The Georgian
affair
THE FOLLOWING interview, originally published in Pravda on August 12, 1988, gives an idea of the discussions currently taking place among Soviet historians on some burning questions. V.V. Shuraljov, who belongs to the Marxism-Leninism department of the CPSU Central Committee, and A.P. Nenarokov, historian in the Academy of Sciences, reply to questions. The "Georgian affair" is also mentioned in the article by Antonio Moscato in this issue. The first Congress of Soviets proclaimed the fraternal union of Soviet republics based, according to Lenin's principles on "a footing of equality". Readers were right to remind us that, just before this congress, there was a worsening of the conflict in Transcaucasia. What is known as the "Georgian affair" took place. It is obviously necessary to come back to these events.
Recently, the Institute for Party History for the Central Committee of the Georgian party organized a scientific discussion on the problems of this period. The journal Saija Vostoka published an interesting article by G.K. Shvani in June 1988. But, up to now, very little has been said about the reasons for and the basis of the conflict in Georgia, which provoked vehement reactions
from Lenin. This led, moreover, to a worsening in his health.
It is clear that Vladimir Illyich attached a lot of importance to these
Yes, because in fact it was an extraordinary event: at the end of October
1922, the central committee of the Georgia party unanimously resigned.
Such a thing had never happened in the history of the party. What was the reason for this resignation? We should remember the course of events after
July 24, that is to say after the signing of the eleven basic points concerning the foundation of the new Transcaucasian Federation, (the signatories were
A. Myasnikov, N. Narimanov, B. Mdivani and S. Kirov). Formulations that were likely to satisfy all the parties involved and damp down passions had been worked out. But according to F.I. Makharadze there were mainly tactical differences on "the methods to get nearer to the masses"
reported in both 1921 and 1922 to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) "the use of war communism in peace conditions, solving the problem with the methods used in the Civil War period played a really harmful role in
The situation worsened particularly because of the desire of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, to develop an analysis and an independent evaluation as well as its critical attitude towards the pressure of the Transcaucasian committee of the RCP(B). This attitude provoked extreme irritation on the part of Stalin, who saw in it a confirmation of his the fear of vexing the nationalists could provoke a split in the party, because the 'national' spontaneity in the periphery does not work towards unity of the Soviet republics, and formal
The "explosion" took place on October 19 during the enlarged plenum of the Tiflis committee. The members of the central committee of the Georgian
CP, K.M. Zinzadze, M.S. Okudsava, S.I. Kavtaradze, and F.I. Makharadze, made statements in which they welcomed the decision of the plenum of the central committee of the RCP(B) on the foundation of the USSR, but formulated objections "on one point": the Transcaucasian Federation. They considered that it would "not be viable" in its present form, and that the new form of the Transcaucasion Federation, which was not in keeping with the July agreement, was a mistake. The members of the Georgian central committee proposed to study the possibility of the different republics entering the USSR
This was immediately considered as an "unacceptable violation of party problems...
Transcaucasia."
idea that:
separately.
132 International Marxist Review
". As Makharadze independence only contributes towards this.
The Georgian affair 133 discipline". Orjonikidze declared that the affair "would be transmitted to the Control Committee and to Moscow". He had some very insulting words of the type "the summit of the Georgian Communist Party is affected by a nationalist rot that must be eliminated straightaway" and had had "enough of taking into account old men with grey beards" (Makharadze had a beard).
In the night of October 20-21, Kote Zinzadze, Silvestr Todrija, Lado Dumbadze, Parmen Sabaschivili, Filipp Serguej Kavtaradze and Jefrem Todrija called Yenudidze the secretary of the Pan-Russian Executive Central Committee on a direct line and asked him to inform Kamenev and Bukharin:
The stalemate situation which has been created in Georgia forces us to disturb you. We ask you to transmit the following to cde Lenin: 'We are convinced that a firm decision on his part as well as yours could overcome the anarchy and disarray which are now taking on a catastrophic character'.
