European VAT rates), Revue du CEPI/ No. 33, 1/1988.
Daniel Lebegue quoted by Albert/Boissonnat
ERNEST MANDEL
The crisis in
leadership of the
European bourgeoisie
The bourgeois political system in capitalist Europe is exhibiting deep division, if not profound disarray. This is all the more striking, emerging, as it has, against a setting of sustained economic expansion (but for how much longer?) before the inevitable economic recession.
The break-up of the French right after the last elections is the most revealing sign of this disarray. The electoral defeat of the bourgeois parties in the last parliamentary elections in Sweden and the division between the liberalconservatives and the Social Christians after the last parliamentary elections in Belgium reflect the same tendency.
In Italy, the Christian Democracy is more than ever divided into several movements that advocate differing political tactics and strategies. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) the divergences among the three participants in the bourgeois coalition—-the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian Social Union (CSU) - have recently increased. The CDU has been tempted to move left; the FDP is espousing a neo-liberal policy; while the CSU has become increasingly discredited.
In the Spanish state, the bourgeoisie has proved to be completely unable to present a credible political alternative to the majority Socialist Party.
46 International Marxist Review
The only exception is Britain where the "Iron Lady" seems firmly in the saddle. But her recent "anti-European" escapades and the cavalier way in which her cabinet has treated the astronomical deficit in the balance of payments (which threatens to increase when the oil windfall ends) have deepened the divisions even inside the Tory Party.
The disarray then seems to be generalized. This is not by chance. The timing is not unrelated to the causes of the phenomenon.
This crisis in political leadership can be explained by the gradual change in socio-political conditions under which the European bourgeoisies have operated since the beginning of the depression of 1973-1974 and since the retreat of the workers' movement towards defensive positions and struggles after the defeat of the Portuguese revolution.
Big capital failed to grasp the changes produced in its relationship to the situation of five or ten years ago. It is even more difficult to reach a consensus on a new political orientation for the next period. Clearly the political leaders who could take on and articulate this reorientation are lacking.
Again it is in France, still the most "politicized" country in Europe, that this contradiction is most striking. Even Raymond Barre, formerly the spokesperson for the opposition to cohabitation with the Socialist Party of Francois Mitterand, has abruptly become, for lack of any other credible candidate, the leading propagandist on its behalf. A changed situation
The changes in general socio-political conditions under which the European bourgeois states and governments operate involve first and foremost the relationship of forces between classes, the political intentions that correspond to these relationships of forces, and the predominant ideological climate surrounding these intentions. (For a Marxist, this climate, while not the cause, is certainly a concomitant factor in changes of social forces and material interests.)
But these changes in Europe also relate to transformations in the international situation. Introduced into international conditions, the relationships of national social forces tend to generalize and modify the international changes which, in turn, increasingly influence so-called "national" policies.
The very fact that we live in an era of impetuous internationalization of productive forces and of big capital's mode of operation, implies that the bourgeois states, faced with multinational trusts, are increasingly powerless. The big bourgeoisie have been unable to come up with a common program with
The crisis in leadership of European bourgeoisie 47 which to confront this new situation. And this is an important factor in their crisis of political direction.! From the end of the 1970s, the European bourgeoisie had a common political orientation that corresponded to a shared judgement about the evolution of the relationship of forces between classes. They hoped to capitalize on the economic crisis, the growth of unemployment and the paralyzing fear of unemployment, to throw the working class onto the defensive and to inflict serious blows on the workers' movement. These assaults included the dismantling the social gains of the last haltcentury or more and the stratification of the working class along the lines relating to the status of protection accorded the various levels, moving downward from those protections acquired in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, through successive degrees of reduction, to a total absence of protection (the illegal immigrants being the pariahs).
The grand plan of a "dual society" had already impeded the European wage-earners in the pre-1914 period or even in the last decade of the nineteenth century—the era which the sycophants of neo-liberalism touted as the "belle epoque" of the human race and of "social progress." 2
We should point out that the Japanese, and on a more modest scale, the South Korean, "economic miracles" are in large part the result of success in the realization of such a "dual society." They are based, that is, on a superexploitation so great that it has already aroused open opposition, which will inevitably grow in the future.?
