DOCUMENT* l today
=eir own political projects in danger.
lectoral project.
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Central America sure the restructuring projects of both states.
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28 International Marxist Review
This new international context puts enormous pressure on revolutionaries in Latin America, and particularly Central America, to stop taking the Soviet workers' state as a strategic point of reference. This is particularly important given that a large section of the Latin American revolutionary vanguard consider that what they call the socialist camp plays the role of rearguard of the revolution. The warning that the Soviets would not give minimum aid to any national liberation struggle which implies a direct confrontation with imperialism weighs heavily in the revolutionary vanguard's discussions on "the impossibility of revolution", ", as the international situation is evolving. In more than one case this makes them yearn for the old Brezhnev times when, although support was limited, there was nevertheless a more aggressive verbal policy against imperialism.
This international context creates additional difficulties for the development of the revolutionary process of national liberation. This should not be forgotten if we want to have a clearer discussion on the dynamic of events in this part of the world. 2 As well as the terrible actions of the Soviet bureaucracy, the belligeren-
• cy and virulence of US imperialism's actions have to be taken into account. Gorbachev's policies make him just what the doctor ordered for the Pentagon. At the beginning of perestroika, it was thought that this would mean increased difficulties for imperialism in maintaining a directly aggressive policy against our peoples; but this vain hope did not last long. The invasion of Panama was a palpable demonstration of the change in the balance of forces.
The Bush government had a correct reading of the significance of perestroika for Latin America. They understood that it left them a free hand to act with impunity, without the least restriction. The elimination of the Noriega government was not the only objective of the Panama invasion: fundamentally, the idea was to make it clear to all the peoples of Latin America, and in particular to those of Cuba and Nicaragua, that times had changed and that military intervention was a real possibility. Imperialism has combined to perfection this threat with the use of the foreign debt as a disciplinary mechanism for the governments in different Latin American countries, at the same time updating their policy of direct presence and intervention. So, in addition to bases already existing in Guantánamo, Panama, Honduras and so on, in the last few years bases have been set up in Bolivia and more recently in the Peruvian forest. Bases will also be installed in Colombia in the near future. In this way, the direct, physical presence of
imperialism has been strengthened, using the struggle against drugs as a pretext. Imperialism has had palpable successes with its strategy of "low-
It is precisely in this framework that the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas took place. This defeat marks a significant point in the process of changing the regional balance of forces. This defeat was preceded by the way in which the FMLN's general offensive ended (which was not in triumph), the invasion of Panama and the scant response in most of the Latin American countries. All these elements had a contrary effect on the interests of the revolution, and now the Nicaraguan electoral result is another blow against the revolutionary processes in El Salvador and Guatemala.
3 Central America, like the rest of Lawn America, has been suffering a severe economic crisis since 1982. The fall in raw materials' prices, as well as constant devaluations, have sunk these countries into the worst crisis of their history. This is despite the millions of dollars in "aid" that the US government has decided to give to the reactionary governments in this
Foreign indebtedness is, for the time being, the key problem in these countries. This indebtedness has been used to mask the dimensions of the crisis.
Wall Street has had to financially support these governments for political reasons. They had four main aims in mind: destabilizing the Sandinista government; inflicting a definitive defeat on the URNG; preventing the triumph of the FMLN; and overthrowing the Noriega government. As the Bush government considers that these objectives have been accomplished this "help" will
Despite this extraordinary aid, the countries of this region have reached the most impressive levels of poverty in Latin America. From 1981 to 1987, the
GNP per inhabitant fell by 15.8%. While the total Central American foreign debt was $7.651 million in 1980, in 1987 it was $18.183 million. That is to say an increase of around 150%. This is totally different from what happened in the rest of Latin America, where the foreign debt grew much more slowly in this period. Obviously the explanation must be sought in politics and not
The material conditions that explain the development of social explosions are not only continuing, but also getting harsher each day. In the second Santa Fe meeting, US imperialism decided to use the foreign debt as a fundamental element for economically and politically disciplining the Central
American governments, and to try to create an image of stability and prosperies let ant )nhe ny гіhe In en, erpbe in enhe ild eSaof esICL ga alin lat Lin ce 10, in ed of region.
Central America today 29 intensity conflict"
be stopped, or at least diminished.
economics.
30 International Marxist Review ity in contrast to Nicaragua. Here US strategy has failed totally, and the consequences of such a policy are immediately apparent. This is even more true given that the parties supported by imperialism have been displaced by ultra-right, corrupt parties that will not offer a good international image. The era of Aria, Duarte and Cerezon is coming to an end, at least momentarily. This phenomenon reflects the degree of social polarization that exists in the region.
4 However, from a conjunctural point of view, US policy has had sigmi-
cant successes — in particular the Sandinistas' defeat. The outcome of the Nicaraguan elections led to a massive discussion in the Latin American revolutionary vanguard which has led to significant political redefinitions. The two fundamental ideas which recur are the following: Are explosions of social revolution possible and viable in Latin America, after what happened in Nicaragua? And, is it possible for socialist revolution to bring our countries out of economic underdevelopment?
For sectarian minds who think everything is resolved, these sort of questions are totally absurd. But for us to start to answer them is fundamental. Comandante Victor Tirado López — in an individual fashion — formulated the first idea not as a question but as an assertion: I think that this is closing the cycle of anti-imperialist revolution understood as total military and economic confrontations with imperialism. We have to seek other options. The underdeveloped world cannot resist nor live in a state of permanent war like Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Angola, Afghanistan, and so on.