They informed him of the decision of the Transcaucasian committee of the RCP(B) to discharge M. Okudshava from his function as secretary of the Georgian CP and indicated the intention of the Georgian central committee to react to this by a collective resignation. The statement said:
We are placed in a situation for which we can no longer take responsibility. Given that there is no other way out, we will inform the plenum of the central committee of the Georgian
Communist Party of this tomorrow, October 21.
The communication continued:
All this is the fault of Orjonikidze, who uses persecution and intrigues as the main weapons against the comrades who do not prostrate themselves before him. It has become insupportable to live and work under his muzzle. Have we really not merited any better leader, from the Marxist and comradely point of view? Must we be the object of such despotism?
The sharp tone of this document is striking. It is really difficult to believe that these accusations against Orjonikidze, who is known as a valued companion of Lenin and who did a lot for the party, were solidly founded. What was the reaction in Moscow?
The vexing tone and the rigidity of this message are obvious and inexcusable. They explain the vehement reaction of Lenin, which we will talk about later. Stalin did not take offence because he did not practice any reticence in his own statements.
In this statement, Stalin saw above all an infraction of party discipline. It was addressed directly to the members of the central committee, going around the secretariat and transmitted openly, that is un-coded. In addition, the statement proposed to examine the problem of the separate adhesion by the Transcaucasian republics to the future union. This meant a revision of the decision of the decision of the central committee plenum of the RCP(B) of
134 International Marxist Review October 6. This was the sense in which Stalin gave his opinion to Lenin, Kamenev and Bukharin.
This probably explains the concordance of a series of phrases in the telegrams of reply from Lenin and those of Kamenev and Bukharin: surprise at the unusual tone and the fact that the communication had not gone through the secretariat of the central committee. While Kamenev and Bukharin insisted on the fact that the problem of the Transcaucasian Federation fell within the competence of the plenum of the central committee of the RCP(B) and could only be examined by that body, if it turned out to be necessary (we note that the right of the central committee of the Georgian CP to take such an initiative was not challenged). Lenin did not mention this aspect. In his telegram there is not a single world of reprobation for the position of the Georgian central committee. The emphasis is put mainly on the unacceptable tone of the statement about Orjonikidze.
Sergo Orjonikidze, whom Lenin knew well and appreciated a lot, had a tendency to "emphasize the administrative aspect". Differences between him and the leadership of the party and the Georgia soviet had already been discussed in September during Lenin's meeting with Mdivani, Okudshava, Dumbadze, Tsintsadze and obviously with Orjonikidze, whose faults as well as merits were equally well recognized by Lenin. Lenin condemned the inclination of some leaders for ill-thought-out administrative actions: this undermined the authority of the party. In his reply to the Georgian communists, Lenin wrote: I was sure that all the differences had been ironed out by the CC Plenum resolutions with my indirect participation and with the direct participation of Mdivani. This is why I resolutely condemn the abuse against Orjonikidze and insist that your conflict should be referred in a decent and loyal tone for settlement by the RCP CC secretariat which will decide, which has been handed your direct wire message.' On October 25, Machardze, Kavtaradze, Tsintsadze, Dumbadze, Sabaschvili, Okudchava, Toroschelidze, Eschba and S. Todrija telegraphed to Lenin: We sincerely regret the sorrow we have caused you by the indeed very harsh tone of our telegram on the present relations between the Georgian central committee and the Transcaucasian committee of the RCP(B) represented by comrade Orjonikidze and we assure you that it was the strained relations which led us to do this. On this point, we state that we are completely in agreement with the decision of the central committee plenum of the Georgian Communist Party of October 22. We added an insignificant correction to this: we ask the central committee of the RCP to examine the problem of the Republic's [Georgia] joining the Union, not in the framework of the Transcaucasian Federation, which does not yet have either an executive central committee nor a council of people's commissars, but separately. We consider that both the internal and external situation of Georgia require this. The Transcaucasian Committee of the RCP(B) saw in our request a breach of party discipline and reprimanded us.
