INTERVIEW against the AMI INPRECOR. What tactics are the military hierarchy and the government using right now? For example, Fabião was the first to denounce the SUV as "counterrevolutionary"; but today he is trying to coopt it. What do you think the response of the soldiers will be? Answer. For us it is obvious that the officers and the hierarchy are trying to defend their positions, the basic positions that they won and defended for years in the service of the bourgsoisie. The whole hierarchical structure acts with the aim of opposing the develop: ment of the independent organization of soldiers We can see this through many concrete examples. None of us have forgotten that Fabio's first response was to characterize the SUV as counterrevolutionary. Today he is trying to raise the slogan of integrating the SUV into the hierarchical apparatus of the army in order to disarm us and reestablish discipline. What is also significant is that he never opposed the measures taken by Veloso (commander of the northern military region) or the constitution of the AM!. All his position. - about which the reformists keep quiet - astually allow the reactionaries to malce gains. This must also be seen in relation to the government's aftitude to the workers movament. For the moment, the present government is not taking open and violent repressive measures. Instead if is trying to maneuver and isolate the most advanced struggles of the workers, avoiding an open and decisive confrontation in the shorf term in order to prepare the ground for dealing new blows to the workers movement. All the comrades who believe in the possibility of using Fabião against Veloso, one wing of the hierarchy against another, must understand that such a tactic can only create confusion and pave the way to defeat. INPRECOR. The victory of the struggle of the RASP required a mobilization of the workers movement on a regional and national scale. What is the position of the Socialist party and the Communist party on the necessity for this mobilization?
PORTUGAL Answer, In reality, the mobilization was inadequate on a national scale. Nevertheless, conditions did exist for using the enormous capacities of the movement of soldiers to create "support commissions" for our struggle. In Lisbon, for example, solidarity was organized only when Fabião came to Porto (October 14). That was already belated. In a certain sense, the parties implanted in the working class are the main ones responsible for this state of affairs. The SP was constantly screaming about discipline. The result of this policy is obvious: It facilitates the maneuvers of the worst reactionaries, who grab onto the coattails of the SP, even if the Socialists sometimes try to shake them loose. It is important to mention that tomorrow, October 25, there will be a demonstration in support of Pinheiro de Azevedo (the prime minister). The SP has published a statement in which they accuse the CDS (Centro Democrático Social-Democratic Social Center, a far-right party) of trying to take advantage of this demonstration. The SP understands that it has rather unsavory allies at the moment. But that in no way reduces the resporsibility of the Social Democratic leaders, who are turning the workers against the workers in uniform, against the soldiers struggling for their democratic rights and against the creation of a professional army, which represents the essential foundation of our struggle. Nevertheless, the participation of many Socialist workers in our struggle was very positive. As for the CP, the problem is the following: The CP wants to make use of the movement of soldiers to win on influence among sectors of the military hierarchy and also wants to play on the contradictions that exist within the hierarchy. Already the CP has said that if was possible to win Fabião over to the side of the workers. The function of all this is to impose a new government, a sort of fifth-and-a-half government mixing together the fifth and sixth governments. That is, a government prepared to apply an austerity policy (like the fifth government) and a government beaten by the workers who see the necessity of defending their interests, as was the case with the metalworkers, the agricultural workers, the soldiers of the RASP. So we can say that the reformist perspectives are contributing to demobilizing the soldiers and creating confusion in their ranks. INPRECOR. What are the SUV's perspectives for the campaign against the AMI and for the development of the autonomous organs of the soldiers? Answer. The SUV is a front of struggle that encompasses a great number of soldiers who are ready to fight for self-organization. Its platform is clear, the SUV does not pretend to represent all the soldiers, and in this sense it is a very limited organization with very specific functions in this phase of the class struggle. The SUV does not claim to be a substitute either for a political organization of revolutionary soldiers and sailors (which remains a strategic project) or for the soldiers commissions. It is very important to stress this in order to avoid false interpretations. As for the central task, at the moment it is incontestably to step up liaison among the organizations of the workers and soldiers themselves in order to engage in the battle against the creation of a professional army: the AMI. The formation of such an army would mean that any step forward for the prolefarian revolution would involve violent confrontations with a professional army firmly determined to prevent the establishment of socialism. We should not suggest that the AMI would simply Function like the Amadora commandos or some other force designated by the sixth government to carry out tasks of repression. This professional army would be a terrible weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie, recruited from among the troops most influenced by the fascists and Spinolists. The forces of the militarized police, the PSP and the GNR, are already being rapidly reorganized. Confirmed Spinolists have been placed in many posts. They will not be satisfied merely with a reestablishment of order in the manner of the sixth government. Here is an example: During the SP demonstration (October 10 in Porto) well armed and organized fascist gangs with light automatic weapons and pistols took to the streets and attacked the headquarters of organizations of the workers movement. These gangs, like the Spinolists, will be satisfied only by a complete defeat of the entire workers movement. That is why the struggle for socialism, in which the soldiers of the RASP-CICAP are trying to provide on example, is a decisive struggle that must be waged with all our strength. If the reactionaries win this first battle against the movement of soldiers, they will also try to strike at all the mobilizations of soldiers on a national scale and at the whole workers movement too. We do not rule out the possibility of a short period of hesitation during which the soldiers retreat a bit, partially. That is the price we pay for the illusions and confusion that exist. Then it will be a question of drawing the lessons and of preparing to enter the next struggles better armed politically. I am convinced that the task of revolutionaries is to prepare for new offensives, to take a step forward in the movement of self-organization of the soldiers during new mobilizations around precise objectives. The struggle against the AMI - that is the task of revolutionary soldiers wherever they are stationed.
López Portilio The Mexican political apparatus is moving full steam ahead in preparing the campaign of José López Portillo, former minister of finance and now designated successor to President Luís Echeverría for the six-year term 19761982. The procedures used to "designate" the candidate of the official party, which no way differed from the procedures used on similar occasions in the past, demonstrate more clearly than ever the totally antidemocratic character of the Bonapartist system that has been oppressing the Mexican people for more than fifty years now. Revolutionary Marxists have always considered the system that reigns in Mexico as a dictatorial system. Obviously, official ideology denies this and claims that Mexico is a "democracy" - a very special democracy, of course, a democracy "à la mexicaine, " but a democracy nonetheless. A mountain of books and studies have been produced, each more "knowledgeable" than the next (most of them originating from the "Latin American Studies" departments of Yankee universities) presenting the most sophisticated theories on the mechanisms of "oligarchic Mexican-style democracy. " In practice, however, there is only one great elector in Mexico, and that is the reigning president. It is the ruling president who chooses his own successor. That is how Mexican Bonapartism has held on for fifty years without altering its methods, simply changing the Bonaparte every six years (at first it was every four years). A brief description of how Lopez Portillo was designated is therefore instructive.