institutionalization" in that country. Below we are publishing an answer to the United Secretariat issued by the Executive Committee of the PST on August 20, 1974, and a reply by the United Secretariat pst executive committee debate on the "process of institutiondlization» adopted November 17, 1974. stotement of the The United Secretariat of the Fourth International, in a resolution passed at the end of May, subjected the leadership of the Partido Socialisto de los Trabajadores to a severe criticism that we consider to be unjustified. Ordinarily the matter would be discussed within the ranks of the world Trotskyist movement, whose political activities are of fraternal interest to us. (Reactionary legislation bars the PST from affiliating with the Fourth International as an official section.) However, the outhors of the resolution made the document public, thereby compelling us, much to our regret, to reply in public. There are several versions of the resolution. In our reply we shall refer to the version published in the July 26, 1974, issue of Rouge, the weekly newspaper reflecting the views of the French Trotskyists organized in the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire. For the information of the Argentine workers, Avanzoda Socialista is publishing a Spanish translation of the document. No information is provided in the resolution as to the vote cast in the United Secretariat. It was not unanimous. The resolution was proposed by representatives of the International Majority Tendency, which holds a majority in the United Secretariat. Representatives of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction argued and voted against it. They proposed seeking further information from Argentina, in particular from the PST. An odditional fact should be indicated. The decision to make the resolution public was made at a United Secretoriat meeting held July 3, 1974. A postscript, dated July 12, was included in the version published in Rouge, The postscript was not considered at any meeting of the United Secretariat.
document The central contention made in the resolution is that "the PST is entering a new stage in its evolution, openly breaking with the revolutionary Marxist conception of the workers united front based on the Leninist conception of the Third International and revived by Leon Trotsky. This charge is accompanied by the assertion that the leaders of the PST have adopted a policy of crossing class lines and that in justification "they utilize precisely the argument the Stalinists advanced in the mid-1930 to justify their adopting the popular-front line, that is, that it is legitimate to make alliances with the bourgeoisie or lis so-called democratic sectors in order to oppose a fascist danger. In justification of these grave accusations, the authors of the resolution allege that the leaders of the PST joined with representatives of seven other political parties, among which were several bourgeois parties (including the Unión Civica Radical), in signing a common document that was presented to "the Argentine president Juan Perón" in an interview held "March 22. " (The actual date was March 21) To prove that the document could not be signed by the PST without crossing class lines, the authors of the resolution quoted several key passages from it. They then quate from two supposed editorials in the March 28-April 5 issue of Avanzada Socialista. (We say "supposed editorials" precisely because only one of the articles cited as such by Rouge is actually on editorial. This confusion is odd since in recent months Avanzada Socialista has followed on explicit norm, publishing its editorial in each issue on page 3 in 12-point type under the caption "EDITORIAL" placed in the right-hand column. The authors of the resolution are apparently ufilizing the fact that almost all of
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the articles in Avanzada Socialista are unsigned (a trodition inherited from twenty-six years of clandestinity) in order to dub any and all articles as editorials. And they do this despite the fact that the very issue of Avanzada Socialista cited by them adhered to our norm, that is, published only one article under the title of "EDITORIAL" - on page 3 in 12-point type. And from that article, devoted entirely to the interview with Peron, the authors of the resolution cite nothing except the Following phrose: "concrete, flexible responses to every conjuncture in the class struggle. ") In their opinion, this assemblage of quotations proves that the leaders of the PST believe that presenting Perón with a document containing a bourgeois political line signed by a mixture of bourgeois and proletarian parties constitutes an exemplary action in defending democratic rights and fighting fascism. The charges appear on the surface lo be irrefutable. Nonetheless something is awry. The Peronist administration does not appear to have concluded that the PST capitulated. On March 25, four days after the interview with Perón, Comrade Juan Carlos Coral was arrested and imprisoned for participating in a meeting with workers on strike held in front of the entrance to the Banco Noción. An article on this was published in the same issue of Avanzada Socialisto that reported the meeting with Perón. Nor do the ultraright thugs, who are operating in collusion with sectors of the government, appear to have concluded that the PST is bowing to the pressure of the bourgeoisle. To the contrary, they consider that the PST, in