D
OCUMENT*
The national
question in the
Spanish State
1. WE ARE in the fifth centenary of the unification of the Spanish kingdoms. That unification led to the formation of one of the earliest and strongest European states. Today it is one of the European states whose unity is most problematic. This state of affairs is the culmination of a long historical process.
Unification under the Catholic kings was carried out on the basis of kingdoms which already had a strong identity. The formula for unification, imposed under Castillian leadership, also, in some cases, allowed room for a few particularities. The unitary state also meant the expulsion of religious minorities (Jews, Islamic Moors), the promotion of the Castillian language and using the Castillian inquisition as an instrument of cohesion. The foundation and development of the Empire appeared to be a brilliant expression of the strength of Hispanic unity. But it led to its first great crisis. In 1640, less than a century and a half after Castille and Aragon unified (i.e.in less than four generations) wars of secession broke out resulting in the temporary separation of Catalonia (and its link up with France) and the definitive split of Portugal. In the same year the English revolution began. It was fifty years after the de facto independence of the Low Countries. The decadence of the Empire was clear both internationally and domestically. The decline was drawn out over a long period. It blew up again violently in
90 International Marxist Review the 1700-1714 war of succession precisely at the time when the Low Countries, England and France were consolidating as states, reflecting the political rise of the bourgeoisic. However, in the Hispanic Empire the profits from America had not been invested in a capitalist way and the embryo of a bourgeoisie had been practically destroyed. So the Spanish Bourbons' exaggerated, violent centralization did not have the same significance nor the same effects as in countries like France because the economic and material bases were very different. Thus there was a strengthening and hyper-centralization of the state, an absence of capitalist development and the particularities of the old kingdoms persisted to a great extent.
But the decline was as uneven as the rise to unity had been. Catalonia, Valencia and other peoples from the Mediterranean periphery were less severely affected by the crisis and were more capable of economic and financial recovery from the 18th Century onwards. An historical failure
2. Unlike the previous era, the 18th Century was not marked by any serious threat to the unitary state. On the contrary, a greater community of interests, at least between the ruling classes, developed. The inaptly named "war of independence" also indicated that there was no desire for separation among the people although the particularities of the old kingdoms remained alive and were not easily integrated into the very centralized state.
The first Bourbon monarchs managed to win over the provincial bourgeoisies by favouring their access to colonial profits, by encouraging trade, the investment of capital in industry and a small-scale takeover of some of the Church's wealth. These were all very limited measures and were historically late but it did at least open the possibility that Spain could consolidate as a nation state capable of taking its place within the developing capitalist mode of production. The first long wave of capitalist expansion started in the last decade of the 18th Century and went on to the first quarter of the 19th century. The conclusion of the war against the Napoleonic invasion opened, on the one hand, the irreversible crisis of the old regime and on the other strengthened the absolutist monarchy whose political function consisted in avoiding or delaying its disappearance. At the same time the war seriously affected the economy and demonstrated the weakness and timidity of the bourgeoisie which feared the people and was ready to compromise with the regime (a completely opposite position to that of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie of the time.
The national question in the Spanish State 9!
3. The first 75 years of the 19th century are the history of bourgeois timidity and willingness to compromise that was definitively sealed with the Restoration. This evolution proceeded through a chain of political events — the most significant were the Carlist wars' and the federal break-up of the First Republic.
The Carlist grouping incarnated the defence of the ancien regime but linking up in its own way with the interests of an important part of the rural population. The latter had been deprived of land and income through the policy of transfer of Church and common lands into the hands of the landowning nobility or the bourgeoisie. Hence broad popular sectors opted for the defence of the old regime in the form of Carlism. They were joined by a significant number of the clergy (religious orders) who saw themselves as defenders of tradition and their privileges. These forces developed a consciousness of a differentiated community confronting liberal modernization. In Euzkadi, the Carlists were able to attract the majority of the rural popular masses who were suffering bourgeois development with this ideology of a differentiated community. These masses saw the fueros (forums) proposed by the Carlists as a possible means of collectively defending their interests. In order to win the war the monarchy was forced to turn to the bourgeoisie.
The proclamation of the Republic, with the subsequent explosion of federalism and cantonalism once again showed the extreme weakness of Spanish unity. But now it was also marked by social demands and the independent activity of the workers' movement. The majority of the bourgeoisie became even more fearful of the people and agreed to a long term alliance with the monarchy.
At the same time the army became definitively reactionary (marking the end of the era of progressive military uprisings) and consolidated its profoundly centralist ideology, establishing an identification between social order and Spanish unity. This army had been forged in the repression against the secession of the colonies, the territories controlled by the Carlists and the federal operations of the First Republic? Nevertheless it did maintain from the era of military uprisings (pronunciamentos) its character as a political force, with the will to impose its criteria on the State, by acting autonomously when necessary.
The restorationist state can already be considered as a bourgeois state. Its essential features remained in place until the Second Republic and some of them have even influenced subsequent forms of the state. One of its fundamental characteristics was the effort to respond to the weakness of Spanish unity with an exaggerated development of the state apparatus and of its
92 International Marxist Review centralist and repressive aspects. The following fifty years proved its failure.
4. In spite of a succession of political crises during the first three-quarters of the 19th century, capitalist development took place (especially linked to the surge of the first technological revolution based on steam power) but it was backward and enormously uneven. This resulted in a dual economy subordinated to the industrialized European countries.
Only in Catalonia was there a classic process of primitive capital accumulation (which started in the 18th century with the capitalization of land rents) resulting in an industrial revolution. It took the form of a consumer goods industry (especially textiles) of an average size and with national capital. The natural market for these commodities was the rural areas of the rest of Spain — some of which tended to become transformed into subordinated zones similar to those in the majority of the European countries during the first industrial revolution (with unequal exchange, reserve army of unemployed or underemployed labour etc).
