ITALY by LIVIO MAITAN
In the last issue of INPRECOR (No. 12, November 14) we published an article detailing the economic crisis of Italian capitalism. The following article deals with the political crisis that has been racking the ruling class. Previous articles in INPREC OR have dealt with the response of the Italian Communist party to the general crisis and with the perspectives of the revolutionary Marxists of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist
Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International. (See No.8, September 19, and No.9,
October 3.) In a future issue, we will present an analysis of the policy of the Italian far-left groups. - INPRECOR The great wave of struggles and the vast processes of political maturation that began in 1968 had their roots. in the profound changes in economic structure and composition of social forces that had occurred in Italy since the beginning of the 1950s. It is enough to recall that there was a gigantic rural exodus of more than 4 million people who moved to the cities between 1951 and 1967; that is, an annual average of 250, 000. Between 1961 and 1967 this internal migration ran at an annual average of 100, 000, while a nearly equal number of people were emigrating abroad. (Emigration from the country had been even higher between 1951 and 1961) Taken as a whole, the size of the working class increased from 8,250, 000 in 1951 to 9,060, 000 in 1961, and to 9,400,000 in 1971. (The percentage of the active population made up by workers rose from 41.2% in 1951 to 44.6% in 1961 to 47.8% in 1971; in the northern part of the country, the figures were 44.6%, 49.1%, and 51.7% during these same years.) On a national scale the section of the active population 12
THE CRISIS made up by the "relatively independent" petty bourgeoisie fell from 44.4% in 1951 to 37.2% in 1961 and to 20.1% in 1971, while the figures for the white-collar workers for the same years were 9.7%, 13.1%, and 17.1%.* Situation of the working class During the period of the boom and the big industrial development, the working class acquired a greater weight in society and also increased its cohesion as a class. It was not subjected to a process of political integration into the system, even during the period of great stagnation. In 1968 the workers be*These data are based on the census and other official statistics. They were summarized and analyzed in particular by the economist Sylos Labini in "Saggio sulle classi sociali" (Essay on Social Classes, 1974) and in "Problemi dello sviloppo economico" (Problems of Economic Development, 1970). In the former work, Labini makes some international comparisons that demonstrate, among other things, that in Italy the size of the working class as a percentage of the total active population was inferior only to that of Britain (where it was 50.3% in 1966). In fact, the Italian figure is higher than the British if only those workers employed in industry properly so called, including construction, are considered. On that basis, the figure would be 33% in Italy and 31.6% in Britain. It must be noted, however, that the number of small and medium-sized factories is significantly larger in Italy. In Italy 43% of all companies had more than 100 employees; the figure was 46% in Japan, 61% in France, 64% in West Germany, and 74% in the United States. Finally, let us mention that in Labini's work the category "relatively independent petty bourgeoisie" includes farmers, merchants, and artisans, among others.
gan to question the hegemony of the ruling class on all levels and to contest the mechanisms of the system in struggle. The breadth of the differentiations within the working class was limited os a result of struggle; the separation between the blue-collar and white-collar workers was reduced; wage increases were won consistently; a favorable relationship of forces was imposed in many factories; new democratic rights were won.* Beginning from the middle of 1971, after the absence of a revolutionary leadership had prevented full utilization of the general political openings created by the great strike wave of 1969 and after the turn in the economic cycle, the working class found itself generally on the defensive. The bourgeoisie sought to concretize its attack by turning to a center-right government. But the contract batfles between October 1972 and the spring of 1973, particularly the struggles of the metalworkers, concluded politically with a positive change - although the economic results were fotally insufficient - in the sense that the workers manifested on increase in combativity (big successful strikes, massive demonsirations in Milan and Rome, occupation of Fiat Mirafiori and other Turin factories) and the bourgeoisie had to make a turn, returning from the center-right to the center-left. Similarly, the bourgeoisie drew the balance sheet on the big contract disputes between autumn 1973 and spring 1974, which once again were marked by a high level of combativity, significant mobilizafions, strong pressures from the rank and file, and dynamic initiatives by vanguard cadres. Furthermore, the results of the referendum on divorce last May 12 showed that the working class was responding in no uncertain terms to the insidious offensive of its class enemy on the political and ideological level as well. The 80% No vote by the workers of Turin was eloquent in this regard. (For an analysis of the stakes involved in the referendum, which proposed abolition of the law permitting divorce, see INPRECOR No.0, May 9, and No.1, June 6) The response to the fascist bombing in Brescio, with its unprecedent*Calculating on the basis of 1971 lire, average real wages rose from 71, 000 lire a month in 1960 to 122, 000 in 1970, to 130,000 in 1971, and to 145,000 in 1973. (The increase in real terms between 1969 and 1970 was about 13%.) The proportion of whitecollar salaries to blue-collar wages, which was 3.0 to 1 in 1960, dropped to 2.0 to 1 in 1970 and 1.9 to 1 in 1973. As for political gains, the most important element was most probably the emergence of the workers delegates; but from a juridical standpoint, the importance of amendments to the labor code limiting employers' powers to lay workers off must not be underestimated.
