CRISIS
OF SOVIET
AGRICULTURE by ETTORE SALVINI The news coming out of the Soviet Union about this year's grain harvest gets more pessimistic every day. In any event, if is already clear that agricultural production this year will fall far short not only of the objecfives of the economic plan buf also of last year's producticn levels. (The total harvest will probably be equal to or even less than the disastrous harvest of 1972.) Agricultural production accounts for more than 20% of Soviet national income(l), but three-quarters of all consumer goods originate in agriculture. The importance of the agricultural situation in the growth of the national income is thus obvious. Agriculture has always been the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy. From the 1921 famine in the Volga region (during which cases of cannibalism were reported), to the mass hunger in the Ukraine in 1931-32, to the agricultural crises of the early 1950s, and later, in more recent years, to the most important cases of bad harvests (1963-64 and 1972) agricultural crises have punctuated the history of Soviet society and the Soviet economy. Relations with the peasants have been (and, as we shall see, still are) a crucial unresolved problem for the leaders of Soviet society. The process of industrialization changed the face of the Soviet republic, but although the specific weight of agricultural production and of the peasants in the life of the country was reduced, the industrialization did not succeed in solving the problem of agriculture; nor could it, because of the means by which the industrialization was carried out. The ferociously repressive and barbarically despotic manner in which the Soviet bureaucracy effected the collectivization of agriculture during the years 192932 certainly constitutes the central nub of the problems of Soviet agriculture. It almost seems as though the forcibly expropriated peasants, in part deported and completely shunted to the sidelines in the life of the country, are still taking their revenge for what happened forty-five years ago. 26
In reality, however, things are not that simple. The policy of the bureaucracy in conflicts with the peasants has been marked by continual oscillations revolving around the question of individual plots of land. In fact, collectivization gave rise to a dualistic structure in the Soviet countryside: On the one side were the collective farms owned by the state (sovkhozi) and the cooperatives (kolkhozi), whose production was centrally planned and whose products were consigned to state stockpiles; on the other side were the individual peasant plots, whose production remained the property of the peasants. Formally the individual plots (which today account for about 3% of total cultivated land area are supposed to serve exclusively for the consumption of the peasant families themselves. In reality, however, even today 9% of total agricultural production (34% of potato production) intended for sale and 15% of livestock production (19% of meat) intended for sale come from these minuscule plots of land, which are cultivated intensively but without any technical aid from the state. Before the second world war, these percentages were even more unfavorable to the collectivized sector (53% of commercial agricultural production and 54% of commercial livestock production came from the private sector). This meant (and means) extremely low productivity in the collective sector — in which nearly all machinery and investment is concentrated - and an extremely high concentration of effort in the private fields, which are cultivated only manually. The oscillations of the bureaucracy generally unfold according to the following schema: limitation of the use (and area of private plots; fall in overall agricultural production; concessions on the use of private plots; upturn in agricultural production; development of the private sector; first difficulties in the collectivized sector; limitations on the private plots, and so on. In the meantime, agricultural production remains substantially stagnant. Economically, the vicious circle was based on ridiculously low agricultural investments; politically, it was
based on an absolutely authoritarian management of both the sovkhozi and the kolkhozi. The Khrushchevite policy was not substantially removed from the classical Stalinist model, the essential features of which we have outlined above. It is true that the concessions were more extensive and systematic than ever before; but the circle was closed again with the new limitations introduced of the beginning of the 1960% and with the disastrous harvest of 1963(2) Brezhney's agricultural policy The group of leaders that replaced Khrushchev began its work by abandoning the limitations on private plots that had been introduced by Khrushchev and by making a series of concessions to the peasants in the realm of the prices of agricultural products (which were increased); exemptions were introduced on the delivery of goods to state stockpiles. Thus, a very moderate policy produced good results during the second half of the 1960s. But the new element in Brezhnev's policy consisted in the fact that the reaction to the bad harvest of 1969 and the even worse one of 1972 was not the traditional response of resorting to limitations on the private sector in the