Relatively backward Catalan industry needed first protection against European industrial commodities. In the second place it required a growing domestic market. Finally it needed facilities to conquer new foreign markets. In other words the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie had to be hegemonic within the state. Indeed this was its aim and political battle up to nearly the end of the century. This period has been called the regionalist-protectionist phase, in which the Catalan bourgeoisie leading the whole country tried to bring together Catalan consciousness, as a distinct identity, with Spanish unity — Catalonia as motherland and Spain as nation. Paradoxically, the rural, backward regions made up the immense majority and the ruling classes linked to this productive structure (landowners, rural bourgeoisie, commercial and financial bourgeoisie) were hegemonic in the state. The takeover of some Church land and common land had added a number of latifundia [large farms with feudal style labour relations] to those of the nobility and prevented a process of primitive accumulation, independent industrialization and an expansion of the market. But the alliance of the big landowners and financial barons who controlled the state, benefited directly from a policy which combined export of agricultural products with foreign capitalist penetration in sectors as decisive as mining (all its production was exported) or the railways. The costs of this policy was evolution towards a dependent economy. The framework was complex. On the one side you had the ruling class who
The national question in the Spanish State 93 controlled the state favouring a backward and dependent economy. On the other side the industrial revolution was on the march in Catalonia but its bourgeoisie was marginalized out of the leadership of the state. Things did not evolve in a lincar way. The Catalan bourgeoisic never managed to become an hegemonic force within the state but it did obtain sufficient protection to strengthen its industry. The general backwardness of the economy persisted but the Spanish state reacted sufficiently to avoid becoming a semi-colonial country. Key to this was the Basque industrial lake-off which took place in the period running up to the consolidation of capitalism's imperialist phase. Profits obtained in the iron ore mines were invested in the development of a modern iron and steel industry which in turn helped industrial growth in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.
The decisive phase of Basque industrialization was produced by a very big and rapid accumulation of capital leading to the establishment of powerful banks and large-scale industries which required state protection and depended on its economic activity. This was the basis on which the alliance between the old hegemonic classes in the Restorationist state and the new big financial and industrial bourgeoisie was achieved. It resulted not just in industrial projects in Euzkadi but in the whole of Spain. However, big Basque capital did not acquire influence in the state as a representative of all the Basque industrial ruling class (and even less as a representative of the whole people) but through individual groupings and from the beginning they became assimilated with the Spanish.
On the other hand, industrialization and the effects of the second technological revolution did not affect the state in an homogeneous way. The elfects were geographically limited to the extent that we can continue to talk (at the beginning of this century) of a dual economy but now with two main industrial poles: Catalonia and a part of Euskadi. This uneven development was going to have an important part to play in the emergence of modern nationalist movements.
5. In the history of Catalonia there have been a great number of expressions of its differentiated identity and conflicts with Spain. But the capitalist development it went through during the first industrial revolution produced a sharp contrast with the agrarian structure of the rest of Spain. In an initial phase the Catalan bourgeoisie, acting as the representative of the country as a whole, was able to conciliate the affirmation of Catalan specificity with the project of transforming the whole of the "Spanish nation". A few years after the restoration, this same bourgeoisie, having been removed from the leadership of
94 International Marxist Review the Spanish state, withdrew to Catalonia. It became nationalist and demanded political autonomy. The 1898 crisis with the loss of the last colonies, spurred on the nationalists and consolidated the leadership of the bourgeoisie over a broad Catalan coalition of social forces. But only until the deepening of internal social contradictions and the threat of a workers movement with strong revolutionary tendencies, pushed this bourgeoisie into the arms of the Spanish state — more or less definitively after 1917. However, the nationalist consciousness the bourgeoisie had contributed significantly to create was already something outside its control. Its desertion of the cause was seen as a betrayal and the banner of national struggle was taken up by the pettybourgeoisie. This process was consolidated with the triumph of Maciá in 1931.4
Modern Spanish ideology was formed in parallel to Catalan nationalism. It developed more strongly after the loss of the last colonies in 1898 and had anti-Catalonism as an essential feature. There was nevertheless an important difference between the two nationalisms, over and beyond the fact that one represented the values of an industrial society and the other those of a backward rural one. Spanish ideology denied (with the use of force if necessary) the Catalan nation's right to exist — it was an oppressor nationalism.
Given majority Catalan support for its national rights, Spain as a statenation was already an historical failure. It only took a few more years for this conclusion to be ratified for Euskadi too. Crisis after the First World War 6. In the past Euzkadi had on repeated occasions expressed its identity as a distinct community, the last time being during the Carlist wars. But the effects of the second industrial revolution were to radically transform the economic and social structure of first Vizcaya and later Guipuzcoa turning it into the second big industrial region in the Spanish state. However, the forms of emergence of nationalist consciousness and the positions of the various classes on the national question were very different from those of Catalonia. Although there was only about 50 years difference between the transformation of one region and the other the overall situation had completely changed. The Basque industrial take-off took place in the epoch of imperialism and the monopoles, when the banks and large-scale industry was predominant (in Euzkadi it was heavy industry). On the other hand the political framework was the relatively stable one of the Restoration. These circumstances caused a different line of action being taken by various class sectors. Thus the major Basque bourgeoisie was always pro-
The national question in the Spanish State 95 Spanish and played no role at all in the formation of Basque national consciousness. This role was take up from the beginning by another fraction of the same class — the small and medium scale bourgeoisie - through the movement founded by Sabino Arana which became the PNV. The new situation and its own political traditions defined the parameters of this nationalism. There was no component proposing the regeneration of the Spanish state. The dominant sentiments were those of rejection and support for sovereignty (or independence) based on the fuerista tradition. What predominated was a defensive attitude towards the nation faced with the consequences of a capitalism of banks and monopolies intimately associated with the centralist Spanish state for the Basque people. This type of capitalism caused damaging social and cultural changes, mass immigration and a danger of the disappearance of the language etc. All this was translated into a populist ideology and the establishment of a party with a very broad pelly bourgeois base. It was also reflected in the organization of their own trade unions among the Basque working class (this was facilitated by the Spanish ideology of the UGT, the main workers' organization).
