arab-persian gulf the workers states (with the emergence of "social imperialism") and the disintegration of the "socialist camp" would seem to indicate a situation that is other than excellent. The international tasks the Chinese CP has set for itself ill accord with supporting workers and revolutionary struggles throughout the world, struggles that are now developing quickly, especially with the new potential rise of the colonial revolution in several areas (Africa, Southeast and South Asia) and (the most important thing) the deepening class struggle in Western Europe. Once again, the objective conditions for the world socialist revolution are manifesting their maturity. The essential weakness of the present international revolutionary upsurge remains the disorganization and confusion of the vanguard. The essential task of an internationalist leodership standing at the head of a workers state like China would be to aid in the recomposition of a real world communist movement. The Maoist leadership, however, is aiding in its splintering. Footnotes: 1. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, p. I. 2. Ibid, p.Il. 3. Peking Review, May 10,1974. It is true that Huang Hua expressed some reservations about the UN document presented by the third-world countries. But they amounted only to regretting the use of terms like economic "interdependence" and "world division of labor, " which could be taken over by the great powers. 4. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, 1974, p. V. 5. Peking Review, May 10, 1974, p. 14. 6. On this subject, see the article on the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies published elsewhere in this IRAN the shah: _byA. PARSI In recent months there has been no lack of declarations from the shah of Iran about Iran's growing role in the region of the Arab-Persian Gulf, a role that the shah has been assigned by imperialism. Thus, the shah told a reporter for the American magazine Newsweek (May 21, 1973 issue): "European security is nothing but an empty phrase without stability and security in the Persian Gulf. Western Europe, the United States, and Japan consider the Gulf as integral to their security, but they are not in position to guarantee this security. That is why we are doing it for them. ... America does not like to play the role of policeman, even when its vital interests are at stake. Anyone with the slightest geopolitical sense must come to the conclusion that we had scarcely any choice - any more than the United States did -- when they decided to extend us their support." This policy is tied to a series of military, political, and economic factors. The sort of investments made in Iran by the issue of INPRECOR 7. The capital of Zaire, formerly the Congo. 8. See Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1974, "Le Conflit Frontalier entre le R.P.C. et l'U.R.S.S. " (The border conflict between the Peoples Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.) 9. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, 1974, p.Il. 10. Ibid. p.III. 11. Ibid. p.Il. 12. Pekin Informations, November 26, 1973 (French edition of Peking Review). 13. See Far Eastern Economic Review, issues of May 6 and May 13. 14. The problem is not only one of international policy. It also rebounds on the sort of interal development chosen. INPRECOR will return to this problem in future issues. 15. It appears that Cambodia is the only issue that still gives rise to real anti-imperialist mass mobilizations in China. 16. Cahier de la Chine Nouvelle, March 22, 1974. On the other hand, there were many dispatches reporting attacks in the Bangkok press against the Soviet Union. There was even an account of a badminton tournament being held in Thailand. Let us recall that aside from the Indochinese CP, the Thai Communist party is the strongest one in the region and that it is of Maoist orientation. 17. Pekin Informations, April 19 and April 29, 1974. 