neoreformist strategy
PCF1.1 declaration by LIVIO MAITAN The joint declaration Issued November 13 by the Italian Communist party (PC| - Partito Comunista Italiano) and the French Communist party (PCF — Parti Communiste Françals), the importance of which cannot be overlooked, was inspired primarily by factical political considerations internal to the international movement of Communist parties. There is no doubr that Berlinguer (of the PCI) and Marchais (of the PCF) wanted to further clarify their positions before the convening of the European conference of Communist parties, making it clear that their present course will not be altered by any resolution passed by that conference. (or by any possible reticence or ambiguity in a compromise resolution). Taking such a stand was especially necessary because several months ago Pravda, expressing an interpretation of Leninism that had been immediately rejected by the leaders of both the PCI and the PCF, had made it known, even if only indirectly, that Brezhnev and company were watching the evolution of the two largest Communist parties of the capitalist world with some concern. The fact that this was done so sharply even by the PCF, which has traditionally been cautious in taking distance from the Soviet leaders, and the fact that the November 13 declaration came as a followup to the declaration of Berlinguer and Spanish CP leader Santiago Carillo last July indicate that a pole has now been formed by the West European CPs, a pole that is determined to assert ever greater political and theoretical autonomy. (It may be noted in passing that during the same period the Soviet CP received an unhappy surprise from the British CP, which took a formal position in favor of oppositionists who have been hit by bureaucratic repression in the USSR.) In a commentary published in the Paris daily Le Monde, Alberto Jacovieilo, editor of the PCI's official daily, l'Unita, went so far as to affirm explicitly: "Up to now, the differences between the two most powerful Communist forces of West Europe had contributed in no small measure to maintaining foreign hegemony. The breach is now healed." But the signers of the declaration also had more particular reasons for solemnly proclaiming their "agreement on the essential problems, "as the PCF daily, I'Humanité, put it in a headline. Berlinguer obviously wants to put an end to the period of more or less explicit appeals to orthodoxy by his French colleagues, because then he does not have to worry about any possible utilization of such criticisms by opponents within the PCI itself. Marchais, who is threatened by the new rise of the Socialist party in France, has an even greater need for an official agreement, so as not to be periodically opposed by the orientation of his Italian comrades. He needs to combine tougher conjunctural tactical positions, more intransigent in appearance, with an ever more explicit affirmation of his "democratic consistency, " of the organic unity of his strategic options. But the principal mainspring of the declaration was most probably the present situation in capitalist Europe. The leaders of the Communist parties no longer utilize the
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PCI-PCF categories preevolutionary or revolutionary situation (yet another sign of their theoretical decay and political regression). Nevertheless, they cannot ignore the reality of a crisis that is now racking many countries of the continent and affects every aspect of economic, social, political, moral, and cultural life. " They cannot ignore the fact that ever broader layers of the working class are posing not only problems of immediate political and tactical orientation, but also basic problems of the struggle for the transition to socialism. The Portuguese events of recent months have blown these problems up so sharply that they cannot be avoided. The November 13 declaration was intended as a response to these new exigencies. Of course, the ideas and positions contained in the declaration in no way represent anything new in substance compared with other theses that have been approved separately by the two parties. But the important thing is that certain positions have now been reaffirmed more explicitly, not in documents that will be known only to party members and interested observers, but in a statement aimed at a broad international audience. The important thing is that the PCF has overcome the final obstacles and has decided to draw out all the implications of a conception that in the past it had sought to conceal behind a smokescreen of stereotypic appeals to orthodoxy. Thus, the declaration is intended as a sort of strategic outline for the Communist parties of West Europe. It is a neoreformist outline that, despite the proclamations of novelty and originality, repeats all the essential concepts, and sometimes even the terminology, of the Social Democracy of the Second International. The title of the article by Jacoviello quoted above, "In search of socialism that is possible, " is in itself indicative of the reformist and gradualist inspiration of the document. (1) The document begins by noting the "crisis that is hitting the capitalist system as a whole and this is affecting all economic relations on a world scale. " The conclusion is not that the solution to this crisis requires breaking the very framework of this system and overthrowing an economic mechanism based on exploitation and profit, but rather that "the working class and the popular masses can, through struggle, ... win new gains and open the way to new social and democratic progress" and that the PCI and the PCF, while "they wage the struggle for the immediate interests of the workers and the popular masses, at the same time act for a policy of deep democratic reforms that would permit solving the grave economic, social, and political problems of their countries. " Thus, the perspective is not one of struggle for socialism but instead one of a struggle for an "advanced" democracy under which these reforms would be carried out. in this regard, one simple question may be put to the bureaucrats: Isn't there a massive contradiction between the fact that more than a half century ago, at the time of their founding, the PCI and the PCF claimed that socialist revolution was on the agenda and the fact that today, in the context