This nationalism expressed the indignation of broad popular sectors and at the same time served the interests of the hegemonic class in the national bloc. The latter explains its reactionary features of religiosity, traditionalism and racism but it does not nullify the former aspect. A national movement cannot be only judged by its leadership. It is necessary to relate to the collective problems it expresses and understand that its political character reflects the social forces to which its leadership responds.
7. In the first decades of this century an important change took place in Galician society. In 1920, 82% of the working population worked in agriculture and fishing, 7.3% in industry and 9.9% in services. In 1930 those working in agriculture dropped to 65.3% of the total, industry rose to 14.7% and services to 20%. However as a whole, it remained a backward, dependent economy that suffered from the consequences of unequal exchange, emigration and the investment of the small surplus outside the region or in nonproductive sectors.
These economic changes, their effects on social relations, the great specificity of Galicia's historical, economic, social and cultural identity and the political changes of the period meant that the small nationalist nuclei were able to organize important sectors of the peasantry and the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie - providing the basis for the demand of an Autonomy Statute. There was a victorious plebiscite on this in June 1936 but it was nev-
It should however be noted that the national movement was weak and it did not impinge greatly on the political reality of the state. This was due in the first place to the economic backwardness of the region which meant that the leadership of the movement was in the hands of a small group of intellectuals and a small sector of the petty bourgeoisie. There was no strong local bourgeoisie. In the countryside the dominant social group were peasant owners of small amounts of land. The working class was very small and was led by political and trade union organizations that did not do a great deal to take up the national demand. In the second place, the rapid victory of the Francoist forces cut short the development of the national movement, preventing a mass political mobilization and experience around the Autonomy Statute in
8. At the end of the first European war, an important crisis opened up in the
Restorationist state coinciding with the end of the economic euphoria achieved thanks to Spanish neutrality, with the effects of the big workers and peasant mobilizations stimulated by the impact of the Russian revolution and a specifically political crisis. The under-representation of the financialindustrial sector of the bourgeoisie in the state played an important role in
The Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-30) was a response to this situation. It came out of the army and was supported (if not outright solicited) by the ruling class. On the one hand the regime's project was to involve the state more in a interventionist economic policy that would favour the interests of the financial-industrial sector of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand it aimed to ensure the passivity of the workers' and peasants' movement (that had already suffered an important defeat in the previous period) through systematic repression against the radical wing of the movement and a pact with the moderate sector (PSOE/UGT). This dictatorship was initially supported both by the main Basque bourgeoisie and the Catalan bosses and the Lliga.S
But the regime ended in failure. There was economic growth shown by significant development in Madrid as well as in the traditional industrial areas of
Euskadi, Catalonia and the Asturian mines. But a significant factor in this growth can be attributed to the favourable international situation (until the
1929 crash). But this growth was not accompanied by political control of the state by the industrial and financial bourgeoisie. State power was monopolized by the dictator amid inefficiency and many scandals. Repression was not able to eliminate the CNT which won more prestige among the workers
96 International Marxist Review er implemented the Civil War conjuncture.
this crisis.
1
S
U d ri
The national question in the Spanish State 97 and in the end even the UGT was forced to distance itself from the regime. The ferocious centralism seen in the dissolution of the Mancomunidad, military trials for offences against the unity of the fatherland provoked an increase in nationalist discontent. In Catalonia, hegemony passed from the Cambo tendency, which had been discredited by its collaboration with the dictatorship, to Maciá. Opposition also grew among students, intellectuals and minority progressive sectors even within the army. In the end the fall of the dictatorship brought down the monarchy as well and led to the Second Republic. Centralism and Spanish ideology
9. The national conflicts maturing from the end of the 19th century broke out with special intensity during the Second Republic and the Civil War. Sereral conclusions can be drawn from these decisive years:
a) Centralism and a pro-Spanish line was not the exclusive policies of the monarchy and the dictatorship. The Republic only made a few concessions on autonomy and it did not put into question the unity of the "Spanish nation". ". For example: pressure was put on Maciá to annul the proclamation of the Catalan Republic of the 14 April 1931; the Juntas Generales of Guernica of the 17 April were prohibited; the Nuria statute was dropped; drawing up of a centralist constitution; delays in the approval of the limited statutes that this constitution allowed; and the atlacks on the gains made by the nationalities such as the Conciertos Vascos or the Ley de Contratos de Cultivo de Catalunya. etc. It is also important to remember that the Republic refused to decree the independence of Morocco or to support the forces willing to fight for national liberation against the Francoist troops. Consequently it can be said that centralism was not a problem of government nor even of a state form (monarchy or republic) but a problem of the state itself, of its fundamental apparatuses and mechanisms (that remained unaltered from the monarchy to the republic) and especially of the army due to the form in which it had been historically shaped over the previous hundred years. b) The petty bourgeois parties (ERC and PNV) which were hegemonic in the national movement at decisive times clearly chose the path of pacts with the new centralism instead of taking up a vigorous struggle for national rights. When they did exceptionally seem to initiate such a struggle they were inconsistent and abandoned it. Moreover this lack of firmness in standing up to the centralist bourgeois state went hand in hand with great efforts to ensure