18. See Far Eastern Economic Review, December 24, 1973, and January 14, 1974. This information must be looked at with some caution, especially as regards the extreme for of the conflict. What is certain is that the CP in northern Kalimatan has just suffered a very serious split. But while a link between that split and Chinese foreign policy is possible, it has not been demonstrated that one exists. new cop in the big multinational corporations and the restricted size of the internal market (a result of the low wages paid the industrial workers and of the exclusion of the major part of the population from the market) combine to create a gap between the growth of production of manufactured goods on the one hand and the growth in the demand for these products on the internal market on the other hand. The social layers that have sufficient income to purchase such products are relatively narrow. The demand stimulated by the state sector cannot completely measure up to the requirements of the multinational firms. Hence, a policy of intensive export of essential and luxury commodities has become a decisive aspect of the regime's general economic policy. Consequently, the huge income that Iran derives from oil has generated a tendency toward exporting capital to the Gulf, to Afghanistan, and to other areas. Furthermore, the Iranian regime is deeply concerned with cutting off any development of revolutionary struggle in the whole region around the Gulf, for such devel-
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IRAN opments would have strong repercussions almost immediately in Iran itself, And finally, American, European, and Japanese imperialism are interested in Iran not only as an importer of automobiles manufactured by General Motors and Toyota, but also as a link in the counterrevolutionary military chain. The policing policy of the Iranian regime in the Gulf region must be viewed in that context. Counterrevolutionary surrogates Given its setback in Vietnam, its internal social and political difficulties, and the requirements of interimperialist competition, American imperialism decided to modify its strategy of direct military intervention and to work toward establishing counterrevolutionary surrogates that could enjoy a certain amount of relative independence. Nixon himself proclaimed this new strategy during his visit to the island of Guam on July 25, 1969. As Nixon put it, the strategy consists of shifting part of the costs and responsibilities of "defense of our allies and of the free world" to allied powers that are able to assume those costs and responsibilities. Thus, American imperialism is counting on these counterrevolutionary surrogates to crush or contain revolutionary movements in various parts of the world (the Israeli army in the Near East, the Iranian army in the Middle East, the Brazilian army in Latin America. Obviously, this strategy does not preclude direct intervention in cases of crucial necessity for imperialism. Nixon recalled this doctrine once again in his January 21, 1972, State of the Union message: "We will maintain a nuclear deterrent force sufficient to deal with any threat to the security of the United States or its allies. Our commitment to liberty remains solid and unshakeable. But others must bear their fair shore of the burden of defending freedom throughout the world. " In April 1970 Elliot Richardson explained American imperialism's attitude toward Iran: "The Nixon doctrine postulates that in order to attain its goals of peace and security, the United States must pay close attention to the countries of the region (of the Gulf -- INPRECOR), and especially to Iran." Clearly, this special attention to Iran is not fortuitous. The importance of the local bourgeoisie, the strategic role of the country, and the regime's ability to "bear its share of the burden" are important factors in determining which governments can play the role of ally and policeman. Imperialism in the Arab-Persian gulf At the beginning of the twentieth century England held a dominant position in the Arab-Persion Gulf. Oil had not yet been discovered. The Gulf region had a commercial and strategie importance (protecting the route to the East Indies) and was favorably located to serve as a ground on which to compete with tsarist Russia. From the start of its rule, British imperialism tried to break the region up into various emirates, each subjected to colonial domination. With the discovery of pany (APOC), the Gulf region took on decisive economic importance for British imperialism, and more generally, for European imperialism. France was shut out of the area. Britain and Russia sought to coexist through verious compromises.* * In 1907 a treaty was concluded between Britain and Russia according to which northern Iran was handed to Russia and southern Iran (and the Gulf was ceded to Britain. But Russia tried to gain both access to the Gulf and a share in the oil of the south. 24
Russia dominated northern Iran and played an important role in Iranian commerce. Through the medium of the APOC, London built its own administration and its own police force in southern Iran and in the Gulf. The APOC acquired the status of an independent ruling power in the region.
