defeats that have been suffered in recent years.
Havana Conference of Latin American Communist Parties APOLOGY FOR DEFEAT by PABLO ROJAS It will henceforth be necessary to take account of what the Cuban workers state formally calls its alignment not with the "socialist camp" in general but with the Communist parties of the continent in particular. To analyze the results of this meeting in this context thus involves an analysis of the process of the Cuban revolution, of the course followed by this workers state, of the significance of Castroism as a political current over the past fifteen years, of the defeat of the guerrillas and the bloody failure of the "peaceful road to socialism" in Chile, This requires deepening the analysis of the causes of the defeats in Brazil, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, etc., as well as broaching subjects like imperialist strategy in the continent since Cuba, the role of Brazil today, the role of the armed forces throughout the continent, and so on. Reaffirmation of the bloc with the «national bourgeoisie» The document of the conference is divided into nine chapters in which a description and historical analysis of the various periods of struggle on the continent is offered. The text begins with the defeat suffered by the Spanish colonialists in the Battle of Ayacucho against the Latin American "independentist" forces, which occurred 150 years ago, and runs through the present day. This manner of beginning the document by mentioning the struggle for the "first independence" is much more than a purely formal and rhetorical device. In a general way, it points to what the overall line of the analysis will be. Yesterday the Battle of Ayacucho, during which the "first independence" was consolidated; today the conference of the CPs on the struggle for the "seeond independence. " Yesterday a foreign enemy on the continent, an imperialist power that was able to be beaten by dint of the common efforts of various movements of "national liberation, " which in each country - and beyond the borders of each country - acted above and beyond the varying "social conditions" of their component parts. This means that all classes -regardless of the "detail" of their different interests -
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LATIN AMERICAN CPs were able to unite against the main enemy and drive him off the continent. Today as well, the Communist parties cite a main enemy: Yankee imperialism, the foreign power that oppresses all peoples and plunders the countries of Latin America. Why not do the same thing today as was done yesterday, they reason, and unite our efforts in a common struggle above and beyond borders and also, why not, above and beyond the various existing "social conditions "? We could almost say that this is the fundamental "message" of the conference, the nub of the declaration. Hence the constant mention throughout the nine chapters, whenever the opportunity arises, of the "patriotic" character of the struggle for the "second independence." Nevertheless, this message is not abstract and is not addressed to "the peoples in general. " What is involved is not a ceremonial declaration of patriotism launched into thin air with no particular target. On the contrary, the target was named very specifically, several times, so there can be no doubt: all the patriotic, anti-imperialist, and democratic forces. In chapter 6 these forces are labeled more precisely: "It is for this reason, without abandoning the struggle for democrafic rights and for the conquest of new structures in our countries that we communists are prepared to support the positions of Latin American governments that can stand for the defense of our natural resources or can assert their will to put an end to the attempts of multinational corporations to preserve and increase their control of our economies every day." "This historical reality does not at all mean that there do not exist sectors within the Latin American bourgeoisie that because of the contradiction between their interests and those of imperialism adopt certain positions analogous to those of the proletariat, peasantry, and other noncapitalist layers of the population in struggle against imperialism and for the conquest of economic independence and complete national sovereignty. " "Consequently, these bourgeois sectors can contribute to the unity of democratic and anti-imperialist action jointly with the popular forces." "The CPs and all other anti-imperialist fighters ... accord great importance to this possibility ... which constitutes an indispensable factor in this complex and multifaceted struggle," "The incorporation into the broad anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchie struggle front of forces and organizations that represent sectors of the bourgeoisie is of great importance." Not only is this possibility of fronts and alliances established, but precedents are sought in Latin America, from the Popular Front of Pedro Aguirre Cerda in Chile to the defense and lauding of the "efforts" of the Latin American CPs before and during the second world war *to form national, antifascist, and anti-imperialist fronts. " It is indicated in passing that "the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International (1935) played an important role in this serse." Finally, 30 the text refers - with no doubts or hesitations - to the "Chilean experience" of our time. On this subject, the following is said in chapter 4 of the document: "It was possible to obtain this victory (in the 1970 elections -INPRECOR) because the popular movement had succeeded in uniting around a correct political line that precisely showed