countryside; instead, there was a redistribution of investments in favor of agriculture. This represented an important change in Soviet economic policy, which has always considered agriculture as a poor relation to be axploited in a colonial fashion. Thus, productive investment in the agricultural sector rose from an average of 15.4% of total investment in 196165 to 16.9% in 1966-73; it attained 20.3% in 1972 and should average 21% during the ninth five-year plan, 1971-75. (3) Such a policy had in fact already been imposed by Khrushchev, who had raised the quota of agricultural investments, which had been virtually nonexistent during the Stalin period (11,7% in 1946-50). Nevertheless, it was Brezhnew who systematized this policy and followed it through to the end. In addifion, the notable decline in the agricultural population made it necessary to intensify investment if an increase in the availability of consumer goods was desired. Concurrently, the standard of living of the peasants was significantly raised and, more important, the increase was more rapid than it was in the city. In addition, various social gains were introduced in the countryside for the First time, like a guaranteed monthly income and pensions for the kolkhozi workers. In this manner, the basis was laid for putting an end to the traditional marginalization of the peasant class. Nevertheless, the results of this year, even more than those of 1972, demonstrate the inadequacy of all the efforts that have been made. Granted, Soviet agriculture functions under unfavorable climatic conditions, much worse than those prevailing in the United States. (In this regard, see René Dumont,
Sovkhoz, kolkhoz, et la problématique du communisme, Paris, 1964, pp. 17-21.) Granted, the policy of exporting grain during the tsarist period and during the years 1920-1950 was made possible only by the general lowering of the living standards of the population. Granted, investments in agriculture require years before they produce results. But in spite of all this, this year's bad harvest will constitute a genuine failure, the proportions of which will be especially serious if the most important part of the harvest, the grain harvest, turns out to be less than 168 million tons, that is, the lower limit of the current five-year plan, already reached by the miserable harvest of 1972. The objectives of the ninth five-year plan in the realm of agriculture were rather cautious, as they were in all realms: an increase of 15% over the 1966-1970 average yearly harvest of 167 million tons was projected; that is, an average of 195 million tors during 1971-75. This objective has already been placed in question by the bad harvest of 1972. This year's harvest will demolish it definitively. As we shall see, this implies negative consequences for the Soviet economy as a whole, consequences that in turn will probably have effects on the political field. It thus becomes important to examine the causes of the lack of success of the Brezhnev agricultural policy. We have seen that Brezhnev sought to break out of the vicious circle afflicting Soviet agriculture by allocating a much larger share of investment to agriculture than had been allocated in the past. But nothing was done on the political level to have the peasants participate in the management of the cooperative and state agricultural enterprises. Both of these sorts of enterprises, which increasingly resemble each other, are managed substantially in just as authoritarian a manner as they were thirty or forty years ago, at the height of the Stalin era. In this situation the function of "material incentives" (to use the Soviet term) could not be decisive; just the apposite, they could produce only totally inadequate results, as we have seen. In fact, an authoritarian structure is perfectly adequate to a market economy in which the logic of profit is sufficient to assure the maximum efficiency compatible with this type of system. When neither the market nor the logic of profit exists, as is the case with the Soviet economy, the absence of economic (and political) democracy becomes a strong brake on development; the overall advantages made possible by total planning are increasingly unable to compensate for this. Soviet agriculture has another weak point that further aggravates the situation: the dualistic structure, or rather the schizophrenic division between the very large mechanized enterprises and the tiny private plots. Initially, this dualistic structure was necessary in order to compensate (af least partially) for the negative consequences of a collectivization that was carried out against the will of the great majority of the peasants and in the context of a virtually nonexistent level of industrializa-
