The Significance of Gorbachov

by Ernest Mandel · International Marxist Review Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1987 · pp 8-42 · 15,261 words

This article was cut at the top of the page the printed contents gives it, because its headline could not be found in the machine-read text. Its opening may carry the end of the article before it.

The significance of

There are two mistaken views of Soviet reality prevalent in the West.

The first presents the Soviet Union as a frozen and totalitarian society.

The control of the bureaucracy over all areas of social life creates almost tegrating everything into its system including the black market, corruption, crime, economic dysfunctions, the attraction of the Western model of consumption. The apoliticism of the population is the ultimate proof of its success. Because of this, the system is capable of going on reproducing itself indefinitely. A good number of right-wing "dissidents' would go even further in this assessment, which is shared by most bourgeois

The second vision presents Soviet society as essentially in movement.

Economic progress, the rise in the standard of living and the increasing skills of the workers explain both the lack of popular political opposition and the constant pressure for progressive reforms, which the bureaucracy cannot avoid for ever. Since Stalin's death in 1953 successive waves of reforms have been on the agenda. These are bringing the Soviet Union closer and closer to the model of socialist society envisioned by Marx and

Lenin. The Gorbachov reforms are viewed as only the last in a long series;

demonstrating the vitality and basic health of the society. The course of

This second view is not only prevalent within the pro-Soviet Communist

Parties. It is also increasingly present among Eurocommunists and within a growing wing of European social democracy, partieularly the Social

Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany and the British

An objective analysis of Soviet reality and its evolution over the last thirty years leads to the conclusion that both these views are mistaken. They do not take into account the nature and the contradictory development of

ERNEST MANDEL

Gorbachov total immobility and

'Sovietologists'

Labour Party.' stability. The bureaucracy has succeeded in inradical reforms and democratization is irreversible.

Soviet society, which is precisely a product of the combination of

The movement results from the economic and social growth, which is impressive over the long term even if this is slowing down year by year.

This growth has profoundly changed the country from what it was in 1940,

The immobility results from the bureaucratic stranglehold on the state and society as a whole. This is an obstacle to future growth. It deprives the country, particularly the working masses, the youth, the creative intelligensia, women, the national minorities and the 'new poor' of a good

This is the contradiction which is today dominant in the Soviet Union.?

This is what determines its immediate future. This is what explains the concern, the worry, indeed the anguish of the Gorbachov team, of which we can make a balance sheet after two years experience. This is at the root of both its populist demagogy in favour of 'radical reforms' and its failure to to implement them on a sufficient scale to give a new spurt to economic

1) The Contradictory reality of the Soviet Union

Since the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union has gone through a real crisis of the regime. The most superficial observers have been struck above all by the superstructural phenomena which reflect this crisis: the aging and unchanging leading figures at every level; growing immobility faced with political choices; increasing rigidity and ineffectiveness of the dominant ideology. The more serious critics relate this to the crisis of socio-

The most striking manifestation of this crisis of the regime is the

Slowdown in economic growth. The fall in the growth rate has been regular from one five-year plan to the next over the last 20 years.

Far from increasing growth in popular consumption, the slowdown in

8 International Marxist Review dynamism and immobility.

1950 or even 1960.

share of the fruits of past growth.

growth and progress towards socialism.

A real crisis of the system

Average growth in Soviet national income:

Annual by five-year plan

1951-55 11.2%

1956-60 9.2%

1961-65 6.6%

1966-707.75%

1971-75 5.75%

1976-80 4.75%

1981-85 3.5%

----- pull-quotes on this page -----

economic structures which is hitting Soviet society?

economic growth is being caused by an even clearer slowdown in con-

Rate of annual growth of consumer spending per head of the population

(From G. Shroeder, 'Soviet living standards' in Soviet economy in the 80s,

The most dramatic expression of this slower rate of growth is the quasistagnation in cereal production particularly animal feed, which for years has made the USSR dependent on massive imports of agricultural products from capitalist countries (Argentina, Canada, USA, France and

For the same reason the effects of the long depression of the international capitalist economy on the Soviet economy have increased. The export products of the USSR (essentially gold and oil) have been subject to violent price fluctuations. The necessary resources for importing hightechnology goods are not automatically ensured. The depression is stimulating imperialist rearmament, which is in turn increasing pressure on the use of the resources available for the economic growth of the

USSR. On both the objective and subjective level we therefore find ourselves facing a really combined crisis of capitalism and the system of

The fall in the economic growth rate poses an awful problem for the bureaucracy; the impossibility of reaching the three goals set by the bureaucracy since Khrushchev: maintaining a high level of investment;

improving the masses' standard of living more or less constantly even if at a modest rate; continuing the arms race with American imperialism.

The more the growth rate falls, the more one or more of these targets risks

Technically, the fall in the growth rate expresses the regular increase in that function which is the equivalent in the Soviet economy to that which we call the 'capital coefficient' in the capitalist economy. The investment sumer spending:

in the Soviet Union.

Global consumption

Goods including:

foodstuff non-durables durables

Services including:

foodstuffs education health

Part II.)

Australia).

bureaucratic rule.

having to be sacrificed.

1966-70

5.1%

5.4%

4.3%

7.1%

9.1%

4.3%

5.8%

2.9%

3.2%

The significance of Gorbachor 9

1971-75

1976-80

2.9%

2.2%

2.8%

2.1%

1.6%

1.0%

3.0%

3.1%

10.05%

5.4%

3.0%

2.5%

3.4%

4.6%

1.5%

1.6%

1.4%

1981 1.8% 1.8% 1.4% 2.1% 1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 1.3% -0.2%

mass necessary to increase the national income (material production) by

1% increases from one five-year plan to the next. This is caused in the last analysis by the growing non-utilisation of the material resources resulting from the general malfunctioning of the economy, as well as by

The concentrated result of this malfunctioning is summed up in Andropov's succinct phrase and repeated by Gorbachov: a third of the paid

Contrary to what is claimed by technocrats East and West, this is not due mainly to workers' 'laziness' or 'lack of drive' (Stalin put it more crudely: sabotage), but to the generalised waste engendered by

This is characterised by an irregular flow of raw materials; a lack of balance between production on the one hand and the transport and the distribution system on the other. This is partly caused by decades of insufficient investment in these last two areas; a lack of spare parts and many related problems; a gradual aging of the machinery; chaos in prices and

The main problems of the Soviet economy, criticised by Gorbachov himself in his report to the plenum of the Central Committee on 11 June

1985 were: technological backwardness, the low quality of many industrial products (these two factors leading to 'the low level of competivity of Soviet products, including machines, in the world market 4 return on generally excessive and for a long time unfinished (frozen) investment, unbalanced planning, chronic wastage of energy and raw

A report drawn up the the Polish Academy of Sciences (quoted by the

British weekly The Economist, 6th July 1985) calculated average spending on energy (in coal kilogram equivalents) and on steel products (in steel kilogram equivalents) for every 1000 dollars of the gross national product

(*These figures are not really comparable: the manufacturing industry plays a smaller role in the formation of the GNP in these countries than

Gorbachov summed up these criticisms in a swingeing attack against the materials.

Country

USSR

GDR

Czechoslovakia

Hungary

Britain

West Germany

France

Switzerland

10 International Marxist Review the low productivity of human work.

work hours in the USSR are wasted.

bureaucratic mis-management.

bonuses; decouraging technical progress; etc.

in the other countries mentioned.)

(at the official exchange rate) for the years 1979-80:

Energy

1.490

1.356

1.290

1.058

820

585

*502

*371

4, the low

Steel products

135

132

*42

*26

steel ministry: '50 billion roubles have been invested in 15 years. Most of this has been allocated to building new capacity, which is still not finished, while the technical re-equipping of the enterprises has been neglected.

Because of the faulty policy of the steel ministry and the minister, comrade

Kazanets, this sector has not been able to attain its target in either the 10th or lith five-year plan. The situation which has developed requires a

The Soviet backwardness in use and distribution of computers in some ways sums up the scientific, technical, economic, social and political pro-

We can hardly talk about the Soviet Union lagging behind the United

States, Europe or Japan in the field of pure scientific research. Soviet mathematicians are among the best in the world. Vladimir Gurevich stated on 20 January 1985 on Radio Moscow that the Societ Union was producing the most advanced super-computers in the world at Severodenetsk. We do not know if this was a boast but in itself it is not impossible.

However, there is a huge gap between the project, building prototypes, the first tests, and the regular production or the generalised use. In this field the backwardness of the Soviet Union is striking, undeniable and full of problems. The only type of computer to which the enterprises, administration, schools have access in practice-and even here we should not overstate the case—is that called of the third generation. The production of what is called the fourth generation-general in the West-has hardly begun. Only 32% of the big enterprises (employing more than 500 people)

have a computer, while the comparable figure in the USA and Japan is almost 100%. Although the current five-year plan planned an annual production of software(computer programs) of 2.5 to 3 billion roubles, real production in 1983-84 reached hardly 1% of this figure.