edly broad mobilizations, was a similar demonstration. (See INPRECOR No.2, June 20.) Nevertheless, it would be wrong to underestimate certain negative social and political tendencies that have begun to appear. First, the decline in buying power resulting from the exacerbation of inflation is provoking a vast increase in overtime hours (a phenomenon that was sharply declining in the preceding period). Second, because of the lock of an overall response by the trade-union organizations, success in the defense (or partial defense) of living standards depends largely on the strength of the workers in each individual sector and company. Finally, suspensions and layoffs are on the rise, hitting various layers of workers in various forms. The consequence of all these phenomena is the emergence of widely different conditions among the workers, even within a given category. It is perhaps premature to postulate a real turn in the trend as compared with the post-1968 period. But let us repeat, concrete indications already exist and it is easy to understand the implicit dangers in the symptoms we have mentioned. It goes without saying that the situation would become extremely serious should the present bourgeois offensive against employment levels not provoke an energetic response in time; that would lead once again to the formation of a vast reserve army of labor. Petty bourgeoisie: radicalization or reactionary regression? The social and political crisis that opened in 1968 has provoked a radicolization of wide layers of the petty bourgeoisie. The basis of this radicalization was the various changes that had occurred within this social layer. We have offered some data in previous articles. Other facts could be added. But all the statistics indicate that there has been a decline in the so-called old middle classes and a clear increase in the so-called new middle classes (private and public white-collar employees, professionals, certain categories of employees in commerce and transport, etc.). Considerable changes have continued to occur during the past few years. Here are two examples involving layers that are politically importont: The number of teachers, which had already risen from 325, 000 to 451, 000 between 1951 and 1961, rose to 600,000 in 1971 and is approaching 700,000 today; according to CENSIS, the number of employees in public administration rose by 140,000 during 1971, while the number of small shopkeepers declined by 49,000 during the same yearThe radicalization was stimulated on the one hand by processes of declassing and disintegration of tra-
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ITALY ditional layers and on the other hand by the aspirations of the "modern" layers more closely linked to production and administration; these layers wanted to improve their conditions, taking advantage of the favorable political conditions. The collapse of traditional values, which occurred in the context of the storms that shook the educational institutions, did the rest. In the past, the crisis of the middle classes has quite often favored reactionary, fascist, or Bonapartist operations. In the Italy of those years of turmoil the road was opened for a relative - and temporary - broadening of the social base of the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano - Italian Social Movement, the largest neofascist organization) and for some partial electoral success by the fascists in 1971. Should the present crisis become even more pervasive without any positive outlet being presented, some sectors of the petty bourgeoisie (small merchants facing bankruptey, for example) could become susceptible to new, dangerous suggestions and could furnish a basis for an authoritarian turn. Up to now, though, this has not happened, or has happened only to a limited extent. The radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie and of some layers of the intelligentsia has not ot all been co-opted. In fact, as a result of a perfectly explicable unevenness, some layers hove radicalized only in a very recent period. This is the case, for example, with teachers, whose struggle has developed especially during the past two years os a by-product of the student movement. It is also the case for numerically less important but nonetheless significant layers, such as journalists, whose opposition to the merger of editorial boards and to the complete subjection of the press has given rise fo conflicts that have generated a broad response, conflicts that in the last analysis are expressions of the ideological crisis of the ruling class. Finally, one must not forget one massive phenomenon that has been at the root of remarkable political and social tensions and has provided the major contingents for the struggle in the neighborhoods and regions and for particular types of actions (against high rents and the housing shortage, for example). At the end of the 1960s, according to statistics that certainly do not er in the direction of exaggeration, the number of those marginally employed or underemployed stood at 3,700, 000 (three-quarters of whom lived in the Mezzogiorno). The