A few days before independence, November 11, the military situation suddenly deteriorated for the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). On the northern front the forces of the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola - National Front for the Liberation of Angola) have stepped up their pressure on Luanda, although they have not reached the area around Quifangondo, where the water-treatment plant for the capital is located. For several weeks the FNLA has been intent on taking this village in order to break the resistance of the population. The major weapon being used in these encirclement operations is the Panhard fank equipped with 60 mm mortar and 75 mm recoilless cannon mounted on jeeps. The defense by the FAPLA (the armed forces of the MPLA) Is being waged through two main tactics: bombardments with Soviet 122mm missiles and counterattacks by light units equipped with grenade launchers and AK-47 rifles. The stagnation of the Luanda front is bad for the MPLA. It restricts an important part of MPLA forces to a very small part of the territory, tires and discourages the population of the city, and, finally, permits the FNLA to advance toward Malange and solidify its apparatus in the northern part of the country. At the same time, the military situation in the South has changed qualitatively. Several weeks ago, the MPLA controlled the entire coast and part of the province of Huila. UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), barred from Nova Lisboa and Siloa Porto, hardly extended beyond the provinces of Huambo and Bie. In the past several days, however, the relationship of forces has been turned around. Sa da Bandeira fell, then Mossämedes, and finally Benguela and Lobito. For the first time since July, UNITA and FNLA reinforcements in the center and south command a broad opening to the sea, which allows them to bring in supplies and use a pincer strategy against Luanda. Apart from these military aspects of the situation, it must be noted that Lobito is the country's second major port after Luanda and that Benguela is the terminal of the famous railroad line that carries copper from Zaire and Zambia. Thus reorganized in the South, the forces of UNITA and the FNLA will be able to attack South Cuanzo province and try to take Malange from the south. What has happened to make such a turnabout of the situation possible? The first cause, and this is undoubt-
Angola: INDEPENDENCE by C.GABRIEL edly the major factor, is the massive military support imperialism has given the reactionary forces during the past period. Sa da Bandeira was retaken with the aid of South African troops and Portuguese mercenaries supplied by the ELP (Portuguese Liberation Army, a far-right paramilitary group). Several weeks earlier, UNITA president Jonas Savimbi had revealed that his organization would soon acquire exceptional heavy weaponry. And that happened. In the North, the training of FLA forces by troops from Zaire has not diminished, and Zaire itself has received increased military assistance from the United States and France. As a sort of warning, France has just delivered the first Mirage jet fighters to the Zairois air force. While South Africa is taking an increasingly decisive part in the conflict, and while Zaire is massively supporting the FNLA and Zambia is doing the same for UNITA, the military aid to the MPLA from the so-called progressive African countries is a bluff. Granted, the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) is aiding the MPLAin the transfer of matériel, and Guinea, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique are giving diplomatic support to the Neto leadership of the MPLA. But when Congolese President N'gouabi threatens an intervention by his army, one can only smile, given the instability of this regime and the disciplinary internal function of this army. Once again, the Organization of African Unity is demonstrating its counterrevolutionary function. Once again, the grotesque Illusion of a "progressive Africa" is crumbling. Against the nationalist rhetoric of "progressive Africa, " a very real world is organizing, a world composed of the strong links in the imperialist chain in the region: the South African and Zairois armies. Nevertheless, the reverses of the MPLA cannot be accounted for solely by the intrinsic military power of its enemies. Other factors come into play. The immensity of the country makes it impossible for a small politicomilitary apparatus emerging from a rural guerrilla war to control the country militarily and administratively. The distances involved, combined with transport difficulfies, have made the logistical factor decisive, and the FARA has no air force. It is certainly on this level that the Soviet aid to the MPLA has been especially inadequate, massive supplies of helicopters are needed. Moreover, the duration of the battles and their civilwar character have accelerated the decomposition of Angolan society, particularly in the cities. Centrifugal ethnic forces have massively reappeared and a section