On average these computers are only used 12 hours per day, against a

The mass introduction of computers into schools is a burning necessity in order to prepare the young Soviet generation for the generalised use of this new work and research tool. Given the insufficient production in the the Soviet Union itself, and the limited export capacity of the GDR, the

Soviet authorities have approached British and American firms with a view to importing 'personal' computers of the Apple Macintosh or IBM

PC-AT type. But the Soviet Union is estimated to be 10 to 15 years behind the United States and 5 to 10 years behind the British and Japanese in the

There is an even greater delay as far as their use is concerned. At the beginning of the 1970s, there was a widely-held idea in the Soviet Union and the GDR that the planned economy was much more suited than the radical change'

The computer test case blems facing the Soviet Union.

scheduled use of 18 to 20 hours per day.

quantity and quality of computers widely distributed.

The significance of Gorbachor 11

capitalist economy to the use of computers for planning and managing production, investment or economic life as a whole. Projects for a central unified system of information on the whole of the national economy of the

Soviet Union were drawn up. Today, Soviet philosophers, economic managers and apparatchniks must be very disappointed. The generalised and rational use of computers in managing the enterprises and the national economy has come up against numerous and, it seems, growing

Certain of these difficulties are of a technical nature, but difficult to eliminate in the short or medium term: insufficient infrastructure (particularly the telephone and telecommunications system), lack of electronic technicians and particularly software specialists, difficulties in justifying the advantages of using computers in financial or productivity terms (the introduction of computers does not lead to the elimination of mechanised

But the main difficulties are socio-economic and socio-political. The generalised use of computers presupposes clarity and unimpeded dissemination of information, which is guaranteed within capitalist enterprises by private property. Its extension to the whole of the national economy does not automatically flow from the functioning of the market

Within the Soviet economy, given the bureaucracy's material interests in getting the maximum possible resources for the minimum possible goals for the plan, not only is open information between the enterprises and the higher bodies not assured, it is practically excluded. It is even limited within one enterprise. The bureaucratic management system works largely on the basis of wrong information, as is recognised by all those concerned.

That is what the former Hun fran Cony How can a seed noras puter system be used 'rationally' in these conditions? The bureaucratic

Alongside the socio-economic difficulties there are the socio-political difficulties. The personal computer normally has a printer attached, that is, a printing machine which can play the role of a small offset or duplicator. Millions of personal computers in the schools, universities and enterprises would thus be so many samizdats, so many publications avoiding censorship. What a nightmare for the KGB, what a godsend for perate thy corn and natal canise viche gories which is rest the own opinions on real life in a workers' state, as Marx and Lenin expected

If imperialist propagandists look down on the Soviet Union, which today contains one quarter of the science graduates and almost half the engineers in the whole world, although considerably behind the imperialist countries from a technological point of view, their malicious pleasure, their

Schadenfreudeis is much too hasty. These scholars, these engineers, the

12 International Marxist Revien difficulties.

economy S and defended their right so to do.

or even manual accounting or clerical departments).

management system itself seems to be an obstacle.?

skills and culture of the Soviet workers are facts, and impressive ones.

Those who do not understand that do not understand the reality of the

It is the immobility and the stranglehold of the Soviet bureaucracy which prevents this enormous potential being realised for the good of international socialism and of humanity as a whole. If the Soviet masses throw off this straightjacket, the world will change as rapidly and dramatically as it did in the ten days that shook the world in October 1917.

The crisis of the system is as obvious in the social field-social relations as a whole-as in the strictly economic field. A whole series of the relations that Stalin and even Khrushchev had tried to freeze have gradually relaxed or even decomposed under the combined effect of the frustrations provoked by the lack of self-determination, of self-management and of liberty, and the attempt to substitute individual or small group solutions

Thirty years of almost uninterrupted increase in the standard of living of the workers' and collective farm workers, although at a very slow rate, have been accompanied by a scandalous backwardness on social allocations. The result is the appearance of a wide-spread layer of 'new poor' in the country. Tens of millions of people, including invalids, disabled, widows, single mothers (they are still called 'deserted wives' in the

USSR), alcoholic down-and-outs, youth on the fringes of society, are livevidence, brings about demoralisation, a sharp rise in alcoholism, the crime rate, and, to a lesser extent, drug use. Realistic estimates put this section of society at more than 30 million people; including the children that is 20% of the Soviet population. Their income barely reaches 50 roubles per month, while a workers' salary is 200 roubles per month.

Alcoholics and criminals do not only emerge from among the poor and the 'marginals'. They are also the products of the wide-spread feelings of frustration, dissatisfaction, the lack of perspective which can only be fed by the generalised lack of sincerity, the lies and cynicism which

The growing crime rate also feeds off the almost universal corruption which, under Brezhnev, had begun to show even at the summit of the the bureaucratic management of the economy, the 'privileged relations' the (tolkach) middlemen, the system of blat ("pull') that try to overcome

The low quality of consumer goods, the slowness of the official distribution and allocation system, the insufficient supplies are in part corrected by the black market, semi-legal trade and 'moonlighting', which also obworld today.

A slow decomposition of traditional social relations for the lack of collective solutions.

ing well below the bread line.

characterise social life.

bureaucratic pyramid.

the vacuum left by the non-functioning of the plan.

The significance of Gorbachor 13

° This "marginalisation', on all the

1° It is further stimulated by the dysfunctioning of

viously help to increase incomes. The whole thing wallows in a climate saturated with the search for individual advantages, money, indeed individual enrichment. The official ideology which talks about 'material in-

2) A society which is beginning to become conscious of the

Alongside the deepening objective contradictions, what is most characteristic of the evolution of the Soviet Union over the last few years is the gradual reappearance of a consciousness of the crisis in different sections of society. We are seeing a real public opinion taking shape in this

This is of course an opinion fragmented into different social minimilieus. There is no overall vision of the social ills. Such a vision could only be political, and Soviet society continues to be marked by a real depoliticisation, product of more than 60 years of bureaucratic

Nevertheless, the reappearance of a public opinion independent from the

Kremlin high-ups is a major change in the situation. It is in part a product of the crisis of the system itself. It also corresponds to the long-term consequences of the disappearance of the terror, the wearing away of the

, the slow easing-up of repression of the mass of the population, except for political opponents against whom repression has increased since

This has resulted in exercising a certain pressure within the higher layers of the brueaucracy themselves through intermediary groups and

We can very schematically distinguish the following 'social minimilieus' which have given a more or less open expression to the

Their number has grown considerably during the 1970s and 1980s. This distancing from the 'party line' has been manifested among social science researchers (philosophers, sociologists, historians, economists), writers, stupid and ignorant censorship, these dissonances and demonstrations of non-conformism have appeared in a growing number of articles in reviews and book, even outside the samizdat and the 'wild' exhibitions of non-

Themes once considered taboo have been cautiously evoked, including the transition to communism, the nature of economic equality, the 'conclasses and social groups with different interests, the weight of these dif-

14 International Marxist Review terest' is obviously not unconnected.

crisis country.

dictatorship.

fear'

1968 sub-sectors.

a) The non-conformist intellectuals theatre and cinema people 12 figurative art.

tradictions within socialism' phenomena of social uneasiness and discontent.

, painters and sculptors. Despite the heavy,

', the existence within the Soviet Union of

ferent interests on daily social behaviour and even on political decisions, the existence of poverty in the Soviet Union, the history of the first months of the Soviet regime seen through the archives of the period, that is to say

In general only accessible to specialists and distributed in small numbers—as is also the case for the non-conformist novels and short stories such as those of Trikhonov-these products of artistic and literary creation or scientific research independent of the nomenklatura have begun little by little to change the intellectual climate of the country.

Stalinist monolithism was dead long before the sensational 'opening up'

The decomposition of this monolithism does not in any way imply an automatic return to the golden age of Soviet art and science of the 1920s.

The thorough discrediting of communism, socialism, and Marxism by its transformation into a state doctrine (or even a state religion), the overall balance sheet of the Stalin and Brezhnev eras, and the gap between reality and the official ideology, which seems completely lying, continue to have a deepgoing effect. In these conditions the diversification of thinking feeds as many backward, mystical-religious, Slavophile, pan-Slavist, chauvinist, racist, anti-Semitic, or, on the fringes, outright fascist

, as it does liberal or left or right-wing social democratic, anarchist or authentic communist (oppositional) currents. We can mention among the latter the social-democrat Yuri Orlov, now an emigre, and the oppositional communists who published an Appeal to Soviet Citizens in

It would however be premature to conclude from this that, in the case of the eruption of broad masses onto the political scene, all these currents would share more or less equally the favours of the wage-earners who today constitute the big majority of the population of the Soviet Union. Ideas are going to pass through the sieve of social interests, above all material interests, whether consciously or instinctively grasped. It is not very probable in these conditions that Solzhenitsyn's apologies for tsarism-to take just one example-will have much echo in the working class or among the

Sometimes this original thought even percolates into the official ideology. Thus, under the anodine title of 'Methodological problems in

Marxist-Leninist Sociology' (Voprossi Filosofii, 1986, No 8), the director of the Sociology Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, V.N.