98 International Marxist Review the maintenance of a bourgeois state in Euskadi and Catalonia. The masses' reaction to the fascist uprising there might have put the state in danger or in the Catalan case might have destroyed it and replaced it with a revolutionary regime. During the civil war the Euzkadi and Catalan governments only formally disposed of limited power granted them by the Republican statutes but in reality they took on much greater power - exercising a high level of sovereignty (this explains the cherished image that the Statutes still have for the masses). However, the May 1937 events in Catalonia showed that — when faced with the threat of revolutionary mobilizations by the masses - the Companys' government capitulated once again to a subordinate pact with the Republican government even at the cost of losing a significant amount of the sovereignty and self-government already gained.® c) The consistent struggle for national liberties could have been carried forward in a much stronger way, integrated into the struggle for the revolution, if the working class had managed to make itself into the vanguard of this struggle. The particular experience of Catalonia which was the most advanced of them all during the Civil War years, seemed to indicate that a change in the ruling class was possible. In the first phase of reaction to the military coup there was a correspondence between the maximum levels of popular power (the committees and the Central Committee of Anti-fascist militia) and the maximum extent of national sovereignty (although mass consciousness on this was very weak). Conversely, the liquidation in May 1937 of the last vestiges of popular, workers' power, also signified the progressive loss of sovereignty. The POUM was the only party which put forward and tried to bring about a change in the class leadership of the national movement. But it failed in this task, partly because of the extreme difficulty of the task (owing to the absence of a consistent line on the national question by the CNT and the PSUC's reformism) and partly through its own errors. The task had been clearly set out but its resolution will be an objective for the future. 10. The Francoist counter-revolution (financially supported by "nationalists" like Cambo or "pro-autonomy" liberals like March) was an attempt to finish with national demands through the means of a military-fascist dictatorship that lasted nearly 40 years. But when the dictator died the results were the exact opposite of the declared objectives. In fact nationalist demands in Euzkadi, Catalonia and Galicia were much stronger that at the fall of the previous dictatorship (Primo de Rivera's). The movement became particularly radical in Euzkadi, where a revolutionary nationalist current (ETA) emerged. It carried out armed struggle and said it
The national question in the Spanish State 99 supported unity between national and social liberation, contesting the PNV's hegemony. Later currents of this type developed in other nationalities. In trade unions with majority support stated that it belonged to Euskadi. These Navarra, Carlism disappeared as a mass force and the workers' parties and forces (PSOE, UGT, PCE, CCOO) were in favour of the provisional reestablishment of the Statutes of the Republic and some of them (PCE) called formally for the right of self-determination of nationalities like Euskadi, Calalonia, Galicia and the Canary Islands. This facilitated its convergence with nationalist forces and in the case of Catalonia, the formation of a broad bloc based on the Asamblea de Catalunya.
But the resurgence of these national demands were not limited to the three above mentioned "historic" cases but became extended to peoples who had not previously expressed such sentiments (or had done so only very weakly). These were Valencia and the Islands (the latter affirmed a Catalan cultural and linguistic identity and the Catalan countries idea gained ground); the Canaries (with a strong influence of the radical current) and Andalucia. The idea of demanding an Autonomy Statute was taken up everywhere. This was a new phenomenon which in some cases could be interpreted as a regional demand with a concern for decentralization and in other cases related to the emergence of a national question. It is necessary to refer once again to the uneven economic development of the Spanish state to explain this range of cases.
The effects of the long capitalist "boom", which began in Europe after the Second World War, did not affect the Spanish state until the beginning of the 1960s. Economic growth was much more intense than in the main capitalist countries. The Spanish state acquired the features of an industrialized couniry, transformed itself into the tenth industrial power in the world and took on the role of a secondary imperialist power. There was a very strong industrialization in this period, a great expansion of the cities, large-scale migration of workers from the countryside to the city (and to other European countries), mechanization of agriculture and growth of the service sector (especially tourism).
But this development did not affect the different nationalities and regions in any more of a homogeneous way than in the past. So while the traditional centres of Euskadi and Catalonia continued to have the best levels of development and profit, there was a big leap forward for Madrid with a lesser advance in Valencia, the Balearic Isles and the Canaries. On the other hand, a traditional industrial area like the Asturias began to decline because of the crisis of the coal mining sector. Finally there was the traditional backward-
100 International Marxist Review ness of Galicia, the two Castilles, Extremadura and Andalucia. Now it was not so much because of a lack of capitalist development (as was the case at the beginning of the century) but more because of the relative backwardness of the capitalism that was developing there — mainly uncompetitive companies, sectors in crisis, or urban centres isolated from the whole of Spain. At the same time this underdevelopment was often accompanied by great ecological costs. In some cases this uneven development favoured the development of a regionalist consciousness. In other cases it was a key factor in the emergence of a national question — a clear case of this has been Andalucia. Andalucia and the Canary Islands
11. Andalucia has a very specific identity that has historically provided a basis and a home for various political movements (Sovereign Junta of Andalucia, 1835; Defence of the Andalucian Union, 1860 etc.). For a time the Andalucian urban bourgeoisie put forward political and economic measures that favoured capitalist expansion. At times it proposed projects for organizing the state that recognized Andalucia's specific personality.
After the 1868 revolution however, the domination of the landowning oligarchy in the economy and in politics, together with the precocious emergence of radical class struggles developed by sectors of the Andalucian proletanat, led to the political unification of the bourgeoisie around the acceptance of a subordinate role for Andalucia within Spanish capitalism. Just when the industrial perspectives that had existed in the first half of the 19th century were closing the Andalucian bourgeoisie converted itself into one of the standard bearers of the Spanish national project. It brought a deformed and prostituted version of Andalucian culture into this project as a complete facade. Defence of this popular Andalucian identity was left in the hands of some sectors of this weak urban petty bourgeoisie (federal republican constitution of Andalucia, 1883) among which emerged a movement to recover national culture.
