DEFEAT GOVERNMENT by A. UDRY The two-week-long campaign of support to the sixth government organized by the Socialist party and the Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic party) has been cut down to its proper size by the four days of struggle by the construction workers. The hopes of the government - or the hopes the government pretended to have - rapidly evaporated. Pinheiro lost his air of swagger in face of the tens of thousands of construction workers. The people demonstrating in front of São Bento Palace bore little resemblance to the "people" who had acclaimed Pinheiro on October 25 in Porto, November 4 in Faro, and November 10 in Lisbon. A bit shaken up, Pinheiro lost his head and in one unguarded phrase summed up the antiworker policy of the sixth government: "Vão a merda" (Go take o shif), he shouted at the tens of thousands of workers chanting their demands. That was a mistake. The workers took up the slogan and aimed it back at Pinheiro. The mobilization of the workers of a key sector of Portuguese capitalism drove home the reality of the relaHonship of class forces for all those who had been talkIng of a retreat or an inversion of the trend. After the victory of the construction workers, the demonstration called for Sunday, November 16, by the coordinating body of the workers commissions of the industrial belt around Lisbon (controlled by the Communist party), will certainly reflect the rise of the movement for workers demands that has been developing since the beginning of October. Moreover, the bourgeoisie has understood the situation quite well, even though it has decided to launch an alarmist campaign about a "coup" supposedly being prepared by. the CP. Thus, the CDS (Centre Democrátice Social - Democratic Social Center, a far-right party) issued a communique on November 15 stating: "The sixth government and the forces that support it have not succeeded in carrying through their programs. The government has no authority to compel respect and obedience or to permit the reestablishment of the minimum conditions of order, discipline, and authority without which power evaporates, states dissolve, and parties wind up perishing. " As for the PPu, it has "taken refuge" in Porto, 14
PORTUGAL affirming that. "Lisbon is no longer reliable." If the PPD is playing the card of a North-South opposition, which could encourage a reactionary offensive in the North, this nevertheless expresses the bourgeoisie's fear of the mobilizing capacity demonstrated by the construction workers. The SP took a luke-warm shof at the future of the November 16 demonstration and cried: "It is obvious that such a demonstration has the aim of preparing to block circulation in the city and of launching an assault against the basic structures of the state apparatus." The SP concluded its communiqué by calling for "vigilance" and by raising the slogan "Everyone into the streets!" Nevertheless, the Socialists refrained from organizing a counterdemonstration in Lisbon, especially a counter-demonstration around the traditional slogan: "The people are in the streets!" AMI: first defeat At the very moment that important sectors of workers are engaged in struggles for their demands, nearly all of which lead to confrontations with the government and the Ministry of Labor, the struggles of the soldiers are continuing. That is what gives a real dimension to the present political crisis. Thus, the government and the Council of the Revolution assigned the troops of the DGFA (General Air Force Depot) the task of destroying the Radio Renascença broadcasting tower in Buraca. Pinheiro de Azevedo explained: "The Council of the Revolution has accomplished its duty in the manner that appeared least risky, and the armed forces executed their task with freely observed discipline, as is proper." The day after this action, however, the paratroopers of the DGFA, united in a plenary assembly, condemned this operation and voted the following motion: "We repudiate and condemn the destruction of RR on orders emanating directly from the Council of the Revolution. *We inform public opinion that the mission was executed
by elements foreign to this unit, concretely by specialists of the PSP (Public Service Police), in the presence of paratroopers belonging to the AMI (Military Intervention Group): "Further, this action was aimed essentially at the destruction of an information instrument in the service of the exploited class and the toilers. "We demand the immediate dissolution of the AMI and we repudiate its actions. # There were also reactions in other paratrooper units. For example, the plenary assembly of the sergeants of the Paratrooper Base and School of Tancos demanded that "the paratrooper companies that have been detached from Lisbon to serve in the AMl be immediately sent back to the Tancos base. The government's success was really complete! Not only did the soldiers of the DGFA give a long explanation on