social Democracy holds military and political hegemony. Thus, the MES, like most of the organizations of the FUR, is incapable of grasping the real counterrevolutionary nature and function of the SP. The Socialist party, under the cover of the defense of bourgeois democracy, was and is aiming at disarming the workers, eliminating the soldiers commissions, and maximally reducing the role of the workers commissions, while not suppressing the democratic rights of the reformist organizations or challenging the functioning of the institutions of bourgeois-democratic parliamentar ism. It is certainly true that this policy allows the bourgeoisie to stabilize the organs of state power, but it does not follow from this that the SP is the functional instrument for crushing the working class. This appears clearly when, after a success for the democratic counterrevolution led by the SP, the second phase of the direct offensive of the bourgeoisie opens up. On the basis of their characterization of the SP, the centrists rejected any coherent policy of united front taking advantage, for example, of the tensions that exist within Mario Soares's party because of his opposition to the movement for the demands of the construction workers and metalworkers, Hence, the centrist organizations not only consolidate the division of the working class, but also fail to offer any response to the uneven development of the mobilization in the North and the South, an unevenness that is linked to, among other factors, the varying influence of the SP among the workers of the two regions. The events of November 25 and 26 must also be seen within the general framework of the ultraleft policy of the centrist organizations, which fuses with the extremely narrow technical-militarist conceptions held by a nucleus of revolufionary officers who have some influence in Lisbon. Too easy a victory? For two days, November 25 and 26, slightly more than 400 commandos literally waltzed around from one area to another in the region of the capital. Colonel Jaime Neves emerged as a brilliant orchestra conductor capable of using a very small number of troops to whip several of the major military units of the Lisbon "commune" into line. Neves, firmly supported by the SP since the end of July, had already established order in his own unit, the Amadora commandos. The homage paid to him on November 20 by Captain Antonio Bras, who had just been "expelled" from the Tancos base, suffices to indicate the respect this colonel commands within the military hisrarchy: "Intelligently, Colonel Jaime Neves was able, at the opportune moment, to once again lend the commandos their real function. . . . He was able to cut the disease at its roots. . . . He was able to energetically denounce the origins of this disease in the army. ••. He did so in order to preserve the unity and cohesion of the armed forces at any price." (Expresso, November 22, 1975.) But on November 25 and 26 it was not fundamentally the strict military efficiency of the commandos that carried the day. In spite of the profound crisis of the state apparatus and of bourgeois political leadership, what was asserted during these two days was the capacity for centralized initiative still possessed by the bourgeoisie despite its weakness. Militarily, the command of the counteroffensive was coherent and centralized. But we must also note Costa Gomes's cleverness and haste in making sure that the mass media, crucial instrument of centralization, would be in the hands of the government. The broadcasting towers of Portuguese national radio and television and of Emissora Nacional were silenced; Radio Clube Português shut down its transmitters on the night of November 25 under the threat of intervention by the EPC (Proctical Cavalry School): By eight o'clock at night, the government was on the dirwaves from Porto, broadcasting its orders throughout the country. The North was available as a more reliable base, and the government had certainly prepared in advance to transfer its radio centers there.
9
PORTUGAL
Finally, inscribing his response within the framework of the "democratic counterrevolution, "the president of the republic took care to have the Constituent Assembly vote on the state of emergency. The motion was carried by a majority composed of the SP, the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático - Popular Democratic party), and the
CDS (Centro Democrático Social - Democratic Social
Center). The state of emergency allowed Costa Gomes to take command of all military units and to enact a series of measures aimed at facilitating the political utilization of the immediate military advantages that had been won. In fact, the state of emergency gives the authorities the right to conduct searches and arrests without warrants and to censor all forms of correspondence, including the press, publicity, and propaganda. Further, street demonstrations were banned. The movement initiated by the Tancos paratroopers, the soldiers of the EPAM, the Lisbon military police, and the RALIS (Lisbon light artillery regiment) was totally disorganized in offering any military response to all this.