of a much more profound crisis of the system both worldwide 20 and in Europe itself, they now talk about democratic reforms and do not advance the overthrow of capitalism as an objective to be attained in the current phase? To remove all doubt about their break with "old" conceptions and schemas, the PCF and PCI explain: "The Italian and French Communists consider that the march to socialism and the construction of socialist society which they propose as a perspective in their respective countries must be realized in the framework of a continuous democratization of economic, social, and political life. Socialism constitutes a higher stage of democracy and liberty, democracy carried through to the end." The qualitative leap of the revolutionary break, the destruction of the state apparatus of the ruling class, disappears completely. The transition to socialism is conceived as a process of gradual transformation during which a permanent "democratic" framework is progressively filled with a new content. The real precursers of this "novelty" are clear: Bernstein and the other grand old men of reformist socialism. For its part, the PCI had yet another opportunity to exhibit the conception that Inspired the declaration, in a recent polemic against Pravda. "The new and essential fact that Zaradov does not see, " wrote Luciano Gruppi, specialist in ideological polemics and member of the PCI delegation in the meeting with the PCF, in the PCI weekly Rinascita (No. 41, 1975), "is that we find ourselves not only confronting but also within parliamentary democracy, of which we are a decisive component, this parliamentary democracy would not exist if it had not been won and defended by a struggle of the democratic forces in which the working class and its parties have played a preeminent role. Thus, the Marxist critique of bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism does not fall, but the task of going beyond their limits and defects is posed as a struggle within these institutions to assemble the people, the workers, in a new way in order to enrich, complete, and strengthen democracy, carrying it beyond its present limits, articulating it through decentralized and basic institutions, and filling it with a new economic and social content." It couldn't be more clear! The declaration points in the same direction when, offering further explanation, it affirms that the proposed political and social fransformation "requires the existence of democratic institutions fully representative of popular sovereignty, the guarantee and extersion of the powers of these institutions, the free exercise of direct and proportional universal suffrage. It is in this framework that the two parties - which have always respected and will continue to respect the verdict of universal suffrage - conceive of the accession of the toiling classes to the leadership of the state. ... Their attitude is not tactical but flows from their analysis of the material and historical conditions of their respective countries, from their reflection on international experience as a whole." The differences in the present political lineup in the two countries have prevented the leaders of the PCI
and PCF from utilizing exactly the same formulas on the problem of the alliances needed to develop their strategy or even to unblock the present situation. Hence, after recalling the necessity of mobilizing the majority of the population around the working class, the declarafion repeats the conception that the "main enemy" of the working class is not capital as such, but rather monopoly capital, from which flows the need for a "free entente among the various social and political forces within which the united working class must affirm is intention to fully play it leading role. * Beyond the cautious character of the formulas, what is conceived is a policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie, or at least with some sectors of the bourgeoisie. The present orientation of the PCI, based on the perspective of the "historic compromise, *which includes even the Christian Democracy, is an unequivocal confirmation of the real content of the formulas. The call for peaceful coexistence as a "more favorable terrain for the struggle against imperialism, for democracy, and for socialism"(2) and the assertion of the need for a "democratization of the orientations and functioning of the European Economic Community in favor of the constitution of a democratic, peaceful, and independent Europe" constitute a sort of crowning point for the reformist strategy of the two parties. There is no doubt that as far as the Common Market and its institutions are concerned, the PCF has once again made an adaptation to the greater consistency of the PCI, although not without many hesitations and much reticence. That the democratization of the institutions of the EEC is a perspective that is no less nebulous and utopian than that of the well known democratic control of the EEC monopolies is another story. It is a story that relates more generally to the perspective outlined in the joint declaration. Contrary to what is claimed by Jocoviello, who, as we have seen, speaks of "socialism that is possible," the strategy proposed in the declaration is based on assumptions that historical experience - Chile and, all proportions guarded, Portugal as well - has consistently shown to be without foundation. In this regard, the articles by Berlinguer published in Rinascita immediately after the overthrow of the Unidod Popular government in Chile are perhaps the most explicit sources. Berlinguer's idea, expressed in an allusive rather than explicit manner, was that the Unidad Popular had committed maximalist and sectarian errors that worked against the establishment of the broadest possible alliances. The explicitly enunciated idea was that an electoral majority is insufficient in Itself and that what is necessary is to seek to stabilize alliances and convergences even with forces standing outside the victorious electoral bloc. (In Chile, as in Italy, this means to seek systematic collaboration with the Christian Democracy.) As far as Portugal is concerned, the declaration is cautious in its formulations but nevertheless suggests a judgment that the PCI has openly and repeatedly expressed: that the Portuguese CP has committed adventurist and sectarian errors.