subproletariat af that time numbered about a million and a half. * Given the recessionary period * In his essay "Disoccupazione ed esercito industriale di riserva in Italia" (Unemployment and the Industrial Reserve Army in Italy, 1972) Luca Meldolesi evaluates the industrial reserve army for 1968 at 6.6 million to 7.7 million (including those un14 that has opened up and taking account of the longterm tendency toward contraction of employment levels, the mass of poor appears surely destined to rise, with all the political and social dislocations that inevitably follow. Stratification and differentiation in the bourgeoisie For about two decades, and especially during the prolonged boom of the capitalist economy of Western Europe, private industry had taken on a predominant role, despite the noteworthy strength of the state sectors. In fact, in the absence of a determined plan and during the phase of leadership crises, the big capitalist groups (in the first place Fiat, Pirelli, and Montedison) had imposed their will, determining the type of development and, in the final analysis, assuring the relative dynamic equilibrium of the system. But with the exhaustion of the boom and the new situation that emerged after 1968, even these groups ran into growing difficulties, suffering serious crises at various times. Generally speaking, profit reductions, crises, and actual bankruptcies resulted in intensifying state intervention into the economy and thus further enlarged the part of industry under the total or partial control of the state. (As is well known, even a bulwark of private capital like Montedison now has o considerable dose of state participation.) At the same time, the accentuation of the process of supranational concentration has entailed a massive penetration of foreign capital. (Recall, for example, the events in the various domestic electronics companies.) Schematically, then, the following stratification can be outlined: (1) the bourgeoisie of the big private industrial groups, whose weight has diminished for the reasons listed above; (2) the bourgeoisie linked to specific sectors, like petroleum, that are closely linked to international capital; (3) the financial and speculation-oriented bourgeoisie, whose weight, far from declining, has been increasing; (4) the technocracy, the leading bureaucracy of the public sector, whose positions have been further strengthened. These distinctions are to some extent arbitrary, for there is an interpenetration, while not an identity, among some of the indicated strata. But the interpenetration is not total, and in any case the various strata and groups have different overriding interests; employed and looking for work, the marginally employed, and the unemployed work force). Some of his quantitative estimates are debatable, but the importance of the phenomenon is difficult to contest-
in times of crisis, when decisive choices have to be made, this fact can have a particular pracfical urgency. Another consideration must be taken into account, however. The extension of the public sector - even in the most radical form - does not entail a break with the system as a whole; in fact, it can even strengthen the system. Nevertheless, it does not involve a decrease in the weight of the bourgeoisie as such, which has inevitable political consequences. (The technocracy or state bureaucracy cannot carry out all the social and political functions traditionally handled by the industrial bourgeoisie with a view toward improving the operation of the system and lending it an overall balance.) Here another of the objective roots of the crisis of the ruling class must be delineated. To what extent is it possible to establish a correspondence between the various sectors of the bourgeoisie and the political tendencies that are being manifested in the current phase? Is there any foundation to the interpretations being advanced in some quarters that there is an alliance between the financial and speculation-oriented bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bureaucratic "bourgeoisie" on the other? It is necessary to refrain from establishing connections that are too mechanical. This is all the more important during a period in which the fate of the system as a whole is at stake and in which political choices are determined generally by the need to defend the interests of the system as a whole. That said, however, it is impossible to disregard certain specific inclinations. The financial and speculation-oriented bourgeoisie can find broad agreement on a conservative basis with the state bureaucracy, all the more so in that it is not directly concerned with the problem of relations with the working class. The same can be said about the oil industrialists. These are the sectors of the ruling class most strongly inclined toward reactionary solutions; they are the sectors that have had the decisive weight in the right wing of the Christian Democracy in the past. The industrial sectors, which would need to continue to develop in a more "modern" and "rationalized" atmosphere and which employ larger sections of the work force, feel pushed in