view of its fast rate of growth and Th expansion into more and more areas, is becoming a greater potential threat to Argentine capitalism. That is why they have stepped up their raids on our headquarters and their assassinations of members of the PST. The leaders of the PST did not sign a common document with any other political party, and no document of such kind was presented to. Perón at the March 21 inferview. How then did the authors of the United Secretariat resolution gain a contrary impression? We acknowledge that we are partly to blame for this. Avanzada Socialisto did publish the text of the supposed common document in the March 28-April 5 issue, Moreover, it included a list of supposed signers. This was an error — along with the delay in correcting it - for which we take responsibility. Comrade Coral did make a public correction on May 8 in a television interview. A public rectification was also mode by the editorial staff of Avanzada Socialista in the June 26 issue. However, these public acknowledgments that an error had been committed did not satisfy the authors of the United Secretariat resolution. Apparently they consider the public rectifications to be merely part of a cover-up. It has thus become necessary to explain the circumstances of the interview with Perón more fully. The context was the ultrarightist coup of February 27 in which the chief of police in Cordaba, Antonio Domingo Navarro, toppled the elected provincial government headed by Obregón Cano. This ominous development, which threatened to start a chain reaction that could lead to a similar coup in Buenos Aires and the reinstitution of a military dictatorship on a nofional scale, was profoundly disturbing. To meet the threat, it was Imperative for the Argentine workers to mobilize in defense of their hard-won democratic rights and press toward a socialist resolution of the economic and political crisis rocking Argentine society, For the PST, this was the central objective governing everything we did. 18
The coup in Córdoba also disturbed other circles, including sectors of the bourgeoisie. For various reasons these sectors feared a resumption of military rule; they also feared the possibility of a confrontation that could good the workers into a socialist revolution. From the revolutionary-socialist point of view there was every reason to foster this Incipient division within the ruling closs and to seek to take advantage of it. While this was a secondary consideration, it played a role in shaping our immediate tactics, particularly in the question of gaining publicity that might aid in mobilizing the workers. The leading figure in the move to seek an interview with Perón was Ricardo Balbin of the Unión Civice Rodical. He hod his own political reasons, of course, for doing this. Among them was fear of what the Cordoba coup might signify. He arranged the Interview with Perón. Perón. granted the interview os head of the government. As the authors of the United Secretariot resolution correctly explain, Perón wos interested in bolstering his political image as the "guarantor" of democratic rights for everyone except the ultrerightists and the protagonists of guerrilla warfare. We understood this, and we did everything we could to counteract Perón's objectives in this respect, exposing the real role of his regime. The projected interview had another side — it involved a formal governmental act of quasiparliamentary character. The interview was an official one between the president and the representatives of legally recognized parties listed os being in the opposition. Perón therefore demanded that the opposition parties present a document stating the objectives they sought in the interview. For on opposition party to withdraw of this point would have brought into question its legal status. To struggle for legality and to defend it when it is won is a matter of principle for Leninists. Oscar Alende, of the Partido Intransigente, drew up a draft for consideration by the seven other parties. Aside from other items, we found the draft to be totally unacceptable both for what it included (support of a bourgeois government and its institutions] and for what it left out (mobilization of the working class in defense of democratic rights). At a meeting of representatives of the eight parties, we argued in favor of amending the document along these lines. We sought to eliminate all references to supporting the Peronist regime and to add points concerning mobilizing the workers. It soon became clear, of counte, that it was impossible for the eight parties to reach agreement on a joint statement. Balbin communicated this fact to officials of the Perón administration, Perón then made a concession; he withdrew his demand that a common statement be presented. Thus the interview was held without a common statement being presented to Peron and with each party free to state its own positions. It was on that basis and that basis alone that we participated in the interview, We went as representatives of the PST and not as adherents of an unprincipled bloc or incipient popular front. It can be argued that we made a mistake in doing this. We do not think it was a mistake, but we are quite willing to discuss the question and are open to persuasion if sufficiently compelling arguments can be odduced. However, this has nothing to do with the charge made by the authors of the United Secretariat resolution that we joined with bourgeois parties in signing an unprincipled document.
