decisive hour
AFRICA the liberation struggle in the portuguese colonies _by C. GABRIEL Most analyses of the struggle of the Portuguese African colonies, even the ones that are written in support of these struggles, are content to locate the liberation movements in the center of a triangle bounded by the metropolis, the colonial army, and imperialism. Everything is handled as though Portugal's three African colonies stood completely outside the history of the African continent. We believe it is necessary to place these struggles in the framework of the African continent and the African revolution, for we want to combine our support to the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC with an analysis of the direction of their political development. The Portuguese coup has opened a decisive period. The liberation movements are now confronted with complex problems of negotiations that require that they go beyond ampiricism and more precisely grasp the role of reformism in Portugal and -even more important -- the nature of the neocolonialist regimes' interest in, "support" to, and machinations with the liberation movements. The Portuguese bourgeoisie and imperialism are seeking a neocolonial solution. But is this possible? Can a Gaulliststyle policy be applied under different historical conditions and achieve the same results? Mario Soares, the leader of the Portuguese SP, is fond of repeating that "whot unites us is much stronger than what divides us. " But he cannot turn the clock back fifteen years. The neocolonialist trap will not be sprung through a crude seduction of the liberation movements through moralizing declarations from the general secretary of the Portuguese Socialist party. But the neocolonialist danger cannot be reduced to a question of good or bad morals. It could gain a foothold by using the illusions in a "democratic and national state, " or, it could simply develop on the besis of certain multinational investments that have been plundering Angola and i lozambique for a decade and about which the Portuguese reformists have become suddenly silent. Silent about the private army of Gulf Oil in Cabinda in Angola. Silent about the sales of Cabora Bassa's energy sources to South Africa. Lisbon's present policy is aimed at shunting the liberation movements to the sidelines by stimulating the emergence of "third forces" capable of breaking the intransigence of the PAIGC or FRELIMO.
The Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties, for whom the government of national union is an end in itself, are not above stooping to blackmail, saying in effect: "In order for the negotiations to go on, the present government must stay in power; and for it to stay in power, it must obtain a minimum number of concessions from you, the liberation movements." The period that has now opened up will thus reveal either the depth or the limits of the political sophistication of the liberation movements. It will also test their cohesion. Will the crisis now shaping up in the MPLA facilitate the maneuvers of imperialism? The united front with the ANLF that is envisaged by a faction of the MPLA would amount to a front with N'Gouabi, Mobutu, Kaunda, and Nyerere (respectively the heads of state of the Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania). That is, it would amount to a neocolonialist front. It is only with an authentically anticapitalist program that the vanguard of Angolo, as well as that of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, will be able to frustrate imperialism's neocolonialist plan. - SUPPORT TO THE PAIGC, FRELIMO, AND THE MPLA! -- IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE! -- AGAINST NEOCOLONIALIST SOLUTIONS! -- THE STRUGGLE GOES ON, SUPPORT MUST GO ON TOO!
* At the end of the 1950s, when the struggle against Portuguese colonialism took a decisive leap forward, the political situation on the Black continent was marked by a deep downturn of mass struggles and by the integration of a good part of the nationalist movement into the framework of neocolonialist solutions. In the spoce of five or six years, nationalist parties nearly everywhere had enthusiastically accepted positions os imperialist lackeys. The urban petty-bourgeoisie, which had developed widely within the colonial administration, raised itself to the status of ruling closs after having made use of the mass movement as a means of pressuring the imperialist governments.