For Tirado López., taking as his starting point that what he calls the socialist countries do not have the least intention of helping the revolutionary process, the only possible way forward is to try to avoid the imposition of brutal capitalism. This is a significant statement. For broad sectors of the masses and the vanguard, the 1979 revolution was proof that it was possible and viable to defeat imperialism. Today, such an assertion can have a significantly demoralizing effect. Our answer to assertions that the revolution cannot solve the problems of underdevelopment is as follows: it is true that the revolution does not solve the problems of underdevelopment, but can these problems be solved without the revolution? Revolution only opens the way for the creation of a more just society. Underdevelopment is a product of imperialist pillage, and while this exists it will not disappear. Are there other options for countries as small as Nicaragua? Without the anti-imperialist revolution, there is not the least possibility of emerging from a state of underdevelopment - above all there
: no possibility of generating a real national sovereignty and beginning to reate a more just system. To succeed in this there has to be a confrontation
• ih imperialism. We know that the balance of forces is not the best, we
• cow that the bureaucratic apparatuses have played a harmful role in ensur-
* imperialist domination and so on. But we also know that the anti-
- perialist revolution helps to change the relationship of forces and that, in
*tum, statements like Tirado's help imperialism to act with greater arro-
Answering such assertions is fundamental, but we also have to understand
- y they are made. The Sandinista experience in the economic field has been ally frustrating. Not for the simplistic reasons given by some that if the
..* of the means of production had been nationalized the whole situation
• uld have been radically different (in a positive sense). But because of the
• * in which the imperialist countries and the Stalinist bureaucracies treated i struggle for national liberation. And, it has to be said, because of the
:% - the absence of big workers' mobilizations in the imperialist countries
- ich could have created a different international balance of forces.The
..ence of an anti-intervention movement — as there was in the United zes during the Vietnam War — weighs particularly heavily. Thus there
- ire not concrete actions against financial aid to the contra at a series of cru-
For this reason, it is not enough to differentiate ourselves from Tirado tz's vision. We also have to give an overall interpretation of the terrible
Raulties that the Sandinistas confronted in building another society. By
-tying the problems confronted by the Sandinistas, as well as the policies implemented, we can participate in their discussions and the debate in
* iatin American left, as well as elaborating some possible scenarios for it is not totally arbitrary to speak of two periods in the Nicaraguan economic situation. There was first the period prior to the 1984 elections up he beginning of 1985; and the second up to the present day. There is also a
• henship between the end of the first stage and the beginning of the impe-
*: blockade. Until the end of 1984, the social and economic project had tollowing guiding elements: increased social investment and subsidies
• copular consumption, with the establishment of a loans policy for the rest agricultural producers; the implementation of an agrarian reform
••.. substantially changed land possession (in comparison with what exist-
Lance and brutality against our peoples.
- most total indifference of the workers'
:. moments.
..rg the current contradictions in Nicaragua.
Central America today 31 movement in the imperialist coun
32 International Marxist Review ed under the Somoza dictatorship); an economic policy of significant investment in social services, in particular in health and education; and, finally, the initiation of some industrial projects that, in practice, were the weakest points of this whole vision.
Thus, the FSLN's electoral victory in 1984 reflected the degree of social consensus reached. But their policies were modified by the economic embargo decreed by the USA. From this point on, the economic limits of a country with extremely limited development of the productive forces, which meant very acute external dependency, became very obvious. This was true for external credits, as well as for direct investments and the level of commercial exchange. From then on, the "despotic incursions" against private ownership of the means of production stopped. What was left was an economic structure in which private initiative maintained a significant weight: the APP (Areas of People's Property — nationalized) sector controls 25% of agriculture, 40% of industry and 38% of commerce; small and medium proprietors control 58%, 30% and 50% respectively and big proprietors 17%, 30% and 12%. This relationship does not explain a series of fundamental aspects such as the role of each sector in exports, productivity levels or the impressive growth of the informal economy and black market.
The international financing agencies played a significant role in this economic stranglehold by cutting aid to Nicaragua even before US imperialism decreed the economic embargo (the IMF from 1980, the World Bank and AID from 1982 and the IDB from 1983). At the same time, the region's reactionary governments received substantial aid. The gradual deterioration of the economy led to substantial changes in economic policy. It is difficult to have a complete vision of what the Sandinistas could have done. Our obligation as revolutionaries is to start from the significance of imperialist pillage. Without looking at things this way, it is not possible to understand what happens in countries which, like Nicaragua, carry through a radical revolution and confront immense difficulties in building a different society. This is not just any problem. Imperialist countries have gone through an essential change in work relations: the economic restructuring combined technological transformations with big changes in internal work organization. The questioning of "scientific methods" of organizing production provoked a substantial increase in work productivity. This was achieved without the working class in the imperialist countries being able to challenge these plans through direct confrontation. Nowadays, the adjustment policies applied in most Latin American countries also mean the same transformations, but with the slight difference that they are applied to economies devas-
Central America today 33 cated by the crisis. Productivity targets have risen to such an extent that our economies have been driven even further into underdevelopment.
This is why we insist once again that the only way to prevent imperialism irom stifling struggles for national liberation leading towards socialism is hrough a decisive and timely response of the working class in the metropoli'an countries. The poor nations of the third world will only be able to advance in their revolutions with the determined support of the workers of these counsies. That is why to characterize the Nicaraguan revolution as unfinished is a ruism. Up to now we do not know of any revolution that has been fully comFleted — that will not happen as long as the world capitalist market exists.
• The economic stranglehold led the Sandinistas to implement a policy ot economic adjustment which had harmiul consequences on livin standards for the mass of the population. This was implemented through two readjustment plans. The first was launched in February 1988, and in some *ays already meant an aggressive policy towards the population. However, -is plan still maintained three central aspects: a significant harmonization of * ages; subsidy, and thus price control, of 45 basic food products; and the ¿ontinuation of a policy of stable employment. This proposal was carried rough alongside a mobilization of the population, especially on the ques_on of monetary modification. At that point the population still had a great deal of confidence in the Sandinista government. This plan lasted only four Fonths due to unprecedentedly high inflation rates and a certain amount of :e-capitalization. Later, in June 1988, a new plan was introduced which increased the burden in the workers in the countryside and the city. In this plan, the number of rasic food products subsidized was reduced to only four (rice, sugar, oil, «ap), accompanied by an indiscriminate liberalization of prices without any : oncomitant wage rises for the workers. At the same time, the first cut was -ade in the number of state employees, increasing unemployment and -ader-employment, plus indexation (to inflation) of interest rates on credits - the APP and small peasant sectors. The combination of these two adjustTent policies led to the almost total bankruptcy of the Nicaraguan economy * the end of that year; inflation reached 36,000% - 100% per day. GDP recreased by 9%, while GDP per capita dropped by 12.1%. The value of exports fell by 15.5%, while that of imports rose by 9.1%. This adjustment policy meant further impoverishment of the people with: ut any popular mobilization, which is why many called it a "plan without _e people" '. Comandante Carión pointed out that the era of great social
34 International Marxist Review reforms had passed, and that the driving force of economic improvement was to come from foreign and private investment. To achieve this, they had to represent themselves to the investing sectors as credit-worthy, and thus the social aspect of the revolution had to be stopped.