The historic Andalucian movement inherited this tradition. It was explicitly linked to the political demand of Andalucian identity and it already defined Andalucia as a nation. The Andalucian programme brought together the demands for an Andalucian regime within a confederal framework, for defence of its culture and for a land reform. Demands for autonomy were raised during the Second Republic. The bourgeoisie opposed them and fomented localist disputes while the workers
The national question in the Spanish State 101 organizations oscillated between silence and sympathy. Finally a political recognition of Andalucian identity was won through the Statutory Bases approved in 1933. The statutory process was restarted more seriously in 1936 but was interrupted by Franco's coup. Most of Andalucia was occupied from the beginning of the Civil War. But Andalucia's demands had sufficiently progressed for the right to self-determination to be included in common programme of the workers' organizations of Malaga in November 1936 when it was the only big Andalucian town still free.
Consciousness of underdevelopment and its rejection played a determinant role in the crystallization of Andalucia's national demands which were raised again in the first years of the post-Francoist period. But this was not the only factor. There was also an affirmation of Andalucian dignity and the defence of differentiated cultural elements resulting from certain historical particularities that had never been erased from the people's memory. This cultural identity was rediscovered and promoted by intellectual and professional sectors which also dusted off the heritage of the historic Andulucian movement. But national sentiments were awakened in much broader sectors and workers and immigrants played a very important role in the process. The example of the Euskadi and Catalan national movements during the crisis of Francoism and the transition also contributed to giving a national form to this combination of rejection of underdevelopment and cultural affirmation. Although its political demands were very different from those of these "historic nationalities" and became concretized in the demand for a "Poder Andaluz" capable of solving the key social problems but which did not explicitly challenge the unity of the Spanish state.
12. The emergence of Canary Island national consciousness in the last years of Francoism was the result of a long historical process.
The conquest of the Canary Islands resulted in the ethnocide of the Guanche people and the very rapid establishment of an export-based plantation economy (sugar cane), controlled by foreign commercial capital (with the Genovese holding the lion's share) and leading to great ecological damage. The very physical limits of the islands made these crops very vulnerable to competition from new agricultural zones so there were successive crises and changes in the export crops. Wine took the place of sugar cane and from the middle of the 18th century this was replaced by raw materials for the English textile industry (such as cochineal dye). But neither the change in crops nor the predominance of English capital decisively changed the situation. There was a succession of prosperous periods interspaced with periods of
102 International Marxist Review great misery. Throughout, this speculation in export foodstuffs and increasing exploitation of the masses was an important element in the accumulation of the local ruling classes (landowners and commercial bourgeoisic). Hence these rulers needed the coercive military apparatus of the Spanish state.
In the middle of the 19th century the concession of a Free port regime to the Canary Island commercial bourgeoisie was an important concession. Il opened the islands to English imperialism and closed off the possibility of independent industrial development. Coal mining and shipping interests developed along with new export crops (bananas, tomatoes and potatoes) providing the basis for modern development dominated by British capital albeit under the political sovereignty of the Spanish state. A dependent bourgeois class developed in this particular situation which was disarticulated due to the geography of the archipelago and institutions like the Cabildos (or the later provincial divisions).? It never functioned as a national bourgeoisie.
The First World War had very different effects on the Canaries than on the peninsula because of the catastrophic fall in exports and the paralysis of port activity. If you add to this Primo de Rivera's policies then there was a tendency for a greater integration into the peninsula's market.
During the Second Republic a current emerged in the workers' movement that linked national emancipation with social demands. At the same time intellectuals from the small and middle bourgeoisie, influenced by the Catalan example, demanded autonomy and even drew up a draft Statute that remained in the state due to the July 18 coup.
Francoist repression finished off these stirrings of nationalist consciousness. The protected market on the peninsula for Canary bananas offered an alternative to the loss of foreign markets and opened a period of growing integration in the Spanish market. An important change in Canaries' society began in the 1960s mainly because of the tourist boom. This led to the Economic and Fiscal Regime agreement which expressed the new pact between the ruling class in the Canaries and in the Spanish state. The final crisis of Francoism coincided with a slowdown in tourist development and a worsening of living conditions for the newly urbanized population. At the same time, the ending of Spanish rule in the Sahara exacerbated international tension in North West Africa with immediate repercussions in the islands which were transformed into frontiers with the stationing of colonial troops like the Legion there. In these conditions a sense of a distinct Canaries identity grew among the people, and among some layers this became a clear national consciousness. Radical nationalism grew rapidly even resulting in very minor episodes of
The national question in the Spanish State 103 armed struggle. The demand for self-determination and national independence took firmer hold.
13. With the death of Franco and in the first years of the transition a threefold crisis opened up: a crisis of the Spanish nation-state, of the Spanish nation and Spanish national ideology itself.
There was a crisis of the Spanish nation-state because nations existed with a clear consciousness that they did not feel Spanish but were repressed by the Spanish state which was seen as a "prison-house of pcoples"
There was a crisis of the Spanish nation on two levels:
a) To be Spanish traditionally implied forming part of a community with peoples that no longer questioned its unity so this change raised again the problem of Spanish identity.
b) The "security zone" of the Spanish nation was becoming seriously threatened with the rebirth of the Navarra question, the Catalan countries project and the development of Canaries national consciousness. But the coup de grace was without doubt Andalucia which up to then had been, with Castille, the backbone of Spain. Nobody in Andalucia was talking separation but as time went on there were less and less people who wanted the old union and affirming Andalucian identity undoubtedly weakened Spanish identity.
Finally there was a crisis of Spanish national ideology as such. Firstly because of the extraordinary aggressive, reactionary and practically racist form it took under Francoism which meant that it was rejected by the majority of those fighting the regime. Secondly and in a more profound way, because the crisis of the Spanish nation-state and of the Spanish nation weakened the tics of Spanishness with its traditional national-territorial base. The State of Autonomous Regions
14. However this triple crisis finally unfolded into the El Estado de las Autonomias [State of Autonomous Regions], a centralist state that rejected the fundamental national demands raised in the struggle against Francoism by various opposition forces and movements (self-determination, federalism, re-establishment of the Republic's Statutes, etc) but at the same time claimed to be integrating national demands through a series of concessions.