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AFRICA The contradictory content of formal independence was a consequence of a twofold process. For the European bourgeoisie, breaking with classical economic colonialism in order to move to a higher stage of plunder in accordance with the contemporary development of capitalism was an empirical political response to the rise of the colonial revolution. For the African masses, it was a matter of the first generalized offensive against imperialist barbarism occurring within a social framework fashioned by colonialism, that is, under the political leadership of the "bureaucratic" petty-bourgeoisie. The neocolonial economy is not at all a "supreme" stage of imperialist rule, as Nkrumah claimed. The conversion did not open up a new era of bourgeois rule, but was rather a last resort allowing for a qualitative increase in plunder while at the same time temporarily easing the revolutionary pressure. In this light neocolonialism appears not as an objective development determined by the system of domination, but essentially as a defeat for the nationalist movement, which by its nature was unable to transform the independence struggle into an anticapitalist struggle. In his book Les Fleurs du Congo, G. Althabe explains exoctly the ideological game played by African nationalism: "The nationalist party as it was built during this period was for a section of the bureaucratic elite simultaneously an instrument of struggle against foreign rulers and a framework through which to establish a relationship with the mass of the populafion, a vehicle through which the bureaucratic elite succeeded in mobilizing the mass of the population around itself. "(p. 238.) "The nationalist party was thus built as a counterinstitution whose mode of existence was wholly determined by the adversary it was facing. "(p. 240.) "The aim of the struggle was to tear the population loose from the bureaucratic institution represented by the administration controlled by Belgians in order to reintroduce them into a new bureaucratic institution: the party, controlled by so-called nationalist politicians. (p.241.) "The sequel to the confrontation was simple: The nationalist party became the administration and the duality between the two bureaucratic institutions was erased. "(p.241.) And we may odd that the erasure of the duality was effected either through file integration of the nationalist movement into the neocolonialist framework or by the repression of the most radical elements (the UPC in the Cameroons, Sawaba in Niger, the MNC in the Congo, etc.) It was, then, primarily by these means that neocolonialism was able to become a realistic policy for the colonial bourgeoisies. To estimate the possibilities for a neocolonialist policy in the Portuguese colonies therefore implies examining factors like these in the context of a continental and international situation that is in all respects different from that prevailing in past years. The anelysis of nationalism in the Portuguese colonies must therefore integrate two factors: * The consequences of the character of the political period on the formation of the nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau at the end of the 1950s; * The importance and the limits of their break with the traditional nationalism of this period and their own balance sheets on the countries that were granted independence. Formation of the nationalist movements The PAIG was founded in September 1956. A little more than six years later, in 1963, the armed struggle was launched - after a process of political and military preparation. But between 1956 and 1963, this reg'on of Africa was marked by 10 a significant decline of mass struggle and by the stabilization of a relationship of forces favorable to imperialism. The Senghor regime came to power in Senegal and, after the imprisonment of Mamamou Dia, a strong state was sef up that for several years was to harass the PAIC's rear areas along Guinea's northern border and lend its support to a right-wing grouplet, the FLING. In Senegal itself, there was repression against the PAl, which resulted in the disappearance of a potential source of support for the PAIGC from within the neocolony itself. In GuineaConakry the failure of the first economic plan was to bring about an initial right-wing reaction from the Touré regime. To be sure, this episode scarcely affected Conakry's attitude toward the nascent PAIG; to be sure, from a quantitative standpoint aid from Conakry remained large over the years. But from the standpoint of the birth of a revolutionary leadership in Guinea-Bissau, the political path followed by the Guinean regime played a not insignificant role, both in terms of the regional relationship of forces and in terms of direct political influence on the young cadres of the PAIG. The impasse of Guinean nationalism could not prevent a process of radicalization within the PAIG, but it nevertheless was not conducive to going beyond Guinean nationalism on a theoretical level, as Vasco Cabral's statements about the "party-state" attest to. In reality, a complex jousting of political influence was going on, and its outcome would depend on the ability of the PAIGC to theorize its own struggle and to give it a class content. The MPLA was created in December 1956 by