In none of the following articles, letters or notes of Lenin was this demand considered incorrect or a breach of party discipline. The central committee of the Georgian Communist Party did not oppose a decision of the plenum but
Stalin started from a diametrically opposed position. He insisted to Orjonikidze that he should take severe measures, which led to passion blazing up
We intend to finish with the intrigues in Georgian and to severely punish the Georgian cen-
This point of view was expressed in the following directive:
From my point of view, we should take a resolute attitude. All traces of nationalism should
Stalin asked Orjonikidze if he had kept a copy of the Lenin's telegram to the members of the Georgian CP central committee, and he gave his own interpretation of Lenin's attitude. "He was moved, he is not pleased with the
On October 23, Orjonikidze telegraphed to Stalin: "From my point of view we should relieve them and form a new central committee."
The next day Stalin, in a coded telegram, gave his consent "the request to resign by the present Georgian central committee should be accepted", given that apparently it did not accomplish the "tasks of prompt and loyal applicaaccount, imagined "arrangements" for sending the resigned members of the
Georgian central committee to Moscow without provoking any reaction.
Makharadze could be proposed for the praesidium of the Pan-Russian central committee executive and Kavtaradze as member of the central committee executive... or something of
With this arrangement, the recall of Tsintsadze would not attract the attention of the circles concerned. The following desire illustrated the way Stalin
It would not be a bad idea to make a split in the communist nationalist faction by removing
It was because of this context of intolerance and obscenity that the situation led to serious insults and what Orjonikidze did, who slapped Kabachize after the latter had called him a "Stalinist ass". These acts were deeply unworthy asked for it to examine one point.
once more. In a coded telegram he wrote:
tral committee.
be banished from the central committee.
attitude of the Georgian nationalists."
According to him:
that sort.
acted:
Filipp.
of a communist.
tion of the directives of the RCP central committee"
These two "arrangements" were partly carried out later.
The Georgian affair 135
. Stalin, in his own
At the end of November, the political bureau of the RCP(B) sent a special commission to Georgia: F.E. Dzerjinsky (chair), D.S. Manouilski and W.S.
Mizh-kevitch-Kapsukas. During the vote on the composition of the commission, Lenin abstained mainly because Stalin had nominated Manuilski in place of L.S. Sosnovski, party member since 1904, whose political attitude
When the commission was already working and Stalin aware of Kabachidze's statement to the central control commission, he reassured Orjonikidze to check again the information on the aggressive behaviour of the Georgians and to produce an official statement about this affair signed by all those who knew about it... And then to
He recommended him "to be prudent and don't exaggerate the danger".
Mid-December, the Dzerjinsky commission forwarded to the political bureau of the central committee of the RCP(B) a report in which the political line of the Transcaucasian committee of the RCP(B) was completely approved, while the position of the central committee of the Georgian Communist Party was condemned. We read here that the accusations against
Orjonikidze were unfounded. The commission passed over in silence the statements about the atmosphere of intolerance and breach of the ethical norms. It did not interview those who made these statement; it did not even mention them. Nor did it mention the slap, although this incident was known
We know that Lenin was not pleased with the work of the Dzerjinsky communication, that the communications of its conclusion provoked 'very serithe investigation of all the material which Dzerjinsky's commission has collected must be
The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian campaign must of course be laid
Apparently he knew very well the role Stalin played in this affair.
Undoubtedly. Better still, he suspected that the commission already had a fixed position before it left Moscow. The correctness of this suspicion was later confirmed to Zinoviev in a conversation with Fotijeva. On December
12, the day following Dzerjinsky's return to Tiflis, Lenin had a conversation
Just before my illness, Dzerjinsky spoke to me about the incident and the commission's
136 International Marxist Review was more independent.
and advised him:
wait for the measures taken by Moscow.
ousfears' in him. Lenin demanded:
completed or started over again.