ANGOLA of the population has preferred to return to its region of origin, thus increasing social disorganization and aiding the control of the population by tribal notables cultivated by the FLA and UNITA. The industrial investments of the post several years had permitted the development of a proletariat that was young and concentrated, although little skilled and lacking in troditions of struggle. In 1973 about 130, 000 wage earners were employed in manufacturing producfion, mainly in the industrial zones of Luanda and Lobito. But because of its youth this proletariat could not avoid the traditional pressures of its rural origins. The MPLA itself was not shielded from this weakness of the "universal point of view" conferred by the urban milieu on the proletariat cut off from its peasant origins. The reduction of the MPLA's antitribalism to ideological slogans did not help to raise the consciousness of the most backward sectors. UNITA's control of the most important agricultural region is causing a food shortage that is giving an impetus to the exodus of the population. In Luanda, lines form in front of the stores early in the morning. The food departments are almost empty; oil, salt, sugar, and meat have become scarce. A kilogram (2.2 pounds) of rice now costs 20 or 25 escudos; the previous price was 9 escudos a kilo. The price of salt has risen from 1 to 3 escudos. Manioc, which is the basic foodstuff for the African populations, has risen in price threefold, and the MPLA is trying to reduce this inflation by organizing distribution by "neighborhood commissions." Finally, the departure of the Portuguese is intensifying the disorganization of the trade networks. Such a situation generates apathy among the masses and is now affecting the structures of "popular power, voking a decline in dynamism and increasing tailendism of the MPLA leadership on the part of these structures. Internationalization The Scuth African intervention has now become official. The Americans are no longer hiding the aid the CIA has given the FNLA and UNITA. An article by Leslie Gelb in the September 25 New York Times asserted that reliable sources in the CIA considered Holden's FNLA , a possible alternative to Portuguese colonialism as long ago as 1962. Nevertheless, the imperialist commitment in Angola was not deliberately set on provoking civil war. After April 25, 1974, when the Salazarist regime was overthrown, the divisions of the MPLA and the weakening of the organization rendered quite credible the Spinolist operation based around the FNLA and the organizations of the Portuguese colons. What imperialism totally underestimated was the urban mass movement and its immediate adherence to the MPLA, which, despite its weakened condition, conserved great prestige. It was too late to take advantage of the political weakness of the MPLA. It was too late to integrate the leadership or a faction of the leadership into the neocolonialist project. The Alver accords and the coalition government came too late.* The mass movement was placing its trust in the MPLA. The right was no longer able to counterpose itself to the MPLA. Lucio Lara of the MPLA declared, "Part of the population has been armed, but that was done in July 1974 to resist aggression from reactionary whites. These self-defense units have since placed themselves under the MPLA banner, but we do not control them. " The MPLA leodership, which in spite of is divisions is on the whole a petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership, then had no choice but to rely on the mass movement for "self-defense" against the FLA; the MPLA leadership thus decided to develop this movement while maintaining control over it. No imperialist group placed any trust in the MPLA, because of the mass movement that remained attached to it. The provocations of the FNLA in Luanda and its physical attacks in the muceques (the urban slums) turned out to be insufficient to break down the activity of the masses. It thus became necessary to opt for civil war, otherwise there was a risk of losing the last trump cards for negotiations with the Neto leadership of the MPLA. But the internationalization of the conflict meant not only the reaction of imperialism against the movement of the Angolan masses. It also meant interimperialist conflicts exacerbated by the eclectic links maintained by the FNLA and UNITA throughout the world. Thus, the intervention of South Africa is also an intervention aimed at strengthening UNITA; the aim is to stabilize a zone in direct contact with Namibia, mainly the Ovambo region and the Caprivi strip, which constitute the key regions in Pretoria's strategy. ** Zambia, which is now on a honeymoon with the South African regime based on the mutual desire to preserve stability in southern Africa, is involved in this because UNITA can assure Zambia that the Benguela railroad will continue to function and thus to carry Zambian copper to the sea. Thus, the southern counteroffensive also represents a political conflict with the FNA aimed at guaranteeing a fair regional balance for the future neocolonial Angola so as to preserve the markets for the development of the Cunene valley. The Cassinga mines, which are owned by Krupp, and the European and South African investments increase the interest of the Common Market in aiding Savimbi's UNITA. *The "Alvor accords" were signed in Alvor, Portugal, on January 15, 1975. They set up a coalition government composed of representatives of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, with a representative of the Portuguese government acting as "arbitor." **Namibia, just south of Angola, is occupied by South Africa in defiance of United Nations resolutions and the will of the country's inhabitants. Ovamboland, the territory of the Ovambo tribe, is in the northern region of Namibia and is used by the South African regime as a source of forced labor for mines in Namibia. The Caprivi Strip, a 300-mile-long, 40-mile wide band, is an extension of northeast Namibia separating Angola and Zambia on the north from Botswana on the south.