But the realization of this "grand plan" which has been clearly outlined by the neo-conservative, pseudo-liberal and pseudo- reformist (a "liberalism" that increasingly attacks democratic freedoms and a "reformism" more and more opposed to reforms) ideological offensive, requires that the relationships of social forces born of the long post-war period of "prosperity" and nearly full employment be fundamentally reversed.
Now, the traditional tenacity with which the working class has defended its past gains turns out to be "desynchronized" in relation to the predominant economic and ideological climate. This is the big difference between the period 1973-1988 and that of 1923-1939.4 At that time the gains collapsed more quickly and the relationships of forces deteriorated more spectacularly in the successive victories of fascism.
This time there is a slow erosion of the standard of living, not a brutal collapse. There is a marginal retreat of trade-union organization (more serious in France and in the Spanish state), but not paralysis. There are ups and downs in workers' combativity, but no years without important strikes. And especially,
there is a timid resistance among workers, including the most conservative, to
Under these conditions, the project of a "dual society" remains only a rough draft. Workers' resistance is gradually forming. It has even shown a tendency to harden, and the relationship of socio-political forces have not been funda-
If the bourgeoisie maintain unchanged their policy of social regression, the reaction will not be long in coming. The majority of the electorate will move from center-right to center-left. This is in the process of happening.
The differences from the 1930s can, of course, be explained by objective factors. The crisis is at this point less serious than before. Unemployment is currently less severe. Since social protection is more solid, the loss of purchasing power is smaller than before. And from these factors stem the greater
But the conclusion should not be drawn from this that in case of an aggravated economic depression, increased unemployment and loss of buying power, worker combativity would automatically experience a new decline. It could be just the opposite. In the face of fiercer attacks the workers' response may
The bourgeoisie, sufficiently expert not to exclude this last possibility, therefore hesitate to engage in a provocative political course. They badly misjudged the nature and evolution of the relations of forces. They do not want to
It is equally true that the situation of the bourgeoisie is also less serious than it was during the 1930s. Profits have not fallen to zero, far from it. The well has not (yet) run dry. The bourgeoisie have not been forced to play all of
In these conditions the risks of a socio-political crisis seem to them more serious than the danger of immediate economic collapse, particularly as the working class is not paralyzed. So they have (provisionally) put the grand neo-conservative plan onto the backburner. From this stems a progressive loss of credibility for the ideological offensive that lay behind it. But there is no alternative solution, neither for political strategy and nor for predominant
The same problems pertain in the question of the construction of the European community. The grand long-term design of the European bourgeoisie in this area has been the perfection of this structure through the realization of the
"truly integrated market" in 1992. But the internal dialectic of the capitalist economy, especially in the imperialist era and even more in its phase of late
48 International Marxist Review any attack on social security.
mentally overturned.
well be to harden in its turn.
compound that error.
its cards.
cohesion and capacity of workers' organizations.
ideology. This is at the origin of their crisis of leadership.
The crisis in leadership of European bourgeoisie 49 capitalism is implacable. There can be no true unification without at least a common currency, a common commercial (customs) policy, and then a certain minimum of common government and common budgetary resources. And that means at least a minimum degree of abandonment of sovereign power on the part of the imperialist countries that comprise the EEC When Mrs. Thatcher affirms that this is a question of "abstract principles," she is off the mark. It is a question of absolutely concrete problems which, as any honorable British gentleman knows, can ultimately be reduced to problems of pounds, shillings and pence. How can a common market in textile products be set up and protected against the competition from cheap imports (which are always by definition manifestations of "disloyal competition") from Hongkong, China, Eastern Europe and others, unless there is a common policy among the twelve states on this question? How can a common electronics market be defended against Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese "dumping" without speaking with one voice in negotiations with Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei? How does one protect the high-tech "future of Europe" without negotiating as one body with Washington and without reaching common agreement on a policy of research and industrial investments and the question of subsidies? In all these areas, "economic realism" is on the side of Mr. Delors, not that of Mrs. Thatcher. From the point of view of the interests of big capital, it is she and her shameful neo-Gaullist allies in the other countries leading the fight for absolute "national sovereignty" who are the abstract dogmatists, one, if not two, wars behind the times. The price of Europe
But just a moment. All this has a price-it can be calculated precisely, if not in pounds, shillings and pence (it has been a long time since the pound sterling was the most solid currency in the world), at least in Ecus and Deutschmarks. Let us remember how different the resources of the different member countries are, how their competitive capacity, their commercial solvency, their financial solidity, the degree of their public (not to mention their private) indebtedness, differ from country to country. These are the sharp, nasty and permanent squabbles awaiting the ladies and gentlemen who sit on the council of ministers of the EEC.