SOVIET UNION tion of agriculture (lack of mechanization and chemical fertilizers). This mixture, with its feudal flavor, became a powerful factor of economic conservatism: In large part, the agricultural stagnation can be traced back to this. Nevertheless, an "administrative" (that is, bureaucratic) abolition of the private plots could entail, if not a genuine peasant uprising, at least forms of passive resistance disastrous for agricultural harvesh. The only alternative is to aim at a progressive overcoming of the peasants' desire to own their own land by increasing the income the peasants derive from the collectivized agricultural enterprises, which means by significantly increasing the productivity of these enterprises. This was the policy that Brezhnev followed - correctly - in the economic field. But the economic measures were not sufficient; deep political changes were also necessary. And that is where Brezhnev called a halt, naturally. A political democratization could not have been limited to agriculture; therefore, in one way or another, such a change would have undermined the power of the social layer Brezhnev represents: the bureaucracy. In theory, of course, a different solution was possible: a return to generalized private property in the countryside. Obviously, the private plots could have constituted an important basis for this. A cursory examination of the present structure of the Soviet countryside is sufficient to demonstrate that this could not have opened the way to a return to capitalism. But it is hard to imagine how the approximately 6,000 hectares cultivated by each kolkhoz (or the 20,000 hectares of each sovkhoz) could be divided up, or how the thirty-four tractors, ten harvesters, and sixteen trucks would be shared, not to mention the mechanized stables, the chicken-breeding equipment, and all the other fixed Investments that have been accumulated during the years of collectivization, especially during the past two decAgriculture and industry The failures of Soviet agriculture have immediate (and, of course, long term) effects on industry. In the first place, there are direct effects on light industry, since three-quarters of the raw materials for Soviet light industry originate in agriculture. In addition, the mobilization of the whole population that is required to reduce the consequences of the bad harvest(4) obviously has effects on industrial production itself. But the indirect consequences are even more serious. The grain deficit itself will be partially made up through the purchases abroad that are now being negotiated, especially with the United States and Canada. If we assume that 30 million tons will be purchased, (5) the expenditure in foreign exchange could amount to between $2,000 million and $3,000 million, depending on the sort of grain that is bought. For the most part, this grain will be purchased from advanced capitalist countries, 28 that is, from countries that provide the USSR with sophisticated technology essential for the development of 5oviet industry. The USSR will thus have to cut back on the purchase of machinery from the western countries, at least temporarily, in order to buy grain, (6) which will constitute 20-30% of total Soviet imports from the western counIn addition, the attempt to redress the agricultural situation will generate strong pressure for a further redistribution of investment in favor of agriculture. This will slow down the development of other industrial sectors. Over the longer term, account must be taken of the fact that investments in agriculture do not assure as rapid a return as investments in industry. This could have more longterm effects on the rate of economic development. The bad harvest of 1972, like the bad harvest of 1963, statistically demonstrated that negative results in the agricultural field have immediate negative effects on industrial development. Thus, the results of the ninth five-year plan, which are already none too good, may turn out to be completely unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the new five-year plan will not only begin on a bad footing, but will also have to deal with a weighty negative heritage. Obviously, It is not easy to quantitatively evaluate the impact of this year's results, and it is even more difficult to establish the influence these results will have in 1976. Problems of industry It is nonetheless useful to briefly recapitulate the situation of Soviet industry in 1974(7) The overall development of Soviet industry was greater than had been called for in the yearly plan, but less than the provisions of the five-year plan itself. (The five-year plan is amended by yearly plans.) There were lags in a series of important sectors. This was due to the reappearance of that endemic malady of the Soviet economy, the "dispersion of investment, "and, more generally, to the failure to solve the basic problems that reemerged with unaltered intensity after the economic reforms were shelved. As of 1974 a striking qualitative failure with respect to the objectives of the five-year plan began to take shape. These objectives called for a more rapid growth For the sector producing consumer goods (Department Il) than for the sector producing means of production (Department I), although not without ambiguity. In reality, however, beginning in 1972 the proportions started to turn around once again, reverting to the "classical" model of Soviet economic development. Once again Department I was getting the top priority, and this in spite of the fact that it was already clear to the Soviet
