ITALY 14th congress of the PCI: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE "HISTORIC COMPROMISE» by LIVIO MATTAN organizational structures. For the rest, some of the differences that had emerged during the preparatory discussions in l'Unità and Rinascita (the daily and weekly of the PCI) were considerably played down during the sessions of the congress. For example, Pietro Ingrao muted his thesis that the realization of the historic compromise would imply or presuppose splits within the Democrazia Cristiana (DC - Christian Democracy), a thesis that others had vigorously rejected. Nor was there any resurfacing of the disputes over economic policy between those who uphold the necessity of taking investments as the starting point for action (like Trentin and other trade unionists) and those who instead opt for action around consumption (Barca). It is true that one voice of explicit opposition was raised at the congress (and during the preparatory phase); that was Umberto Terracini, one of the founders of the party and presently a member of the leadership. But Terracini, while he correctly criticized the party's official position, which avoids clearly defining the class character of the DC as a party under bourgeois hegemony, did not draw the necessary conclusions and did not question the party's overall strategy. For this reason he will continue to play the role of an outsider who may be allowed to speak in an unorthodox manner from time to time inasmuch as he does not represent any alternative to the line of the leading group, even embryonically. The sessions of the congress were characterized above
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VITALY all by the top position occupied by discussions on the long- and short-term problems of the realization of the historic compromise and by the outbreak of polemics about the Portuguese events. The contradiction between the urgency of responding to the problems posed by the current situation (the seriousness of which was not underestimated in Berlinguer's report) and the assertion that realization of the historic compromise requires that a number of prior conditions be created (and the consequent implication that the historic compromise is a relatively long-term proposition) could not continue to be expressed solely through indirect polemics; above all, this contradiction had to be overcome in some way. In particular, it was necessary for Berlinguer and company to take a concrete attitude toward a DC whose leading group has taken a position vigorously hostile to the historic compromise. The necessity of doing this could not be postponed after Amintore Fanfani, the secretary of the DC, provocatively took advantage of the decision of the Portuguese military barring Christian Democratic candidates from running in the elections to order the noisy withdrawal of his party's delegation from the dais of invited guests of the congress, relaunching a 1950s-style anticommunist campaign. The Berlinguer group responded to this in various ways. First, in his report itself, Berlinguer explicitly declared that the solution to the most urgent problems, especially the economic ones, was not dependent on reaching agreement on the historic compromise at the government level. "In order to advance solutions for these problems, " he said, "we can certainly not wait for the advent of a government of democratic turn. It is necessary to fight for all of these (economic) objectives immediately, seeking to influence as much as possible the direction of economic policy and the methods of governing and administering public affairs." Concurrently, Berlinguer could not pretend to ignore the DC's rejection of the perspective of the historic compromise or the increasingly conservative and reactionary orientation Fanfani has been giving his party, especially in view of the campaign around the coming regional and administrative elections. Berlinguer thus devoted a good part of his concluding remarks to a massive attack on Fanfani and set attacks on the present Christian Democratic secretary as an immediate objective around which to mobilize. This was a rather clever tactical way of overcoming the disputes over how to force the DC to "change" and of stimulating an active and united participation of the whole party in the coming electoral campaign. The DC could come out of such a campaign weakened, and Berlinguer now considers such a weakening of the DC as one of the preconditions for realizing the historic compromise. 16
Second, conscious of the dangers of an electoral battle centered on the events in Portugal, the leading group of the PCI tried to turn the situation around, utilizing the case of Portugal to offer a solemn new demonstration of the PCI's "independence" of other Communist parties and of its own fidelity to the conception of a democratic and gradual transition to socialism. Berlinguer thus clearly took his distance from the decision of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement and therefore from the "fraternal" party of Alvaro Cunhal, taking yet another step in affirming the independence and specificity of the "Italian road to socialism." Tracing out the Italian road' But the attempf to provide the strategy of the historic compromise with a more systematic politicalideological foundation was one of the distinctive features of the fourteenth congress even apart from the Portuguese "incident. " Some of the contributions
BERLINGUER: «emerging from the realm of pure utopia" forme di strutturaaa... Toraza. to the precongress discussion, beginning with the opening document approved by the central committee, had moved in this same direction. They tried to systematize the conception of the Italian road to socialism, detailing its content especially with respect to the phase that would be opened if the historic compromise were actually applied in practice. At the congress it was Berlinguer himself who pushed forward on this field with a vigor well above that of all his previous performances. It is worthwhile to look at some quotations. In regard to the international situation, the central committee's preparatory document contained a rather clear contradiction between an analysis that did not ignore the structural aspects of the world economic crisis nor underestimate its seriousness and the presentation of solutions based merely on rationalizing the system (systematic agreements among countries of diverse class natures, universal economic collaboration, etc.). In his report to the congress Berlinguer tried to go further:
"If we take a more long-term look, we could think that the development of peaceful coexistence and of a system of cooperation and integration extensive enough to progressively overcome the logic of imperialism and capitalism and to include the most varied aspects of the economic and civic development of all humanity could also make it realistic to consider the possibility of a 'world government" that would express the consent and free cooperation of all countries. This hypothesis could thus emerge from the realm of pure utopia to which the projects and dreams of various thinkers have been restricted during past centuries. " It may be that Berlinger's hypothesis would permit certain ancient conceptions to emerge out of "the realm of pure utopia. "But when he outlines a murky gradual overcoming of imperialism and capitalism, disregarding the essence of the revolutionary doctrine of Marxism and Leninism, and speaks of a world government on this basis, he enters the realm of new utopias no more credible than those of antiqvity. His originality boils down to pure and simple arbitrariness. Moving to domestic perspectives, what is the character of the process within which the strategy of the historic compromise must be viewed, according to the interpretations of Berlinguer and the fourteenth congress? In the reports to the congress and in various documents reference was made to "elements of socialism" that are supposedly to be introduced little by little. It is true that there was some vacillation on this point - it was probably not at all accidental, for example, that the final resolution did not repeat this notion. But apart from the vacillation, the concept of gradually developing elements of socialism does not constitute an original discovery by the ideologists of the PCI; rather, it is part and parcel of the rusty old arsenal of reformism (even in Italy, it would be only too easy to cite precedents). The real substance of the strategy of the historic compromise, however, emerges above all from the characterization of the phase that is presented as the "second stage of the democratic antifascist revolution" (the first stage being the period of the end of the second world war and the years immediately following). "The new features, " Berlinguer explained,
"must add up to a process that involves progressively moving beyond the logic of the mechanisms of the capitalist system and thereby to the full assertion of the leading function of the working class and the laboring classes on a national scale."