who the main enemies were: imperialism and the monopolist and agrarian oligarchy, against whom the struggle was oriented. " "The Chilean working class had constituted a political and social front - Unidad Popular - which succeeded, thanks to this correct policy, in winning the government and at the same time in gaining a piece of political power." And for good measure: "The conference energetically condemns the foreign policy of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party, " which "Foments pseudorevolutionary groups that, on the basis of a false radicalism, divide the left, attack the Communist parties, inhibit the development of progressive processes, and often act as agents of the enemy within the revolutionary movement." This point is closely linked to what is said in chapter 8 about other groups of the left, namely "certain organizations that claim to be Marxist-Leninist, * in regard to which "the time has come to cite our differences with certain strategic conceptions and tactical viewpoints held by these forces. " "The Communist parties ... cannot pass in silence over their differences with these groups, but must always establish their differences with these erroneous positions and adventurist attitudes, which they condemn. " To conclude: "An anti-Communist and anti-Soviet left is inconceivable, Communists will work to isolate those who adopt such attitudes." Let us stop here for a moment. The document is dated June 13. On June 27 in Berlin, at the conclusion of another conference, the representatives abrood of the parties that compose the Chilean Unidad Popular released a document. In reference to the Chilean MIR, they said: "Antifascist unity with the MIR is possible on the basis of a common policy that eliminates any intention of division or alternative and is based upon mutual respect. " It should be noted that somewhat earlier in the same document the Unidad Popular said: "The armed men (that is, the Chilean armed forces -INPRECOR) who, deceived by antihistorical ideology and propaganda, believed themselves to be outside the popular liberation movement have a possibility to express their demands here (that is, within the antifascist front the UP proposes for Chile today - INPRECOR)." These quotations give an indication of the conceptions that guide the political policy of the Latin American Communist parties at the present time. The role of Cuba Faithful to their policy of "revolution by stages" and their conception of the bourgeois-democratic character of the revolution at the present stage, the Communist
parties have been adept at class alliances, the policy of popular fronts, and the "peaceful transition to socialism. " The Chilean example is still fresh in the memories of the Latin American masses; the "peaceful form" in which the CP led the Chilean working class to a massacre is a lesson that the masses have not forgotten; but the conference forgot it, favorably recalling the "experience" (it would be more appropriate to call it a reformist adventure). Not content with that, the conFerence treated the "Chilean experience" as a good example to be repeated. The CPs committed themselves to promoting similar experiences wherever conditions permit. There is nothing new in this, and it would not be very important to analyze a conference of the CPs if there were not some new element that has altered the Latin American political panorama and will alter it still more in the Immediate future. The new element is that the conference reached political agreement with the Cuban CP, which for more than a decade had maintained an attitude of relative political independence of the Soviet bureaucracy and hod tried to stimulate the revolufionary struggle on the continent apart from the CPs and against them, creating and supporting alternative organizations in each country and often publicly attacking the CPs, sometimes in speeches by Fidel Castro himself. OLAS represented the most important Cuban attempt to form an organizational alternative to the traditional Communist parties on a continental scale. This conference represented the formal end of OLAS, but in addition, it acknowledged, with the signature of the Cuban CP, the defeat of the previous attempt and the recognition of its failure. Cuba also tried to form the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (Council of Revolutionary Coordination) for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay in 1974. Does the present conference mean an end to support to the Junta? Has its failure also been recognized? Everything indicates that this is the case, not only because of the content of the document and the political tasks it outlines, but also because of the treatment of the organizations that are members of the Junta. The Chilean MIR, for example, received the treatment already mentioned at the meeting of the UP in Berlin on the part of the Chilean CP, "Fraternal party" of the Cuban CP. Also because of what was said by Armando Hart, a member of the political bureau of the Cuban CP in his speech in Havana last year in honor of Miguel Enriquez. This is important not only because it implies recognition of that defeat, but also because of the enormous influence of the Cuban leadership on the "new vanguard" that arose throughout the continent under the impetus of the victory of the Cuban revolution. The traditional CP's have been unable to capitalize on the emergence of this new vanguard; in fact, they were almost completely bypassed by it. That is why this conference will have important effects and grave consequences for the future. The word of Cuba is listened to and respected by broad sectors of the masses throughouf the continent.