We can point out that the pressure from the so-called socialist countries grew unbearable for the Sandinistas. It was felt all the more harshly as overall aid from Eastern Europe to Nicaragua had reached $7,000 million. This was very little for in comparison with Nicaragua's needs but seemed very high to the Soviet technocrats. That is why the Soviet burcaucracy is so happy about UNO's victory. It is significant that for the Soviets, Señora Chamorro's victory simply represents savings in oil, dollars and weapons. The return to normality means that Nicaragua returns to the orbit of imperialism's "responsibility" ", not only in the political arena but also and fundamentally in the economic arena. This element should not be forgotten in analyzing the Sandinistas' view of what was possible and why they had to reformulate their relationship with US imperialism.
Aid from Eastern Europe was not enough to make the Nicaraguan economy function. The defence effort made GDP fall by 15% and the war left accumulated damages of $12 billion. On the other hand, in the last few years, there has been an even greater deterioration in the exchange mechanisms for raw materials exports, as well as a significant reduction of the land surface dedicated to producing cotton. And all of this took place in the context of the US trade embargo. To this we have to add the direct damage caused by Hurricane Joan, which was estimated at $700 million. The Sandinistas concluded that they urgently needed to open credit lines from the United States and end the trade blockade. It was in this perspective that they brought forward the election. 7 Public investment fell by 66% between 1987 and 1989. Jobs in the put. The economic and social effects of such a crisis have been impressive. lic sector were cut by 35,000, GDP per capita fell by 27.4%, real wages -taking the base of 100 in 1980 — were reduced to an index of 11 in 1987 and as low as 5 in December 1988, falling further to 1 in January 1989. This is to say that readjustment plans followed the same criteria as in the rest of Latin America, but with a central difference: there was no input of fresh hard currency that could ease the situation in return for implementing these plans.
This situation had important consequences for the relationship between the FSLN and the masses. Most leaders of the mass organizations decidedly supported the readjustment plans. One of the clearest examples of this was the
Central America today 35 attitude of the CST (Central Sandinista de los Trabajadore - Sandinista Workers' Federation) which publicly supported the redundancies in the state sector. Another example was that of the Juventud Sandinista which supported the reactionary restructuring plans for the university, similar to those in other Latin American countries (leading them to lose some elections). Some government ministers even had to point out to the leaders of mass organizalions that they should take some distance from certain economic projects that the government was forced to initiate. But reality was very complex.
However, today it would be too Manichean to hold the leaders of social organizations responsible for something they did not decide. The Sandinistas tried to bridge this abyss with the cara al pueblo ["face the people" public meetings for dialogue between Sandinista leaders and the masse]. It is well known that very often the local Sandinista leaders prepared the cara al pueblo to question the government's central policy, interventions were organized and more than once they won important concessions. Daniel Ortega was obliged to modify his economic policy under the pressure of these assemblies. However, in the long run, these small expressions of people's power did not manage to develop and express themselves through the big mass organizations. A section of the Sandinistas thought that these consultailons replaced the need to really consult the workers but reality demonstrated a fundamental truth. In moments of revolutionary euphoria (when there is unlimited confidence in the vanguard) democracy of this type appears as sufficient. However, when the crisis explodes, this type of plebiscitary democra¿y not only does not function, but very often generates more dissatisfaction. The problem is that it is necessary to develop direct democracy (creating an organizing structure where the social organizations can exercise their power) starting in the period of revolutionary euphoria, because later on it is much more difficult. In a certain way there began to be a separation between the FSLN and the masses, especially between the social organizations and the masses. What was most worrying in the last electoral campaign was the famous closing rald ly of the ESLN campaign. More than half of the participants voted for UNO, even though they had attended the rally, as well as many previous demonstran tions that had affected the whole city. Let us consider what it means when 35% of the inhabitants of a capital city participate in a mobilization. What we have to ask is why they participated and why they subsequently voted for e UNO. In large sectors of the population a certain fear and rancour began to develle op in regard to the Sandinista cadre in the social organizations. Many people
36 International Marxist Review who had participated in that rally did so simply under social pressure, in order not to be shown up in front of their leaders. These leaders asked the workers to mobilize to support the austerity plans of the government, and at the same time some of them already started to have a standard of living slightly different to that of the workers as a whole. X But this was not the central factor determining the vole for UNO. The five years of war and the continuation of obligatory military service weighed heavily on the consciousness of the population. Big layers of the population drew the following conclusion: a victory of the FSLN will not only not end the war but, on the contrary, lead to its intensification.
There is a weakness in the usual analysis of the Nicaraguan situation. Everybody said that the Contra had been militarily defeated, and thus that a key element of the US strategy of "low-intensity conflict" had stopped functioning. However, reality was totally different. Undoubtedly the Contra had no military perspective if viewed as the key instrument for taking power, but it is very difficult to think that this was the imperialist vision. For them the Contra was an element of destabilization which played a key role in the formation of a solid civilian instrument. In this respect, Cardinal Obando's role has been fundamental. We should look for the explanation of UNO's victory (from the point of view of its forces) in the light of the division of labour between the Cardinal and the Contra.