the fusion of various small urban groups. The Luanda revolt broke out on February 4, 1961. It was followed by a peasant insurrecfion in the north. This occurred while the Congo crisis was at its height. American imperialism was determined to make the Congo the turning point for the counterrevolution in central Africa. The American bourgeoisie had always taken an ambiguous attitude toward African nationalism. U.5. imperialism wanted simultaneously to break the rising revolution and to exploit the crisis of European colonialism in order to win new markets that were inaccessible to Washington in the existing colonial economic framework. Toward this end, Washington began aiding the most right-wing elements of African nationalism, the tactic being carried out especially through the trode unions affiliated to the International Federation of Free Trade Unions.(1) In Angola, the emergence of a movement of the "peoples of the north" (the UPNA), a predominantly ethnocentrist organization, was a windfall for Washington. (It emerged, moreover, independent of direct American action.) The crystallization of a right-wing nationalist movement, a potentially valuable interlocutor with Lisbon and a possible "border army" with political-ethnic links to the Kinshasa regime, could only have come about through a coming together of this movement and American policy, even if their relationship went through ups and downs. The victory of the counterrevolution in the Congo resulted in the expulsion of the MPLA from Kinshasa and the recognition by the Organization of African Unity of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile. Nevertheless, the "three glorious days" in Brazzaville in 1963 represented a conjunctural revolutionary upsurge that the MPLA was to exploit. The new, verbally nationalist regime of Massembat Debat accorded asylum to the MPLA after the overthrow of F. Youlou. This was done not only out of the revolutionary convictions of some of the regime's supporters. It was also a
key to organizations MPLA Peoples Liberation Movement of Angola
PAIGC African Party for the Independence of
Guined and the Cape Verde Islands FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front
ANLF Angola National Liberation Front. The
Union of Peoples of North Angola was created in 1954. It later became the Union of Angolan Peoples, and the, after winning over several grouplets, became the ANLF, which for reasons of diplomacy founded the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, which is based in Kinshosa and controlled by Mabutu.
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. It developed in 1966 after a split in the ANLF. It concentrated in the reaction by right-wing elements (like Debat himself to the threat of the formation of a Bakongo association under the leadership of Kinshasa. (2) On the basis of this situation, the MPLA was able to open a front in the enclave of Cabinda (a section of Angola separated from the rest of the country by a strip of Zaire). The MPLA came out of this period in a weakened condition, caught between Portuguese repression and Kinshase's support for the ANLF, which had its base along the northem border. The relationships between the MPLA and Congolese nationalism are not easy to establish. It is probable that between the time of Lumumbaism and the Brazzaville Civil Defense the cadres of the MPLA hod plenty of opportunity to draw a balance sheet. But was this belance sheet -- which was not very explicit -- extended to cover the experience of the N' Gouabi regime, the Diawaro struggle, and the left wing of the Tanzanian Communist party? The question is important. For while the political influence of Congolese nationalism appears to have been weak, it is no less true that the political situation on Angola's northern frontier plays a decisive role for military perspectives in the economically developed regions. In May 1966 the MPLA came out of the crisis by opening up a new front on the Zambian border. There agoin, the "socialism" of Kaunda scarcely had any influence on the ranks of the MPLA(3). But the political squabbles within the MPLA may parallel those within the Lusaka regime. We have recently seen the coincidence that may have existed between the Chipenda tendency of the MPLA and a faction of the Zambian regime. If there was no direct ideological influence, there was at least a political intervention through the bureaucratic structures of the organizational apparatus, especially in the delegations sent to foreign countries. FRELIMO was formed in 1962 through regroupment of the MANU, the UDENAMO, and the UNAMI. It also included small groups of emigré nationalists in Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi. The nationalist movement in East Africa has been heavily influenced by the personality of Julius Nyerere. But in spite of that, and in spite of the importance of the Tanzanian-Mozambiquian border, interchange between Nyerere's TANU and FRELIMO remained weak. Since it was formed later than the MPLA and the PAIGC, FRELIMO was much less confronted by the struggles that preceded the winning of inbeginning on gaining a base in the south and center of the country. The main criticisms it makes of the MPLA are that the latter has a petty-bourgeois leadership and that it directs the liberated zones from outside.