And he noted:
on Stalin and Dzerjinsky.
and figured among the accusations against Orjonikidze.
with him. Later, in January 1923, he told L.A. Fotieva:
The Georgian affair 137 work and this made a very painful impression on me.
On December 13, Lenin suffered two serious attacks. His illness was getting worse. It is written in the history of his illness:
With much difficulty we convinced Vladimir Illyich not to participate in any meetings and to temporanly abandon all work. Finally, Vladimir Illyich said he agreed and that he would start that very day putting some order into his affairs.
On December 14, Lenin wanted to dictate a letter on the national question and the formation of the USSR. In the night of December 15-16, his state of health rapidly worsened. When he obtained permission to dictate, on December 27 or 28, he indicated, among other themes, "dealing with the national question and internationalism (in relation to the recent conflict in the Georgian party)". On December 30, the day of foundation of the USSR, Lenin started, at the same time as the congress of Soviets was opening, to dictate his remarks on "the question of nationalities" or of "autonomy". He who devoted all his strength, all his knowledge and all his conviction to the foundation of a frateral union of the peoples of our country, condemned with all his energy and passion the idea of imposing autonomy by force, infringing on the principles of proletarian internationalism.
At the time, Lenin's notes were neither published nor communicated to the party leadership. It was only on April 16, 1923 that the political bureau of the central committee of the RCP(B) became aware of Lenin's letter. It was read to the delegates of the 12th Congress. Were Stalin and the other leaders of the central committee aware of Lenin's attitude on the outcome of the Dzerjinsky commission's work?
We can say definitely that Stalin, even if he did not know everything, made no mistake about this. He imposed, not without reason, the adoption of the communication and the commission proposals by the political bureau. On January 25, 1923, it was decided with the abstention of the majority of the members to send a special letter to the committees of goverments and regions, containing, obviously, Stalin's judgements and his version of the facts.
A characteristic detail. The day before Lenin contacted L.A. Fotieva to entrust her with requesting from Dzerjinsky or Stalin the commission's documents on the Georgian question. Together with Gorbunov and Gljasser, she was to study them carefully and prepare a report for Lenin, which he "would need for the party congress". In the secretary's diary it was noted "Undoubtedly he did not know that the political bureau would have to authorize the
138 International Marxist Review handing over of the documents."4 Up to the beginning of February, Lenin regularly asked if the documents which he needed had been handed over, and each time the reply was negative. Stalin did not forward them, referring to the political bureau. It was only on February 1 that the political bureau authorized handing them over.
On February 6, Stalin ordered Gljasser, through his secretary Nasaretjan, to immediately communicate to Lenin the letter which the central committee had sent to the committees of governments and regions following the decision of the political bureau on the Georgian affair (January 25) as well as the letter of the USSR constitution. When Gljasser reminded him that the doctors were not allowing Lenin to deal with current questions, and that the general report based on the Dzerjinsky commission's document, destined for Lenin would only be ready in three weeks, Stalin explained that one could still wait but that Lenin could only be informed about the Georgian affair in the context of the documents he had indicated.
We know that Trotsky was involved in this conflict. Why did Lenin ask him to take on the defence of the Georgian question?
The reply to this question must be sought in documents we will speak about later. For the moment we will come back again to the point where Lenin decided to examine both the "incident" and the Dzerjinsky commission documents.
When he ordered the secretaries of the council of people's commissars to prepare a report from for him on the "Georgian affair" he, as usual, formulated to the questions which interested him very precisely:
1. For what reasons was the former central committee of the Georgian Communist Party accused of deviation? 2. What was the violation of party discipline of which it was accused?
3. Why was the territorial committee of Transcaucasia accused of stifling the central committee of the Georgian CP? 4. The physical means of coercion 'biomechanics'. 5. The line of the central committee of the RCP(B). 6. The attitude of the commission. Did it simply examine the accusations made against the central committee of the Georgian CP, or also those against the Transcaucasia territorial committee? Did it examine the cases of 'biomechanics"?