Ivanov, emphasises the different interests of different social classes and groups in the Soviet Union, who retain their specificity-and thus their

This discontent of a section of intellectuals, indeed their sometimes dar-

, have undoubtedly come into play since the end of the

Brezhnev era, in the sense of the 'unfreezing' and the "liberalisation' which have been shown since the beginning of the Gorbachov era.

without flagrant historical falsification.

of the Gorbachov era.

currents 13

1986.

mass of the intelligentsia.

opposition-even if they come together 'overall'.

ing initiatives

The significance of Gorbachov 15

b) The young technocrats and their ideological transmission belts

The dysfunctioning of the economy has become so striking that at least a section of young cadres in the enterprises cannot avoid thinking critically and making proposals for reforms. The plan/market relation or, which comes down to the same thing, the bureaucratic despotism/law of value relation, the fundamental contradiction of the economy, has been present in official thinking, without mentioning potentially oppositional thought, since the start of the Stalinist era. We see from time to time attempts to express this contradiction. There was a new start to this discussion at the

The purpose of this discussion has been more or less the same for a

(economic growth) to intensive industrialisation, given the exhaustion of existing reserves. Moreover, O. Lacis did not hestitate to recall (Kommunist No 13, 1986, pp 32-41) that the terms of the discussion and the proposals put forward have hardly changed from those advanced by Nemchinov, Kantorovitch and Novochilov around 1964. He could have also

The difficulty is not the lack of a diagnosis, but applying the remedies in a systematic manner on a broad scale, in the economic system as a whole, without too much incoherence or too many contradictions. Partial reforms are not enough for this. It is the whole of the 'economic mechanism' which must be turned upside down. This thorough shake-up is impossible without a parallel shake-up of the political system. The economist Tatiana Zaslavskaia and her 'Novosibirsk report'- under the auspices of the academician Aganbegian, who became one of the main advisers of Gorbachov-played a key role among the ideologues of the young technocrats oriented towards a radical reform of the Soviet economy. But the failure of the Liberman reforms in the 1960s and the

Kosygin reforms of the 1970s led them to be very prudent-and very vague-about practical proposals, which stands in contrast to the clarity

Through the effects of very different demographic dynamics, the Soviet

Union is becoming a federal state in which the Russian people will soon

Brezhnev reacted by a dual approach, on the one hand developing internal colonisation, which increases national oppression, and on the other develop in abe day tal on Russian atonatues, in ract of the rat-

That national oppression and discrimination exist-and are increasing-in the Soviet Union cannot be doubted given the following facts. According to the official statistics, the print run of daily newspapers in Russian is 3.5 times greater than those of the daily papers in all the other

: hutinal Marxist Revien' beginning of the 1980s.

quarter-century: the need added Kosygin's proposals ten years later.

of their diagnosis.

c) The non-Russian nationalities only be a minority of the citizens.

them into the defence of the status quo.

to pass from extensive industrialisation

16 The bureaucratic top level under

The significance of Gorbachov 17 languages spoken in the Soviet Union although these concern 50% of the population. Of the books published in the Soviet Union, only 18% of their print run in in non-Russian languages, again for 50% of the population. In the Soviet Socialist Republic of the Ukraine, 70% of the books and pamphlets published are in Russian while only 20% of the population in this Republic have Russian as their native language.

There have been many reactions to these manifestations of national oppression. In particular there was the attempt to suppress the principle of 'unilingualism' in the administration of the Soviet Socialist Republics, except for the Republic of Russia, which took shape during the last constitutional revision. These reactions have mainly been among indigenous intellectuals and students in the Baltic Republics, in Ukraine, in the Caucasian Republics and in certain Central Asian Republics (where we are also seeing a renaissance of Islamic fundamentalism). The most virulent reaction was in Georgia through mass demonstrations at the time of the last constitutional revision. d) The rebellious youth

Although less developed than in Western Europe, the United States and China, expressions of cultural rebellion among young people began to be seen in the Soviet Union towards the end of the 1970s. They were particularly concerned with popular music, jazz and pop songs. Some of these demonstrations had (and retain) a quasi-political character, insofar as they imply a constant clash with the censorship if not its open rejection.

Contemporary technology plays an important role in this rebelliousness—partiacularly the habit of making cassettes with the aid of tape recorders often imported from abroad. In the SSR of Estonia, the reproduction of Finnish radio and television programmes has taken on the scope of a real 'domestic industry'.

The most typical case of this youth cultural rebelliousness was the poetsinger Vladimir Vysotsky, who died in 1980 at the age of 42. He had become the idol of Russian youth. His songs played a similar role to that of the protest songs of Joan Baez or Bob Dylan in the USA of the 1960s. They were increasingly repressed and banned by the authorities-to be reproduced illegally by young people. The day of his funeral, 15,000 people gathered at his graveside, despite the KGB's attempts to conceal its whereabouts and forbid people to go there.

Alongside these 'libertarian' rebels there are also young conservative thugs, similar to British skinheads, including the Lyobersists in Moscow. They are said to be manipulated by conservative groups within the KGB. They are opposed by other gangs of youth, including physically, to such an extent that on 22 February 1987, the school authorities called on Moscow parents not to allow their children to go out during the weekend, so that they would not get caught up in these fights.

18 International Marxist Review e) Ecology activists

The ecological approach has gradually spread among certain layers of intellectuals, timidly supported by a small number of local state and party cadres, and some groups of citizens. The writer Zalyguin is the most prominent representative. He already made himself noticed by his campaign against the industrial chemical pollution of Lake Baikal (this is the biggest fresh water reserve in the Euro-Asian land mass). He has again taken the lead in the fight against the project of diverting the Siberian rivers Ob and Irtych towards the south. The goal of this project was to increase cereal, rice and cattle feed production in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by at least 35 million tons per year. Up to the 27th Congress of the CPSU this project was maintained despite the protests of ecologists. At the end of the congress it was mysteriously abandoned, without a vote or discussion being taken at the congress itself."

Zalyguin took up this question again during the 6th Writers' Congress of the FSSR of Russia. His speech was reproduced in Literaturnaya Gazeta of 18 December 1985. He won a significant success, taken further by the Gorbachov team which made a sharp attack against the minister who had made the proposal. '

But it is obviously the Chernobyl catastrophe and its regional-that is national/Ukrainian-implications which has made the biggest contribution to provoking wide-spread public opposition on ecological questions. At the time the Ukrainian press mentioned the fact that it was wished to speed up the opening of the Chernobyl plant at the cost of the security measures. It is significant that the criticisms and denunciations of this had been published in the press before the catastrophe, without appropriate measures being taken as a result! '9 f) Feminist activity

The difficult situation of the vast majority of women in Soviet society is above all the result of the difficulties in buying food and the lack of child care centres. But it is also a reflection of obvious sexist discrimination. For example, although women were 27% of the delegates at the 27th CPUS congress, only 7 women were able to speak there-that is 8% of the speakers list as a whole. Fifteen women were elected to the Central Committee composed of 307 members, that is less than 5%. Not one single woman was elected to the Political Bureau of 12 full members and 7 candidate members. One woman was elected the the Secretariat, without being a member of the Political Bureau. Adding it all up that makes one woman (less than 4%) among the 26 people at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid.

A feminist sensibility is gradually becoming visible in the Soviet Union. Its first appearance was throught the samizdat by Leningrad women entitled Women in Russia at the end of 1979.2° This publication had a broader popular success than foreseen, in any case, more than other samizdat publications. The collection contained significant information on the

work, wage and living (including in prison) conditions for woman, as well as poetry. Among the authors were socialists like Tatiana Mamonova who, without considering herself Leninist, does not reject the Leninist tradition, and deeply religious and anti-Marxist women. The group suffered severe

The revelations of Women in Russia were sensational. There are precise figures on the 'second (domestic) work day for women'; on the fact that there are only 1.5 million creche places for a population of 270 million;

on job discrimination in the machine-building industry (70% of the women in this industry are in non-skilled jobs, only 1.3% of the women employed there have a post that carries some sort of responsibility; on the dreadful conditions for abortions in one hospital in Arkangel, etc.

There was a spectacular expression of this rise in consciousness at the congress of the Union of Soviet Women on 30 January 1987, notably in the speech by Valentina Tereshkova, summarised by the French daily

Liberation (3 February 1987). According to this report most Soviet women still do tedious and unskilled manual jobs. They waste hours every day queuing for low-quality products and doing housework which in itself constitutes a second working day. The report criticises the lack of creche and nursery places, the lack of health safeguards, responsible for the rise in contagious diseases among children and the rise in infant mortality which is twice the rate of the advanced capitalist countries.

There has not been a wave of workers' strikes and demonstrations comparable to the rebellious activities of the social milieus we have just detailed. But it would be wrong to conclude that the working class was satisfied with the Brezhnev regime or that it held back from reacting to the accumulation of problems resulting from the growing crisis of the system.

The behaviour of the working class was above all a result of the shift in the relationship of forces in the workplaces in the workers' favour. This resulted from a long period of full employment?' combined with slow but constant improvement in the standard of living. The result was a growing pressure within the enterprises against stepping up work speeds, overtime

(particularly unpaid overtime), the lack of security and hygiene, the high number of work accidents, manipulation of bonuses, etc.

ject we can talk about a broad workers' resistance often crowned with

The improvement in the standard of living slowed down considerably after 1975, or more or less disappeared as far as good-quality food was concerned (food still accounts for almost 2/3 of the consumer spending of the Soviet worker). This is clear from the figures below drawn from the repression in 1980.

g) Workers' resistance

The reality is more complex.

success.

Soviet Union's official annual statistics.