leaders that it was politically necessary to aim at the development of consumer goods in order to hold in check the latent sociopolitical tensions that were coming to the fore with ever increasing force. But it is not easy to alter proportions that have crystallized out of decades of economic development, especially since the preservation of the "slice of power" of the most influential groups of the ruling caste (in this case the groups linked to heavy industry) depends on the maintenance of these proportions. Moreover, the agricultural failure in 1972 slowed down the development of light industry, in a twofold manner: First, by depriving light industry of necessary raw materials; second, by diverting a part of the investments in light industry either directly toward agriculture or toward those sectors of the production of the means of production that service agriculture (tractors, fertilizer, etc.). These tendencies will inevitably intensify in coming years. The magazine Planovoe Khozyaistvo (numbers 8 and 9 in 1975) has already made use of previously unpublished articles by Lenin to reconfirm, according to old dogmatic practice, the Stalinist "law" of lending priority to the development of heavy industry, a law that had been consigned to oblivion several years ago. But a return to the past on this question - not so much on the level of theory, as on the level of concrete economic management - could be laden with political consequences. Since the accelerated development of the consumer goods industries serves to assure mass consumption (even if only passively), a return to rates of development inferior to those of the economy as a whole would sharpen and make more obvious the tensions that arise from the existing strong imbalances, which are increasingly less compensated for by possibilities of social promotion. Brezhnev's policy The past ten years of Soviet history have probably been the most tranquil of all Soviet history since the October Revolution. This represents the main achievement of Brezhnev and his colleagues, an achievement that has cost them a good bit of pain. The causes of this unexpected tranquility in a world that has undergone rapid and traumatic changes in both the East and the West must be sought in the substantial immobility of Soviet society, accompanied by a constant but not exceptional economic growth and a moderate increase in the standard of living of the masses. The silently shelved economic reform; the tormenting debate on Stalinism (laden with current, but prudently quashed significance); the many, although confused, innovative initiatives of the Khrushchev period, watered down and altered in a conservation direction. Oppositionists not sufficiently well known to go abroad locked up behind the padded walls of criminal asylums, Beyond the borders of the USSR, the invasion of Czechoslovakia (which clearly disturbed the tranquility) is both the other side and the premise of the détente with the United States. It was these conditions that enabled the Soviet bureaucracy to rediscover its unity and homogeneity, which had been seriously undermined during the decade that followed the death of Stalin. Naturally, a price had to be paid, and that price was precisely to postpone dealing with all the problems that could have created conflict, to take only those initiatives that were strictly necessary. (8) But this could not be done indefinitely, especially since the consequences of a foreign policy that is rather active both economically and politically began to be felt. At the beginning of the 1970s, as the first economic difficulties arose, the first signs of unravelling began to crop with within the leading group, which up to then had remained surprisingly compact: Mahavanadze, Shelest, Polyanski, and more recently Shelepin have been removed from the Politburo. The addition of Gromyko, Grechko (from the army), and Andropov (of the political police) was intended to make this body, which is the real holder of power in the USSR (in any case, the only body in which votes take place), more representative, and therefore more solid. But reality does not always correspond to intentions, even the best calculated ones. As far as foreign policy is concerned, relations with the United States have not rediscovered the atmosphere of affectionate coordination that prevailed during the Nixon years. The defeats of American imperialism (in Vietnam in the first place) have not automatically become victories for the Soviet Union. The strengthening of Soviet military positions around the world (Mediterranean, Indian Ocean) have not always been accompanied by a strengthening of political influence. In Egypt, for example, exactly the opposite has occurred. The greatest successes for the Kremlin have been registered in Europe (the German peace treaty, the Helsinki conference), but it remains to be seen whether these successes will be anything more than verbal. The rumors about Brezhnev's illness and, more recently, about the possibility of his being replaced at the next congress of the Soviet CP (scheduled for February 1975) must be seen in this framework. In this regard it is worthwhile to note that if Brezhnev has to be replaced, the question of the state of his health would be of purely secondary importance; we have seen how difficult it was to replace Segni, who was completely paralyzed, so we can imagine the difficulty involved in replacing the first secretary of the Communist party of a country that is a bit more authoritarian than Italy was during the 1960s. On the other hand, it seems unlikely to expect a party congress, which is but a ritual gathering that lacks decision-making power, to take any measure of political significance.