a different direction. International factors also come into play in some cases (Fiat's relations with the Soviet bureaucracy, for example). These are the sectors that favored the center-left government when it arose and, beyond conjunctural tactical political oscillations, they are the sectors that could end up accepting the "historic compromise" proposed by the Communist party. But today there is an element that unites all the various strata of the ruling class, and that is their growing lack of faith in the instruments used to administer and defend the system in the framework of the institutions that emerged out of the fall of fascism. The Christian Democracy, the leading party for about thirty years now, is considered these days as an instrument that is too costly and at the same time too little effective. The same evaluation has been extended to the state and administrative apparatus. At a time when profit margins are tending to decline again and when what is needed is instruments that can act quickly and comprehensively, the bourgeoisie cannot passively resign itself to such a situation continuing to drag on. The Christian Democracy The Christian Democratic (CD) National Council last July, which was advertised as an occasion of self-critical reflection, rather amply reflected the profound crisis of both the party and the ruling class. The most important speeches had to recognize very heavy liabilities, from failure of economic planning to cultural bankruptcy; many fears were shed over the deterioration in relations between the CD and the country's social forces. More concretely, the CD notables were forced to observe that the bourgeoisie no longer has confidence in them, that the middle classes, and even some small and middle-sized industrialists, were succumbing to the lure of the Communist party, and that the current ferment of discontent had spread even to the small farmers, traditional bulwark of conservatism. Small and middle-sized industrialists had established good relations with the CP in the so-called red regions some time ago. Recently, representatives of these categories have paid visits to the CP federations in Lombardy and Sicily as well. More than 300 entrepreneurs participated in a meeting on small and medium-sized industry organized by the CP in early November. On October 30 representafives of the association of building contractors held a meeting with CP parliament members. These are all indications of the orientation being worked out by some sectors of the bourgeoisie and could constitute a prelude to the realization of the Historic Compromise. The depth of the crisis was confirmed by the total inconsistency of the solutions that were proposed. With the exception of a few admissions uttered in a pathetic tone of grotesque lack of understanding, Amintore Fanfani's speech stressed preserving the status quo.* But the discussion - insofar as any *For example, Fanfani described the consequences of Vatican Council Il, or its "interpretations, " in the following terms: "It happened that new interpretations of the social apostolate induced many sheep of the old fold to regard themselves as shepherds and to devote themselves to converting supposedly lost sheep to these new interpretations. The result
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thing came out of it at all - never went beyond totally vague projects for "social pacts, " vacuous yearning for the New Deal or for the French planning system, and time-worn commonplaces about making the most of local bodies or institutions like the CNEL (Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro - National Council of Economy and Labor, a body containing representatives of both the employers and the trade-unions and having only consultative powers). The sterility of the discussions need not be demonstrated. And the whole thing ended up with an outline of organizational proposals on the methods of selecting ministers and on the transformation of the Christian Democratic study center into a research institution. The Christian Democrats were concrete on some points: They Flaunted their own contradictions in the face of the industrial bourgeoisie; they revealed the ephemeral character of certain attempts at direct economic cooperation between the employers and the trade unions; and, above all, they revealed that while the old instrument had perhaps grown rusty, there was no new one on the market. Effectively, the relative strength of the CD lies in the fact that there is no available substitute for it so long as the democratic corstitutional framework is maintained. The bourgeoisie is condemned to sustain the CD despite everything, even if the Historic Compromise is carried out. In fact, what other coun terweight could there be to the strength of the CP, possibly united in a bloc with the Socialists? Authoritarian solution or Historic Compromise? In a context in which the parliamentary regime has suffered great erosion and in which the exploited classes and wide layers of the middle classes are compelled to bear the heavy costs of the crisis, the authoritarian solution presents itself to the ruling class as a possible way out almost as a matter of course. was that the great old fold lost a part of its flock, and the sheep already said to be lost were considered to be on missions. These sheep who had transformed themselves into shepherds were in their turn lost, instead of carrying the lost sheep back to the fold and thereby increasing its numbers. " And here is a real pearl of Fanfoniesque interpretation of the demands of the new generation: "The youth today should take note of the fact that the satisfaction of the just demands they are raising often requires not revolution but only the reestablishment of the good old rules that have fallen into disuse, besides, of course, adding the new rules called for by experience. 16