The significance of Gorbachov 19

22 On this sub-

These figures take on their full significance when we know that the

Soviet thinkers consider that the needs of the population, and its purchasing power, is 75kg of meat per year per person (V. Tichonov in Voprossi

Certainly, with a consumption of 3400 calories per day per person, the

Soviet Union has reached the levels of food consumption of the imperialist groups and levels of income). But Soviet food is still far too strongly dominated by carbohydrates (bread, potatoes) and too little meat, milk, fresh fruit and vegetables. Animal products only furnish a quarter of the daily protein intake, compared with a third in Western Europe and in the

It is true that for domestic electrical products, the Brezhnev era was

But in this field, the low quality and the difficulty of getting rapid repairs plays an analogous role to the lack of supplies of good-quality foodstuffs.

In both fields, the workers' reaction has been a growing use of 'do-ityourself: moonlighting and the black market. From Soviet sources we estimate that from 17 to 20 million people provide services as an auxiliary activity, usually outside work hours. Izvestia (19 August 1985) the 'value' of these services as 5-6 billion roubles per year while the turnover of the state enterprises in the service sector was 9.8 billion roubles in 1984. According to the review EKO (NoS, 1985) 60% of spending on maintaining or repairing private cars goes through the black market. 23

Workers' resistance and their discontent is therefore increasing both as producers and as consumers. They aspire to a standard of living comparable to that of the proletariat in the imperialist countries, from which

The fact that this discontent does not yet take very collective or active

20 International Marxist Review

Meat/fat

Milk and milk products

Eggs (in units)

Fish/derivatives

Fruit

Wirelesses

Black/white TVs

Refrigerators

Washing machines

Vacuum cleaners they are still far removed. 24

Food consumption per head in kgs per year:

1964

251

124

12.6

28 most industrialised 'people's democracies' marked by more consistent progress:

Household equipment in units per 100 families:

1965

1975

56.7

366

216

16.8

1975

1980

1984

57.6

60.4

317

314

239

256

17.6

17.5

1984

The significance of Gorbachor 21 forms does not mean that it will not be expressed. The rapid increase in the number of critical letters sent to the daily newspapers is an indication of this. The number of these letters offically noted by the three dailies Pravda, Izvestia and Trud rose from 300,000 in 1955 to 720,000 in 1960, 1.14 million in 1965, 1.26 million in 1970, 1.47 million in 1975 and more than 1.5 million at the beginning of the 1980s. 25

These letters sometimes touch on political and institutional criticism. Zhores Medvedev signalled that the Political Bureau, the Central Committee and other organisms were inundated by thousands of letters denouncing instances of corruption after Andropov's first public allusions to this scourge. In the same way the Politburo began to receive thousands of protest letters about illegal interventions by the police, and as the Politburo committed itself in December (1982) to reply to workers' letters. it was forced to reconsider its own tactics. '26 3) The scope and limits of the first Gorbachov reforms. "Things have got to change'. All those in the Soviet Union who think with their own heads are unanimous in their opinion. There are many more of them than the Alexander Zinovievs would let it be understood with their myth of a 'homo sovieticus' who is definitively conformist. For the moment there is no perspective of a change from the bottom up. It is thus the wait for a change from the top which polarises the hopes of intellectuals and technocrats in these conditions.

The expectation of big reforms was not rapidly disappointed. On 17 May 1985, after two sessions of the CPSU Central Committee entirely devoted to this problem, the 'measures against alcoholism and drunkenness' were promulgated, which were to take effect from June. Alcoholism is a terrible scourge in the Soviet Union which, according to the Academy of Sciences, aftects 40 million people. Its effects on the economy (absenteeism) and on public health are disastrous. It is undoubtedly the primary cause of the fall in the average life expectancy which has appeared in the Soviet Union alone among all the industrialised countries in the last few years (the other causes are the bad food, the backwardness in use of modern medicines, and the increasingly obvious decline in the quality of health care)." It is therefore in the obvious interest of the bureaucracy to try and act. The big income that the state gets from the sale of alcohol certainly does not compensate for the losses caused by the curse of alcoholism.

The measures taken are of an administrative and repressive nature: a ban on serving alcohol in cafés, canteens and restaurants before 2pm and after 8pm; steep price rises; increased production of mineral waters and fruit juices; massive reduction in future production of vodka; crack down on home distillers; heavier sentences for drunken driving and absenteeism due to drunkenness, etc. But for the time being the effects of these efforts

are still modest. The population generally shares the scepticism of the Le

Monde Moscow correspondant, who wrote in the 7 June 1985 issue:

Despite the full-blown press campaign, Soviet daily life has not yet changed.

The tightening up will perhaps be gradual. After the repressive measures will come the automatic effect of the reduction announced in alcohol production.

But for the time being, the habits are still well implanted, as pointed out by the magazine Ogoniok. One of its writers has had the experience in a restaurant.

He ordered tea. The waiter smiled, appreciating the joke; 'In a bottle or a

At the same time, from his arrival in power, Gorbachov relaunched the campaign of violent repression against corruption and 'economic crimes' started under Andropov, which Chernenko had rather allowed to decline.

This consists of severe cuts in the ministries of the Union and of the

Republics, among the cadres of the commercial enterprises in particular, the entrepreneurs and the middlemen of the 'parallel markets' (the black

However, what marks these reforms is that they are a struggle against

'bureaucratic excess' by typically bureaucratic methods: decrees, administrative measures, repression, punishment. The state should act more ruthlessly, its organs should act more ruthlessly, that is to say the police should act more ruthlessly, to strengthen discipline, this is how we can sum up the social and political philosophy of Mikhael Gorbachov up until

It is strikingly revealed by his incapacity to grasp the social nature of the evil that these reforms are supposed to fight against. The source of mass alcoholism is the demoralisation, the lack of social and political perspectives; the lack of social relations in which one's personality can be expressed; the temptation of drowing in vodka the hopelessness, the boredom, the greyness of everyday life. This is an elementary thesis of

Marxism: forty million drunkards are not simply forty million individual social problem. There is no point in asking Gorbachov, his lieutenants or his ideologues what are the roots and nature of this social problem.

The universal corruption which exists in the Soviet Union (not to mention Eastern Europe or the People's Republic of China where it also now seems to be spreading) obviously goes back to the survival, consolidation and extension of market relations and the power of money within the society. This is once again the ABC of Marxism. Even partial market production, such as exists in the Soviet Union, reveals the partly private nature of work indicating the survival of private interest and the systematic

Of course, no one demands that all this should be abolished from one day to the next. It could even turn out to be indispensable to temporarily extend the sphere of influence of the market and money economy. But no

Marxist worthy of the name can close their eyes to the objectively harmful, disorganising and demoralising effects of the power of money and the

22 International Marxist Review carafe?' he asked.

and 'grey' markets).

psychological 'cases' search for individual advantages.

now. This is a purely bureaucratic philosophy.

. They are also forty million proofs that there is a

extension of social inequality and individualism in the process of building socialism. As Lenin wrote in 1918: 'The corrupting influence of high salaries upon the Soviet authorities . . . and upon the mass of the workers is indisputable.' (The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government). And still more clearly: "To conceal from the people the fact that the enlistment of bourgeois experts (and this applies even more strongly to so-called communist experts) is a retreat from the principles of the Paris Commune would be sinking to the level of bourgeois politicans and deceiving the people.' The bureaucracy has been carefully hiding all this from the masses for more than 55 years, ever since Stalin discovered that egalitarianism was not a principle of communism but a 'petty bourgeois

The bureaucracy must hide it from the masses not from ignorance or stupidity but because of its social interests. It is a question of justifying the enormous social privileges that it enjoys. This is why it cannot reveal

It can therefore only have recourse to the secular arm. But in acting in this way it only confirms the social and not individual nature of the evil

'Punishment is simply a means for defending society against any violation of the conditions for its existence, regardless of their content. But what sort of society is it, that has no better means of defence than a penal judge?... If then crimes are seen in great number and they appear with such frequency and regularity that they appear to be natural phenomena... is it not necessary, instead of hailing judges who remove a part of the criminals simply to make way for new ones, to think seriously about altering the system that produces

Every word is applicable to the social reality of the Soviet Union which

The Polish press recently claimed that the prosecutor in a trial of two young people charged with stealing a pair of sheets in a youth hostel, asked for a sentence of ten years in prison. It seems that it is impossible to buy sheets in a shop, and that 'decent people' are particularly angry about such

This says more about the social reality in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe28 than one hundred books of 'Marxism-Leninism' made incomprehensible through adaptation to the needs and interests of the bureaucracy. Even if Mikhael Gorbachov, who obviously lacks neither intelligence nor knowledge, half understands this reality, he has to keep quiet. Not for 'reasons of state' but for the interests of the bureaucracy.

On 11 June 1985, before a plenary session of the Central Committee bringing together all the high Soviet dignatories, except for his principal rival Romanov, Gorbachov made a real indictment of state of the Soviet economy. His listeners were called upon to understand and apply 'radical deviation' the sources of corruption and economic crimes.

it is supposed to be fighting.

Marx expressed himself very clearly on this subject:

such crimes?' has a prison population of several million.

crimes.

The significance of Gorbachov 23

(Article in the New York Daily Tribune, 18 February 1853).