FLING Liberation Front for the National Independence of Guinea. A sort of reactionary grouplet based in Dakar, supported for several years by Senghor, president of Senegal, and manipulated by the Americans.
GUMO United Group of Mozambique. A potential third force. Has just declared itself in favor of interracial, interreligious coexistence and for a Lusitano-Afro-Brazilian community! dependence in most of Africa. It also appears that the greater integration of Mozambique (relative to Angola) into the southern African bloc had turned the attentions and relations of the militants more toward the movements in Rhodesia and South Africa. It therefore definitely seems that of the three orgonizations, FRELIMO was the one whose earliest development was least affected by the crisis of nationalism in the neighboring countries. Nevertheless, for all three movements, the struggle began in a situation of general downtum on a continental scale. They were thus extremely isolated in meir early years, and this isolation is not unimportant in understanding their difficulties of political clarification and the absence of a real theorizotion of the revolutionary process. The limits of a political evolution The three movements, then, were initially made up of young nationalists, memben of the urban petty-bourgeoisie. They were more or less influenced by the struggles in the French or British colonies. Through the Portuguese Communist party they discovered the existence of the Western workers movement, which they viewed (unconsciously) through a Stalinist and social chauvinist prism. Heterogeneous and lacking a political post, the young leaderships were content for a time simply to raise a series of slogans that come down to the demand for independence. The content of the struggle, its straf egy and historical perspectives, were scarcely detailed. But is there any larger body of written material today? To be sure, we have Mondiane's book The Struggle for Mozambique, as well as Cabral's writings between 1961 and 1969. These works already indicate a break with the traditional analyses of an Nicrumch or a Sekou Toure. But in reality, it is mainly through interviews and speeches that progress in analysis and development and specification of detail can be seen. This leadership's production of theoretical works -- the educational and propaganda function of which is decisive in speaking to the world anti-imperialist movement -- has been meager. A comparison with the Vietnamese leadership is revealing. On the one hand we have militants whose large production of political analyses indicates their historic ties with the inter-
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AFRICA national workers movement; on, the other hand, we have the African liberation movements, which, having been built in the stultifying framework of Portuguese domination, have a thousand difficulties in breaking with empiricism and discovering the tools of Marxism in order to formulato a theoretical structure for their struggles. And need we add that these efforts can be abortive if they are attempted through the application of sterile Stalinist concepts? Cabral himself recognized the empiricism that prevailed at the beginning of the struggle. (4) For his part, Dos Santos (a leader of FRELIMO) recognized the extent of pragmatism and the heavy influence of heterogeneity. In an interview with The African Communist (issue no.55) he declared: "So right from the start in 1962 different ideologies were reflected at the top. But the tasks facing us in those early days demanded that we create a collective that would accommodate all those who were prepared to work together to get the basic struggle off the ground. So, the nature of the political, social, and economic realities of the situation as it was then demanded a pragmatic attitude. " (p.47.) Empiricism asserted itself first of all on the question of forms of struggle and on the analysis of the forms of colonial domination. Confronted by an adversary that, unlike French or British colonialism, lacked the political and economic means to alter the form of its domination af the end of the 1950s, the liberation movements saw the necessity of armed struggle after going through the experience of legal mass mobilizations that were met with repression that blocked any possibility of their developing into national independence movement. Thus, Cabral declared of the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations: "The Pidjiquiti massacre committed by the Portuguese colonialists on August 3, 1959, against the striking dock workers of Bissau and the workers of the river transport boats cost us fifty strikers dead and more than a hundred wounded. It was a painful lesson for our people. We learned that there was no question of choosing between peaceful struggle and armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialists. ... We then decided ... to suspend all demonstrations for demands in the cities and to prepare ourselves for armed struggle." In Lorenzo Marques (in Mozambique) anti-Portuguese demonstrotions were savagely