The first fact of life that the reformists try to ignore is that the interference of international imperialism is an inescapable fact, even when the relationship of forces prevents a direct intervention. It is totally illusory to think that this or that concession can induce the imperialists to accept the prospect of a peaceful evolution and to respect the rules of some sort of democratic game. Nor is it useful to take an attitude like that recently assumed by the PCI, minimizing the significance of the positions taken by Washington against any participation of the PCI in the Italian government, or, worse still, presenting the trip of an Italian parliamentary delegation to the United States in a completely false light. (3) The second fact of life is that in a period of deep crisis of the system, a period during which situations arise like the one in Chile between 1971 and 1973 or in Portugal today, it is impossible to avoid the crystallization of conservative and reactionary forces and is extremely difficult, even if not impossible in the abstract, to prevent such crystallizations from drawing in some layers of the petty bourgeoisie that are forced to bear the burdens of a prolonged crisis. The Chilean experience actually indicated just the opposite of what the neoreformist bureaucrats claim: Allende and the Chilean CP set themselves on a course of continual concessions and tried not to push for a radical and revolutionary solu tion to the problems that were posed. Consequently, there was a progressive increase in the hostility not only of the big bourgeoisie, but also of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. A similar development has occurred in Portugal. In such situations it is a disastrous illusion to believe that the class struggle can be confined to the channels of bourgeois-democratic institutions. A test of strength is inevitable on all levels, and what is decisive is the relationship of forces in action and direct mobilization. If there has not been a Chilean-type result in Portugal - and if is improbable that there will be such an outcome in the short term - it is not because the Portuguese process is more moderate or balanced or because the government that succeeded the Caetano dictatorship was less "maximalist" than the Allende government or conducted a more clever policy of alliances (in fact, one could rather say the oppositel, but because the process of the disintegration of the state apparatus is much deeper, fully affecting even the military apparatus, and because the masses have succeeded in constructing embryonic organs of dual power much more than in Chile. In reality, the Portuguese example, coming after that of Chile, demonstrates the substantial inconsistency of the strategic prospects of the PCI and the PCF. The assumption that with the line suggested in the platform the problems of the struggle for socialism can be posed in terms different not only from Russia in 1917 but also from Portugal in 1975 is rodically false. When revolufionary crises occur, the "normal" mechanisms of the structures of bourgeois democracy break down, or tend to break down, and the demands of the class struggle of the workers cannot be satisfied, not even partially,
PCI-PCF by a political program that does not infringe upon the fromework of the system. The declaration makes no allusion at all to the crucial problems of real revolutionary processes like the one in Portugal today (or Spain tomorrow), concentrating instead on a political development that is held to be possible in the abstract. During periods in which the two parties have been involved with bodies of the sort that arose from the 1969 struggles in Italy, for example, or when they have adopted an orientation toward the army, they have conceived of the potential organs of dual power as auxiliary structures of bourgeois democracy and have posed the objective of a "democratization" of the military apparatus in terms not dissimilar from those employed by the Chilean Communists, who, right up to the last moments, continued to uphold illusions in the army and to offer potential cover to those who were preparing the coup and the bloody repression. It its own way, the present positions of the Portuguese CP represent a verification of the inconsistency of the plans of the PCI and the PCF. The Portuguese CP today would not sign a document like the PCI-PCF declaration, and we do not rule out the possibility that the Portuguese CP will use the occasion to express a different point of view on the problems posed in the declaration. (It is likely that this has already been done internally.) Are these particular positions perhaps due to incurable Stalinism? To answer affirmatively would be hasty to say the least. It is perfectly true that the apparatus of the PCP was less exposed to the events of destalinization and that this party has maintained a more orthodox attitude toward the Soviet bureaucracy. But this is not the foctor that determines the specificity of the PCP positions. If must not be forgotten that after April 25, 1974, the ranks of the PCP were swelled with new odherents. The party is now composed of an overwhelming majority of militants and middle-level cadres that the old apparatus has not had sufficient time to assimilate through systematic Stalinist education. These militants and cadres entered the party not because they were Stalinists or favored a policy of class collaboration, but because the PCP appeared to them as the party that was most effectively and systematically struggling against the dictatorship and as the most credible instrument for an anticapital ist battle. These militants and cadres are not only subject to the daily pressures of a situation of revolutionary crisis, but also represent a vehicle through which this pressure is transmitted to all levels of the party. Second, the PCP, especially since the elections of April 25, 1975, has been caught between two fires: on the one side a strong Socialist party and on the other side a far left that, in spite of its divisions and its strategic and tactical inconsistency, constitutes an important force with growing impact among significant sectors of the proletariat. In such a context, given the problems posed not by theoretical debate but by