• The reform must be carried out urgently: 'we no longer have

That there is real cause for alarm is particularly underlined by the fact that, after a brief upturn under the effect of the Andropov disciplinary measures, the growth rate of industrial production once again fell in 1984.

According to official sources, industrial production only rose by 3.1% in the January-June period 1985, compared to 4.5% during the January-June period 1984 and 4.1% during the January-June period 1983. For the period January-April the gap was even greater: 2.7% against 4.9% and

The criticisms are significant but after all routine, except for the feeling of urgency which surrounds them. They refer back to conditions which we have for a long time pointed out are of a structural character.

The conclusion is clear: growth has to be restarted with less investment.

Stress is put on two factors: modernisation and discipline. Gorbachov revolution in the nomenklatura's language. Automate; computerise;

robotise: these are the central themes taken up in chorus by the official

'Discipline' is supposed to mean major economy in the use of energy and raw materials, a more rational use of equipment and labour power, a reduction in demands for supplementary investment to meet the plan's targets. All this is traditional, abstract and unrealistic, given the material interests of the bureaucracy which more than ever rules the roost in the

The only concrete proposal is a substantial reduction in construction of new plants for the sake of substantial modernisation of existing factories and equipment. 'Rebuilding' from now on should absorb more than 50% of investment spending, while it currently accounts for only 30%.

How can this scheme, along with the related ones in Gorbachov's report, be carried out? There are of course the traditional and routine allusions to 'material incentives' and the 'mobilisation of the workers' everybody knows that these are only empty rhetoric, particularly given the small results achieved by the similar formulations used for the Liberman/Kosygin reforms in the mid-1960s. The only recourse left is administrative changes, that is readjustment of the bureaucracy. In fact, this

He proposes to strengthen both the power of the central planning bodies and the powers of the plant managers and groups enterprises. It is therefore the intermediary layers: ministers, particularly of the republics;

local and regional or sectoral bodies; inspection bodies, which will be reduced in number, authority and weight. A simplification of the indices of the plan will accompany this bureaucratic rationalisation.

All this is neither very radical nor very convincing. One is reminded of the old saying of the Latin poet Horace about a mountain in labour giving

24 International Marxist Review changes' time'

4.4% for the two preceding years.

ideological apparatus.

economy.

is all Gorbachov's reforms can lead to.

The investments themselves must be 'rationalised'.

is the herald of the 'scientific-technical revolution'

, the third technological

. But

The significance of Gorbachov 25 birth to a ridiculous mouse. The gravity of the affliction, the severity of indictment, are out of all proportion with the vague and limited character of the proposed remedies. It is reminiscent of the 'Novosibirsk report' of 1983 in which Tatiana Zaslavskaia formulated a critical analysis of the structural deficiencies of the Soviet economy, only to arrive at very vague and limited reform proposals.

This is not a chance reference. Despite reprimands of Zaslavskaia she was not dismissed from her post. Her ideas did not fall into disrepute. They were brought up again in an interview that she was able to get published in the 1 June 1985 issue of Izvestia. And they seem to have inspired, at least partly, the Gorbachov economic reform, as they did Andropov's 'experimental reform'. 29 In any case, one finds in the 'Novosibirsk report' the same theme of parallel strengthening of the powers of the central planning bodies and of the plant mangers with a reduction in the power and weight of the intermediary bureaucratic authorities, a theme which dominates the Gorbachov reform. Agriculture and the services: trial run for the extension of the market But there is also another reform proposal, which has not yet been taken up officially by Gorbachov, but which will perhaps come to the fore soon: the extension of the 'private' sphere of the market economy in agriculture and in the services. The interview with Zaslavskaia in Izvestia explicitly mentions the possibility of doing this in agriculture 'so long as it remains within the limits of the law'

We should remember that Gorbachov was for seven years the boss of Soviet agriculture within the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The least that one can say is that the balance sheet of his stewardship is not very brilliant. Soviet agriculture is in permanent stagnation. The deficit in cattle feed cereals has led to a stagnation of meat production at around 60kg per capita, against more than 100kg in France and 92kg in the GDR, a country more and more frequently cited as an example by the Soviet leaders (including Gorbachov) in terms of planning and economic management.

In 1985 cereal production is showing a slight increase. It will no doubt be around 190-95 millions tons. But this is still far from the objective of 240-245 million tons that was initially set for the five-year plan 1981-1985.

There are many indications that Gorbachov wants to stimulate the production on the private plots of kolkhoz (collective farm) members, which fell into stagnation under Brezhnev. This represents some 25% of total agricultural production, with a greater specific weight in livestock raising and the production of fruit and vegetables. 3º Stimulating private production, while keeping it under state control and channelling it through the outlets of the state and cooperative distribution networks, is one of the

26 International Marxist Review solutions advocated by reformers. This recipe is close to East German model, halfway between the present Soviet structure (inherited from the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras) and the Hungarian one, to say nothing of the Polish or Yugoslav models.

The most audacious aspect of this reform comes in the services. It has been applied experimentally in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia. According to an article in the 19 August 1985 issue of Izvestia, the repair services industry in the Soviet Union is one of those which gives the least satisfaction to the population.

In the SSR of Estonia, the radio and television repair firm Elektron in Tallin rented out one of its shops to a brigade of technicians for 650 roubles a month per worker. The technicians also had to pay the cost of materials, electricity, heating etc. In return they could ask what they thought was a proper price for repairs from their customers. The prices were therefore fixed by the operation of the law of supply and demand. The repair workers could keep 70% of their income. They had to give 30% to the state enterprise as a sort of tax on their profit.

The results seem to have been sensational. The waiting for repairs, which had been two weeks-and in that respect Tallin was fortunate in comparison to Moscow and Leningrad, where waits are much longerwas reduced to one ot two days.

A radio or television set was often returned in the evening. The quality of the work improved to a remarkable extent. Bribes were eliminated and prices rapidly stabilised. In fact, the supply and demand were brought into balance so quickly that the brigade is now looking for new clients, since the market for its services in Tallin was rapidly saturated.

The fact that articles about such cases can be published in the Soviet press seem to indicate that Gorbachov and his team want to expand this sort of experiment. The example in the sevice industries is already closer to the Hungarian model. But as the case of Hungary itself indicates, it is by no means easy to apply this sort of reform in large-scale industry and there is no assurance of success in either social or economic terms. 31 4) The social implications of the economic reforms Gorbachov's dilemma is essentially social. It is a choice between contradictory social interests which collide from the start and would enter into an explosive conflict if certain developments were carried right through to the end. 32

The "bureaucratic rationalisation of bureaucratic management' obviously implies an increase in the rights of managers, which would go against guaranteed employment, the main remaining gain of the October revolution for Soviet workers. All the attempts to get around this difficulty, mainly through the self-discipline and self-sacking of wage-earners collectives, with the aid of the shift system, and by holding out the promise of

substantial increases in bonuses (for a minority) have up until now run into the class solidarity and instinctive egalitarianism of the workers.

not very likely that simple political pressure can break this barrier. There would have to be great economic pressure, that is mass introduction of unemployment. 34 However mass unemployment could not be introduced in the present relationship of forces without provoking an enormous, ex-

But if this barrier of the workers resistance is not broken, the increased power of managers will remain limited, essentially to a minor redistribution of spheres of authority within the bureaucracy. The positive effects on the rate of economic growth, on the speeding up of technological innovation35 will thus be for a limited period, even if they are real, as were the first Malenko/Khrushchev reforms then the Liberman/Kosygin ones. After a few years, the same causes would have the same effects. The

From 1 January 1987, the social effects of the economic reform entered a second phase. 'State quality control' took effect in 1500 state enterprises and trusts, including the biggest and most important ones, which account for half national industrial production. According to an article in Pravda at the beginning of March 1987, production below the quality standards

The elimination of badly-made goods has however led to temporary halts in production, accompanied by reductions in monthly salaries, mainly through the bonuses. This has led to opposition from the workers. At the January 1987 Central Committee plenum, Gorbachov talked in rather sybillic terms-where is the glasnost?-about the possibility of conflicts.

A Tass dispatch stated that there were neither strikes nor open conflicts.

In December 1986, there was a mass workers' protest against the reduction of wages in the Kamaz lorry factory in the town of Brezhnev in the

Autonomous Republic of Tatar. Izvestia mentioned it. During his visit to the SSR of Estonia, Gorbachov himself mentioned the 'intial reaction' of the staff of an electronics factory against the effects of the 'quality control'. According to an article in the journal Sovietskaya Rossia in January

1987, 'many workers' lost up to 50 roubles from their wages that month, that is a quarter of the average wage. On 4 March 1987, Tass stated that wages had dropped by 30% in an agricultural machines factory in Tjumen,

Siberia. The next day, the same agency indicated that 60% of the enterproses subm goads for January control' had not been able to achieve their

In one heavy machinery factory in Alma Ata, the loss of wages reached

60 to 70 roubles, nearly a third of the monthly wage (Soviet press reported

The workers' indignation is not motivated by 'complicity' with the incompetent managers or the conservatism of the 'lazy' as Gorbachov's

Western sycophants proclaim, or as his henchmen in the Soviet Union and plosive resistance on the part of the workers.

ill is structural and not conjunctural.

will be reduced by 7.5%.

This does not conform to the facts.

in the weekly Die Zeit of 10 April 1987).