VOTA COM M VOTA L SOCIALISMO DEL A PARTITO SOCIALIS Nevertheless, the conditions are lacking for a fascist solution of the 1920s Italy or the 1930s Germany type. The fascist movement has been able and will be able to polarize sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the subproletariat on the electoral level. Concurrently, it has been able to organize far-right nuclei to carry out paramilitary actions and terrorist undertakings. But it has not succeeded in gaining the political and ideological hegemony among substantial layers of the petty bourgeoisie that could permit it to appear as a credible alternative. Nor has it organized a substantial antiworker strike force. The failure during the past two years of the attempts to repeat operations of the Reggio Calabria type (when the fascists were able to generate mass
MUNISTA LIBERALE EMOCRATICDE LISTA ITALIANN MANA V mobilizations) has had especially negative implications for the fate of neofascism in the current period. At the same time, the conditions necessary for an operation of a Bonapartist type, whether classical or Gaullist, also do not exist today. Apart from clumsy figures more suited to musical comedies, no de Gaulle or other Bonapartist candidate has emerged - even in the remote distance. It is exactly for these reasons that the attempts to break the democratic-constitutional system have been confined to attempts at a coup of the Chilean or Greek variety. It is now common knowledge that on several occasions such attempts have reached a stage of advanced preparation and even of momentary fulfillment. On December 7, 1970, a squadron organized by Borghese* actually penetrated the Interior Ministry; just a few weeks ago a "leftist" terrorist offensive of vast proportions was supposed to be set off with the aim of provoking a resolute intervention by the armed forces; there have been many intervening attempts as well. The people who have been behind these projects cannot be reduced to wizened old commanders yearning for the Mussolini era or the Sald Republic, nor to reactionary fringe groups headed by megalomaniacs who are more noisy than harmful. As we have mentioned, there are sectors of the bourgeoisie inclined toward an authoritarian solution, and given the impossibility of achieving this through fascism or Bonapartism, they could foment or support a coup. It is no big news that financial backers of the fascists are to be found among the oil men (the name of Monti is the best-known in this regard, but it is not the only one). Among the backers of the so-called Rosa dei Venti (Points of the Composs), the clandestine far-right organization founded in November 1973, we find the industrialist Piaggio; and of the time of the Brescia massacre the existence of financial supporters of the fascists among the industrialists of the region was revealed. Orlandini, the building contractor, figured as one of the major suspects in the abortive coup of December 1970. Moreover, supporters of authoritarian solutions and potential putschists are found in the very parties that define themselves as constitutionalist. The case of Edgardo Sogno, a former monarchist supporter and now a member of the leadership of the Partito Liberale Italiano (Italian Liberal party), is symptomatic. Sogno openly proclaimed himself in favor of the overthrow of the existing institutions; nevertheless, several months after this declaration, he has not yet been expelled from his party. In addition, no one doubts that infectious germs have spread widely within the ranks of the right wing of the CD, among leaders of a Mafia and Camorrist stamp. (Not only among these sectors, however. In a recent interview Senator Pastorino, one of the CD's major leaders in Genoa, did not hesitate to openly declare himself for a putsch.) Possible putschists could certainly find useful accomplices among the ranks of the Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Social Democratic party), a filthy bought-and-paid-for formation, one of whose parliamentary deputies associated himself with Fascists to protest the arrest of Miceli and whose president, Mario Tanassi, has been accused by Saragat himself *Prince Borghese, noted for his military actions during the second world war, supported fascism even during the Nazi occupation of Italy (the period of the so-called Sala Republic, which was marked by antipartisan repression).