the radio and television of the fact that they had not been informed of the objective of the mission, they even made a comparison between the way the paratrooper commanders tried to drag them into an attack on the RALIS (Lisbon light artillery regiment) on March 11, 1975, and the Radio Renascença operation. "Dissent" has thus taken hold in the ranks of the very troops on whom the government and the Council of the Revolution had counted for support. The explanation the soldiers gave for their refusal to continue to be part of the AMI expresses a process of rodicalization and politicization that is unusual for troops of this character, In reaction to the affack on the Rodio Renascença broadcasting tower, the soldier-paratroopers thus took a position directly opposed to the sixth goverment. A very clear cleavage was introduced between the soldiers and sergeants on the one side and the officers on the other. The latter, virtually unanimously, supported the prime minister and the Council of the Revolution. They in turn got support from the Socialist party. The defense of bourgeois institutions has a certain logic. For example, in face of the stated desire of the paratroopers not to serve as on antiworker striking force, the SP federation of the Lisbon urban zone gave its support to the office, for: "To destray the paratroopers would mean to destroy an important weapon of our revolution. " (Portugal Socialista, November 12.) Statements against the AMI were voted in many units. The soldiers of the RIA (Infantry Regiment of Abrantes), for example, held a general assembly and adopted a motion "condemning the AMI and denouncing the reacfionary maneuver of the sixth government of the bourgeoisie, which, through the formation of an army of mercenaries, is creating the conditions for the Portuguese people to be crushed by a bloody dictatorship as in Chile... Our weapons will always be at the side of the people in the struggle against fascism and capitalism. " (November 6, 1975.) Concurrently, the movement for free transportation is continuing. Hundreds of soldiers are taking the train and refusing to pay. In addition, a tendency is emerging for soldiers to take direct control of the arms depots. In the DGMC (General Depot of War Matériel) of Beirolas, a struggle commission was formed with the dim of implementing the slogan, *The weapons must be controlled by the soldiers who stand at the side of the worker and peasant masses. " A support demorstration for this struggle was organized by some soldiers from other units as well as by the workers and tenants commissions. The hierarchy is now counting on special troops returning from Angola to qualitatively strengthen the forces of intervention. The man directly responsible for the attack on Radio Renascença, Air Force General Moraise Silva, gave a long explanation of the importance of once again placing military maneuvers on the agenda. The aim was clear: the troops returning from Angola have to be drawn info a structure; their contamination has to be avoided: "The return of the air force and the troops from the excolonies gives the units a feeling of lack of mission. Under these conditions . . the creation of these detachments (combat detachments) is extremely dynamic and mobilizes the troops, " In face of the many challenges to these maneuvers by assemblies of soldiers, the general exclaimed: "It would be strange for these maneuvers not to take place, for that is the very reason for the existence of the armed forces, to defend the Portuguese people and not to serve to multiply general assemblies of soldiers." The soldiers understand the task of defending the Portuguese people somewhat differently. Of course, the level of radicalization is not even on a national scale and the measures demobilizing an imporTant part of the soldiers of the land army are going to have some effects. But it is certain that for the moment the bourgeoisie does not command sufficient forces to deal any important blows to the mass movement, af least not without risking a very serious crisis. The re-emergence of terrorist acts, carefully calculated and well prepared technically, is an index of the loss of confidence in the sixth government by reactionary sectors. In fact, as if by a miracle, these attacks had stopped when Pinheiro came to power. Today they are starting up again. Ir is even difficult for the government to utilize the police forces, the PSP and the GNR. These troops bear the mark of the past too much, and that makes their utilization politically dangerous. Moreover, they are beginning to be affected by demoralization, at least the ones stationed in Lisbon. The government's impotence, its retreats, the attitude of the military police, and the massive character of the mobilizations (in civil construction, for example must generate doubts even among those who were considered invulnerable less than two years ago. For example, more than one policeman hesitated to intervene against the picket of the workers of the Ministry of Social Communication, who wanted to prevent the secretary of state for information - a former collaborator of the "scientific" services of the Salazarist secret police - from entering the buildings of the Ministry. After several hours, the prime minister