The significance of Gorbachov 27

.33 It is

28 International Marxist Review Eastern Europe murmur more discreetly. It is in fact explained by the feeling of having been unjustly treated. The workers' are punished, the wages are reduced for faulty management, for which the workers are not responsible.37 This faulty management concerns inter-plant relations-delay and irregularity in supplies of raw materials and spare parts, inadequate supplies of materials and equipment—as much if not more than the organisation of production within the enterprise itself. This is what has brought Lenin's old slogan of workers' control over production back to workers' consciousness.

Threatened by underhand attacks on full employment, the working class has also seen its living standards attacked. During 1986, and still more in the first few months of 1987, official propaganda gradually shifted the primary thrust of the economic reforms from an improved status for all (the famous promise of comfortable accommodation for all by the year 2000) towards a distinctly more production-oriented requirement: increase productivity and intensivity, link wages to productivity. The workers can not but feel these incessant appeals as an increased pressure to overwork, to increase the social surplus produced at their expense.

This is felt all the more strongly as the improved good-quality supplies in the cooperative shops and private restaurants are out of range of the pockets of ordinary workers. They thus heighten the feeling that the bureaucrats continue to enjoy substantial privileges, even if there is growing criticism in the press of special shops, the special rooms in hospitals, the schools for the gifted (in reality the sons and daughters of dignatories), the vacation resorts, etc. For the man or woman in the street nothing has changed in day-to-day life: this is the feeling which prevails in the working class. This is what explains their fundamental mistrust of Gorbachov.

The growing attention paid by Gorbachov's ideologues to the differences and social conflicts of interests has also taken a turn unfavourable to the working class. They put more and more emphasis on the contradictions of sectoral, corporatist, regional or indeed even individual plant attitudes and interests, thus rationalising the effort to divide the working class and hide the fundamental difference in interests between the workers and the bureaucracy. 5) The political reforms Gorbachov's only way out is offering the workers some compensation at the level of institutions. But the shape and content of the offer are much too vague to overcome the scepticism.

These offers were made during the 27-28th January 1987 Central Committee plenum. The political reforms proposed concern:

a) The selection of several candidates for each post to be elected for the local and regional Soviets (it is not sure if this reform will also be applied to the choice of candidates for the Supreme Soviet).

b) Secret ballots for party officials (once again it is not sure if this will also be introduced for the election of delegates to the CPSU congress and c) The selection of candidates for election as trade-union representatives d) The establishment of new mechanisms of workers participation in plant management. These mechanisms allow notably the election of managers by the workforce (in all cases? in some cases?) ... every five years, which runs the risk of further 'legitimising' the increased powers of these managers, rather than increasing the real weight of workers in the

With the announcement of these political reforms, the opposition of a good section of the apparatus became clearer. This concerns particularly workers of the GOSPLAN and the 'economic' ministries, a majority of the state apparatus, local and regional party functionaries, a good number of conservative and routine factory cadres and the (minority) conservative faction (usually the most mediocre from a creative point of view) of the

To get a clear idea of the scope of this opposition-or rather the force of intertia and obstruction of the apparatus—it should be noted that the number of ministries in the Union and the Republics has risen from 18 in

1936 to 40 in 1946 and 80 in 1986. The whole of the state administration includes at this moment 18 million functionaries. 39 The apparatus of the party, trade-union and other mass organisations should be added to this.

At the same time we also see more clearly which are the sectors on which Gorbachov relies, and to which he made an almost open appeal in his report to the Central Committee on 1 January 1987: the liberal intelligentsia, which in its majority gives him enthusiastic support; younger and more modernist technocrats, particularly at the level of the enterprises and the central ecomomic administration (where they seem however to be in a minority; more farsighted and lucid 'modernist' sectors of the party,

While Gorbachov described the crisis of the system in dramatic terms in his report to the CC, while he talks more and more of the real 'revolution' which is necessary, this is to save the bureaucratic regime, not to overthrow it. The differences between him and the so-called 'conservative' faction concern its criminal underestimation of the crisis. Confronted with the depth of the crisis, the Brezhnevites reject the surgical measures proposed by Gorbachov; they are just suggesting aspirin.

We could give many proofs of Gorbachov's goal of defence of the bureaucracy furnished by his report. The principle of the one-party system is strongly defended, as is the dogma of its necessarily leading role in the political domain. Gorbachov eulogises the KGB (who asked him to) as an institution. The 'principle' of democratic centralism such as it has operated since the victory of the Stanlinist faction, and thus in reality the Central Committee).

within the workplaces.

daily running of the enterprises.

intelligentsia.

The total is around 25 to 30 million people.

police or army apparatus. 40

The significance of Gorbachov 29

30 International Marxist Review bureaucratic centralism, is considered as the touchstone of the whole political system. Its extension from the party to the mass organisations and the state structures is celebrated as the highest point of Marxist-Leninism, with which obviously it has no relation.

One indication of Gorbachov's desire to defend the dictatorship is his attitude on the national question in the Soviet Union. In his report to the CC, the emphasis is put on the struggle against the 'bourgeois nationalism' of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, and not against Great Russian nationalism. This emphasis takes on a more concrete and more negative sense in the light of the purging of the first party secretariart in the republic Kazakhstan, Dimukhamed Kunaev, which provoked demonstrations in Alma Ata in December 1986.4' On the basis of the information we have, it is difficult to know if this was really a popular reaction or an inter-bureaucratic conflict which resulted in the manipulation of certain sectors of the masses by the local bureaucracy, which is in any case widely corrupt. But for a Great Russian like Gorbachov to concentrate his fire on the nationalism of the oppressed ethnic minorities, and to support the nomination of Russian leaders in the federated republics, is in any case profoundly reactionary.

It is by measuring Gorbachov's aim against the means proposed to reach them that his dilemma appears most clearly. For almost sixty years almost everything in the Soviet Union has functioned on the basis of vertical commands, from the top down, without initiative or autonomy of the masses. Underlying this bureaucratic dictatorship is the principle that 'material incentives for the bureaucracy are the driving force for making the economic machine work and fulfilling the plan. The monopoly of power and material privileges flow from each other. So Gorbachov began to apply his reforms from the top towards the base.

But the apparatus resists. It turns out to be of a ponderousness unsuspected even by its most lucid critics. It sabotages or even worse systematically obstructs. So it has to be shaken up. One starts to administratively shake up the administrators. Then there are new obstructions, glaring new manifestations of inertia, new partial failures, new delays and postponements.

The time bomb of the crisis of the system ticks on relentlessly. All the time that passes is time lost. So you have to act through other social forces. Apart from the bureaucracy, only the masses can be the protagonists of the 'real revolution' that Gorbachov says the Soviet Union needs. The technocratic and cultural intelligentsia, which is supporting him more and more enthusiastically, does not have the weight to counterbalance the millions of functionaries and inspectors defending their well-worn ruts and their privileges.

But how can some bureaucrats mobilise the masses against others and control and channel their mobilisations? The risks of such an adventure are confirmed by the examples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China; and perhaps the most terrifying example of all: the Poland of Solidarnosc. Like

the 'liberal empire' of Napoleon 111, and that of the last tsars, the liberal dictatorship' of Gorbachov is literally caught between two fires. Divisions within the bureaucracy widen a breach through which the autonomous ac-

While the daring nature of Gorbachov's diplomatic initiatives— particularly on the question of disarmament—are in striking contrast with his hesitations on the level of domestic policy, this is not only because there is a much broader consensus around the foreign policy of the

Kremlin than there is around the political structures of the bureaucratic dictatorship. It is also because the bureaucracy really needs to put a stop to the nuclear arms race in order to reduce the share of the Soviet Union's

Like the world revolution, the international elimination of capitalism has even formally disappeared from its objectives—it is not even mentioned in the new programme of the CPSU adopted at the 27th Congress—-the relaunching of a policy of defente based on peaceful coexistence sounds more sincere than in the Khrushchev period and has found broader echo in the imperialist milieu (see the surprising commentaries in the British press which surrounded Margaret Thatcher's trip to Moscow). 42

The Eurocommunist supporters of Gorbachov underlined this with their

Times have changed since the days when Khrushchev started a similar reform programme in the Soviet Union. Unlike Khrushchev, Mr Gorbachov is not being militarily provocative or aggressively anti-capitalist in his ideological boasts. This gives him a real chance to win the Western public and particularly its opinion-formers away from the language of anti-Soviet sabre rattling, or at

The lucid spokesperson of the international bourgeoisie express themselves with an even clearer clairvoyance on the dilemma underlying the Gorbachov reforms and for the bureaucracy and international capitalism. Samuel Pisar states in an interview given to Le Monde 30 April

Russian has always oscillated between tyranny and chaos. If the reins are let go there is the risk of an accident. Gorbachov is conscious of this, he's taking considerable risks. There is even a danger (!) that he has a political or physical

Chaos, for the international bourgeoisie, is obviously a mass mobilisation of the Soviet proletariat, the biggest in the world, this sleeping gaint whose reappearance of the political scene-like that of the USA proletariat—would in one fell swoop change the world situation. This is the fundamental explanation for the favourable attitude of the liberal international bourgeoisie for Mikhael Gorbachov43 fear of a real political revolution, of a real new revolutionary mobilisation of the Soviet masses.