We recognized that our participating in an interview with
Perón might be misunderstood by a few loyal militants and that some of our opponents might subject it to malicious misinterpretation. Through all the means at our disposal, including nationwide television broadcasts, we sought to lessen those risks. In the only genuine editorial cited by the authors of the United
Secretariat resolution, we clearly stated our political opposifion to Peronism and the Peronist regime. For instance, in relation to our posing the danger represented by the violent actions of the budding semifascist currents, we said:
*Preserving the stability of the institutions in this period does not mean supporting the Peronists" policy or their government, rather it mears defending the right to utilize all democratic
Instruments, which however precarious, insufficient, and grudgingly conceded, make possible a more extensive and continuous relatiorship with the working closs as a whole and the people. If means preserving the right - for ourselves as well as the other political forces — to publish journals, open headquarters, make use of radio and television, organize rallies, assemblies, and demonstrations. It also means the right for workers to Improve their trade-union organizations, freeing them both from military Interventions and from the bureaucracy, as the companieros in Villa Constitucion have just done. If means, Finally, the chance to make an impact in the election of our rulers and in criticizing their programs and the activities of the government. "All this has absolutely nothing to do with a defense of the policy of the government. Perón came to office with the support of a broad alliance of all the capitalist and imperialist sectors. Defending Perón's govemment would mean defending the Social Pact designed to freeze wager at the present levels of exploitation, guaranteeing the privileges of the landholding oligarchy and the Investments of the foreign monopolies. It would mean, finally, defending the brood range of repressive means by which they are trying to impose this economic policy, from reforms of the Penal Code to enforcing the Ley de Prescindibilidod (Civil Servants Redundancy Low). * (Emphasis in the originol.) We believe that ir is impermissible under any circumstances to give political support to a bourgeois regime, party, coalition, structure, or representative — and we have never done so in the slightest way. We have always opposed taking the road of class collaboration leading to popular frontism and to bourgeois nationalism. In the face of a rightist coup, the threat or actual outbreak of civil war, and an assault on the liberties of the people and the rights of the worken, it is permissible and even sometimes imperative to organize and carry on practical actions in defense of democratic rights together with nonproletarian organizations and tendencies. That is what Lenin taught. Af the same time the revolutionary party must make if crystal clear that such a strictly limited toctie of joint action to ward off an immediate danger does not entail the slightest political subordination, rapprochement, agreement, or collusion with the false policies of the temporary bourgeois democratic allies. Lenin instilled the principle of maintaining independence of action and voice. Democracy can be safeguarded only through the constant and independent struggle of the workers for power and socialism. The PST has worked to mobilize the masses along this line and will continue lo do so. What led the daily papers to report that a common document had been signed? What led some of them to say that the supposed joint document had been handed to Perón? (The majority of the Buenos Aires dailies, however — Noticias, La Nación, Clarín, Mayoria - said that it was only a press release.) In giving the press his version of the interview with Perón, Balbin used as an aide-mémoire his own draft statement based on corrections he had made to the draft drawn up by Alende and the one proposed by Coral. No doubt if was from this that the reporters gained the impression that it was a joint statement, and a few of them concluded that it hod been handed to Perón.
It should be odded that the leaders of the Communist party have been pressing for the formation of a popular front in Argentina and they hoped to utilize the interview with Peron as a step in that direction. It was in their interest to help advance the interprefation that a common document had been agreed to.