The reasons for such a strong contrast are the same as those that explain why the rupture with Francoism remained within the reformist framework. In other words, Francoism was not completely cleared out. The dismantling of the regime was limited to its political apparatus and its replacement with a formal democracy. The basic state apparatus was retained as the Suarez gov-
104 International Marxist Review ernment kept control of the transition and gradually allowed the bourgeois forces to regain the initiative. The basic reason for the way the transition turned out was neither the force of the state apparatus (although it was not in crisis) nor the strength of the bourgeoisie (which manoeuvred with some skill), but was rather the reformist policies of the traditional workers' parties. They established a series of pacts with the government and the bourgcois forces and took a consensus line on all the big questions. This approach put the mass movement (whose militancy was greater than its level of class consciousness) into a subordinate position, as a simple pressure group to widen the initial limits of the reform.
Right from the beginning the bourgeois nationalist parties of Catalonia and Euzkadi (PNV and CD) were up to their necks in these pacts and were integrated into the general consensus - although with different forms and rhythms. In any case they adopted a "junior partner" approach facilitating their fundamental compromise in the reform framework. Their differences were only formal, aimed at keeping up their nationalist image among the voters and at throwing all responsibility for attacks on the nationalists onto the shoulders of the UCD and the PSOE.
Finally, the revolutionary forces which were for the complete dismantling of Francoism and for self-determination were too weak to organize mass resistance to block or defeat the Reform. Only in Euzkadi — given the presence of ETA and HB — was there a mass movement for a clean break with Francoism and self-determination. This has been the fundamental cause of the Basque crisis. But since it was limited to Euzkadi it did not develop into a general crisis of this State of Autonomous Regions. The consensus policy radically changed the situation that had existed in the last period of the dictatorship. It eliminated the possibility of decisively and rapidly taking the Francoist state apparatus apart and of allowing the masses to become the protagonists in solving the national questions. This was a political defeat for the mass movement and it was on this basis that the new regime could steadily become stabilized. Stabilization was founded on a pact between the Francoist state apparatus and the democratic institutions under the King acting as umpire — he was projected as symbol and guarantor of "Spanish unity" The result of the consensus on the national level was the setting up of the State of the Autonomous Regions. It did not have to confront any serious alternative except in Euzkadi. This was the beginning of a long term attempt to integrate national conflicts. So a more or less prolonged period was opened up in which the masses were to go through the experience of this new
The national question in the Spanish State 105 State. Two questions were posed: Was this integration possible and, if it was not, how fast would the challenge develop?
15. It was not very likely that the State of Autonomous Regions would succeed in solving the national questions. In a situation of rising struggles and a worsening social situation, the movements began to become more political and look for an overall solution. The national question could easily become a focus for the convergence of various movements. In these conditions a gap opened up between the basic demands for a solution to the national question and the concessions the State of the Autonomous Regions could allow.
The basic demand for the solution of the national question is the right to self-determination. In other words the right to have full sovereignty over the shape of your own political regime both in terms of the form of an independent state and in any desire for confederal, federal or other types of relations with other nationalities or peoples. This was the historically latent demand within the national movements and it resurfaced during the crisis of Francoism. It could not be assimilated by the State of Autonomous Regions.
16. Within the framework of a centralist model (denying the right to self-determination), the State of Autonomous Regions could provide a centralism with a certain degree of administrative decentralization or a system allowing a certain redistribution of political power in favour of nationalities or the regions. There were two distinct phases in the implementation of this reform. In the first the pendulum swung rather towards concessions to the nationalities while in the second phase it was characterized by a centralist reaction. The overall balance-sheet we can draw is one of real progress towards administrative decentralization coupled by a very limited redistribution of political power. New shifts are possible — their importance will depend on the level of mass mobilization and the general political situation. The movement in Euzkadi and Catalonia
17. The degree of mass opposition to the State of the Autonomous Regions following the consolidation of the PSOE in the government has been totally different in Euzkadi compared to the rest of the nationalities. In Euzkadi the bulk of the revolutionary nationalist movement - ETA, Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS - Socialist Patriotic Coordination), Herri Batasuna — followed a consistent line and succeeded in maintaining its links with important sectors of the population. This is the main factor explaining the crisis of the State of the Autonomous Regions in Euskadi. Already the rejection
of the Constitution here had shown how deep the opposition was. The test of practice has shown that supporting the Statule did not lead to a gradual development of self-government as the PNV had claimed it would when justifying its acceptance of this compromise. As long as there was a mass radical nationalist current the Statute would not provide a framework for the national bourgeoisie to administer certain powers. Faced with the mass mobilization and the impasse over the Statute the PSOE government responded only by repression and centralism. This exacerbated the Spanish State's crisis of legitimacy and produced a new surge in nationalist consciousness and a greater nationalist mobilization. The question of the line to adopt in this situation was an important factor in the PNV's crisis and eventual split. Later the
PNV opted for a "conflictual" collaboration with the PSOE in order to hold on to its parcels of power and to unblock the functioning of the autonomous region's institutions. On the other hand Euzko Akjatuma (EA - Basque Solidarity] while not excluding a pact with the state, prioritized the issuing of nationalist declarations with an eye to gaining electoral ground. The PNV's crisis opened the way for HB to become the most important component of
Basque nationalism — including in elections. HB was able to organize very broad mass mobilizations, for example against NATO. But all this was not enough to cause an open crisis in the reform regime in Euzkadi, mainly because of the mediating role played by PNV, EA and Eukadiko Ezkerra [EE
- Basque Left] and the weakness of the social resistance and political initiative of the Basque working class. In this framework neither the regime nor the national resistance succeeded in forcing a fundamental change in the rela-
Nowhere else was there the same degree of popular opposition and of crisis around the Statute. Nevertheless the situation in Catalonia was politically important too. After the big mobilizations against the LOAPA organized situation had been characterized by a certain accumulation of social and political forces, radicalized on the national question and in specific situations able to mobilize even broader social layers. But even then the decisive threshold that could lead to victory had not been reached. These currents were essentially based on the youth who rejected centralism and wanted sovdence" and "Paisos Catalans" were raised. The organized forces within this current were either communist — the LCR, the Movimiento comunista de
Cataluna [MCC - Communist Movement of Catalonia], Movimiento Esquerra nacionalista [MEN - Left Nationalist Movement] or revolutionary nation-