The combination of the elements of provocation, spontaneous initiative, partial application of aspects of a putschist military plan, and the possible hesitations at the highest level of the military hierarchy go a long way toward explaining the unfolding of this adventure, which some people certainly saw as the beginning of an armed insurrection. The soldiers of the units involved in this operation not only possessed no central command, but, above all, were not prepared to launch into a confrontation that would open the way to civil war. The hesitations in the ranks of these soldiers increased from hour to hour. In face of determined troops who appeared as defending "legality" against "rebellion, " these vacillations inevitably increased, especially when the "dynamization commission" (linked to the former Fifth Division) gave the order to cease fighting at four o'clock in the morning of November 26. As is logical, the working class took a wait-and-see attitude toward this obscure military confrontation, with the exception of some sectors among whom a mobilization took place (at Setnave, for example, where the PRP-BR has some influence). Clearly, the Communist party did not join into the operation, contrary to the possible expectations of the centrist groups or the forces nostalgic for the Fifth Division. The CP was content to mobilize defensively in the work places. On November 27 the CP published a communique stating: "The left forces committed a grave error by overestimating their own strength and aftempting this desperate act. ... The attempt of the forces of the right to take advantage of a favorable situation to impose such hegemony would be dangerous. The solution must be political and negotiated." The CP was only reaffirming its orientation. For the CP, the false battle engaged around the nomination of Vasco Lourenço, even if its dynamic was very dangerous, fell within the general framework of the CP policy of exerting pressure for a recomposition of the Council of the Revolution and the government. 10
As for the "revolutionary left, " and more precisely the
MES and the PRP-BR, they of course called for "armed insurrection" and denounced the "betrayal" of the CP.
Here again, there is continuity.
The counteroffensive decided on by the commandos of
Jaime Neves and supported by the tanks of Salgueiro
Maia (commander of the EPC) won very rapid success.
Although this success has allowed the military initiative to pass back into the government camp, the real scope of this victory must nevertheless be measured carefully. Some days before November 25, Melo Antunes described how he viewed the government's priorities. He said:
"The army must be an instrument for action and not a political laboratory. We must correct this error today. We will do this by altering the structures and shifting personalities around. ... The debate (in the Council of the Revolution and the hierarchy is very lively right now. A struggle is going on, a struggle on which everything depends. For the only way to continue to be able to govem along with the CP... which is something we want to do... is first to win the battle in the army, a battle that is going on at nearly all levels. That is vital. A second imperative is nearly as important, though, and that is the battle over the news media. " (Nouvel Observateur, November 24-30.) The victorious military counterattack offers the Pinheiro de Aze vedo government an opportunity to take the initiative again in the areas mentioned by Melo Antunes and to try to make a few tests in other realms as well. For the moment, the government is making gains, or trying to make gains, in four areas, while maintaining the state of emergency: 1. The measures of demobilization of the Military Police (temporary?); changes in the command of various units (RALIS, EPAM, Military Police); the return of the sergeants to the Military Police; arrests of many officers; the removal-resignation of Carvalho and Fabião all point in the direction of regaining a grip on the army and of attempting to homogenize the command structures. After the abortive attempt to construct the AMI (Military Intervention Group) on the basis of the example of the Amadora commandos, the hierarchy is now seeking to reconstitute a viable infervention force within the army itself, in collaboration with the police Forces of the National Guard (GNR) and the Public Service Police (PSP). 2. The nationalization of Radio Clube Português, the handing of Radio Renascença back to the Catholic church, and, most important, the strict control over the nationa! radio and television station and over Emissora Nacional are concretizations of the measures that the sixth government has been vainly trying to impose since September. These measures reflect a not inconsequential change in the political situation. Previously, because of the influence of the workers of these radio stations and because of their declared collaboration with the struggles of the working class, the working class commanded both a fan-
tastic tool for publicizing its battles and stimulating polificization and a possible instrument of centralization. The bourgeoisie understood this very well. It is thus trying to bring all the means of mass communication back into its camp. In addition, in the realm of written information, the administrative councils of the newspapers have been modified and right-wing editors who had been removed are retaking their posts. It is not at all impossible that the battle around Repüblica will come up again. 3. The searching of the headquarters of the MES and the PRP-BR may represent a first step in a policy of selective repression that will initially be carried out around the decree on the "obligation to return all arms" and the decree against "armed militias." 