SOVIET UNION What next? But the problem is not to make predictions about the possible date of Brezhnev's fall or about who will succeed him. The important thing is to note, as we have sought to do here, that a period of Soviet history - a period that for convenience's sake may be defined os the "Brezhnev era" - is coming to an end. This does not necessarily mean that it will end during the next few months, but simply that the elements that characterized this era are now eroding. In seeking to understand what will happen after the end of this era, it is useful to recall the problems that Brezhnev has to confront and that his successor will have to confront as well: Agriculture: Whether or not to increase investment still further; whether to continue (and possibly deepen) the liberalization policy toward the private individual plots or to return to the traditional policy of retreating at difficult moments; whether to prepare reforms in the agricultural structure aiming at a partial decentralization or whether to maintain the traditional structure. Consumer goods: Whether or not to rapidly increase production in this sphere; If it is decided to do so, at the expense of what sectors (armaments, heavy industry, or agriculture); if not, how to deal with the inevitable discontent. Foreign trade: Whether or not to continue the present policy of expanding trade with the western countries (or, on the other hand, to trade mainly with the countries of the Comecon, the Third World, or even to slow down the expansion of foreign trade). General policy: "Restoration of discipline" domestically, and thereby greater authoritarianism, or cautious liberalization? Similar questions in the realm of foreign policy: continuation of cooperation with the United States or "hardening" of positions (a line that seems to have prevailed during the past few months)? There is no inviolable link between the foreign options and the domestic ones; a strong discrepancy, however, (for example, an extremely authoritarian policy internally and complete détente externally) could provoke contradictions in the medium term. It is obviously difficult if not impossible to predict which choices will actually de made or to nail down the interrelationships among the choices in various sectors, which is what defines a policy in the final analysis. But the options we have outlined above are those that are possible within the limits of the present balance of political and social forces in the Soviet Union. Within these overall limits the victorious line over the long term is a moderate liberalization both internally and externally. This does not exclude, but even presupposes, the possibility of "hard" turns for periods whose duration may be longer or shorter, but will always be limited.
But this does not at all mean that the present balance of forces will remain the same indefinitely. Just the opposite, the first signs of a shift in this equilibrium are beginning to appear — a shift toward a return to the historical scene of a protagonist that has been absent for many decades now: the working class and, more generally, the popular masses. It is clear that this reentry, probably sudden, will inevitably be spectacular and will change all the terms of the problems that we have tried to examine here. This is a perspective that will not come to pass immediately, but neither is it something that will happen only after the present generation has possed from the scene. October 13, 1975 FOOTNOTES: 1. The real share is actually higher: The prices of ogricultural products are underrated compared to those of industrial products. See, for example, T.S. Khachaturov, Sovetskaya Ekonomika na Sovremennom Etape, Moscow, 1975, p.273. 2. We will not deal here with the opening up of the virgin lands, a central element of Khrushchev's agricultural policy, the partial failure of which contributed to the fall of agricultural production in 1963. But my intention here is not to write a history of Khrushchev's agrarian policies; the point is rather to highlight the structural elements similar to those of the preceding periods. 3. Data cited by Khachaturov, op.cit., P.273, in Gosudarstvennyi Pyatiletnii Plan Razvitya Narodnago Khozyaistva SSSR na 1971-1975, gody, Moscow, 1972, p. 180. The data were compiled by various criteria, but the resulting increments are analogous. 4. For example, according to western travelers, at the end of August the entire active population of the Kostroma region was engaged in an agricultural campaign at least one day a week (Saturday). 5. That is, the increment necessary to cover the difference between a harvest equivalent to that of 1972 (168 million tons) and the average harvest called for in the plan (195 million tons). 6. The cutback will not be that large, of course. The USSR will resort to sales of gold and will borrow on financial markets. The main cuts will be made in the import of goods considered nonessential. 7. For a more detailed analysis, see INPRECOR, No. 26, May 22, 1975. 8. This is the case domestically. Soviet foreign policy, on the other hand, seems more active, and to a certain extent it is. But if Soviet foreign policy were really analyzed (which is not within the scope of this orticle), it would be seen that even here there are not many really new elements; it is more a matter of the development and rationalization of the Khrushchevite options.