106 International Marxist Review tionship of forces.
mainly by the CRIDA' ereignty. Slogans like "we are a nation"
, popular opposition had considerably declined. The
", "self-determination"
", "indepen-
The national question in the Spanish State 107 alist — CRIDA, the two MDTs. 1° But they did not succeed in developing united action except in particular situations.
We need to look at the tensions between the CIU (Convergence and Union) which became hegemonic after the PSOE's arrival in power, and the central government to understand the problems of the State's project in Catalonia today. These tensions express the contradiction between the national bourgeoisies and the State of the Autonomous Regions, which is a deformed reflection of that existing between the nation and centralism. While this contradiction was in play from the beginning of the transition it worsened with the retreat on autonomy concessions after the abortive February 23, 1981 coup. While the CIU was part of the constitutional commission (claiming formally to also represent the PNV) and had also participated in working out the statutes (this time with the involvement of the PNV), the nationalist forces had been excluded from the Zarzuela Pact for the simple reason that this pact was also aimed against them." This was because they do represent, albeit timidly and in their own interest, national demands that the pact wanted to crack down on. The CIU never seriously took part in the mobilizations against the retreat on autonomy, but at the same time they did not frontally oppose them. On the other hand it carried out masterly manoeuvres in transforming an initial failure into winning a solid absolute electoral majority in Catalonia. Its task was facilitated by the presence of a radical movement with a mass influence which allowed its main leader, Pujol, to capitalize on the partial withdrawal of the LOAPA and then to become the protagonist of some parliamentary battles against the laws on harmonization.
In Galicia, attempts to regroup the bourgeois forces which had timidly taken up the nationalist banner and to present a reformist nationalist alternative continue. At the same time there is still a radical nationalist current organized and consolidated with a far from negligible social influence. In Valencia the political expression of nationalism is weak but resistance on the cultural and linguistic terrain is significant.
In Andalucia, the legitimacy of the State of the Autonomous Regions was strengthened following the PSOE's arrival in government and the opposition is very weak. It is limited to solid national sectors in which the communist left is the fundamental component.
In the Canaries the nationalist current is fragmented and has lost its social base, but nationalist sentiments still exist and this is reflected in the forms of struggle adopted during the campaign against NATO and in the victory of the "No" vote in the referendum. The forces of the traditional right wing have partly latched onto this specific consciousness through a sort of insularity
108 International Marxist Review which politically expresses the gcographical basis of its economic interests and results in a contradictory nationalist position (which clashes with the specific "Spanishness" of historic insularity that places the island against any greater Canarian project). This insular tendency is premised on a greater external dependance to the extent that it emphasizes the European definition of its project. Added to this political fragmentation there are the serious differences between the various economic sectors concerning the Canaries position within the EEC. Consequently criticism has been made of the present model of the Statute (with the demand for an extension of powers and a challenge to the distribution of insular power which is reflected in the Statute).
In this situation a new form of Spanish ideology corresponding to the State of Autonomous Regions project has developed. This ideology does not deny distinct national realities as did the Francoist Spanish ideology rooted in the armed forces and Acción Popular. It recognises them but considers it is necessary to integrate them into a Spain which is presented as a larger national community or a nation of nations, in turn integrated into the larger European reality. Here it means combining a national identity and a Spanish one but at the same time excluding any national identity that is not at the same time Spanish. On the concrete question of language, this ideology implies the formal acceptance of bilingualism as a model, while rejecting as an attack on Castillian (the obligatory common language) any norm laying down a full social utilization of national languages. The general dynamic is for this new Spanish ideology to gain ground at the expense of both the old Spanish ideology and basic forms of national consciousness.