The war meant almost 50,000 dead: 1.66% of the population. Transposed to France we would be talking about more than 800,000 dead, and more than 3.5 million in the USA. To this has to be added the number of wounded and mutilated, and also those who were evacuated or who lost their homes. This means that almost every Nicaraguan home directly experienced the effects of the war in one way or another. It was in order to end the war that the majority of Nicaraguans voted for UNO. theless, we have lo point out another very important element. The only These are the elements which fundamentally explain the defeat. Noneway in which a people can accept the type of poverty and difficulties experienced by the Nicaraguans is if they have a very big decision-making power over what is done. An adjustment policy that provokes a drop in living standards can only be accepted if it is decided by those who are going to be centrally affected by it. For us, the problem is not the number of nationalizations carried out by the Sandinista government. Nicaragua is often spoken of as if it was France or Japan. Of course, the Nicaraguan government made mis-
Central America today 37 takes in terms of economic policy, and those mistakes significantly influenced the mood of the masses. But to think that in a country like Nicaragua t nationalizations could have solved the social problems of the population is not to understand what underdevelopment means. If the Sandinistas carried out that economic policy it was fundamentally due to the limits of the internauonal situation.
Giving Cuba as an example can be very good for public rallies, but the situation was totally different. The Cuban revolution coincided in time with moments of euphoria of the Soviet bureaucracy. Nikita Khrushchev was firmly convinced that the USSR would in a few years overtake the USA's *ork productivity level. Soviet aid to Cuba was out of all comparison with the aid given to Nicaragua. A policy of collectivization of the means of projuction inevitably requires significant international aid if you do not want to fall immediately into the abyss).
We think that the fundamental weakness was the very limited existence of direct people's power. No form of direct representation of mass organiza-ons developed again after the 1984 elections. The disappearance of the - ouncil of State distanced the organized masses from the spheres where the undamental decisions were taken. It was thought that the question was solved by recruiting most of the social leaders to the Sandinista Assembly (a -ort of central committee of the FSLN). Obviously, this was not so.
The FSLN gradually developed, and in a way theorized, the importance of elections as we know them in the capitalist world. We did not explicitly point rut the limits of this path. We should not make the opposite mistake today by initicizing the Sandinistas for having held this type of election. We express ur admiration for the way in which the Sandinistas maintained - in a situa-on of counter-revolutionary war supported by US imperialism — the funda-ental political freedoms and the democratic character of the process as a - hole. However, the democratic mechanism chosen by the Sandinistas had al the limits of bourgeois parliamentarism: separation of executive and legisative power, which led to strengthening presidential power and the delega¿on of power for a significant period (6 years) without the the electors having iny means of control. These two elements alone reflect the limits of parliamentary democracy. Thus we have to demand democracy at the base, that is io say people's democracy, which in Nicaragua could have adopted the following form: the municipalities would have been the power base, guaranteeing the existence of multi-partyism and freedom of elections, with also the free recall at any moment by the electors who would have permanent control over their representatives. It is obvious that this formula would have saved
38 International Marxist Review the Nicaraguan people from having a reactionary parliamentary majority clected for six years, when a great number of those who voted for UNO will be sorry or are already sorry they did so, without having the possibility of changing this majority in the institutional terrain. Only a general strike or the creation of a popular movement of such vigour that it would impose new elections could change this majority. The method we are talking about is by principle opposed to the idea that a government is legitimate once and for all. The limit of years that parliamentary democracy of bourgeois origin always imposes really reflects the limits of its democratic vision. The legitimacy of a government is won daily.
This raises a question to discuss in the Latin America revolutionary left (which was hard hit by this defeat). One of the key elements in answering those who say farewell to anti-imperialist revolutions is to make these criticisms of the SLN. Building direct people's power is still a goal 1o be realized. Only this type of regime can lay the basis for resisting imperialist aggression, through the workers of the countryside and city taking their fate into their own hands. 1U sion on the lype of revolution that it was the lype of state it created The Sandinista electoral defeat has of course given rise to a discusand what exists today. The Fourth International must take part in this discussion, but it should not make this its only interest. The discussions on what happened and what to do to win back the government are of such richness that we would be wrong if we limited our discussion to that subject. However, it is necessary to say several things about it.
The Nicaraguan revolution was, more than anything else, a national, popular, democratic and anti-imperialist revolution where the class struggle demands were not the central ones. This is not unimportant. This limited class struggle profile was not due, as some sectarians could think, to the weakness of the leadership or a policy of alliances with the leadership. The explanation is a little deeper. The Sandinista strategy for taking power was the only one possible in a country like Nicaragua. This strategy was determined by the type of society and the level of consciousness of the population. The Sandinistas achieved something that still inspires the Latin American revolutionary left: this is to be the vanguard in the struggle to refound or actually found) the Nation with an autonomous and sovereign project in relation to imperialism. The social content and driving forces of this project were democratic and popular. The particularity — and what marked it out from other Latin American and generally third-world revolutionary processes —
was the socialist and revolutionary character of the FSLN. That is to say that the FSLN developed the beautiful idea of José Carlos Mariategui that the work of Latin American revolutionaries is to fuse the highest point of the social scientific thought of the developed world (Marxism) with Indo-
American reality. This was the great achievement of the FSLN.
Daniel Ortega pointed out that the Sandinista revolution had been socialist, and this is absolutely true from the point of view of the path it took. The sole possibility for "refounding" or "actually founding" the Nicaraguan nation as autonomous and sovereign in relation to imperialism, was through a socialist perspective. That is to say the building of a socialist society in Nicaragua
In our analysis and our political vision of Latin America it is important to take into account the concept of the pueblo ("people") as not only the sum of sectors that form the driving force of the revolution, but also the ones are going in the direction of building another society where exploitation will not exist. The pcople are those underneath, the poor of Latin America. The San-
Jinista revolution was a revolution of the poor, of those from underneath and
To think that the Sandinista revolution did not qualitatively modify the type of state that existed under Somoza is not to understand anything about the revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial world. It is to live by and for
The Fourth International characterized the state born on the July19, 1979 as з "workers' state". This category — like all analytical categories including bourgeois state" — covers very different realities. For us the Sandinista slate had a proletarian nature, which was determined by workers' and people's power. From this characterization we can draw two conclusions: 1) in the framework of this new state, the backbone of the advance to socialism was the Sandinista armed forces and the popular militia; 2, for the bourgeois counter-revolution to triumph it would have to dismantle this state and rebuild the bourgeois state destroyed since the fall of Somoza.