The affair of the Ecu expresses the epitome of the bourgeoisie's dilemma in regard to the European structure. No definitive consolidation of a common
50 International Marxist Review market without a common currency. But no common currency without a central European bank which must hold at least a part of the reserves of the EEC states. But these reserves, especially gold, are unequally divided among the states. And, above all, their commercial balance and balance of payments develop in ways diametrically opposed from one country to another.
In the space of just a few months, the anticipated deficit of this commercial balance in Britain in 1988 rose from £2,000 million to £15,000 million. France runs the risk of an analogous evolution, and tomorrow it may be Italy's turn.
Under these conditions would it be any surprise, then, if the FRG, which has become the foremost exporting country in the world—ahead of the United States and Japan—and which holds the largest reserves in Europe, hesitates to dedicate a portion of them to the support of the Ecu when that portion is in danger of being consumed by the commercial deficit of its principal partners? Is it any cause for astonishment that the directors of the Bundesbank, the defenders of the solidity of the deutschmark, express this reticence in the clearest tones? The European dilemma
But once again, the dilemma is real and the choice extremely difficult. The European bourgeoisie (especially the German but it goes for all) is in a real dilemma. What it hopes to gain by the budgetary and monetary plan— immediate penny-pinching gains—it stands to lose in the middle term on the commercial and industrial level.
Given the capitalist interconnections in Europe today, to stifle competition is to suffocate one's customers. It is significant that the share of exports that go to the ECC largely determines the degree of enthusiasm for the "horizon 1992": the maximum being to the Benelux countries and Italy, the minimum to Britain and the FRG, with France occupying a median position.
But even in Britain the European market is much more important today than it was thirty years ago, and there is no comparison with those of the Commonwealth countries or the United States. That is why the Churchillian ideology of "privileged relations" with the two latter no longer carries the weight that it formerly did, at least in the industrial milieu (the holders of exports of sterling capital are of another opinion). The dilemma is exacerbated by the economic depression—-to be worsened in the universally expected approaching recession—as well as by the repercussions from the change in the socio-political situation. If it is necessary to
The crisis in leadership of European bourgeoisie 51 moderate, or at least not overly accentuate the policy of austerity, then the budgetary difficulties become graver. There will be less disposable funds to finance the integrated European programme. If the economic depression deepens, the budgetary repercussions will go in the same direction. In a period of depression competition is exacerbated; the notion of "each one for himself" is strengthened; the temptation to slide back towards protectionism, not only in respect to the Third World but also the European partners, regularly resurfaces.
What course to choose? To sacrifice the present to the future, the temporary to the permanent, stop-gap formulas to grand solutions? Who would dare to decide irrevocably from among these paths and the various combinations of them? Therein lies another source of the crisis of leadership. The world context in which the European bourgeoisie operates has also changed radically from the situation of fifteen years ago. The decline of the absolute hegemony of the United States in the industrial and financial realms is irrevocable, in spite of Ronald Reagan's braggadocio.
But no other imperialist power-neither Japan nor the FRG (we are not including a "unified" Europe which is a project still only partially realized) is capable of replacing the fallen giant. Hence, the crisis in international imperialist leadership, the creeping paralysis of international conferences, the inability to react genuinely together to confront the growing dangers—all of which have repercussions on the European bourgeoisie.