7. The present situation (the electoral campaign, the Mensheviks, the repression, the misunderstanding between nationalities). 6
Lenin thus concentrated on the key questions, which were indispensable to his own judgement on the question.
On February 14, Fotieva noted:
Vladimir Illyich's instructions: make Soltz [currently member of the presidium of the RCP
(B)'s central control commission] understand that he [Lenin] lines up on the side of he who has been offended. Make it understood by one among those offended thai he is on their side.
Three elements: 1. Should not fight. 2. Should make concessions. 3. A big state cannot be
Did Stalin know this? Why did he not react? To call people 'deviationists" for chauvinist and
Menshevik tendencies indicates the same deviation in those who display great power
On March 3, Lenin received a written report from Gobunov, Fotieva and
Gljasser, and an opinion on the documents of the commission on the Georgian conflict. They had been typed to ease his work. The text had been divided into different paragraphs which had as title the different questions posed by Lenin. The reports had been noted on the right, on a broad strip that had been left blank. A number of supplementary documents directly related to the
1. A note of Fotieva, saying that, according to the informations of Soltz, the statement by A. Kabachidze, which she had asked for on Lenin's behalf, had been lost in the central committee. 2. In place of this statement had been added, on Soltz's advice, a copy of a letter from A.I. Rykov who had been witness to the incident in Orjonikidze's house in Tiflis. It is true that Rykovhad not heard what Kabachidze said but he states that the insult was of a personal character. 3. A letter of M. Okudshuva which gave an account of another very tense conversation with the leader of Transcaucasian committee of the
RCP(B). 4. A statement of K. Kabachadze, according to which Orjonikidze had proposed to him to take measures against Mdivani, whom he considered
. Personal statements in which all the accusations were rejected and called lies born out of factionalism. 6. The notes on a conversation between Fotieva and Zinoviev who was reporting the central committee vote in the absence of Vladimir Illyich: Sergo went too far, Stalin encouraged him rather than holding him back. Sergo is guilty at 20%. Without the authority of the central committee Makharadze would have the majority in the party
[that is the majority in the central committee of the Georgian CP]. A compromise took shape. We send two prestigious comrades, Kuibyshev and Bukharin or Kamenev, to their congress [of the Georgian CP]. In disagreement with
Orjonikidze's line: Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev (hesitating). The compromise: send back a section of the dissidents [who had earlier been summoned from Georgia]. Zinoviev: we must absolutely leave Orjonikidze
After he had seen these documents and had understood that his presence at the central committee plenum planned for the end of March was uncertain,
It is my earnest request that you should undertake the defence of the Georgian case in the compared with a small one.
chauvinism.?
subject had been added in appendix.
"mean-spirited"
on the spot. We can send Stalin to Turkestan for a year.
Lenin dictated, on March 5, a letter to Trotsky:
Dear comrade Trotsky,
The Georgian affair 139
It is generally thought that Trotsky, using illness as a reason, did not get at
This is not quite true. Lenin's letter was communicated to Trotsky by telephone by a collaborator of his secretariat, M.A. Voloditcheva. She noted
Trotsky's reply which was that, because of his illness he could not take on such a commitment. But Trotsky added that he hoped for a speedy recovery and asked that he besent the documents if no-one else needed them so that he he said that he did not know these documents at all, that he had spoken to Makharadze and
Mdivani and had heard Orjonikidze at the central committee plenum and that, while at first
It is worth looking more closely at what Trotsky and Glasser said during the February 1923 central committee plenum of the RCP(B).
Gljasser: Comrade Trotsky, during the discussion on the national question you said then that you had some doubts at the time the decisions on the Georgian conflict were made [at the
January 1923 plenum] now, in the course of the discussion, you are more and more convinced that this decision was incorrect and that Orjonikidze's line in Caucasus was an error.
