Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Portugal: "Portugal Will Not Be the Chile of Europe!"

Inprecor no. 36, 23 October 1975 · p 8 · 420 words

Latin America Portugal

EUROPE"

We are publishing below a document written by soldien of RALIS (the Lisbon Light Artillery

Regiment) for discussion in a general assembly. Copies were sent to other barracks. The slo gan "Portugal will not be the Chile of Europe" has not only been taken up in soldiers" demonstrations, but is also becoming a subject of study and discussion in the barracks. Solidarity with the Chilean workers, expressed in many barracks on September 11, the second anniversary of the Chilean military coup, is now being extended toward the preparation of plans by the soldiers themselves to prevent → in practice — Portugal from becoming the Chile of Eu-

Trope. We publish the RALIS text as a document. CHOLE TWENTY-FOUR MALE IN CHILE -V

Purge and demotion (and eventually assassination) of officers loyal to the legal regime. 2. Control of broadcasting stations by the fascists. 3. Slander campaign blown up by newspapers in the service of reaction. 4. "Improperly prepared military, men" were taken by surprise and shot by the thousands. 5. Lack of information services and lack of surveillance over the launching of fascist operations. 6. Lack of control of "traitorous" elements in the armed forces (active-duty sections, reserves, ond retirees). 7. Lack of control over important fascists and capitalists, the CIA, provocateurs, big capital, factories be8 longing to fascists, and foreign relations. 8. 1ll-propared, isolated, and uncoordinated civilian militias. 9. Lack of links between the (unorganized) popular masses and the loyal army. 10. Defense of factories (why?). 11. Resistance in the centers of the cities (which is the worst possible strategy). 12. Military men loyal (to the Allende government) too concentrated in the same barracks (which were, in addition, known). 13. Bad and slow communications. 14. Lack of a plan of immediate reaction. 15. Little or no combat experience of the popular forces. 16. Disunited parties, either passive or effectively linked to traitors. 17. Known, and therefore vulnerable, local assembly points. 18. Well-prepared putschists; scientific and military planning (U.S.A.-style) and support from traitorous miliTary men. 19. Failure to take advantage of the spontaneous resistance of the people and lack of training by loyal military men. 20. Noninterrupted communications and non-sabotage of the means of transport of the traitorous military men. 21. Fragile and localized popular resistance in isolated neighborhoods. 22. Isolated and noncoordinated night-time resistance. 23. Lack of secret arsenals of arms and ammunition (antitank weapons, cannon, bazookas, anti-tank mines, ete.). 24. Lack of clandestine radio communication for the revolutionary resistance. Study the best ways to avoid these errors!

← Portugal: RALIS: Build Soldiers' Commissions! · Spain: Franco: New Isolation →

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