junta's chile of Algeria, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Senghor of Senegal.) The "battle for raw materials" has enabled China to integrate itself into the third-world "front. " But more especiolly, the situation is evolving very quickly in Southeast Asia and in the Far East. In April 1974 Peking signed on accord on Sino-Japanese air fransport with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. The signing touched off a furor in Taiwan. To obtain this agreement, Tokyo had to tolerate the rupture of its airline link with Taiwan, which has been an important transit point and will cost the Japanese economy quite dearly. The pro-Taiwan lobby in Tokyo seems to be really running out of steam. Malaysia in its turn has established diplomatic relations with China, sending its prime minister, Abdul Razak, on a trip to Peking. Malaysia was the first non-Communist country of Southeast Asia to do this. Peking is also rapidly developing its relations with Thailand (which sent a mission to Peking in December 1973) and with the Philippines, whose goverment is headed by the extremely pro-American Ferdinand Marcos. Even Suharto's Indonesia seems prepared to change its attitude (gradually) toward China. But all this will inevitably have serious consequences for the Communist parties of Asia. The trip of Khieu Sampan, leader of the Khmer Rouge, to Vietnam and China probably resulted in the recementing of ties between Chine and the FUNK. But the announcement in 1971 of Nixon's trip to Peking provoked the first serious political broak between China and the Vietnamese Communist party -- a break that has only widened since then and that will offect all the Indochinese Communist movements. Japan has now become the world's second imperialist power. If is intervening in Southeast Asia and was the target of mobilizations during Tanaka's trip to South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In all of these countries there are more or less developed guerrilla movements led by Communist parties of Maoist inclination. Now these movements will once again face an alternative: take their distance from Peking or "moderate" their actions. During his speech welcoming Abdul Razak, Chou En-lai alluded positively to the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia, a project that strongly resembles the plans of the extremely anti-Communist states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He did not repeat these allusions upon the departure of the Malaysian prime minister. But they remain disquieting nevertheless. 22
After the overthrow in October 1973 of the Bangkok military regime by the popular and student mobilization, the Communist parties of Thailand and Vietnam pointed out the reactionary character of the new government and called for continwing the struggle. Peking Review, however, was silent on the statements and military actions of the Thai Communist party. (Significant guerrilla zones exist in Thailand.) The New Ching News Agency (Hsinhua) limited itself to publishing in its daily bulletin a belated recapitulation of the main actions of the Thai CP.(16) There was not a ward about the political positions taken by the Thai CP! The Maoist leadership has just recently given some support to the Communist party of the Malaysian Federation by distributing the declaration published after the defection of many insurgents (some leaders among them to the government in northern Kalimatan (the island province of Malaysia) -(17) But it appears that the development of Chinese diplomacy has touched off hard debates within the Malaysian CP. (18) Further west, the Indian Maoist currents have yet to emerge from their crisis, and China's policy on Pakistan and Bangladesh has crushed all possibility of the pro-Peking CPs developing any revolutionary activity in these two countries. China's foreign policy, along with is inconsistency on questions of working-class strategy, has also been one of the factors leading to the disintegration of the Maoist movement in the developed capitalist countries. The Mao-spontanéist tendency has little by little abandoned its strict adherence to China. The Mao-Stalinist organizations have for the most part been reduced to sects, thanks to the twists and turns of Chinese foreign policy. And the Mao-centrist organizations are no longer able to define a consistent orientation on many questions, often taking refuge in silence. The present development of the regional situation will most likely accelerate a process of breakup and recomposition among the Asian Communist movement. And this in a continent where the class struggle is especially developed and where Maoist influence has been deepest. That breakup and recomposition may be one of the major consequences of Chinese diplomacy. For the Maoist leadership, "the east wind is prevailing" and the world situation is "excellent." The sense of this metaphor must be regarded as somewhat elusive. The disappearance of