Furthermore, U.S. imperialism still retains a clear superiority in the military arena, which the loss of economic hegemony will undermine only slowly and in the long term. This political superiority counts in the economic and commercial area. One has only to remember the affair of the USSR-Europe gas pipeline and that of the embargo on exports of "high-tech" to the Soviet Union, which hampered powerful Japanese corporations. What should be the response to these contradictions? Should priority be given at any price to a military presence in Europe including its "nuclear umbrella?" Is that really "effective," that is, would U.S. imperialism risk committing its own nuclear suicide in order to defend Europe? Should the U.S. blackmail of the withdrawal (or at least reduction) of its military presence in Europe be answered with counter-blackmail— the autonomous nuclear rearmament of European imperialism, built around a Franco-British nucleus?
Or rather, is it more important to concentrate on the impressive technological "refinement" of a more-or-less integrated European conventional weaponry? What would be the consequences of these different orientations both on the budgetary program and on the relationships of political forces within the vari-
ous European countries? What would be the repercussions on East-West and
How can one choose among these different variations? There is no consen-
The same observation can be made from an examination of the relations between European imperialist countries and those of the Third World. Here, too, the context is vastly different from that of 1973. On the one hand the climbing of semi-industrialized countries into the world market and, on the other hand, the debt crisis to a large extent typify these changes. Again, the
The Third World represents almost a quarter of capitalist Europe's outlets.
The policy of the International Monetary Fund brutally reduces these outlets.
But the cancellation of the debt would run the risk of provoking a bank crash or of leading to serious inflation if governments nationalized the costs of
For every question, many different answers. The world was decidedly sim-
These agonizing indecisions are aggravated by Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomatic initiatives and by the modifications-limited, but nonetheless real— they have brought to East-West relations. The myth of the "evil empire" has received a hard blow. Cold-war politics is in serious trouble. But the bour-
Could it profit from the intensification of the economic crisis inside the
Soviet Union and the Kremlin's near-desperate search for economic aid, in order to exact diplomatic and military concessions from it? Could it, on the other hand, seek a closer collaboration with Moscow, not just in order to reduce military expenditures on both sides, but also obtain through long-term commercial agreements substitute markets in the event of a serious recession in the international capitalist economy? Could the two approaches be combined, and, if so, with what weight being given to each? Once again, so many
The European bourgeoisie's crisis in direction is real. It could allow the
European workers' movement to retake the ideological and political initiative, to widen the breach, to cross over gradually from the defensive to the
But the bourgeois crisis coincides with an equally serious crisis in the leadership of the working class— crisis of which the rightward drift of social democracy is the clearest but not the only indication. Consequently, barring spontaneous explosions of mass combativity and a more rapid growth of the
52 International Marxist Review on inter-imperialist relations?
sus whatsoever on this question.
choices are difficult. cancellation. questions, so many answers. offensive.
pler in the good old days of "black and white certainties."
geois camp cannot find an alternative to this former course.
far left towards the capacity for initiative and unitary mass actions—a capacity not yet developed—this working-class resurgence will be very difficult to
The trend, nonetheless, moves in that direction, be it ever so slowly and
The instance of the struggle by the Italian group headed by Carlo De Benedetti, the
Olivetti chief, to control Belgium's Societé Générale, which is said to control a third of the economy of this country, is revealing in this regard. It has only been countered thanks to the support accorded Belgian big capital by the French group Suez.
Operations of this sort are possible in the other small members of the EEC, and even
One has only to look at historic photographs of London's East End and "dockland,"
where, at the beginning of the twentieth century in the capital of what was then the richest country in the world, children walked barefoot in the snow and the mud, to
According to a poll conducted by Asahi at the end of 1987, in response to the question, "Do you have a comfortable life?" 62% of the Japanese answered negatively.
According to an investigation carried out by the bank Taiyo Kobe during the first half of 1987, 80% of persons polled estimated that with the revenue available to them they could not meet their daily expenses. (Le Monde, 1 Sept. 1988)
In fact, this observation confirms a broader historical phenomenon. It seems that in a capitalist regime the "long waves" of the class struggle have been separated from the economic "long waves," and that the former are at least partially autonomous, out
Britain may have to pay dearly, through a pronounced technological lag, for Mrs.
achieve in the short term.
Notes
1.
in the Spanish state.
2.
3.
4.
of phase with the latter.
5.
paced ever so differently from country to country.
comprehend this "paradise" of yesteryear.
Thatcher's refusal to participate in European space projects.
TBIE
E89
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