After World War I, British imperialism was obliged to modify its policy of divide-and-rule and to turn to less brutally direct methods of exploiting the Middle East. This shift in policy was caused basically by the weakening of world capitalism immediately afher the war, the rise of liberation movements in the colonies (e.g. the 1920 mass revolt against the British in Iraq), and, most importantly, the October Revolution in Russia. The new policy favored the creation of a few centralized regimes that could rule the area more effectively. The Feisal regime in Iraq, the Saudis in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran, all originated in this period. Having won its struggle against French and German competifors, London found itself confronted with a U.S. drive into the region and especially into Iran. But it was only after the second world war that American imperialism began to acquire an increasingly dominant position in the Arab-Persian Gulf. The 1953 ClA-organized coup that deposed the Mossadegh government in Iran allowed American imperialism to make further gains and forced Britain to recognize Washington's military and econdmic superiority. After the coup, American oil companies obtained a much greater participation in the exploitation of the region's oil. On October 29, 1954, a petroleum accord was signed by the new government, the Nafional Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and a consortium of Western companies. This consortium, called Iranian Oil Parficipants, was owned by the following firms: APOC, which had become British Petroleum, 40%; Royal-Dutch Shell 14%; Gulf Oil 7%; Mobil Oil 7%; Standard Oil of New Jersey 7%; Socal (Standard Oil of California) 7%; Texaco 7%; CFP (Compagnie Française de Pétroles) 6%; and Iricon, made up of American independents, 5%. These figures alone give some indication of the degree of American success in gaining control of Iran's oil resources. Ar the beginning of 1968 the British Labour government announced that during the following three years it would withdraw militarily from the Gulf emirates in line with the polic of "disengagement east of Suez. " The British withdrawal naturally posed the question of who would fill the vacuum left by the departure of British imperiolism, which for decodes had been the "guardian" of this part of the Gulf. In 1970 a conference of American ambassadors to countries in the Near and Middle Ecst was held in Teheran. Also attending, in addition to the ambassadors, was Richard Helms, then director of the CIA and now U.S. ambassador to Iran. The purpose of the conference was to work out the concrete application of the "Nixon doctrine" in the region. According to reports given by James Sisco, U.S. undersecretary of state for Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian affairs, the results of the conference were quite simple: The policing role that Iran would thenceforth play in the entire Gulf region was confirmed. London did its part by sending an emissary to Iran, Sir William Luce, who was to prepare Iran's occupation in November 1971 of the Gulf islands of Abu Moussa, which hod previously belonged to the Sharjah sultanate, and of Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which had been part of the emirate of Rass elKhayma. This occupation, carried out by the Iranian navy, took place just a few days before the proclamation of the "independence" of the Union of Arab Emirates (December 2, 1971). The occupied islands were transformed into Iranian military bases. During the same tip, the representative of British imperialism convinced the shah to give up his attempts
to take over the island of Bahrein, which was not incorporated into the Union of Arab Emirates. The Union of Arab Emirates was thus created under the dusbices of British and American imperialism. Three emirates did not join the union: Qatar, Bahrein, and Rass el-Khayma. Their nonadherence may well have been the result of a decision by imperialism that these states could better be controlled separately. The objectives generally sought by British and Americen imperialism may be summed up as follows: 1. To create an entity capable of cooperating more effectively with imperialism, i.c. the Union of Arab emirates. 2. To step up investments in the Gulf region and especially in Iran in order to foster the emergence of a "middle class" (which is developing in the banking, insurance, marketing, and advertising sectors, and includes engineers and technicians) that could serve both as a social base for the Iranian regime and as a market for a series of durable consumer goods and luxury items being produced by factories built in Iran. 3. To develop the Iranian dictatorship into the main agent for maintaining a social situation conducive to imperialist projects in the entire region. 4. To transform Iran into a top-level purchaser of arms constructed by the weapons and aerospace industry in the United States (and in other imperialist countries as well). The Iranian regime would need such arms to fulfill its new role of policeman of the region, and its oil income would provide it with sufficient currency to purchase such arms. Economic role of Iran Iran's economic role was brought out very clearly during the "oil crisis. " Based on 1972 Figures, the Gulf region contains more than half the world's oil reserves. The table below indicates the relative importance of the oil resources of the various countries of the Gulf:
#Reserves #1972 production #Country
(in millions of tons) (in millions of tons) Kuwait 9,271 152 Qatar T77.6 23 Iran 9,286 254 Abu Dhabi 2,529.6 50 Bahrein 86 3.8 (in 1971) Dubai 205.9 6.5 (in 1971) Iraq 4, 143 67 Oman 689 14.7 (in 1971) Saudi Arabia 19,714 285 In addition, a good part of the oil delivered to Israel comes From the Arab-Persian Gulf. Iran's function is also of crucial importance both in maintaining surveillance of the Gulf and in controlling the "demands" of the Gulf's oil-producing states, which must remain within the confines set by American imperialism. The shah's "leading" role in the oil negofiations of the past few years serves a double purpose: In each round of such bargaining, the first "demands" set the pattern for all other countries to follow. It also provides the shah with a facade of "anti-imperialist" demagogy for home consumption.