repressed in 1956 and 1962. In 1960 in Mueda and in 1962 at the cane plantations in Xinavane peasant demonstrations were repressed of a cost of hundreds dead. It was through the experience of such events, as well as through the example of Guinea-Bissau, where the struggle had been going on for several years, that FRELIMO little by little came to discard its demand for "negotiations" and turned to preparing the armed struggle, which was proclaimed on September 25, 1964. Empiricism remained the method: empiricism to win the sympothies of a village in the heart of the bush country; empiricism to resolve conflicts between two ethnic groups within which the movement had to win a base; and empiricism to structure the guerrilla organization. Up to that time, such questions had been posed nowhere else in Africa. And the responses the liberation movements gave to these problems, even if they were only partial answers, constituted a fundamental gain for the future development of the African revolution. (5) But certain questions are not merely subjective ones. The ethnic question, for example, has historical, economic, and social foundations that pragmatic good will is insufficient for resolving. To be sure, the PAIUC, which was working in a 12 limited geographic area, was able to forge a national consciousness through slow preparation and a varied approach to the ethnic groups. FRELIMO also made some experiments in this field, especially with the Makonda group in the north. But the MPLA was functioning in the worst conditions for resolving this matter. The geographical conditions of Angola, its history of being divided between the Congo and Ovamboland, made the conditions for developing a "national consciousness forged in struggle" very difficult. The Bakongo population in the north, whose cohesion and "legitimacy" derives from the old kingdom of the Congo, is divided today among the Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, and Angola(6), In 1954 the Union of Peoples of North Angola (UPNA) was created in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) on the basis of Bakongo nationalism. The leaders of the UPNA were Barros Nekaka and Holden Roberto, In 1957 the latter wrote to the United Nations demanding the reconstitution of the kingdom of the Congo. Later, the UPNA, which had in the meantime become the UPA, was to support the Tshombe faction in the Congo, not only politically, but militarily as well. Today this right-wing faction of Angolan nationalism has become a real border army functioning under the protective wing of Mobutu. It can play the role of privileged interlocutor. The accord signed in 1972 between the MPLA and the ANLFUPA was of tactical concern to the MPLA, which wanted to unfreeze the situation on its main front in the north. But beyond this conjunctural significance, the accord represented a de facto recognition of the ANLF as a co-representative in the struggle. The ANLF was soon reintegrated into the public support extended to the Angolan struggle by the Organization of African Unity. Today it is recognized by Peking and Sofia.(7) The confusing consequences of this accord were such that the MPLA felt obliged to issue a communiqué in which it reported to the world press: "The MPLA, cs well as the ANLF, maintains all its structures. As should be clear, the present discussions do not entitle anyone to speak of the MPLA as though it did not exist. " In the March 1973 issue of the bulletin Afrique en Lütte (Africa in Struggle), we wrote: "Because of the tactical plans of the MPLA, and contrary to the hopes of imperialism, the agreement reached under the tutelage of N'Gouabi, Mobutu, Nyerere, and Kaunda is not devoid of contradictions. It must be saluted for the new military possibilities it accords the MPLA. But we must still osk ourselves how the various components of the MPLA will envision the application of some of the clauses of the agreement. "And in fact, several months later, the Chipenda tendency explained that the accord constituted an agreement of the peoples of the north directed against the peoples of the south, of which he, naturally, claimed to be the representative. The existence of ethnic groups that straddle borders lends a means of pressure and intervention to the neocolonialist regimes that control a section of these populations. A regionalist faction, whether inside or outside a government, can then establish links with local leaders of the liberation movement. That is what a section of the Zambian government did with the Chipenda tendency in the MPLA. The situation is even more susceptible to operations like this in that the liberation movement lacks a homogeneous leadership and suffers from a certain amount of bureaucratization based on "villagism. " Of the three movements, the MPLA is clearly the most vulnerable on these matters. Chipenda had been in charge of logistics. He was denounced as a traitor, but certainly a political explanation of why should have been offered. Not only was this never done; it also seems that a compromise may have been reached between the "traitor" and the rest of the leadership. This sort of functioning and this sort of heterogeneity cannot fail to have consequences on the organiza-