The fundamental thing is to understand that July 19 was a qualitative change in the state framework, that this change was determined by the type of revolution (popular democratic) and that socialism began to be built on the
This state has not been changed by the victory of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. What we are experiencing is a contradiction between the UNO govemment and the state apparatus of the revolution. This contradiction will iend to be resolved in the framework of an advance of the revolution or the started on July 19, 1979.
the state that was formed answered to them.
schemas.
basis of this state.
Central America today 39
" peasants'
40 International Marxist Review triumph of the counter-revolution. In contrast with what is happening in East Germany, it is very difficult to envisage the possibility of a "cold" change in the nature of the state in Nicaragua. ] The Sandinista defeat in the elections opens a new political scene where the revolution and counter-revolution will both try to impose their options. The particular aspect of this situation is the change that has taken place in the relationship of forces. The forces linked to imperialism have made important advances and now have a legitimacy among the masses which it will be difficult for them to lose. We can say that we are seeing the confrontation of two legitimacies: on the one hand that of July 19, 1979, and on the other that of February 25, 1990. These two legitimacies are antagonistic and mutually exclusive. Over and above some tactical agreements, there will be a confrontation that will solve the contradictory elements. That dynamic is to a certain degree inevitable. The first measures taken by the UNO government, in particular the attempted attack on the Civil Service (the guarantee that government employees had that they would not be sacked) and the response to them (a strike and a mobilization stimulated by the FSLN) go in this direction. Let us take a quick look at the terms of the conflict. First of all, the situation of the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO). This was the product of an alliance between several parties which were not very of confident that they would win the elections. Once victorious, divisions emerged very fast. We can, in general terms, speak of two groupings: one represented by Virgilio Godoy and the other by Violeta Chamorro, although the real leaders of this wing are Alfredo César and Lacayo. The Violeta group controls the bulk of the ministries, but the other group gained control of parliament. The difference between the groups is on how 1o ensure a transition which actually dismantles the Sandinista state, especially the destruction and total transformation of the army. Violeta's current tries to govern in a spirit of national reconciliation, understanding the existence of the EPS (Ejercito Popular Sandinisto - Sandinista People's Army) and the 40% of the votes won by the FSLN. On the other hand, Godoy's current seeks a more rapid and radical confrontation with the FSLN. We should rapidly explain the motives of each current as well as the internal dynamics which motivate them. Godoy's current starts from an analysis of what was the Sandinista revolution. For this current, it is excluded to make the same mistakes as the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie made on that occasion. That is to say, to think it is
Central America today 41 possible to establish an alliance with the FSLN to try to rebuild the country. It considers it fundamental to annihilate Sandinism in this period while it is weak and not allow it to recuperate. It understands the legitimacy that UNO now has and it wants to use it to a maximum to destroy Sandinism. As a consequence, it implements a policy of permanent provocation. This is a simple idea. To surround and to provoke the Sandinistas, understanding that they are going through a period where their legitimacy has much diminished. So they think that the Sandinistas cannot defy the governmental power of UNO and that if they do so US imperialism could intervene without 100 great a political cost. This means that they want to use the relative weakness of the Front as much as possible, that they consider this moment 1o be an appropriate one that is not guaranteed to recur.
Although Señora Chamorro's group starts from a different political standpoint, it is also convinced of the necessity of destroying the FSLN, but it is waiting for the best moment. It is trying to appear as the wing that could isolate both right and left extremes while ensuring foreign financing. However, it will soon reveal its true objectives, particularly in relation to a series of central questions — the Sandinista army, the agrarian reform, and so on - although it will try to avoid a costly confrontation, particularly because of what is happening internationally. It is counting on a division among the Sandinistas. They understand that this is the only realistic possibility for achieving their goals without a major confrontation.
On this, Alfredo César's current and international social democracy are extremely important. Alfredo César sees himself as the next president of the country, and to a certain extent he has the support of both US and European imperialism. The creation or not of a social-democratic current within the FSLN is vital for their project. When we talk about a current of that nature, te are not simply thinking about the discussion within the FSLN about its incorporation into the Second International, but about a real mutation. This current would have to form and then win the majority within the FSLN. If his happened, we would be faced with a qualitative change in which the FSLN would abandon its Sandinista, and thus its revolutionary, roots. It is very improbable that this will happen. The original mistake of sectarian organizations like the MUR or its international offshoots is that they do not understand the type of current that the FSLN represents. They were wrong when the revolution erupted, they have been wrong for the last ten years, and they are wrong now about what is going to happen. And this is all because they think that the FSLN is a social-democratic or petty bourgeois current.
42 International Marxist Review 12 What should attract our attention and fundamentally focus our discussion is what the FOLN is sayıng about the stage that is opening in the struggle to preserve the revolution and the policy that this stage demands. This discussion is very rich. No revolutionary current has ever confronted such a complex political scene at both the national and international level. The duty of our International and our sections is to actively take part in this type of discussion, prudently, but without any complexes. The internationalist solidarity work that we have been carrying out gives us a good opportunity to discuss with our Sandinista brothers and sisters on common ground. We must not let this opportunity slip by. The first condition is to observe what they are doing and listen what they are saying. This implies that we give our opinion on important positions, like that formulated by Tirado López, and explain our disagreements, but at the same time we observe the role that the Sandinistas are playing in defending their (our) revolution. The framework of this struggle is so complicated that it obviously poses big risks for the vanguard. But our starting point is that the Sandinistas have faced very significant risks in the past (maybe not so complicated) and that not only did they survive them with great success but also they left important lessons for revolutionaries throughout the world. This is the type of focus we propose for our International. In the past it has given good results to participate in the political thought of the Nicaraguan revolution.