It is also true, however, that Cuba no longer plays a leadership role in relation to significant sectors of this vanguard. It is a fact of life that the balance-sheet on attempts to duplicate the Cuban experience is negative, and it is also a fact that many of the organizations and tendencies of the broad vanguard no longer act in accordance with the line set by the Cuban leadership. The class struggle has compelled them to seek other roads apart from the old Castroist schemas. All this is true, but the point made earlier about the continuing influence of the Cubans remains valid as well. And that is what the CP are seeking to take advantage of: They want to use the influence and authority of Cuba to draw sectors of the masses now standing outside their control back toward their reformist orientation. At the same time, they want to use this against the vanguard and its organizations, placing them before the dilemma: Either hitch onto the reformist wagon of class collaboration or, as is stressed in the document, confront the fact that the CPs are agreed on "working to isolate those who adopt such positions, " that is, positions opposed to class collaboration. But today it is not simply the traditional CPs who are asserting this; today the weight of Cuba has also been thrown into the balance. The groups of the "anti-Soviet left" have been warned that if they "persist" in their positions, they will have to suffer attacks. Cuban support for the "anti-Soviet left" has now ended; the Castroists and all the centrist organizations of the continent now find themselves caught between hammer and anvil. Is this on advance sign of the end of this type of centrism in Latin America? The Cuban signature on this document will have devastating effects on Latin American centrism in general. It will lead to much confusion and demoralization. The consequences of the future application of the line of the conference will be even more serious. The worst projects of class collaboration and the most counterrevolutionary alliances will begin to emerge with the active support of the Cuban workers state. The effects of confusion among the masses will in turn have important consequences. Revolutionaries will now have to count not simply on the silence or passivity of Cuba, as has been the case in recent years, but on Cuba's active opposition through the support Havana will extend to each national CP. The full impact of these consequences will be felt over the coming period, but one period has now definitively ended and another has opened. Many Latin American centrists had placed their hopes in the changes that "would lead Cuba back to its previous policy, "changes that were somehow expected to emerge miraculously at the time of the first congress of the Cuban CP. Those who believed in the maneuvers and tricks of a few leaders or factions will now have to do a lot of thinking about the document that the Cuban leadership has signed. This document defines a whole strategic line, offering positions on the character of the revolution on the continent, the role of the USSR, the "socialist camp, " imperialism, the bourgeoi-
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LATIN AMERICAN CPs sie of the continent, the mass movement, the program, Vietnam, Portugal, the CPs, the role of the armed forces, and so on. Moreover, the Latin American CPs, weakened and seriously affected by their reformist adventures, need the recognition and approval of Cuba. There is now no doubt that the CPs will present themselves to the masses and vanguard of each country as the big witners in the more than ten-year-long historic struggle against the Cuban line, Cuba now recognizes the CPs, says they are correct, adopts their line and, going even further, accepts the line of the "new period" that opened after Chile, the period of "progressive", military governments, It amounts to a de facto self-criticism by the Cuban CP of its line of more than ten years" duration, without explanation and without analysis. Before its first congress, the Cuban CP made a complete turn, burying everything it had done during the first decade of the Latin Ameri can revolution. Meaning and consequences of the conference It would take a long time to analyze the errors of the Cuban leadership. If must be remarked, however, that This leadership sought to stimulate the revolution in all countries, The Cuban leaders fried → with many failures andipscillatiors and with much empiricism - to create a new Cuba, to break Cuba's isolation, to overcome the danger of imperialist attack, without retreating before or conciliating with imperialism, but by