Let us now take up the attempt by the authors of the United
Secretariat resolution to show by judiciously selected quotations from two articles in the March 28-April 5 issue of Avanzada
Socialista that we have made a furn and now favor joining unprincipled blocs with bourgeois parties in defense of democratic rights. The United Secretariat resolution states that it is our position that in the given context a struggle must not be conducted to overthrow the government or the present institutions, but on the contrary it is necessary to defend "democratic institutionalization and that, to this end, it is correct to establish an accord with bourgeois parties by signing joint declarations and calling for joint demonstrations. Neither the genuine nor the supposed editorials ufilized by the authors of the United Secretariat resolution contain the quotation ascribed to us. Was the "quotation" taken from a different source? We would appreciate learning what the source was. The matter is important, becouse it is on the basis of that "quotation" and Its accompanying interpretation that we are decused of repeating the arguments used by the Stalinists In the thirties in favor of a popular front. The truth is that we have been campaigning in the most consistent way for many years against popular frontism. The very same issue of Avanzado Socialista that hos proved so serviceable to the author of the resolution carries vigorous polemics against popular frontism, which in the current situation in Argentina represents a real danger. (The authors of the resolution acknowledge our polemTes against popular frontism, but brush them aside, saying we only "formally reaffirmed" our postfion.) They brush aside, for irstance, the following statement in one of the articles cited by the authors of the United Secrefariat resolution: "We ... are the most determined opponents of "democratic" or 'popular fronts. " That is, united fronts between workers and bosses. The most basic thing we are fighting for is the political independence of the workers movement from the porties or fronts of the bosses. For this reason, we did not join in the elections either with Frojuli (Frente Justicialisto de Liberación Nacional - the National Liberation Front for Social Justice, the Peronist electoral formation) or the APR (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria - People's Revolufionary Alliance, a popular-fronttype front of small left liberal parties supported by the CP.) We stand, more strongly than ever, for o united front of the working class." The authors of the United Secretariat resolution even go so far as to take phrases from the document allegedly handed to Peron, place them in quotation marks, and represent them as our position. This procedure enables them to say the following: "The PST leodership must have realized that all of this - Th decision to participate in a meeting that served as a cover for Peron's "normalization' moves, is signing a common document with bourgeois parties (including the Unión Civica Radical, the traditional bourgeois party and even today the principal bourgeois force aside from Peronism), it proclaiming a "fundamental agreement among all the signers on defending the process of institutionalization," its accepting 'objectives approved
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by 'the people" (which in reality are objectives elaborated by Cámpora and Perón), and its thesis that the fight against fascism can and must be conducted in common with the parties representing the class enemy - would provake reactions among the party membership." With such methods, it is easy to prove a case — any case, no matter how far it departs from the truth. The other quotations selected by the authors of the United Secretariat resolution are irrelevant inasmuch as they do not presumably defend the famous statement that was allegedly presented to Perón, They deal with the concrete situation revolving around the ultrarightist coup in Cordoba, the broader threat this represents in Argentina today, and how the opposition of certain bourgeois sectors to a possible fascist threat in Argentina might be utilized in furthering the only sure answer to fascism, that is, mobilization of the working class in occordance with the program of revolutionary socialism. From the way these quotations are utilized and from a couple of mistranslations, it is evident that the authors of the United Secretariat resolution do not understand the concrete situation in Argentina or our position on it. For instance, they quote one of the articles in Avanzada Socialista os talking about "defending constitutional stability. " The original reads "defending institutional stability, " That difference is not an essential one; what is essential is to understand that the reference is to the coup in Córdobo and its ramifications. The loose use of the word "institucional" has undoubtedly added an element of confusion (and we are not free of blame in this, but it is hard to understand how the authors of the United Secretariat could have so badly misinterpreted the term in this instance, for it immediately follows the opening paragraph of the article outlining the concrete situation. The translating error (if that is what it really is) is repeated elsewhere. For instance, the article states that the fact "that eight political parties converged to demand a meeting to raise the institutional question is of extraordinary importance (que ocho partidos políticos hayan coincidido en solicitar la entrevista para plantear el problema institucional es de extraordinaria importancia)." This is translated os "the fact that eight parties reached an agreement to call for a meeting to demand institutionalization is of extraordinary importance (le fait que huit partis soient arrivés à un accord pour demander la réunion, afin de demander 'institutionalisation est d'une