This does not mean to say that the international proletariat, that revolutionary Marxists, remain neutral or indifferent to Gorbachov's disarmation of the masses could erupt.

available resources devoted to non-productive ends.

usual cynicism:

least to make such talk seem hollow and irrelevant.

1987):

accident.

The significance of Gorbachov 31

(Marxism Today,May 1987)

ment initiatives or are satisfied with just standing by. These initiatives objectively encourage a new stage for the anti-war movement, a new assault by the mass movement in the West against the arms race, particularly against nuclear weapons. In this sense, they deserve support, on condition that it is an autonomous and critical support which stimulates real mass mobilisations and does not divert the anti-war movement into the channel

But at the same time, one should be conscious that Gorbachov's disarmament initiatives are only one aspect of the foreign policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and take place within a broader framework, whose conciliating character in relation to imperialism-that is,

Political discussion and criticism, a rise in political consciousness for broader masses can only come from a spontaneous political practice and apprenticeship at the base. Marx made fun of those who, under the enlightened absolutism of the Prussian kingdom, thought they could teach people to swim without actually going into the water. He made fun of those

"jumping masters' who tried to prepare jumping over a precipice with the

The enlightened paternalism of Gorbachov comes up against a similar obstacle. In the same way that science can not advance without free discussion, the political apprenticeship of the masses needs freedom of action to blossom. This political freedom is not allowed for in Gorbachov's

That is to say that the masses-particularly the workers and youth-are waiting for a whole series of tests in order to judge the real scope of these reforms. They can be summarised into the following points for example

• Full elimination of censorship. The right for any specific group of citizens to freely publish books, pamphlets, periodicals, leaflets, etc.

• Repeal of the articles in the penal code that restrict freedom of expression, in particular those that prohibit 'anti-Soviet agitation' and 'slanderactivities (terrorism etc.) but institutionalise crimes of opinion and prevent or obstruct the exercise of democratic rights by the masses. 45

• Release of all political prisoners, that is of all those who are in prison

• Establishment of habeas corpus. Any person arrested must be presented with a precise charge within 24 hours of the arrest, and have the right to a lawyer of their choice for the defence. The lawyer must have the right

• As a protection against police arbitrariness, anyone arrested must have

32 International Marxist Revien of diplomatic negotiation.

revolutionary character—is undoubted.

Important tests aid of a measuring tape.

reforms.

(one could easily add further points):

, articles that clearly concern neither spying nor criminal ing Soviet power' or in the camps for crimes of opinion. 46 to see all the evidence on which the charge is based.

its counter-

the right to appeal to the local soviets. The local soviets must have the right to themselves question any person arrested, without police presence. The soviets must have the right to investigate police operations.

• The right for any group of citizens above a certain minimum number, not only to propose candidates for election to the soviets (including the

Supreme Soviet) in nominating assemblies, but to run candidates who have received a certain minimum number of votes in these assemblies in the

• Free election of trade-union delegates, members of the 'Workers'

Councils' and the 'Women's Councils' in the enterprises, with the right to put forward several candidates, without any restriction. For a transitional period, for the reasons indicated by Gorbachov himself, the freedom of such elections would have to be assured by secret ballot.

• The right for freely-elected trade-union members of the 'Workers'

Councils' to contact each other, to consult and organise vertically within an industry, and above all horizontally, in the localities in the big urban centres, in towns, in districts, regions and republics. Elimination of the principle of 'democratic centralism' within the unions, enterprise groups,

This principle even in its original Leninist (that is genuinely democratic)

form makes sense only when applied to persons freely associated on the basis of shared convictions and not to state or class bodies. At this level, to ensure that the masses will genuinely exercise the real power, the guiding principle must be that of delegated authority based on a mandate

• Re-establishment and guarantee of the workers' right to strike or carry out any other form of action in pursuance of their demands.

• Generalised workers' control over all economic activities, at all levels of the plan and management, such as over stocks and movements

(shipments in and out, transport of raw materials; use of and demands for equipment; calculation of current production costs; the establishment of production and wage norms; the targets of the plan within the enterprise and in other enterprises; the general priorities in plans governing employment; right of veto over layoffs and other forms of reducing employment,

These are key measures for increasing real, and not merely formal

, participation by the workers in management. These are decisive steps towards the economic democracy that the Gorbachovites talk so much about, and which is supposed to be the updated version of the 'democracy of the producers' that was talked about in the wake of the

• Elimination of the special stores and reserved sections in hospitals, vacation homes, special restaurants, educational establishments etc.

Workers' control and citizens' committees to ensure that these measures

• Introduction of the principle that no state functionary, including at the elections themselves.

'Workers' Councils' and all mass organisations.

etc.

'public relations'

October revolution.

are applied.

The significance of Gorbachov 33 that can be taken back by the electors who gave it.

34 International Marxist Review highest levels, can get more remuneration (including non-monetary benefits) than a skilled worker.

Given the tight interlocking of the state and the CPSU in the Soviet Union, the extension of a series of measures about "glasnost' to the structures of the CPSU does not reflect illusions about the nature of this party but rather elementary democratic demands. As at present the only real political discussions take place within the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is logical for critical citizens to demand that these debates be published. As Gorbachov proposes that the members of party committees be elected by secret ballot, it is obvious that citizens demand that these elections are not a mere pretence but that there are different candidates with different platforms.

Obviously this does not in anyway detract from the importance of the demand for a multi-party system, that is for the right of Soviet peasants and workers to form freely the political parties of their choice.

Is advocating such demands asking for 'too much, too soon'? Does it strengthen the position of the conservatives against Gorbachov? This is one of the most worn-out arguments. Already on the eve of the 1848 election, the liberals accused the communists of the time of 'playing the reactionaries game' by putting forward their 'excessive' demands. The real problem lies elsewhere. It lies in the class nature of political activity, in the different social interests that are to be expressed and linked up. No socialist democracy without mass mobilisation, without political revolution To think that you can make really revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union as it is today without the working class moving is an illusion. To think that the working class can be made to move without appealing to its interests is falling into the most sterile sort of voluntarist and idealist utopianism. The main thrust for both material and moral incentives for the workers in post-capitalist societies is along the lines that have concretly manifested themselves for the last thiry years: solidarity, justice, equality, real decision-making power. Marxists of course these characteristics of the real movement: internationalism, solidarity with the three sectors of world revolution.

Speaking to a group of writers on 19 June 1986, Gorbachov stated 'The enemy (it would have been better to say the international bourgeoisie) is not afraid of Soviet nuclear missiles. But it is afraid of the extension of democracy in the Soviet Union.' A Soviet Union in which real socialist democracy prevailed would have a power of attraction for the masses of the whole world. It would at one stroke change the international situation. But this would mean a real socialist democracy, which did not just give the workers more economic rights and powers, but still more rights and

power than in the most advanced capitalist countries. Gorbachov's initiatives will not produce such a democracy. It will come from the action of the masses. But Gorbachov's reforms open a breach through which this action could come, when the hopes he has raised have been disappointed.

1. See particularly the remarks of the emigré Czech communist leader Mlynar in the West

German Eurocommunist journal Sozialismus of April 1986. On the other hand, Chore

Medvedev, in a recent book, has a more sober and pessimistic assessment (Gorbacho

Basil Blackwell, London 1986), as did Marie Lavigne in Le Monde Diplomatique of

2. On the Marxist theoretical foundation of this analysis of Soviet reality see my essays

'Bureaucratie et production marchande' in Quatrieme Internationale May 1987 and

"The laws of motion of the Soviet economy' in Critique No 12 (Glasgow, 1980).

See particularly Charles-Etienne Lagasse, L'entreprise soviétique et le marché,

4. In the same speech, Gorbachov demanded a further increase in the production of these

'non-competitive machines'. This increase should be of 9-12% per year in the period

The growing concern of the bourgeoisie with 'computer crimes' is a good expression of this contradiction. The relatively easy access for 'outsiders' to information through

6. The Novosibirsk report a decade later insisted on the fact that the system of economic

(social and political should also be added) management in practice in the Soviet Union generates 'laziness, dishonesty, and a low moral level within the population as a whole'. It could have continude 'the example coming from on high; the fish starts rot-

7. See the interesting remarks in the doctoral thesis of William K. McHenry, an American specialist (very hostile to communism) about the Soviet computer industry.

8. Professor Harley D. Balzer has recently analysed the causes of this contradiction in the

American periodical Issues in Science and Technology. They all come back to the bureaucratic management and dictatorship and not to the system of collective property of the means of production or economic planning. In Sozialismus there is an interesting discussion of the causes of Soviet technological backwardness. See also Karl-Ernst

9. The following anecdote is presently doing the rounds in Moscow. Gorbachov, invited to a banquet by highly-placed dignatories, asked the total cost. Embarrassed, those responsible took some time to make the calculation but finaliy came up with a figure.

Gorbachov divided it by the number of guests and proposed asking each of those present

This sum represents one quarter of the monthly wage of the average worker-for just one meal for a bureaucrat! It is also the sum paid as the monthly pension to most of the 51 million retired persons in the Soviet Union. A good illustration of the social inequality in this country and the bureaucracy's privileges. It is hardly necessary to add

Economica, Paris, 1979, pp 616-617.

1986-1990.

computers 'distorts competition'.

ting from the head'.

for 50 roubles.