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replaced them and dealt directly with the workers of the ministry! It thus appears that one of the characteristics of the current period, an extremely deep crisis of the state apparatus, has been confirmed and even intensified, even though the government tried to assert its authority" by shutting down Radio Renascenço. This crisis only reflects the level of class confrontation now developing in Portugal. A clear defeat The struggle of the civil construction workers come on top of the mobilizations of the metalworkers, the bakery workers, the truckers, etc. All these struggles clashed with Tomas Rosa, the minister of labor, and more generally with the government. The construction workers forced the ministers to back down. In Its latest. "emergency plan to reestablish basic economic mechanisms, *the government has clearly opted for an "austerity policy." As the plan itself recognizes: "The austerity policy is not a popular policy and consequently poses serious political problems. " (A Capital, November 10.) At five o'clock in the morning of November 14, when the government had to give in on the main demands of the construction workers, the ministers were compelled to concretely take notice of the fact that the austerity measures did indeed pose "serious political problems. " Especially since according to the text of the "emergency plan" itself, construction was considered a decisive sector for straightening out the economy as a whole (along with the export sector). Capitalist pump-priming of the construction industry implied, among other things, not making any concessions on wages, refusing to increase monthly wages from 4,500 escudos to 6, 500 escudos. For two days, the ministers had to apply some austerity of their own! The construction workers had them under siege in So Bento Palace. All the streets were blocked. The capacity for the organization of self-defense was impressive. Strict controls were established at each roadblock. In face of this show of force, the neighborhood inhabitants, almost naturally, presented their identity cards at each roadblock. The organization of automobile traffic was taken over by workers pickets. For two enfire days and nights the workers besieged the government, These thousands of workers - among whom were a large number of immigrant workers (from Cape Verde), who were totally united with their Portuguese comrades — quickly developed a sharp sense of political response. That is an undeniable sign of a revolufionary upsurge. On November 14, for example, at two o'clock in the morning, the negotiations commission annbunced that the prime minister was prepared to accept the proposals that had been made, but that he had to consult the Council of the Revolution, which was then meeting at Belem Palace. The negotiations commission had already accepted this request by Azevedo. But the thousands of workers on the scene responded: "Pinheiro does not get out! The 16
-POI The Constituent Assembly Council of the Revolution has to come here!" In two days these thousands of workers, who had gone on such a strike for the first time, had assimilated the basic elements of political tactics. They had perfectly understood where their strength lay: The capacity to physically prevent the government from making any move, not only because of the level of self-defense, but also because of the very crisis of the repressive apparatus. A government so well under control that when a helicopter arrived carrying food (on the night of November 13), the workers seized the cargo and taught the ministers what austerity really means. Finally, the degree of the organization of self-defense constituted a guarantee against any adventurist military action on the part of certain ultraleftist organizations who too easily confound the seizure of power with the seizure of the "winter palace." There is no doubt that the victory of the construction workers will boost the feeling of strength of the entire working class. It will also act as a point of reference for future struggles. For the first time, during a struggle for their own demands, the workers took such sweeping measures as the construction of barricades in the cities, controlling traffic, etc. All these experiences, which go beyond the usual terrain of the factory, are essential in preparing an effective response and counter-offensive to all the maneuvers of reaction. A new step was taken by the Portuguese working class, drawn into action this time by a section of the class that had not been part of the vanguard. That is also a sign of the revolutionary upsurge.