importance extroordinaire)." But the reference in the article is to the struggle for the establishment of constitutional guarantees of democratic rights, a process that began with the Cordobazo and the subsequent downfall of the military dictatorship. In other words, the eight parties sought the inferview in order to dramatize the problem of the coup in Cordoba and the danger that the process of establishing democratic rights might be reversed. The objective of the PST was not to plead with Perón but to give impetus to mobilizing the Argentine workers. Still another charge is mode against the leaders of the PST by the authors of the United Secrefariat resolution. They state: "Ar the some time, they (the PST leaders) have forgotten the Fundamental distinction that exists between the democratic rights demanded by the workers movement and the structures of bourgeois democracy. " We acknowledge that some of the formulations we have used could have led to this impression. We might even have mode the error in the current situation in Argentina of not carefully distinguishing between a given bourgeois "structure" and the defense of democratic rights. Since our attention has been called to this, we have begun discussing the matter. We appeal to other sectors of the Trotskyist movement to also consider this question, bearing in mind the concrete situation in Argen20 tina, including the meaning acquired by the word "institucionalización. " If an adjustment is called for, we will not hesitate to make it as we have in the past on other questions. However, we insist that our basic approach is squarely in accordance with the Leninist concept of the Third International, particularly as promulgated by Leon Trotsky, That basic approach is to mobilize the workers and their allies along the road to a socialist revolution through methods outlined in the Transitional Program. We see no alternative to this approach. The "guerrilla strategy" has been advanced as a possible shortcut. We have rejected the "guerrilla strategy" as not being in accordance with the Leninist concept of the Third International, above all as promulgated by Leon Trotsky. In Argentina the "guerrilla strategy" has proved to be a big obslacle to mobilizing the workers and their allies along revolutionary-socialist lines. We note in passing that the authors of the United Secretariat resolution throw in the charge that we "previously supported the Uruguayan Frente Amplio, which was led by a representative of the bourgeoisie, SEREGNI...." The intent of this gratuitous ossertion is clear. The authors want to suggest that we supported the bourgeois figure Seregni, and called on the workers to vote for the Frente Amplio, a classcollaborationist bloc. The innuendo, however, has no basis in fact. That is why the authors of the United Secretariat resolufion offer no quotations or other "proofs. " (We are willing to discuss the character of the Uruguayan Frente Amplio, the Chilean Unidad Popular, or the French Union de la Gauche, and what tactical attitude ought to have been adopted toward them, but this is hardly the place to take up these problems.) We turn now to the July 12 oddendum to the resolution of the United Secretariat. The addendum acknowledges the public self-criticism made by the editorial staff in the June 26 Avanzada Socialista only to shrug it off as meaningless. If the leaders of the PST did not sign the document handed to Perón, that proves nothing, they argue, because the PST leaders support such a course in general! But then the specific cose involving our allegedly signing the document, on which the authors of the United Secretariat hinged everything, also disappears, and we are left with nothing but their general assertion, deprived of any foundation in fact, that our course has been "opportunist." Moreover, the authors of the resolution contend, if the leaders of the PST did not sign the document allegedly handed to Perón, they at least signed other unprincipled documents; therefore the charges against us still stand. The fresh "evidence" adduced for this argument which is an extraordinary one to say the least - is that on June 29,1974, the PST added its signature to the signatures of seven other parties on a "center-left" declaration supporting "the process of institutionalization in the country" and "the operation of the legal mechanisms of constitutional succession. " The source of this "evidence, state the authors of the resolution, is the June 30,1974, issue of the Buenos Aires bourgeois daily La Opinión. (Other newspapers reported to the contrary. For example, La Nación.) Besides this, the authors of the resolution declare, on July 3, following the death of Perón, the leaders of the PST signed a statement in the city of Santa Fe in response to a request from the president of the provincial parliament in support of "the maintenance of constitutional stability as the only adequate means for attaining social justice in freedom, breaking the grip of the imperialist interests, and achieving lasting independence. " The source cited for this "evidence" is a dispatch from Rosario published in the July 4 issue of the Buenos Aires bourgeois daily El Cronista Comercial.
The reports are erroneous in both instances. In neither cose did either leaders or members of the PST sign any such documents or support them. We would suggest to the authors of the postscript to the resolution of the United Secrefariat that the standards of accuracy in the bourgeois press in Argentina are even below those of Le Monde.
A final point: How could if happen that the editorial staff of
Avanzada Socialista made the error it did in reporting the
March 21 interview with Perón? It is of no public interest to go into the details, which concern the organization and funetioning of the staff. Suffice it to state that the specific problem 2 statement of the united secretariat The