Trotsky: I don't quite understand why you ask this question: are we making a transcription of the discussion? I said more or less: that if I had doubts on the correctness of Orjonikidze's policy, these doubts were now a hundred times stronger [after Orjonikidze's speech].
This scrap of paper, the original of which is preserved in the Lenin archives, explains why Vladimir Illyich contacted Trotsky for the Georgian affair. He was aware of his attitude at the February central committee plenum
According to a statement by Trotsky which he sent early on the morning of
April 16, 1923 to the political members, he received on March 5 a contribution dictated by Lenin "The question of nationalities or or 'autonomy'". This text was also the draft for the speech Lenin intended to make at the 12th party
For his own use, Trotsky made a copy of this article which was important from the principles point of view, and used it, in his own words, as the basis both for his proposals of modification to Stalin's theses (which the latter accepted) and for his article on the national question to be published in
140 International Marxist Review consider it a sign that you do not accept.
With best comradely greetings, Lenin.® all involved in this affair...
noted:
Have I understood you correctly?
and he could therefore count on his support.
congress.
could look at them once his state of health allowed it"
• Voloditcheva also he hesitated, he was now sure that they had made serious mistakes.
The theses in question were written by Stalin for the 12th congress. They concerned the national aspects of building the party and the state. Stalin exaggerated the danger of petty-bourgeois and Menshevik deviations in the periphery and of national liberalism in the centre. But he consciously avoided any reference to the danger of great power chauvinism, which was shown very clearly in his aspirations towards centralization and in the out and out imposition of a leadership style which was based on administrative and com-
The February 1923 plenum of the RCP(B) central committee which accepted Stalin's theses as a basis, also put the emphasis on the insufficient elaboration of the programmatic section, as well as on the absence of any reference to the very negative influence of any form of great power chauvinism on the relations between the Soviet peoples. It insisted that there should be a brief overview of the way in which the national question was resolved in practice in the party and the organs of the Soviet state. We should not that it was also the differences on the national question which contributed to poisoning the personal struggle between Trotsky and Stalin. But this is already another
How did Stalin react to Lenin's criticism? What consequences did he draw from it? On these questions there is not a unanimous position among specialists. Many people think that Stalin took seriously Lenin's indications and
This last opinion is far from the truth. Lenin did not manage to wage through to the end the struggle against the style of command and leadership in which political accusations became the juridical norm, and insults against those who had different opinions became the custom. His illness prevented him. Even though the RCP(B) central committee based itself on collective decisions and Stalin's approach to the problems of national-state building were corrected on many points. During the 1920s, and much later, Stalin clung on to the hard line, constantly accusing the others of nationalism. And
Forced by Lenin's criticisms to make compromises (accepting some members of the former central committee into the new one in Georgia, return to the republic of comrades who had been recalled, signing a special agreement which took their demands into account), Stalin settled accounts in a terrible fashion with Mdivani and the other leaders from Georgia during the 1930s.
Pravda.
mandist methods.
theme.
The Georgian affair 141 that, later, he followed them correctly.
still today the effects of his mistakes are felt.
142 International Marxist Review
In our conversation you have several times emphasized Lenin's tact and esteem towards nationalist feelings, as well as his severe condemnation of great power chauvinism. The impression could be given that Vladimir Illyich attached much less importance to the struggle against nationalist tendencies of small nations.
I have already mentioned, and we should insist again that as far as the problems of building national states and the formation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics are concerned, Lenin started from the position of socialist internationalism which is reconcilable neither with chauvinism nor with nationalism. Vladimir Illyich held strongly to the voluntary union of the republics, to the respect, in practice, of the right of nations to dispose of themselves, to the democratic solution of all questions, without commands and without using bureaucratic methods. There is no doubt about his attitude to nationalism: he took up in an irreconcilable fashion all its manifestations, in which he saw a contradiction with the humanist ideals of the socialist society and, basing himself on the principles, he made no compromise on this point. You just have to read the well-known texts of Lenin on the national question to be convinced of this.