150,000 at fête rouge
There is a long and well established tradition in the French left and for left: For many years there have been regular fêtes of a political, cultural, and fund-raising character, organized on a mass scale. The oldest and largest of these is the Fête de 'Humanité, sponsored by the daily newspaper of the Communist party, which is held in early September each year and attracks several hundred thousand people. With the emergence of revolutionary currents, of a weekly and daily press of the revolutionary far left, there have been more and more fêtes - of uneven success and quality. These fêtes are both political assembies and demonstrations of a cultural character. The fête rouge fell within this general tradition, but it was by no means identical to all the others. If was held well into autumn (October 18-19), a handicap that was overcome by the more than 50,000 people who came from all over France and Europe, For thirty-six hours there were nonstop political debates, music programs, songs, rock music, and restaurants, all of which functioned smoothly. The object of the fête rouge was clear: To hold the largest possible mass demonstration in order to financially and politically aid the launching of the daily Rouge, newspaper of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionwill begin appearing early in 1976. Thus, this fête had a character of its own, which offered an initial glimpse of what the character of the future daily Rouge will be. Stands and displays were set up around various themes and areas of revolutionory activity: workers struggles, women's movement, press and publishing, the Fourth International, the regions of France, youth, the army. These reflected the revolutionary developments taking place in all these sectors, grouping together the various currents of the far left, all expressing their own conceptions. The dominant feature of these packed hours of the fête rouge was the militant, offensive, and antisectarian tone that was set. The major political debates held at the fate dealt with some of the central questions of the revolutionary struggles now taking shape in Europe: - The press and the mass media, with the Portuguese comrades of República and Radio Renascença, Rossana Rossanda of the Italian far-left daily Il Manifesto, a
French television producer, Jean Daniel of the Nouvel Observateur, Daniel Bensaid of Rouge, and Ernest Mandel. The subject was the concept of the freedom of the press from the standpoint of workers and revolutionaries in the light of the Portuguese experience and the various strikes in the printing industry. - The situation in Portugal, with representatives of the organizations of the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (FUR - Front of Revolutionary Unity), including the Liga Comunista Internacionalista, sympathizing section of the Fourth International, comrades of the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão - Soldiers United Will Win), the ADFA (Association of Wounded Armed Forces Veterans), Radio Renascença, and República. - The Union de la Gauche and revolutionaries, with representatives of the organizations of the French for left. - Marxism today, dealing with the current conditions, during the post-Stalin period, of the development of revolutionary Marxism and the struggle against bureaucratic influences on Marxist thought, which have distorted the meaning of the conception of the revolutionary party. A central meeting held the afternoon of Sunday, October 19, was attended by more than 15,000 people. Ernest Mandel, banned from France since May 1968, made a speech on the rise of revolutionary struggles in Europe. Comrades spoke from the SUV and the French Front des Soldats, Marins, et Aviateurs Révolutionnaires (FSMAR - Front of Revolutionary Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen). The entire rally broke into cheers and sang the Internationale when the comrades of the SUV and the SMAR, clenched fists raised, embraced and affirmed the unity of their struggle for the proletarian revolution. The daily and weekly press in