tion's general political line. The situation in Angola allows for all kinds of maneuvers by imperialism aimed at brushing aside the most radical tendencies. It is therefore especially disturbing to read the statement made on May 12, 1974, in
Dares Salaam by MPLA leader A. Neto in which he saluted the progress that has been made by the ANLF and expressed the hope that the MPLA and the ANLF would cooperate in driving Portuguese colonialism out of Africa. But on what program and toward what aim will such a compromise be
FRELIMO has also had to take a position on the regional and ethnic question. In his interview with The African Communist Dos Santos stated: "At the level of regional economic subsistence, at the level of an economy based primarily on agriculture at its lowest level, it is difficult for people to relate to one another in a truly national sense, in the sense of even sharing a common economy and all the social links that this creates. So I would say that national economic development is an essential part of the continuing process of building a nation. Of course a nation is a product of history and its formation goes through different phases. In this sense the work of the final achievement of complete nationhood will continue even after independence, although the fundamental elements of nationhood are already in existence and in the process of being further developed in Mozambique." (p.42.) The armed struggle and the desire for national unification in struggle against the Partuguese oppressor have been two focfors permitting a decisive break with the capitulationist and ethnocentrist elements that arose in the nationalist current in the French and British colonies and opted for a policy of diplomatic pressure and border warfare. It is not by accident that the FLING was supported for several years by the Senghor regime. Nor is Mobutu's support for the ANLF surprising. But because of the heterogeneity of the organizations, especially the MPLA, this break has not been absolute. That is why we should not underestimate the threat of deviations being introduced by compromises between the various tendencies. In the African context, such threats will not disappear so long as a definitive break with nationalist ideology has not been made. To be sure, from the very beginning organizations were formed that unambiguously crystallized the most right-wing sectors of nationalism, the FLING and the ANLF being the two clearest examples. But the story was not always so simple. In Angola there were people who "passed" from the MPLA to the ANLF well after the struggle had been launched. There was also a split within the ANLF which was directed by Savimbi and was to result in the formation of the UNITA. In Mozambique, where FRELIMO was an association of various groups right from the start, the purge was carried out in the very course of the struggle. That was the case for the two main splits, that of Lazare Kavadamé and that of Uria Simango. In an interview with the July 9,1971, issue of the Italian Communist party weekly Rinascita, FRELIMO leader Semora Machel explained these events this way: "The essential contradiction concerned general line. On the one side there was a purely nationalist position that reduced liberation to only one of its aspects, namely driving the Portuguese out. On the other side, there was the position held by the great majority: Liberation must be linked to the transformation of the colonial, native, and tribal structures. " The two expelled members were aiming at definitively establishing fiefs in which they could exert their power in the framework of traditional structures. Machel continued: "But the conflict really broke out when vast territories of Mozambique had been liberated and the question arose as to how to organize these territories in order to turn them into the driving elements of the development of the liberation struggles. ... IF we fight to drive the Portuguese out and then replace them with Africans who function under the same economic system as the Portuguese did and therefore exploit other Africans, then the struggle is for naught. Instead, after driving out the Portuguese, we must act so that the popular struggle remains permanent. The break with reformist nationalism So it is with the Simangos and the Kavandames that Spinola has to wark today if his neocolonialist operation is to succeed. A decisive break has thus been made with the troditions of reformist nationalism that racked most of the freedom movements in the French and British colonies. With the new situation in Portugal and the proposals for a government of national union, an immediate capitulation under the spell of the neocolonialist charm is therefore improbable. There are certainly some genuinely right-wing tendencies in the MPLA that could get some support from outside the movement. But in general the dynamic set in motion by the specific features of Portuguese colonialism and by the years of