We can say in passing that, in his conversation of September 1922 with Mdivani and other Georgian leaders, Lenin mentioned real mistakes, without making any compromises. He patiently corrected these comrades and put them on guard against an exaggeration of the nationalist aspect which could harm the community with the sister republics.
Nor should we forget another circumstance. The events we are talking about here took place at a time where a new national state organization was being created, a Union of republics, equal in rights, which should, according to Lenin, be based on "absolute confidence, absolutely free consent". It is perfectly understandable that the deviations from these principles tolerated in the Georgia conflict, made him so indignant. The fact that for a question like the formation of the Union a lot of patience and circumspection "not to spoil things, not to awake distrust, to get rid of this mistrust" were needed was totally ignored.?
The 12th Congress of the RCP(B), in 1923, set the general framework of the USSR state structure, based on the equal rights and obligations of the Union's republics, both in their relations to each other and to the central state power. The Second Congress of Soviets in 1924 adopted the first USSR constitution and thus created the Union state as a federation of sovereign Soviet republics. The voluntary character of the accord was underlined by the right to freely opt out of the Union, and equally by the right of all the republics —
The Georgian affair 143 both existing and future ones — to belong to it. Foreign policy, extemal trade, finances, the construction of the army, transport and the media were the responsibility of the Union's government. The solution of other questions was entrusted to the governments of the Union's republics. The Executive Central Committee of the USSR was made up of two equivalent chambers: the Union Soviet, elected by a congress of all the delegates; and the Nationalities Soviet, elected by delegates from all the Union's republics and the autonomous republics, as well as by the autonomous regions. The adoption of the USSR's first constitution concluded the first stage of a vast and complicated project — which was accomplished under the leadership of the Party — for the foundation and the consolidation of the Union state in the interests of all the nations and peoples in the country.
What lessons do you draw from these events? Do they have any significance for the present situation? After all, all that happened over 70 years ago.
The history of the USSR's genesis and Lenin's approach to the complex questions of national relations are undoubtedly very instructive. Obviously, today we are living in another epoch, and many of the things that previously caused a storm are now evident. Incidentally, it should be said that this convincingly proves the vitality of Lenin's principles on national policy, which have stood the test of history.
The path we have taken shows that the question of national relations always demands a great deal of attention, that Lenin's principles must be constantly preserved and developed, and that our friendship must be consolidated. Here, everything is important — from the worry over the economic progress of each republic to an increase in their contribution to the global economic complex, from the attention to social problems to the development of national cultures and languages.
It was not for nothing that the 19th Party Conference adopted a special resolution on the national question, that a plenum of the CPSU central committee was consecrated to it, that the role of the Nationalities Soviet of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was enlarged and that other measures were taken to improve our society's political system. And it goes without saying that the lessons of history are extremely useful as regards this question.
It is obviously important to restore justice to those who have suffered from the arbitrariness of Stalin. But, we repeat, the essential thing is to draw out the practical conclusions of this knowledge — whose beginnings go back to Vladimir Illyich — in order to accomplish today's tasks, and in order to con-
1. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Lawrence & Wishart, London, Volume 45, p. 582.
144 International Marxist Review
Notes
2. Ibid Volume 36, p. 610.
4. Ibid. tome 42, p. 512.
5. Ibid. tome 42, p. 514.
6. Ibid. tome 42, p. 660.
7. Ibid. tome 42, p. 662.
8. Op cit. Volume 45, p. 607.
9. Ibid. Volume 30, p. 293.
solidate this friendship between the peoples of the USSR.
3. V.I. Lénine, Euvres, tome 42, p. 512..
Vol.4, No.2
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• National question in Soviet history - Antonio Moscato
• National question in Yugoslavia - Catherine Verla
• The national question, the Ukraine - Leon Trotsky
• Stalinism, the national question, separatism - Oliver MacDonald
• Independence for Soviet Ukraine - Zbigniew Kowalewski
• Early Soviet positions, Fourth International, USSR today - Documents
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