18. The State of the Autonomous Regions has made progress although in an uneven way. But various problems cast a shadow over its immediate future. Mass opposition in Euzkadi creates an atmosphere there of permanent crisis. The retreat on autonomy has produced constant conflicts with the bourgeois nationalist parties of Catalonia and Euzkadi. The state needs to overcome these if it wishes to maintain political stability. On the other hand entry into the EEC creates pressure to renegotiate certain powers and the possible participation of autonomous institutions in working out the government's policy in relation to Europe. Finally, definitive solutions have to be found to questions which have only been dealt with by provisional solutions - particularly the financing and enlarging of the autonomous institutions' powers five years after their establishment. This last question has pushed four communities (Aragon, Castille-Leon, Cantabria and the Balearic Islands) to ask for the reform of this statutes along the lines of an increase in
The national question in the Spanish State 109 their powers — reflecting a contradictory phenomenon. On the one hand this means a consolidation of the State of the Autonomous Regions to the extent that the centralist right represented by AP no longer proposes a reform of the Constitution. On the other hand, both the regionalist right-wing and AP tend to imitate Pujol with an aim of consolidating their position in regional governments, of weakening the PSOE and of carving out parcels of power from central government — for example in the field of water supply, health services, gaming, education etc. But such a tactic increases the instability of the autonomous regions' model which the state generally does not want and some of its apparatuses most definitely reject. Given all these factors the model of the state has become a contemporary political issue. The Catalan socialists have been the protagonists in this discussion. Their proposals basically put forward the development of the State of Autonomous Regions in a federal framework. The difference with historical federalism lies in the fact that the starting point is not the recognition of sovereign states that are disposed to concede a part of their sovereignty to form a federation. That would be radically opposed to the Constitution which for them is not open to reform (at least any important one). For the Catalan socialists it is a case of a set of measures aiming to decentralize political power and resources which within certain limits can be achieved without changing the Constitution. The practical content of the proposals is to strengthen the general system of autonomous institutions (with the same ceiling on the powers) but focused on the administration of certain decentralized public services (education, health, housing). This should both improve the relationship between costs and quality of services and be compatible with the more restricted leeway that the state has on the major economic, political and military questions, especially after joining NATO and the EEC. The only practical form for such a project would be to bring about a generalized consensus between the main parties of the system (PSOE, centralist right and bourgeois nationalists). But that is precisely where the difficulty lies. The aim of a proposal of this federal type is to fix a framework of powers for the autonomous regions which are then loyally accepted by all political currents. The proposal attempts to achieve two ends: a general one of clarifying what model of state is wanted, and another which is specific to the socialists who hope to gain if their proposals receive more support. Indeed it might mean they could avoid permanent conflicts with the bourgeois nationalists which people like Pujol have benefited so much from. At the same time it could help them shed the Spanish image of the PSC (Catalan Socialist Party) and then its opposition to the CIU government would be based around a criticism of its management of
110 International Marxist Review the region. This is really why the CIU do not want to accept this proposal. Pujol's position is too solid and the PSOE's proposal is too weak and too risky. It is too weak because it is not clear whether it would bring more areas of government under Catalan control than are already being won through present pressure. It is too risky because if Pujol became a federalist, if he was ready to drop his ambiguous nationalist position (as demanded by the Catalan socialists), he would risk losing part of his social base just at the time the PSC would be regaining the initiative. The second obstacle lies with the PSOE government itself, which seems cool on accepting federalist type formulas and is more inclined to a synthesis between the old state apparatus inherited from Francoism and the new centralism of the European oriented technocrats. For the latter European integration and adapting the welfare state to "economic realities" are synonymous with restructuring and privatization (including the public services).
It is possible to draw several conclusions from the debate on the eventual "federal" development of the State of the Autonomous Regions. The state has a certain margin of manoeuvre for accepting a wider distribution of the autonomous regions' package of powers, but the Constitution cannot allow the right to self-determination. Whether this margin of manoeuvre is wider or narrower will depend on the depth of the crises and the leadership of the national struggle. It is difficult to foresee in what way and in what timescale the weakening of the State of the Autonomous Regions will develop. The process will surely be uneven and linked to the overall recomposition of the movement and the overall weakening of the regime. It will probably be a slow business.
19. Another conclusion can be drawn. The positions of those who say advances are possible on the road to self-determination and national sovereignty using as a starting point the progressive development of the present statutes are unrealistic. Such positions have been defended by the PNV, the EA as well as by the PCE, PCPE and the EE. From a formal point of view, the debate on the proposal of the Catalan socialists has shown that without a reform of the constitution and even with a maximum of autonomy, there is no possibility of achieving self-determination and national sovereignty. The reform of the Constitution requires a three-fifths majority which is impossible in the present political framework. But there are other fundamental reasons why this gradualist path to self-determination is impractical. In the first place there is the profoundly centralist attitude of the state apparatuses (essentially the Armed Forces) which is decisive for imposing limits on the
present Constitution and for forcing a retreat on the autonomy statutes. In the second place the majority of the bourgeoisie is agreed on maintaining the integrity of Spanish territory and the present state apparatus as an irreplaccable instrument for its class domination. Finally membership of NATO and of the EEC creates new obstacles to any process of sclf-determination.
* This document was adopted by the congress of the LCR (section of the Fourth Internation-
1. The period of the three Carlist wars stretches from 1833 to 1876 — it is characterized by a
2. The First Republic was proclaimed in 1873 and only lasted one year.
4. Francisco Maciá, a leader of the Catalan movement, was leader of the Catalan government
5. The Lliga Regionalista, founded in 1901, was a bourgeois political party and Cambo was
7. The cabildos were assemblies of representatives from the local area bodies.
8. LOAPA Ley Organica para la Harmonizacion del territorio i.e. the law that fixed the pow-
9. The CRIDA is an association for the defence of the Catalan language and culture.
10. MDT, Movimiento de defensa de la tierra [Movement to defend the land] — it has suf-
11. The Zarzuela Pact was agreed after the aborted February 23 coup and it involved a eertain
Notes dynasty as much as by its political aspects.
3. The Second Republic was declared in 1931.
(the Generalitat) from 1931.
one of its main leaders.
6. Luis Companys was President of the Generalitat in Catalonia.
ers of the autonomous regions.
fered a split.
limitation of the autonomous region law.
The national question in the Spanish State I1/ al in the Spanish state) in May 1989. The subheads are by IMR.
REGOLUTIONS
Available only in English, with the following resolutions from the 1985 Congress:
• The world political situation and the tasks of the Fourth International
Resolutions/IDB, Inprecor, 2 rue Richard Lenoir, 93108, Montreuil, France international
AVEWPOINT
FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW OF THE 4th INTERNATIONAL
OF
THE
TWELFTH
WORLD
OF
THE
FOURTH
• The prosent stage of building the Fourth International
- Revolution and counter-revolution in Poland
Dictatorshlp of the proletariat and socialist democracy
• The Central American revolution
Send 50 FF (preferred), $8 or £5 for each copy (postage included) to :
D
1.
rit to sy di im ac ly
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
CONGRESS INTERNATIONAL
D