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Savimbi has implicitly recognized that without this
"mandate" he would be unable to play such a political role. On October 19 he stated (in the Cameroons) :
"Neto will not be able to create an African Cuba as he announced, because Angola, regardless of the sentiments of the population, is located in a zone that is too sensitive politically and strategically. " In other words, what the Angolan people have to understand is that the lusts of imperialism will be stronger than their own mobilizations!
The same Savimbi, in Paris once again, told Agence
France-Presse on October 27 that "if Africa can do nothing, no one will be able to prevent the United Nations from sending in troops. " And he recognized, without protest, that South Africa was effectively occupying the province of Huila in the South.
The final battle?
The FNLA and UNITA, armed wings of imperialism, prepared for November 11 as one prepares for a stage in a struggle; but they did not consider this to be the final battle. The battle will continue, regardless of what form it takes.
ZAIR E o Henrique de Carvalho Telkeira Caga Coutinhe
• Cuita
Cuanavale
CUANDO CUBANGO The MPLA has decided on a "general mobilization" to repel the invaden. Such an initiative could give new strength to the mass movement, provided it is accompanied by a clear political definition of the stakes involved. But the leadership has now announced that it will establish a "government of national union" including "independent patriotic personalities." If is not very precise, but it maintains the "nationalist" and frontist formulations of the MPLA. In a recent issue of the MPLA's newspaper, Vitoria é Certa, the leadership explained how it sees the situation: "Our movement has raised the slogan Let us construct a broad anti-imperialist front, let us defeat the lackies of imperialism and create a democracy of a new type!' ... In that sense, this is a just struggle that will contribute to strengthening the camp of the progressive forces on a world scale, the camp of the exploited in struggle against the exploiters. It will aid in the inevitable fall of imperialism. Now, this struggle against imperialism can be victorious if it draws together all the anti-imperialist forces of our fatherland. Among these forces will be the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and the anti-imperialist layers of the Angolan bourgeoisie. : .. Nevertheless, our revolu-
5
ANGOLA tionary vanguard must be prepared to create a government of a democracy of a new type in our country. This government represents an alliance of all the anti-imperialist classes, which must be led by the most consistently revolutionary class. . . . Democratic centralism and discussion will occur among the organized popular masses on all the national problems and on the application in practice of the conclusions reached by the govemment.. • • To achieve its aims, this government will have to struggle for the nationalization of the big industrial, commercial, and banking enterprises. But since this government represents an alliance of various classes, it will not eliminate the existence of private property, nor will it prohibit the development of capitalist production. In relation to the Angolan peasants, this government will have to define a consistent agrarian reform in its program. Land abandoned by the colons will remain the property of those who till it." Obviously, such rhetoric is used in order to satisfy everybody within the MPLA. If is symbolized by Agostinho Neto, who is a sort of Bonaparte standing above tendencies. "Democracy of a new type" is nothing but the concept of the party-state formulated in a situation characterized by pressure from the mass movement. Let this movement retreat, and the concept will become reality, as was the case in Guinea under Sekou Toure and as is now happening in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The leadership team, drawing its legitimacy from the nationalist struggle, bases itself on holding the masses strictly in check through powerless committees in which bureaucratism and careerism are cultivated, committees that supposedly represent "mass control over the party. In such a political context, revolutionary Marxists support the MPLA against imperialist reaction, against the FLA and UNITA, and against the Zairois and South African allies of these organizations, but they also address themselves to the mass movement so that the "organs of popular power" may become real instruments of the power of the masses. They work for real independence of the mass organizations and committees from the MPLA. They work for the future state to guarantee democratic rights, the right of political organization for all anti-imperialists, for the right to publish literature, hold meetings, and so on. They work not for an MPLA government with people like Lucio Lara under the cover formula "democracy of a new type" (with the class content ignored), but instead for a government of a new type, a workers and peasants government responsible to assemblies of delegates. To do this, there cannot be a "new course" on paper aimed at winning over the leadership of the movement. The vanguard must be regrouped and the construction of the revolutionary party must be prepared. In the political resolution of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International (February 1974) it was pointed out that "in the context of the readjustment of imperialist strategy in southern Africa, the development of the process of permanent revolution on the basis of the internationalization of the conflict throughout this region (southem Africa - INPRECOR) will be able to be achieved mainly through a clarification within the MPLA and