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ITALY of keeping quiet about what was going on at the time of the Borghese adventure. The arrest of Micell and the indictment of Fanali, former air force chief of staff, on charges of complicity with the fascist Borghese offered resounding confirmation of the fact that the putschists are far from insignificant. (According to the October 12 Corriere della Sera, Fanali's office wall features an autographed photograph of Vittorio Mussolini, the ex-king and ex-queen, and Kappeler, the SS official responsible for the massacre of the Fosse Ardeantine near Rome in 1944.) And there is no reason to doubt that foreign secret services, in the first place those of American imperialism, have close ties with the putschist sectors that could take the initiative under the right circumstances. In its November 3 edition La Stampa, the Turin daily owned by Fiat, wrote in an editorial: In spite of innumerable inquiries, we do not know enough about this great destructive design to be able to say how much of it represents foolish ambifion or to identify the perhaps more hidden plots. But that part of the network that has come to the surface or been revealed is sufficient to require that we conclude that the dangers not only were, but also remain, real." The assertions of Agnelli's newspaper clarify the motives that led decisive sectors of the bourgeoisie and the government to finally opt for launching an attack on the putschists: They took account of the fact that these people have not at all been disarmed and even consider that further deterioration of the regime would create more favorable premises for the putschist initiatives. The same article clearly indicated why the great majority of the ruling class continued to reject the putschist or dictatorial solution. "In Italy, "the editorial concluded, "whoever attempts a coup is provoking civil war." In other words, the relationship of forces between the classes remains such that any fascist or putschist attempts are extremely risky. The army itself, whose ranks are increasingly massively filled with youth *Vito Miceli, former head of the Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID, the counterintelligence agency attached to the Defense Ministry), was arrested recently on charges of having been involved in various attempted coups and of having covered for the putschists when the coups failed. The SID, it should be noted, is in charge of preventing coups, among other things. Giuseppe Saragat, a leading member of the PSDI and president of the republic at the time of the 1970 attempted coup, charged recently that Tanassi, then minister of the interior, knew what was going on and did not report it to his president. 18 who have been through the critical experiences of political struggle during these past years and within which ferment is on the rise, could be thrown into a grave crisis. The bourgeoisie is perfectly well aware of this, so much so that its major press organ, the Milan daily Corriere della Sera, wrote explicitly: "Even if, as has happened, a leader should concretely take to the road of sedition, his ruin would be certain. The soldiers, who come from all over the country, could not follow him. The tanks would stop in the middle of the road. " (November 2, 1974.)* The Historic Compromise represents a way out of the crisis in a diametrically opposite direction. This would be a large-scale political operation that would imply participation of the CP in the government and could create conditions more favorable both for the reformist plans of rationalization that the center-left government has proven incapable of carrying out and for an economic reconversion of the type we described in our previous article. (See INPRECOR, No. 12, November 14) But can the Historic Compromise be actually realized? From the political standpoint, the conditions for the Historic Compromise are generally more favorable now than in any period in the past. We have already mentioned the open attitudes being taken toward the CP by layers of the small and middle-sized industrialists and the inclination toward dialogue among a category like the building contractors, who have traditionally lined up behind conservative or reactionary positions. And if is no big news that still more decisive sectors of the ruling class have an attitude toward the CP that is very different from the attitude they held during the 1950s and that they consider the participation of the CP in the government as a plausible hypothesis. From the international standpoint, the present context entails no absolute obstacles. Significant events of the past few years - from the policy of the French CP during the revolutionary crisis of 1968 to the participation of the Portuguese CP in a government of national union - have stimulated a further evolution of positions. And it must be added that the Italian CP has repeatedly offered serious guarantees. On the parliamentary and administrative level it has in fact collaborated with the parties of the government coalition, has allowed certain governments to survive, and has renounced parliamentary fights that, if they were carried on energetically, could have succeeded in blocking *Obviously, the fall of the Salazarist dictatorship in Portugal and, perhaps even more so, the fall of the Greek military dictatorship have weakened the position of the supporters of the authoritarian solution still further.