The analysis that the Sandinistas are starting to develop on the electoral results and their defeat is based on the following ideas. The UNO victory retlected a differentiated level of consciousness in the population. A minority identified with the Contra and a great majority voted to "punish" the FSLN. The objective is to try and distinguish these two sectors in practice. The Sandinistas' understanding of this has somehow reduced this differentiation to a division within UNO. To reach their objective they will have to use to the full what we have at other times called the Sandinista method of doing politics (it is clear that applying this method when in government is not the same as doing so when out of it). Even statements as shocking as Humberto Ortega's when he said that Violeta Barrios de Chamorro was Sandinista (not of the FSLN, but Sandinista) is related to this vision. Violeta will have to choose between two possibilities. Either she accepts this appellation, and in so doing increases the contradictions with the Contra sector of UNO, that is the Somocista sector; or she refuses, entering into contradiction with the July 19 revolution, which everybody accepts (even though unwillingly) to be Sandinista, and so exposes herself to the masses as a Contra.
This tactic was based on a Sandinista idea which we think is correct. The
Central America today 43 UNO goverment has a legitimacy and it is not possible to appear immediately as wanting to end its mandate before schedule. As they are forced to follow parliamentary rules to the full, the Sandinistas now have to manoeuvre in an institutional arena different to that which existed in Somoza's time.
Nonetheless, the problem is the following: there is a limit to institutional respect if this carries within it the idea that the only way to recover the government is to work with a perspective of presidential elections in six years time. To work in this perspective would be to lose sight of elements that will undoubtedly appear. Nor does this mean that this will necessarily be decided before the elections. However, we understand that the longer this perspective is prolonged, the stronger will be the elements of institutional stability. But we also understand that it is not possible to call for an insurrection immediately because the external and internal conditions for such an action do not yet exist.
The parameters within which the Sandinistas are operating are the following: respect for the level of consciousness of an important sector of the masses who have confidence in UNO, trying to confront the government with the needs of the Nation, and at the same time defending the gains of the revolution, particularly the character of the army, the agrarian reform, the state seclor of economy, the allocation of building plots in the cities, and the right to strike. It would seem that in this first period UNO hard-liners have been imposing their positions, that the president has had to re-establish links with this wing and violently confront the FSLN. The FSLN has responded with a capacity for mobilization which proves that the majority of organized people are still Sandinista. The FSLN is trying to emerge from this confrontation strengthened. In practice, it is trying to have a sort of right of veto over the government's decisions (Daniel Ortega pointed out that the government has to understand that it cannot carry through any economic measures without consulting the Sandinistas). This right of veto nonetheless has a double charactar. On the one hand, it shows the Sandinistas' position of strength and, as such, it is seen by fundamental sectors of the masses as a counterweight. But on the other hand it means a certain dynamic of co-responsibility which ¿ould in some ways become the basis for establishing a social pact. However, the limits to this project are the economic policies implemented by Señora Barrios. The adjustment she wants to implement is very harsh: 50% devaluacon of the currency, 100% increase in water bills, 300% in electricity prices and 1300% in telephone tariffs as well as a 150% price rise for basic :oodstuffs.
44 International Marxist Review
The economic and social situation in Nicaragua poses a big problem for those who think that it was possible to develop a social-democratic capitalism. There is no place for such a beast (we would add, there is no place in any Latin American country). Just like Collor de Melo, Salinas de Gortari or Carlos Saúl Menem, Violeta Barrios has to implement an austerity policy ("savage" in the terms of the Sandinista discussion). This policy could be even worse if we take into account the limited productive capacity of Nicaragua. That is why, sooner or later, she will attack the agrarian reform and the nationalized enterprises. The idea that the UNO government will not attack the agrarian reform, considering it a good basis for agrarian modernization, is totally false. This analysis also gets the country wrong.
The tactic chosen by the Sandinistas has a number of risks. Today, they have to work in a contradictory institutional framework where UNO has a certain quota of power, to put it mildly. In this respect we should remember something that often passes unnoticed. UNO won the immense majority of municipalities, especially the most important ones. That local power can be even more effective than central state power. At the same time we must understand that UNO will soon try to change judicial power, either by trying to win over the majority of judges or replacing Sandinista supporters. If UNO manages to do this we would be talking of expression of power at four levels — executive, legislative, judicial and municipal - leaving the Sandinistas with the control of the army (undoubtedly this will be a later confrontation) and of the organized mass movement. The Sandinistas' strength is particularly in this latter aspect. UNO has shown itself to be deeply incapable of mobilizing the population - particularly after announcing their programme. On the other hand, the Sandinista discourse on respect for the electoral legitimacy poses innumerable problems, especially when you want to place in the same category those right-wing sectors that are looking for immediate confrontation with those sections of the left that are trying to place themselves on the side of the concrete demands of the people. This discourse from Ortega about the need to isolate the "extremes" appears more as an internal message than anything else, particularly as what exists to the left of the FSLN represents absolutely nothing. It is very probable that there will be isolated struggles that will appear in the eyes of the Sandinista leadership as extremist, but this will constitute another political test: neither the police nor the EPS should repress such a mobilization. The consequences of such an act would be disastrous. As far as the EPS is concerned, the fact that Humberto Ortega is still Commander in Chief is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it means a victo-
Central America today 45 ry for the FSLN if we consider the attitude of the Godoy section when it learnt that Humberto would continue to lead the EPS. But at the same time some problems can arise. By saying that the EPS must be professional, Señora Barrios wants it to be understood that it should be under her orders. That is why she nominated herself as minister of defence. This can lead to severe contradictions, especially as far as the demand to disarm the people's militia is concerned. On this level the contradictions that the Sandinistas might experience may considerable. In this sense, what is at stake for the FSLN is historic (in the full meaning of the word). The electoral defeat must lead the Sandinistas to think deeply and from there to recover what was its most significant characteristic: its capacity to represent the interests of the Nicaraguan people.
Because of the character of the leadership, as well as the immense economic difficulties that the UNO confronts, we are confident that social hegemony will be recovered and that the Sandinistas will return to government on the basis of a legitimate reconquest (even using the institutional terrain or, rather, being forced to use it). And even though the international situation plays against them.
13 Tel delical rep sausaior. Botherm dingasical and om april bel
point of view, we can say that the electoral result in Nicaragua has negative repercussions for the Salvadoran revolution. But we have to add immediately that this does not mean that the Salvadoran revolution has been defeated.