day-to-day reality, if the PCP limited itself to responses of the type offered in the PCI-PCF declaration, it would risk being completely 22 cast aside and this would facilitate operations that would quickly turn against the party. Hence, the PCP has been compelled to oscillate, to assume eclectic positions, to combine radical formulas and "revolutionary" proclamations with the strategic plan that was formulated under the dictatorship and was applied during a whole phase of the new regime, a strategy that is not qualitatively different from the strategy of the PCI, the PCF, and even the Spanish Communist party. The conclusion is that the synthetic conceptions of the PCI-PCF declaration do not at all respond to the requirements that inspired the declaration in the first place. In prerevolutionary or revolutionary situations like those that exist or may come about before very long in some countries of capitalist Europe, a gradualist-reformist strategy is simply inapplicable and can only condemn the party that follows it to sterility, no matter how large that party's influence among the masses may bej and this in turn objectively opens the way for a reactionary offensive. Instead of abandoning themselves to declarations about the "originality" and "novelty" of their strategies, the bureaucrats of the Communist parties would do befter to reflect a bit more on historical experience, both old and new, and to draw some more adequate conclusions. Not that there is any reason to hope that they will do so. Can it be excluded that the neoreformist strategy may find application in some context? No, it cannot be ruled out a priori, that in this or that country, after achieving some success in overcoming its crisis, the bourgeoisie, in order to consolidate the situation and to go beyond ephemeral readjustments, might propose reformist operations that could entail a place for the Communist parties. But independent of the probability of this variant, such an application of the neoreformist strategy in proctice would then constitute a direct contribution to the restabilization of the system, to a new equilibrium based on new conditions. And that would not exactly prepare the transition to socialism! November 21, 1975 FOOTNOTES: 1. The Socialism That is Possible (Il Socialismo Possibile) is the title of a pamphlet written several years ago by the Italian Socialist Antonio Giolitti, who left the PCI in 1956 on the basis of rightist positions and then became an open advocate of reformist conceptions and orientations. 2. There is a small difference here between the French text and the Italian one. The first says "un terrain plus favorable" (a more favorable terrain), the second "il terreno pio favorevole" (the most favorable terrain). 3. The Communist members of the delegation spoke of positive relations between the "democratic" representatives of Italy and the United States; they also offered assurances about the PCI's desire to act in favor of international stability.
The great purges against the Croats in December 1971 marked a turn in Yugoslavia, Just after the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in May-June 1974, we analyzed the main measures that had been taken after late 1971 and outlined the main features of the orientation being pushed by the Titoist leadership, stressing the limits of the turn. (See INPRECOR, No.3, July 4, 1974, and see also the review Quatrième Internationale, No.3, July 15, 1972, and the article. "Yougoslavie: capitalisme ou socialisme? " in the magazine Critique de l'Economie Politique, No. 7-8.) What was involved was primarily an attempt to regain a police grip on a socially explosive situation that resulted from the combined defects of a bureaucratic society and so-called market socialism. Now, some sixteen months after this congress, the leadership of the LCY has just launched a new and vast national campaign to denounce "enemies of Yugoslavia. " The campaign is particularly directed against "neo-Cominformists" and their "foreign allies. * Since the middle of October there have been increasing numbers of speeches and arrests. Trials are being prepared; in Zagreb it is estimated that there have been more than a hundred arrests in that city alone. (Le Monde, November 1) Since the practice of slander, if not of frame-up trials complete with prefabricated evidence, is widespread in Yugoslavia, it is appropriate to consider the internal and international context in which this new wave of purges is unfolding. A serious economic situation It is true that internal industrial production has developed considerably and has not shown any of the signs of recession of the capitalist market economies. (Industrial production was 10.7 percent higher in 1974 than 1973.) From this point of view, the central control of large-scale investments that was initiated in order to redress the negative effects of the 1965 economic reform is beginning to show results. The economic branches that had been sacrificed by decentralization and market mechanisms (raw materials, energy, nonferrous metals) have been given priority and have developed effectively, whereas during the period immediately after the economic reform of 1965 there had been an increase in imports of these basic products even though the resources of the country had not been exploited. But Yugoslavia is suffering severely from the effects of the recession in the capitalist countries, especially the European countries with which Yugoslavia trodes heavily. The deficit in the trade balance has grown steadily as a result of the fall in Yugoslav exports to these contries. (The trade deficit for the first eight months of 1975 was $2, 583 million, S1,500 million of which was the deficit with the countries of the Common Market; the remainder results essentially from deficits with the oil-producing countries.) In addition, the threat of the return to Yugoslavia of the one million Yugoslav worken employed in capitalist countries abroad because of the severe recession in those countries is of considerable concern to the Yugoslav authorities. In 1974 some 80,000 workers returned from West Germany, and there is great fear that the rate of return is going to increase rapidly. If it is also recalled that internal unemployment is ap-