Imperialist investments in Iran are growing at a very rapid rate. American imperialism is in the lead, but German and Japanese companies are also on the offensive. Nissan and Toyota are planning to build a dumptruck factory and an assembly plant. Japanese capitalists have submitted a credit plan of more than $1,000 million. It is linked to plans for participation of Japanese companies in construction of cement factories, automobile plants, a refinery (with a capacity of 500,000 barrels a day, and in the development of production of oil and natural gas. This increase in imperialist investment has led to the production of commodifies that cannot be absorbed by the internel market and are therefore directed toward the markets of certain countries in the ArabPersian Gulf and in Southeast Asia. According to the report of the Iranian central bank, the value of exports of Iranian industrial commodities increased 40 percent between 1971 and 1972. This export policy is manifested in the many Iranian industrial fairs held in the Gulf countries and in the flow of capital from all the Gulf countries (and from the imperialist corporations in Iran) into Iranian banks. At a time when an explosion of oil revenue is going on, this influx of capital is not negligible. And it in turn permits the export of Iranian capital to other countries. A few months ago the Iranian Minisiry of Economics declared: "The Gulf region provides the greatest potential market for our products. We have set ourselves the top-priority objective of becoming the principal suppliers of the oil emirates, whose •per capita income is the highest in the world. Geographical proximity, brief delivery time, and reduced shipping costs have allowed us to double our exports in three years, and we hope to increase them another 200 percent by 1978." (Le Mande, October 7-8, 1973.) As for Rezai, one of the biggest Iranian capitalists, he declared: "Iranian consumption is too limited to absorb the products of our large-scale indusiries. We are therefore constrained to export, particularly to neighboring countries." In addition, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have become increasingly attractive markets for machinery assembled in Iran, in particular trucks, buses, and automobiles. In this case, Iran's role as middle-man in addition to providing the usual advantages (cheap labor, production close to markets) also gives the companies better political cover: the Soviet Union and the Easter European countries importing from an "underdeveloped" country rather than directly from imperialist centers. J. Klochkov, the director of the Iranian subsidiary of General Moters, asserted when discussing the construction of a Chevrolet assembly plant in Iran: "After having conceived the plan of building a Chevrolet plant in Iran, we began to think about the possibility of exporting the products of the factory... We are now conducting negotiations with all Iran's neighbors, especially with the emirates of the Persion Gulf and with Arab countries. At the end of this year, we will still be engaged in discussions with delegates from these countries. I should also say that one of our aims is to penetrate the markets of the countries of Eastern Europe. " (Teheran Economist, February 2, 1974.) A military power In response to a question from a reporter for the West German newsweekly Der Spiegel about Iranian military expenditures and Teheran's intervention in the Gulf, the shah replied, "l have proposed a regional pact, or treaty, or agreement, or whatever you want to call it, aimed at guaranteeing the integrity and security of this region. Up to now, we have re-
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$6,000 million for arms... ceived no response. Access to the Persian Gulf is a life-ordeath question for us. We intend to guarantee this access, with or without the cooperation of others. And that is the answer to your question about why we spend so much money on our defense. "So these are the "good reasons" that "justify" a huge military intervention in the Gulfl The emirates have invited the shah to "guarantee access to the Gulf" and to "guarantee the integrity and security of the region." And the expenses are not exactly trivial. In 1973 Iran spent $3,000 million on armaments. Orders for new military equipment that the shah has already placed raise the figure to $6,000 million. For the capitalists of the arms industry, these orders represent an especially valuable windfall, because the shah's oil income allows him to pay his bills in cash. Strengthening of the Iranian army is a critical necessity since the shah "does not conceal his desire to set himself up as the policeman of the region. With the support