FRELIMO, revolutionary nationalist movements with multiclassist conceptions." The "mainly" meant that a section of the urban movement, in which the MPLA was not at all implanted at that time, would also make an important contribution to the political recomposition. Now, after April 25, the totality of the radical urban elements have joined the MPLA, particularly through the organs of "popular power." That is why it is more correc today to consider that the political recomposition will take place through a clarification within the MPLA toward the regroupment of an anticapitalist tendency, for the construction of a revolutionary party. International support It is this point that is forgotten by those who believe that for revolutionary Marxists to support the MPLA is heresy. We must not support any particular group, we are told, because all three adversaries are nationalists with very similar programs and there is, after all, no revolutionary party. Thus, the Fourth International should pose the question of the roads that lead to the building of such a party. What would Angolan political life be like if Holden's kind of order reigns in Luanda? What would become of the hundreds of militants working in the muceques and in the university around anticapitalist slogans? They would be the first victims, as is attested to by the attitude of the FLA before July 10. In several communiqués the FLA declared that "the people themselves have objectively delegated popular power to the liberation movements" and that it is because of "the infiltration of certain bodies (among them the neighborhood committees) by anarchist elements and agitators • that the FLA has always opposed any form of Angolan organization outside the liberation movements." That is what is involved in supporting the MPLA. On the eve of November 11 it is regrettable to observe that international support is scarcely any greater than it was during the fourteen years of the armed struggle. The committees in Europe slowed duwn their activity after April 25 because these committees, most often controlled by reformists, had illusions in the anti-neocolonial character of the new Portuguese regime. Today this past weighs heavily against relaunching international solidarity. The lack of massive and permanent support to the MPLA and to the Angolan people will in turn weigh heavily on the relationship of forces with the counterrevolution and on the prospect of a social transformation of the struggle, which is still possible. It will not be possible for anyone to demonstrate that support to the Angolan socialist revolution could avoid the necessity of supporting the MPLA when the whole of the anti-imperialist youth are assembled around the MPLA and the counterrevolution is embodied in the FLA and UNITA. November 9, 1975
The truce at the beginning of November that put an end to the fighting in Beirut and the rest of Lebanon in no sense represents a return to social peace or the reestablishment of the situation prevailing before the outbreak of the civil war. At bottom, nothing is settled; the conditions that led to the outbreak of the civil war persist, and a new resort to arms could occur at any moment. What is Lebanon? Ever since its formation, Lebanon has increasingly become the almost exclusive private property of the Maronite Christian comprador bourgeoisie. Little interested in the development of this economically backward coun try, this bourgeoisie draws its commercial and Financial strength from the position it occupies at the crossroads of economic operations between the Arab East and the imperialist West. Its unique function as banker and transit organizer for funds in the region has allowed this bourgeoisie to amass immense fortunes. The lack of any juridical controls over international exchange, a result of the lack of a state capable of imposing its law in the realm of trafficking, has little by little undermined the structure of this state, capitalist anarchy and the frantic race for profits eventually working against the general interest of the bourgeoisie. A precise idea of the reality of this financial paradise was provided by the recent publication of a notice to foreign banks from the Banking Association of Lebanon stating that "since the beginning of the present events, the exchange market has remained relatively balanced without the Bank of Lebanon being able to intervene at any time. Consequently, Lebanese monetary reserves in gold and currency have remained unchanged, at their relatively high level. These reserves exceed three times the amount of Lebanese pounds in circulation (if gold is evaluated at market prices). " During these years of the assertion of the commercial and financial role of the Maronite bourgeoisie of this state, a sizeable per-
The factors that led to the present clashes have accumulated at growing speed throughout the history of Lebanon since the country was created on a confessional basis in 1943, when it was formed as an independent state. The development of the international situation in the Arab East, combined with the internal contradictions of Lebanon itself, led the country to internal warfare.