struggle have incontestably separated this revolutionary nationalism from the swamp of rightism and reformism. But while the neocolonialist solution has not been put into effect through a sudden capitulation of the liberation movements under the impact of the Portuguese coup, it is nevertheless true that neocolonialism can be nurtured by the myth of the national democratic state. The liberation movements have adopted a fluid and deliberately imprecise position on the social goals of their struggle. This inadequacy can be explained by the absence of a theorization of the revolutionary process. But that is not sufficient to account for such a "refusal" to define precisely the historic goals of the struggle. The major cause of this attitude is the heterogeneity of the leoderships. To be sure, everyone rejects neocolonialism of the Senghor or Mobutu variety. But it must not be forgotten that between Toure and the revolutionary Marxists there is an "impressive selection" of neocolonialists on the African continent! This is the question that must be discussed with the comrades of the PAIG, the MPLA, and FRELIMO. In the cases of Angola and Mozambique, a preliminary abservation must be made before the scope of the negotiations is discussed. The guerrilla zones, especially in Angola, have made only very small inroods into the economically rich regions. Imperialist investments are especially large in these regions, and would represent a second-level stronghold for the Portuguese bourgeoisie in a heocolonialist framework. The first game the Portuguese bourgeoisie will try to play will be to seat groups representing the urban African petty-bour•geoisie and the "democratic" sectors of the Portuguese population at the negotiating table. Thus, the "Democratic Movement of Guinea" has suddenly appeared, along with the multiracial GUMO of Mozambique. And to this it should be added that the international press has suddenly started writing about the FLING, despite the fact that only a few weeks ago everyone was reporting that this group had disappeared. The attempt here is to shunt the liberation movements to the sidelines in the name of bringing a representative of the "whole nation" to the negotiating table. An urgent response from the liberation movements about the future of the capital owned by Krupp, the mines owned by Benguela, and the holdings of Gulf and other oil companies is therefore a necessity. If the negotiations should lead to freezing the current situation, granting FRELIMO and the
13
the common
MPLA only partial authority, it would be impossible to coun teract the neocolonialist tendencies that would inevitably be bolstered by an economy that is largely dependent on imperialist investments. Thus, the only solution in Angola and Mozambique is to continue the fight to win a more solid base in the economically developed regions. Everyone knows that if such a base is won, it would soon lead to a test of strength between the present Portuguese government and the colonial hardliners. The hardliners, who have temporarily taken a wait-and-see attitude, would soon win hegemony among the white population, whose dearest desire is to remain in Africa. (A party has just been formed in Mozambique called Fico, which
"I shall remain. ") A Rhodesian type solution is a constant point under discussion among the white colonial population. In Mozambique the tendency favoring such a solution is supported by not insignificant econamic forces, such as the Champalimaud industrial group and Jardim. This threat of a break with the white population in Africa -which would produce a deadly crisis that would definitively compromise their government of national union - is the thing that really ferrorizes the reformists of the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties, It is obvious, then, that these parties will put maximum pressure on FRELIMO and the MPLA to accept the compromise that we described earlier. A. Almeido Sandos, a representative of the white democrats in Mozambique who is close to the SP has just been named minister of interterritorial coordination. And less than a month ago he declared: "The dialogue with FRELIMO should be easy for us. ... But we have to move fast, because all Africans with even a minimum of political consciousness are now or soon will be with FRELIMO."
- to be continued -EEC market in crisis Once again the Common Market is going through a serious crisis, probably the most serious since its formation. This crisis was manifested in the failure of the "common Float" of the currencies of the nine member countries, in the British government's decision to renegotiate the terms of Britain's membership in the EEC, and in the Danish and Italian decisions to suspend free importation of commodities originating from Common Market countries. Earlier, the crisis had been expressed in the most dramatic fashion by the inability of the governments of the member states to work out a common position when faced with the "oil crisis" or to negotiate a joint agreement with the oil-exporting countries. To understand the origins of this