of the United States and Great Britain, he has assigned himself the fask of 'upholding order especially by combatting any subversive force in the Gulf. " (Le Monde, May 25, 1973.) At present nearly 60 percent of Iran's oil revenues are spent on arms, and military expenditures account for 47 percent of the total budget. Iran's anns imports, noted the January 12, 1974, Le Monde, "averaged $85 million a your at the beginning of the 1960s, rose to $156 million in 1968, and will reach S2,000 million a year during the fifth five-year plan launched in March 1973. " And these enormous figures may well be outstripped. The Iranian armed forces today number some 200,000 men, of whom 20,000 are in the air force and 10,000 are in the navy. And this leaves aside the 40,000 police charged with assuring the success of the "agrarian revolution" in the coun tryside and the 60,000 agents of Sovak, the political police, which is a decisive factor in Iran's "independent economic develapment. " The Iranian army has the most sophisticated materiél: F4 Phantom jets, loser-guided bombs, latest-generation British tanks, and so on. And there are many military bases: Ahwaz, Abadan, the Kharg islands, Quishm (air bases), Korramshar (naval base), Bandar Abbes, and Chah Behar (which is the largest military base in the Indian Ocean). Those are just the most important military fortresses. The list leaves aside Teheran's military implantation in Oman. Le Monde's correspondent Eric Rouleau offered the following description
**• paid in cash of the Iranian helicopter base at Isfahan: "Isfahan will be the site of the world's second-largest helicopter base; it will be run by more than 500 American instructors. The shah's latest U.S. purchases are quite impressive. For $3,000 million he has equipped his regime with, among other things, a fleet of some 300 heavy and light bombers, half of which are Phantoms that will be delivered within five years. That is more than hes been promised to Israel, the only other country in the Middle East that Washington has agreed to supply with this type of advanced equipment. " (Le Monde, October 7-B, 1973.) These "purchoses" must be viewed in the light of the conditions of the Iranian workers, who work an average of twelve hours a day for a wage of about 60 rials (a little less than one dollar) and in the light of the standard of living of the Iranian peasant masses, whose income is scarcely enough to live on. The shah against revolutionary movements In a rather loose-mouthed mood, the shah told Newsweel senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave: "There is a possibility that certain of the regimes on the other side of the Persian Gulf might be overthrown by extremists currently engaging in subversive activities. For example, let's take the rebellion in the sultanate of Oman. If it ever succeeded, imagine for a moment what we would be faced with in Muscat, the capital, which lies just across the Straits of Hormuz. First a few rifles, then naval artillery and missiles. This is ridiculous. 1 will not tolerate subversive activities. " (Newsweek, May 23, 1973.) Thus is defined the basic role of the Iranian army, an army that (aside from its occupation of the Gulf islands in 1971) extended its aid to the royalists in Yemen, to the Sana govemment during the October 1972 war between the two Yemers, to Haile Selassie's regime in its struggle ogainst the Eritrean Liberation Front, to Hussein's regime in its battle against the Palestinian revolution, and to the Pakistani government in its war against the Baluchi independence movement.
The Iranian prime minister was referring to all these actions when in April 1973 he said: "Iran is strong enough to prevent any trouble in the region of the Persian Gulf. ... We are a world power that must be reckoned with."
The Iranian army's most important foreign intervention today is in the sultanate of Oman, where 3,000 Iranian troops are fighting alongside 1,000 British troops in an attempt to crush the armed struggle that has been going on for the post nine years in Dhufar, the southern province of Oman. The shah "justifies" this intervention by claiming that the militants of the Popular Front For the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab Gulf are "savages" who represent the "forces of subversion, destruction, chaos, and murder. " (Daily Telegraph, February 7, 1974.) The forces of the Iranian dictatorship are trying to destroy the armed fighters of Dhufar, who have already liberated a good part of the inhabited regions of the province. The Iranian dictatorship is also trying to play on the conflicts between the Iranian and Arab communities in the emirates, in on attempt to be able to justify mili