When talking about El Salvador it is always useful to remember that the war in this country has been going on for 10 years. The ability of the FMILN to continue a war of this nature at the same time as maintaining a big capacity for mass mobilization should be the starting point for any analysis. In the last period there have been various fundamental factors which have marked the new conditions in which the revolutionary process has been unfolding: the November offensive, the Costa Rica agreement, the Sandinista defeat and its consequences and the new round of negotiations. 14 val in government, one could sce the great political weight of the can- | The November offensive. From the very moment of Cristiani's arridona [military hierarchy] in governmental decisions. While it is true that they tried to appear ready to take part in the negotiations, in practice they were drawing up plans to destroy the urban networks of FMLN mass leaders. Through this tactic they were trying to repeat the experience of the immedi-
46 International Marxist Review ate post-January 1981 insurrection, that is the decapitation of the mass organizations, their militarization and reducing the FMN to a guerrilla force with no links with the city.
This policy was most clearly demonstrated by the murder of comrade Febe Elizabeth Velázquez, leader of the UNTS, and ten other trade-union leaders. The tandona had already selected a large number of mass leaders as targets for assassination. (It is well known, for example, that the decision to murder the rector of UCA — University of Central America, San Salvador — had been taken before the November offensive.) Accordingly, Salvadoran television showed photographs of each members of the UNTS executive committee, and at the same time mentioning their supposed political affiliation (to which of the five FMLN organizations each of them belonged) and representing them as responsible for military actions, carrying arms and so on. This shows that they were preparing an all-out offensive against the UNTS to decapitate it.
It was this (with the political tradition of the FMLN which always, when demanding negotiations or even during them, carries out military actions in order to put pressure on the discussions), which forced the FMLN to call the November offensive. Despite the fact that the tandona heard about the projected offensive, the urban networks of the FMLN and their military capacity made it possible to carry it through. The mass response to the first three days was impressive. Thousands of young people followed the call for insurrection. The popular suburbs of San Salvador organized in such a way that the FMLN leaders thought it was possible to make the final offensive.
The US advisers on the spot had the same impression. That is why it was decided to bomb indiscriminately the popular neighbourhoods. The participation of US pilots in the nightly bombings is a well-known fact. The use of the airforce radically changed the scenario of the war. With this action, the tandona forces and their advisers sought to prevent civilian organization of the insurrection.
During the days that the offensive lasted, the world witnessed the tactical capacity of the FMLN guerrillas. How, immediately after the bombings and despite the blockade, they emerged without a great number of losses; how they took the Sheraton hotel and came out of it without a single loss; how they took the bourgeois neighbourhoods (in one of the most beautiful plebeian actions of revolutionary history in any country explaining that they were taking the La Escalona barrio (the rich neighbourhood) to check if the army and the marines would bomb it in the same way as the popular neighbourhoods and how they came out without many losses. They showed that their
Central America today 47 military capacity has reached a very high point, but most of all they have shown that their relationship to the mass movement is what makes this type of movement possible.
Unfortunately, the November offensive did not get the international support it merited. The enemy will always have more military means than the revolutionaries. We know that the destiny of third-world revolutions is partly at stake in the metropolises, dependent on the ability of revolutionaries in these countries to build solidarity movements. Unfortunately, for the revolutionary movement in El Salvador and in general for the Central American popular movement, the world had all its attention centred on the tall of the Berlin wall, the "massacres" in Timisoara, the transformation of the PCI into a social-democratic party, the discussions about the end of history and so on.
Even the abominable murder of the Jesuits, including the rector of the UCA, Ignacio Ellacuria, one of the most respected ideologues of the church of the poor, did not lead to such a level of repudiation as to bring about a governmental crisis. Some years ago an action of this dimension would have immediately generated a general response of repudiation. We only have to remember the echo of the murder of the US journalist a few days before the July 19 in Nicaragua.
Despite everything, the mass movement in El Salvador, like the FMILN, did not experience this offensive as a defeat. From the offensive onwards, they have launched a series of very interesting discussions within the FMLN. We will simply give one example. Many think that it would have been vitally important to launch the offensive after a call by the UNTS for a general strike. This means the organization of the popular movement in a different way, even allowing for the formation of real popular militias.
Finally, the offensive succeeded in its original objective: to stop the possibility of a massacre ofthe leaders of mass organizations. Today, again, the UNTS leaders are acting publicly. They are carrying out a very interesting political activity of united actions with UNOC (a trade-union organization directly influenced by Christian Democracy). On the other side, this offensive provoked an initial crack within the tandona, between those who had to accept that it was not possible to maintain the original massacre plans and those who wanted to stick with them. 15 final victory aould not be achieved, a summit meeting took place i when it was already obvious tha Costa Rica. The agreement that Cristiani got there was a big success for his government. For the first time, symmetrical criteria were used to compare the
48 International Marxist Review FMILN and the Contra ("irregular forces" was the term used); there was an explicit recognition of the legitimacy of his government; and, lastly, responsibility was attributed to the FMLN for the civilian deaths during the offensive. This means he had an all-out victory.