opposing imperialism with many fronts of struggle. A new Lafin American workers state would have given the Cubans a new base of support, weakened the bourgeois and imperialist forces, and given an impetus to the socialist revolution in all countries. Cuba' political independence of the USSR and then sacialist community" could have asserted itself only if Cuba had strengthened. its positiors in Latin America. An important part of the Cuban leadership was conscious ofthis of bottom, even if only empirically. They understood the political impossibility of socialism in one countryke country only ninety miles from the impertalist colossun of that. The most heroic and most tragic Crestimony to this empirical consclousness was Che's guerrilla struggle in Bolivia and the entire continental plan that lay behind that struggle. But the Cuban Ieodechip always held a paternalistic attide toward the masser. It belteved more in the organizations and apparatuses than in the working class. and the explolled theme lves. It le not enough to create groups for the struggles policy in needed to organize the intervention of the masses their self-organization and their independent mobilization, In the realm of competence of the apparatus, the Cubans-were lost in advance against the Cis. It was within the working class itself that Cuba should have contested the reformists. The lack of understanding of the role of a real Leninist party, of the transitional program, and of the 32 Editeur responsoble: Rene Groslambert, 34 rue Nothomb, 1040 Bruxelles importance of workers councils in Cuba itself are deviations that were paid for very dearly in the development of the revolutionary process; these are not just "Trotskyist obsessions. " Initial immaturity and a "young and idealistic " empirical spirit connot overcome the inexorable and implacable laws of the class struggle. The price was very high. Thousands of the best of the Latin American vanguard paid with their lives, and the working class of many countries suffered grave defeats, counting their dead in thousands. Cuba remained isoTated ond suffered manifold failures throughout the conMinent. Eventually, the Cuban leadership capitulated in face of its coristent reformist adversaries. The analysis of this process applies not only to the Cuban leadership, but also to the Latin American revolutionaries who were unable to create another Cuba, They failed for reasons and even motives that were often iden-ical to those of the Cubans themselves. A big responsibility aiso falls upon the revolutionary Marxists, the Trotskyists. At the hour of defeat the reformists, on the basis of their analysis, draw a conclusion more optimistic than ever. First, in theit laboratory of class conciliation, they "isolate" the main enemy. " Then they demonstrate that whoever is not the main enemy is in fact a "main friend. Hence their policy of alliances, the "antifascut* fronts that they propose, and, going a bit further, the joint work with progressive" governments of "patriotic officers and their most "loyal and fien" support to these governments. Ther is the "realistic" policy of the Communist parties (which has led them to characterize the Chilean coup esthe work of a group of "raitorous officers" and to now discover "progressive secfors" within that same military hierarchy). Their strategy: "isolate the main enemy" and then, in alliance with all the other social sectory, "democratize" the situation in order to use interolass diliances to form "brood" fronts that permit them forget into the government and, as they stress in the cose of the Chilean elections of 1970, to simultaneously obtain "a piece of political power." In this way they intend to demonstrate the superidrity of socialism through economic success and thus to "convince" even sectors of the bourgeoisie of the necessity for a "pedceful transition" and to undertake the struggle for the "second independence." The meeting of the Chilean Unidad Populde in Berlin, which fook placerenly wo weekr after the Havana conference, went in the same directionp in their apology for defeat they called upon the Latin American prolehoriat to hitch Tself to the wagon of the "progressive" military governments ond to undertake new odventures of class collaboration by building populan fronts broader than those of the past. Their balanse-sheet of the Chilcan experience is that the UPwas not reformist enough. Today they have taken the rood of rectifying" That error. There is no doubt that this policy of popular fronts of a "new type" will be one of the elements that will mark the political future of Latin America. September 13, 1975