UGAL: Along with this "triumph, " very advanced lists of demands have been drawn up in many sectors (see INPRECOR, No.37, November 6). Three points should be noted. First, the importance of solidarity with the most important struggles. Every time a mobilization acquires a certain breadth or becomes a point of crystallization, mations of support come from workers commissions from all over the country. Second, a debate has begun within the workers vanguard over the question of workers control. Since September the "commission of control of production and management" at Soreframe has been publishing a bulletin called "Workers Control. " In the big SACOR factory (petrol), a real program of workers control, preceded by an explanatory text, was voted in a general assembly. This definition of workers control was published in the Soreframe bulletin: "Workers control is thus a transitional phase. It is a school in which the workers learn the secrets of managing their enterprises and in which new democratic methods of management are created. " While the workers of many enterprises, and even restaurants and shops, immediately place the label "workers control" on their struggle, the reporting of such resolutions - by República, for example — obviously plays an important role in determining the objectives of the worken actions. Finally, because of the link between the level of the demands (workers control, socialist planning, reconversion) and the confrontation with the government, the problem of the functioning of the workers commissions, of their coordination and centralization, is posed ever more sharply. During the plenary assembly of the workens commissions of the "Lisbon industrial belt, " an assembly controlled and strongly manipulated by the CP, the secretariat could not prevent the debate from turning around this crucial question. In line with their perspective, the members of the CP emphasized the role of the workers commissions as "organs of pepular will and of defense of gains won, " that is, as organs that exist side by side with the institutions of a bourgeois-democratic parliamentary system. Other tendencies, on the other hand, affirmed that the workers commissions are instruments through which workers power is asserted and are the organs of the embryonic popular power of the future proletarian state. " A good part of the strategic debate now going on can be summed up in these two definitions. The objective basis for assuring a centralization of the workers commissions is thus being affirmed ever more strongly. The same is true for the tenants commissions, which on the one hand are much more subiect to divisions among the various political currents and on the other hand are very heterogeneous in terms of their real representativeness, the degree to which they function rign letuires to But ery clear position i favor i workers democracy and propaganda and concrete initiatives that pose centralization as an inherent necessity of the movement for workers demands. The political weakness of the far left, often marked by a frenetic ultraleftism, constitutes one of the major obstacles to the launching of this process of centralization, which would be possible despite a relatively uneven development of the workers mobilization between the North and the South. Remodeling the government During the most recent period, the CP has undeniably taken the initiative again and is asserting its authority against a far left that is incapable of taking advantage of the relationship of forces and the gains that were made between August and the beginning of September. Thus, the CP has proven its capacity for mobilization in the Alentejo and in Lisbon through the peasant organizations and the Intersindical (trade-union federation). Its objective is clear. On October 29 Octavio Pato, leader of the CP in the Constituent Assembly, declared: "The solution to the crisis must come about through a rapprochement and entente between the political parfies and the MFA, through an entente among the left parties, the CP and the SP... . The solution to the crisis necessarily implies the existence of a government that has the confidence of the various tendencies of the MFA, the officers, sergeants, soldiers and sailors, the left parties, the popular masses, the working class. Only a government that is capable of inspiring this confidence will be able to reestablish the authority, discipline, and intensive work that it is essential to develop. " (A Capital, October 30.) The CP does not want to overthrow the government, for it fears the crisis that would open up as a result of the fall of the government while the workers mobilization is continuing. It desires only a realignment of the government and of the Council of the Revolution around an SP-CP-MFA axis. Because of that, the CP refrains from attacking Pinheiro de Azevedo and attacks mainly the PPD and various ministers. In addition, in face of the mobilization of the construction workers, the CP lagged behind somewhat (the union organized and controlled the mobilizafion) and took its distance from certain measures of struggle. On November 13, for example, the CP published a communiqué affirming: "While supporting the demonstration and the encirclement of São Bento Palace, the CP nevertheless disagrees with the sequestering of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly and of the prime minister. " The overture toward the SP and the respect due Pinheiro have their exigencies! Given the workers mobilizations, it is not impossible that a section of "the nine" (the group of Melo Antunes) may arrange a rapprochement with the Gongalves supporters in order to present some proposals to the SP, and formally to the CP, proposals for the recomposition of the government on an SP-CP-MFA basis. The sixthand-a-half provisional government could then come into existence. It would remain provisional. This "solution" would be difficult, but any other would be even more difficult. November 15, 1975