4. The suspension of collective contract negotiations until the end of December is undoubtedly extremely significant. In fact, in taking this measure the Azevedo government is trying to transfer its military advantage into the social and political spheres. More precisely, this decision implies a rejection of the victories that have already been won or appeared probable in many sectors (textiles, construction, bakers). But once these measures have been taken, even if all of them have not yet been successfully applied, two central questions come up. First, within the political and military institutions the right and the far right are trying to take maximum advantage of the favorable conjunctural situation. The bourgeoisie has recovered its confidence somewhat. CDS and PPD leaflets are screaming for blood, particularly since there is big panic right now. The Antunes group must be afraid that it will be outflanked on the right. If that happens, the government could be led to make decisions that do not correspond to the real relationship of social forces. And this in turn could precipitate a workers mobilization openly supported by the CP, which today is not frontally opposing the state of emergency and is instead seeking negotiations. Such a mobilization would highlight the presently precarious character of the victory on the government and military level. Antunes is quite conscious of this and has clearly proposed a different option. He declared on television: "I think that the roads to the right can be definitively cut in Portugal and that the military men who now hold political leadership can be the bearers of an alternative left program, which is a historic bloc for the building of a democratic and pluralist socialist society. The participation of the CP in the building of socialism is indispersable." (November 27.) Because of the present relationship of social forces and the fensions among the various tendencies within the government, the bourgeois crisis of political leadership has not yet been resolved. Second, the working class as such has not been hit and the economic crisis is continuing. Of course, because of the many links between workers and soldiers that have been forged during past months, the success of Neves's counteroffensive has certainly produced some some frauma among the ranks of the workers. But it would be an exaggeration to claim that the modification of the relationship of forces on the military field will be directly reflected on the social field. The capacity of the working class to break down the policy of the government and the employers in the realm of material demands remains the real test. The fact that 10,000 people turned out to a demonstration called by the Intersindical (the trade-union federation) and the SUV in Porto on the night of November 27 indicates that the potential for combativity is significant. In addition, the victory on the military field is far from absolute. On the one hand, many units in which the CP and the far left have brood influence remained apart from the events and have not suffered the demoralizing effech of a defeat without resistance. Further, certain units are already reacting. For example, the RIOQ (Operational Infantry Regiment of Queluz) has decided to take over the functions of the Military Police. It is organizing patrols in Lisbon so that the GNR-PSP will not be able to operate alone during the state of emergency. On the other hand, the military success of the right is going to permit the establishment of a striking force and the Imposition of tight control over arms depots. That changes the situation. But it does not resolve the crisis in the army as a whole. Coming weeks will provide a basis for measuring the effects of November 25 and 26 more exactly. The defeat suffered in this adventure by a part of the vanguard of soldiers can certainly not be compared to the defeat of the German proletariat in January 1919. The position adopted by the MES and the PRP-BR of creating a "united antifascist commando" goes back to the same orientation that led up to placing the armed insurrection on the agenda. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the blows that have been dealt will permit the bourgeoisie to take measures to reestablish the state apparatus, and this will modify the terms of future confrontations. November 30, 1975 CORRECTION In the article "Portugal: Construction Workers Defeat the Government" in the last issue of INPRECOR (No. 38, November 20) an error appeared, The second sentence of the last paragraph of the first column on page 17 should have read: "The same is not true for the tenants commissions, which on the one hand are much more subject to divisions among the various political currents and on the other hand are very heterogeneous in terms of their real representativeness, the degree to which they function regularly, etc. " The word "not" was inadvertently deleted in the text as published.
Today more than ever, during this "international women's year, "which is above all a year of layoffs of women, the question of abortion is in the center of the crisis of social relations, After the United States and France, where the independent women's movement placed this question on the agenda during the late 1960%, the problem of abortion is now being posed in the most acute manner in political situations as varied as those of West Germany, Italy, and Britain. In these three countries, as in all countries in which women are struggling to win the right to control their own bodies, the right to decide themselves whether they will have children or not, the question of abortion is directly linked to the social and political crisis that threatens the regime of the bourgeoisie. It is a crisis whose factors vary in importance according to the capitalist country concerned; but in all countries, these factors contribute, to one degree or another, to shaking the troditional foundations of bourgeois society and to challenging the position of women in particular: An ideological crisis affecting the family and the church, which is reflected not only in a massive increase in the number of divorces, but also in the fact that broader and broader layers of youth are demanding their sexual liberation and are breaking with traditional morality, with the notions of duty and discipline the system attempts to impose on these youth. An economic crisis, of which women are the first victims, involving massive layoffs and a drastic reduction in investment in social sectors like health, education, child care, etc. A political crisis that, along with the weakening of the major parties representing the interests of the advanced bourgeoisie, is resulting in the emergence of reactionary and fascistic currents, defenders of order and enemies of women struggling for their emancipation. Finally, a crisis of Stalinism, which, along with the bankruptcy of reformism, is revealing the deficiencies of the workers movement in regard to the battle that must be waged against the oppression of women. Italy: the ideological crisis As far as the crisis of the family and the crisis of confidence in the church is concerned, the example of Italy is most illustrative today. In this country in which the percentage of women working professionally is the lowest in Europe (a result of the weight still possessed by the notion that a woman's place is in the home"), in this country in which only a short while ago the word abortion" was pronounced only with trembling lips, in which the 3 million women who get abortions each year do so in the most absolute secrecy and under deplorable hygenic conditions, it took only the victorious leftist vote in the divorce refer12
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