Notes

Lohman's essay, 'Argument', Sonderband AS 135, Berlin 1985.

The significance of Gorbachor 35

36 International Marxist Review that a lot of what was eaten at the banquet is unobtainable for the workers, even those who have the money to buy them. As Trotsky said: 'When there is a shortage a policeman is needed to oversee the queue in the front of the shop, and he serves himself first.'

On the general problem of poverty in the Soviet Union, see Mervyn Matthews

'Poverty in the Soviet Union', The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn 1985. 10. A good description of the corruption in Azerbaidjan and in Georgia is given in the La corruption en Union soviétique, by the sociologist Ilja Zemtsov (Hachette Paris 1976).

The author was professor at the Lenin Institute in Baku and head of the Department of Information of the CP in Azerbaidjan before emigrating to Israel at the end of 1973.

It seems that the Brezhnev family itself—particularly his daughter Galina-was involved in a sordid affair of trafficking in gold and currency. For other cases of corruption involving top bureaucrats, particularly PolitBureau member Romanov, who asked for the dinner service of Catherine the Great from the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad for his daughter's wedding celebration, see Zhores Medvedev, Andropov au pouvoir, Paris, Flammarion, 1983.

On criminality in general in the Soviet Union, see Patrick Money, La Kleptocratie,

Paris, La Table Ronde, 1982. 11. It is said that during the famous Khrushchev report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, he was interrupted by a voice asking 'And where were you while all these crimes were committed?'. His reaction was to reply menacingly: 'Who spoke?' There was deathly silence. Then he continued 'Now you understand why I kept quiet. ' Nothing like that happened when Gorbachov denounced the measures of the Stalinist era. The atmosphere has changed.

On the rise of experimental theatre, see the interesting interviews of Youri Lioubimov, former director of Taganka, in L'Alternative No 29, Paris, September-October 1984. 13. In the October 1986 issue of the journal Molodaya Gvardiya the following 'solution to the crisis is put forward: attack the intellectuals, women back to the home, step up censorship, long live manual work. 14. The economist Tatiana Zaslavskaia and the philosopher Butenko were reprimanded for their audacity. The writer Yevtushenko was censored in Literaturnaya Gazeta for his attack on censorship, basing himself on one of Marx's early writings. But these were mild attacks in passing. 15. This is particularly expressed in the review EKO, published in Novosibirsk. On the famous Novosibirsk report, see Marina Bak's article in International Viewpoint, No 73

1985. 16. On the demographic evolution in the Soviet Union and its consequences on the nationality structure in the country, see Hélène Carrère d'Encausses, L'Empire Eclatée,

Paris, Flammarion, 1978. The conclusions of this work should be treated cautiously. 17. On the project of diverting the Siberian rivers, see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, of 23/24

November 1985. 18. Zalygin's speech was reproduced in Rouge of 17th February 1986. Another Soviet ecologist activist, Komariv, was discussed in L'Alternative No 25, January-February

1984. 19. See the review Soviet Nationality Survey (Vol III, No 4-5, April/May 1986), the reproduction of an article in No 13, 27th March 1986 od Literaturna Ukraina (Keiv),

Reproduced in 1980 by Editions des Femmes, No 22. See Jacqueline Heine's article

'Work like a man and also like a women' in International Viewpoint No 115, 9 March

Two significant expressions of V.T. Kzyma the head of the building department at if he is lazy... These days it is difficult to force the workers to do even an hou Chernobyl: 'It is very difficult, and sometimes simply impossible to sack a worker ever more, without mentioning getting them to do an extra shift. (The Ukrainian review Vitchyzna, No 3, 1986, quoted in Soviet Nationality Survey Vol III, No 4-5, April-May

A lorrydriver working near an airport in northern Siberia explained in an interview with the dissident writer Alexander Nekritch how his fellow workers elected him president of the trade union committee, despite the fact he was not a Party member, In the hop of getting overtime paid at the same rate as the geologists. He did not get this. (L Alter

23. These figures were assembled by Maria-Elisabeth Ruban, in an article in the review

24. It is difficult to compare the standard of living of a Soviet worker with that of a worker in Western Europe or the USA, given the big difference in price structure and buying power. If one takes the same weekly basket of goods plus one quarter of the monthly rent and 1/250 of the cost of a television (purchase price spread over 5 years) one gets the equivalent of 41 hours of work in Moscow, 28 in Washington, 27 in Paris and 24 in London in 1979 according to Keith Bush in Leonard Shapiro/Joseph Gordon ed. The

Soviet Worker, London Macmillan, 1981. But the vagueness of this comparison is

25. See Nicholas Lampert, Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union, Macmillan, London, 1985.

27. The director general of the Hungarian Health Ministry, Dr Imre Oery, recognise that his country had the lowest male life expectancy in the whole of Europe, 65.5 years.

In Poland it fell from 67.3 years in 1975 to 66.8 years in 1984, in Rumania from 67.4 years to 66.9 in 1984, according to official sources (Financial Times, 17/10/86).

28. This did not stop General Jaruzelski from coolly telling L 'Humanité on 3 June 1985,

'Our state ensures so many social benefits and of such a nature that there is no

29. This concerned a limited number of branches and enterprises, where the managers' had broader powers to decide on prices and the assortment of products. The poor results of this reform were pointed out by Aganbegian in EKO No 6, 1986.

30. For fruits and vegetables-except potatoes-the gardens of urban workers also play a

31. In his interesting work Travail et Travailleurs en URSS, Editions La Decouverte, Pan

1984, Jacques Sapir points out that under Andropov, there was an attempt to clam lown on the absenteeism which is partly caused by moonlighting, and increased b

Icoholism, an attempt which petered out. 'Sending out the militia at the beginning o

1983 to check on the people in the cafes, cinemas, theatres, to see whether they were one month before the accident.

20.

1987.

1986.)

native No 29, September-October 1984).

Osteuropa, August/September 1986.

obvious.

26. Zhores Medvedev, op. cit. pp 11, 184.

equivalent even in the bigger and richer imperialist countries.' not insignificant role.

The significance of Gorbachov 37

38 International Marxist Review absentee workers could be an indication. But the way in which the campaign fizzled also shows the limits of such an actions. One cannot put a policeman behind 128 million workers.' 32. The Novosibirsk report explicitly mentioned the contradictory interests of different social layers as one of the causes of the delay in a radical economic reform in the Soviet

Union. Gorbachov himself made allusions to the same phenomenon in milder terms. For all the debate in the Soviet Union on the existence of such contradictions see the already-cited article by Marina Bek in International Viewpoint, No 73. 33. A French industrialist invited to the Soviet Union reported some interesting details in

L'Expansion, 24 May 1985. 34. On the risks of unemployment reappearing in the Soviet Union, see Der Spiegel, 3

February 1986, which refers particularly to the calculations of Professor V. Kostoko, expert of the Gosplan who estimated the job losses to come as 13-19 million. The Soviet press has recently put forward the figure of 100 000 unemployed in the SSR of Azerbaidjan. On 26 March 1987, Tass reported on the first bankruptcy of a Soviet enterprise, a building firm in Leningrad employing 2000 persons. 35. Gorbachov promised to increase wages for engineers and technicians and to increase bonuses. 36. This information is from an article in Neue Zürcher Zeitung April 1987. 37. See the statements by the workers of the Kamaz factory reported in an interview with the 'official' dissident Roy Medvedev in Business Week (2 February 1987). 38. A quite convincing analysis of this resistance is in Die Zeit of 10 April 1987. Also see

The Economist, 4-11 April 1987. This latter states that twenty contributions to the Central Committee plenum in January 1987 were openly critical of glasnost, accusing it of undermining the Party's authority. 39. V. Koudrjavtsev and J. Luchakova: "The tasks of sciences after the 27th Congress of the CPSU' in Kommunist, No 9, 1986. 40. According to Maria Huber/Christian Schmidt-Häuer writing in Die Zeit of 10 April

1987, the generals Ljuchev and Lisitchev are among the most important supporters of

Mikhael Gorbachov. 41. The limits of glasnost were once again demonstrated on this occasion. We still do not know who demonstrated and what was the scope of the repression. Some have spoken of many dead. 42. See for example The Economist, April 1987. 43. See also in the same vein the biography of Mikhael Gorbachov by Huber/Schmidt-

Häuer, Piper Verlag, Munich 1987. 44. The question is more topical than ever. At the journalists' congress, marked by many incidents, this question was not raised. As previously, the de facto monopoly of the of-

Fficial doctrine was insisted upon. 45. Burlatsky, political commentator of Literaturnaya Gazeta, and other Gorbachovites use the formula: freedom of discussion but not freedom for anti-socialist ideas. Deng

Xiaoping and Peng Zhen use similar formulas in China. But how can it then be explain-

The significance of Gorbachor 39 ed that many chauvinist Great Russian or openly anti-Semitic writings are tolerated.

like those of Tseran Solodor, while the writings of strongly anti-capitalist socialists.

communists and anarchists are banned? 46. The particularly courageous case of the psychiatrist Koryagin who was in prison for seven years and went on hunger strike should be mentioned. His 'crime' was to denounce the political utilisation of psychiatric internment, particularly against the miner

Nikitin, founder of an independent trade union in the Donetz region. He has just been released and exiled.

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