Beyond the deliberately elastic formulations, the central idea is that the "democratic antifascist"
collaboration that was interrupted in 1947 by the
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ITALY Christian Democracy acting at the behest of American imperialism can and must be taken up again, this time carrying out what was not realized thirty years ago because of the interruption of the process. Berlinguer and company may also spice the dish up with a dash of "socialism. " The real substance of the perspective of the historic compromise can only be a perspective of class collaboration within the framework of an "advanced" democracy under which the most that can be hoped for is the introduction of some reforms aimed at rationalization. Nobody could seriously believe that a policy based on collaboration not only with the Socialists, but also with the Christian Democracy, which continues to be the major political instrument of the ruling class, could actually lead to breaking down or going beyond the system. In an attempt to further clarify his thought and to explain the full import of the concept of the historic compromise, Berlinguer wandered off into a digression on Italian history of the nineteenth century. According to him, the process of building a united Italian state developed positively primarily because of the convergence, or alliance (the "compromises"), established on various occasions among different social and political forces. "The lesson of the strategy of more than a century of national history, " said the secretary of the PCI, "is that the revolutionary forces actually altered the course of events when - avoiding the opposite but complementary errors of rail-endism and vanguardism, opportunism and radical-sounding extremist sectarianism — they were able to line up with progressive currents and to draw the most diverse forces into their struggle. Every advance, all real historical, political, and civic progress, has always been the result of an alliance of diverse forces, not homogeneous, but heterogeneous, both socially and ideologically. But this is not merely the definition of a purely political strategy that only we support. For us it is - and we think it must become so for everyone - a general vision of the way in which Italian society can develop, the way in which it can develop its political relaFionships, including those among individuals and thus moral life itself. That is precisely one of the characteristics of Italian Marxism." * Let us leave aside Berlinguer's facile interpretation of Italian history and especially his facile overlooking of the consequences that certain compromises have had on the structures and dynamic of Italian society after the establishment of the united state. Even then, it remains unacceptable to develop a general method that is at bottom based on making an analogy between the transition from a feudal or precapitalist society to a society in which the bourgeoisie has imposed its own hegemony and the transition from capitalism to socialism. Marxists have long known why such an analogy is invalid. Berlin18 guer has obviously forgotten this (or else has never had the time to bother with it). And it remains absurd to project an evolution toward socialism on the basis of an organic compromise (that is, a longstanding collaboration) among forces that are nof simply varied and heterogeneous, but downright antagonistic. The prospects The attempts to give more substance to the ideology of the historic compromise and to the political-tactical choices that flow from it have initially helped and will help the leading group of the PC to keep the party together and perhaps even to further increase its influence. But while this will have the effect of accentuating the reformist development on the ideological plane, it will not be able to prevent problems and contradictions from coming up on the political field, even in the short term. In particular, a new sharpening of the crisis in the country - which is anything but excluded - could once again urgently pose the necessity of moving toward applying the historic compromise in practice. This could also happen simply as a result of an aggravation of the crisis of political leadership. This variant could come to pass in three or four months if the regional and administrative elections scheduled for June 15 result in a defeat for the Christian Democracy of the type that occurred during the by-elections last year. Furthermore, we should not lose sight of the fact that despite various triumphant announcements currently being rashly published and distributed by "authoritative" organs of the international press, the economic crisis is continuing at Full steam, and its most serious consequences could unfold precisely during the next few months or even after the summer. In such a context the Italian bourgeoisie - whose most representative spokesmen, from the president of Fiat to the governor of the Bank of Italy, have rejected the historic compromise during past months, at least for this period - could find itself obliged to change its tune. In that case the PCI would not be able to limit itself to tactical responses or to continuing to harp on supposedly necessary preconditions without running the risk of losing favorable opportunities. But the difficulties of the PCI's leading group have deeper roots. Consider, for example, the possibility that the Italian bourgeoisie, once again finding itself in dire straits, draws the conclusion that there is no alternative but to repeat the experiment of collaboration of the 1944-47 period and accepts the historic compromise, that is, agrees to PC/ participation in the political leadership of the country. In that case,