Daniel Ortega signed this statement, surprising everybody and particularly his own comrades of the FMLN. His signature seemed to prefigure the vision of some Sandinistas that the cycle of anti-imperialist revolutions is ended. In any case, what is clear is that this signature had a very negative impact on the Nicaraguan revolutionary vanguard. In their anxiety to get recognition, by signing the San Isidro agreement the FSLN accepted a state doctrine according to which legality and legitimacy of a regime come directly from the polling stations. From this point of view, the Cristiani government is legal and legitimate because it is the result of an electoral process. According to this view, it does not matter that such a process had taken place without the participation of the most significant political force, that there is a civil war is going on, that more than 50% of the population abstained and that the votes for Cristiani only represented 20% of Salvadorans with the right to vote. Even worse, according to this view once a government is elected it can do practically whatever it wants — massacre mass leaders, assassinate progressive Jesuits, bomb the civilian population, and so on. None of this is important as long as it has been elected in the polling booths. This outlook completely confuses legality (Salvadoran legality which is deeply antidemocratic, and we should not forget that Somoza also had a legality, also had polls, and so on) with legitimacy. Unfortunately, Daniel's signature gave legitimacy to the Cristiani government and this helped it to get out of the worst moment of its crisis. Nonetheless, it is necessary to explain the conditions in which Daniel signed In Costa Rica, the Sandinista government was under more pressure than ever. They had decided to bring forward the elections within a dual perspective: the conviction that they would win and a need for recognition of its legitimacy internationally and regionally, particularly from the Bush government. The threat was obvious. If Daniel Ortega did not distance himself from the FMLN, such recognition would not be forthcoming. Recognizing the Cristiani government was the price they asked the Sandinistas to pay, and they paid it by signing. The practical result of this declaration was minimal. Even though Cristiani used it within El Salvador, the FMLN had previously made a manoeuvre that took the negotiations out of the regional sphere. They had already paved the way to have the UN general secretary take responsibility for arranging
Central America today 49 negotiations. 1O decided to use the aspect of symmetry which lavourd them as much After they learnt about the Sandinista's electoral defeat, the FMLN as possible. The proposition was the following: the elections in El Salvador should be brought forward, allowing the FMLN to take part legally in the electoral process. Of course, for this to happen, several preconditions had to be met: release of political prisoners, return of the exiles, dispersion of death squads, new electoral law, etc., while the FMLN committed itself to laying down its weapons if the result was not rigged. In order to achieve this they proposed that a very broad commission of international observers be established, as in Nicaragua.
This proposal is being discussed with the mediation of Pérez de Cuellar. The way in which the FMLN has confronted the political situation since the Costa Rica affair and the Sandinista electoral defeat has been fundamentally correct. We must simply take into consideration that in the same days that the negotiations were taking place, the FMLN carried out a military action against Cristiani's residence, provoking the admiration of the whole world. With this, the FMILN wanted to demonstrate that, despite everything, it still relains the methods that has enabled it to walk through the minefield of war and negotiations without abandoning its revolutionary goals.
Now, for the first time in a long time, there is a possibility that imperialism Cristiani's chiefs) will agree to call elections and compete with the FSLN on that terrain. In the last analysis, the Bush government is confident that — particularly considering what is happening in the rest of the world and what recently happened in Nicaragua - the FMILN will be defeated in elections and that the revolution would lose the elements of legitimacy it has. On the other hand, the possibility of an eventual electoral victory by the FMLN is obviously not seen by imperialism as the catastrophe that an insurrectional revolutionary victory would be. In this case, they would again try to establish a parallel with Nicaragua as far as the police and army are concerned, or they would even dare to not recognize the victory, depending on their view of # hat is going on in the world and relying on the supposition that the upheaval would not be too deep nor too costly. In the meantime, the FMLN is trying to win back its presence in the cities through mass mobilizations. Around 15,000 people took part in the demonstration commemorating the murder of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero. This demonstration took place despite the state of siege that exists since the general offensive and the fact that all the mass media waged a campaign of
50 International Marxist Review intimidation of the population, pointing out that the demonstration had been banned and that it would be repressed. This action is worth more than a thousand speeches about the revolutionary or petty-bourgeois character of the PMILN. The policy of the FMILN is designed to open up a space for the participation of a population suffering crisis and war; a population that, although it identifies with the FMLN, is tired of the war. If the FMLN has been able to survive and grow stronger during the last 10 years it is precisely because it has been capable of understanding the level of consciousness of the population and has known how to put forward a concrete policy that helps to raise this level of consciousness. If one goes to El Salvador today and talks with an average citizen asking who is responsible for the war, the answer is immediate: the government. This is an impressive achievement of our Farabundista brothers and sisters. 17 Am co a few months ago we could unequivocally say that the Latin
American revolutionary movement was experiencing a very favourable situation and that expectations existed of revolutionary outbreaks in several countries. What has happened in Eastern Europe, and primarily its repercussions in strengthening US imperialism, has substantially changed the relationship of forces. We want to end the report by quoting some paragraphs of a magnificent Latin American revolutionary document by Eduardo Galeano, which explains clearly and much better our state of mind:
In Bucharest, a crane is hauling away Lenin's statue. In Moscow a crowd is queueing avidly at the door of MacDonalds. Small lumps of the abominable Berlin Wall are on sale. In Warsaw and Budapest the finance ministers speak the same language as Margaret Thatcher. The same in Beijing, while the tanks flatten the students. The Italian Communist Party, the
West's biggest, announces its forthcoming suicide. The Soviets reduce aid to Ethiopia and
Mengistu suddenly discovers that capitalism is a good thing. The Sandinistas, who carried out the most beautiful revolution in the world, lose the elections. ... It seems that there is no place for revolutions except in the showcases of archaeology museums, nor is there any place for the left, except for the penitents who agree to sit at the right hand of bankers. ... (However] in Latin America, capitalism is anti-democratic, with or without elections. Most ot lis people are prsoners of need, condemned to solitude and violence. Hunger lies, violence lies: they say that they are part of nature, they make believe that they are part of the natural order. When this 'natural order' is upset the military step onto the scene, their faces masked or unmasked. As they say in Colombia... 'the cost of living goes up and up but the value ot lite goes down and down'. ...
The elections in Nicaragua were a very harsh blow, a blow as hard as the hatred of God, as the poet said. When I learnt the result I was and still am a child at the mercy of the elements.
A lost child, but not alone. We are many. In the world as a whole we are many. ...In a few months we have witnessed the violent shipwreck of a system usurping the name of socialism, which treated the people as everlasting children and dragged them by the ear.... In our time, the bureaucrats have discredited hope and have sullied the most beautiful of human
In fact — 10 the contrary of what imperialism, the oligarchy and the reactionary officialdom of the armies and bureaucrats apprentices of capitalism think — this is not the end of history; it has only just started.
* This document was approved by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth Internit ila in d ly Tne 10 st 0es as IS. 1lur an
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Notes rational at its meeting in June 1990. adventures; but I also believe that socialism is not Stalinism. ... Central America today 51
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