government projects. (A good recent example is the fiscal decrees of the summer of 1974, which would have had a difficult time being approved within the time limit set by law had the Communist deputies resorted to obstruction.) Nevertheless, it is improbable that the Rubicon will be crossed immediately or in the short term. The bourgeoisie and its parties are torn by very bitter polemics and are suffering continual vacillations. At its National Council the CD reacted to the CP's advances with a very clear rejection. Further, and perhaps even more significant, a "no" answer was given by Agnelli, the top leader of Fiat and head of the national employers organization, who has correctly been considered as one of the people most inclined to accept the Historic Compromise. Imperialist circles, already alarmed by the Greek events and concerned about strengthening the Italian NATO bases, have made no secret of their negative attitude. The unhealed internal crisis of the CD constitutes one of the major complicating factors. Would this party be in position to engage in such a daring operation without risking being overwhelmed or being threatened by multiple uncontrollable centrifugal tendencies? For its part, the CP is hesitating and will hesitate further before taking the decisive step. (In fact, the CP might temporarily radicalize its criticism of the government, as it did for a short time last spring when it adopted the formula of "intransigent opposition. ") In reality, the CP has to take care to preserve its links with the masses and it is not inclined to assume any heavy responsibility for the present state of affairs without getting something in return; that is, without receiving a guarantee that it is getting into an operation of broad scope. The difficulty lies precisely in the fact that in the present circumstances, the CP finds it hard to see what the reward would be. When the CP participated in the coalition government of 1944-47, it was able to present itself as the force restoring democracy and as the guardian of the immediate economic interests of the broad masses after the catastrophe of the war. (A similar reasoning applies for the Portuguese CP today.) The Popular Front government in France in 1936 could be justified by the CP because of a series of important gains won by the working class, even though in the final analysis the popular front allowed the bourgeoisie to extract itself from a critical situation. But in Italy today a government functioning within the system with a CP participafion could not assure any new political gains for the proletariat, and given the economic situation, it would be difficult for it to guarantee even modest. economic gains. For all these reasons, the Historic Compromise appears difficult to realize, although it is inscribed in the potential tendencies of this period. If the crisis of the system further sharpens on all levels and if the bourgeoisie feels it has reached the end of its rope, the terms of the problem will change. For its part, the bureaucracy of the CP could be driven to leap over the impediments in the conviction that it is its duty to do so given the extreme danger facing the institutional framework that it has every interest in maintaining because of its definitive acceptance of the traditional reformist logic of lesser evilism. Could the Historic Compromise lead to a restabilization if it were realized? For a brief period the impact of the new situation could provide certain maneuvering room and could even ease political tensions temporarily. But in a more general sense, the answer to the question must be negative. The crisis the Italian economy is going through is simultaneously conjunctural and structural. It is so extensive and so deep that an early restabilization would not be possible even with the Historic Compromise. Insofar as the Historic Compromise were not just an ephemeral operation or a continuation of the old routine under a new label, insofar as it should begin to take the radical measures necessary for the reconversion we have described, and insofar as the masses should begin to demand something concrete, tensions would not only rise again very rapidly, they would also become even more acute. From this standpoint, it is not at all arbitrary to recall the situation in Chile during the Allende period. Once again, this conclusion is called for: A restabilization could come only after decisive battles between the main classes, and to the extent that these battles should develop, the very basis of the operation attempted with the Historic Compromise would evaporate. The risks involved in a putschist or dictatorial solution combined with the persistent difficulties blocking the path of the Historic Compromise have had and are still having the effect of resigning decisive sectors of the ruling class to a chronic crisis of leadership. It would be inexact to say that the centerleft still lives. As a comprehensive political solution, as a formula for effective leadership, the center-left is dead and buried. The ruling class is condemned to continue to flutter back and forth, to suffer perpetual crises of its government. It is condemned to seek ever more precarious governmental solutions whose only element of continuity with the past (except for the Andreotti period) lies in the fact that the parliamentary base is the same, or very nearly the same, as that of the center-left. The ruling class certainly knows very well that it can't go on this way. And yet, for the moment, it has no other choice but to do so.D
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