France under Mitterrand: results and prospects order to escape Communist leadership.'
Party had already taken most big cities in 1977, half the general councils and eight regional councils. For years it has been the recipient of shifts in the
Actually the novelty of this election lay in the massive rejection of Communist Party policy by part of its traditional base and the consequent unprecedented vote of the SP. The rejection of the Right (symbolized by the very disciplined second round transfer of votes to Communist candidates
The SP now holds all the trump cards. The President of the Republic has all the powers he needs to implement his policy - and his political respon-
The socialist victory is so large that the SP has no excuses, no alibis and no lines of retreat. The SP newspaper, Combat Socialiste, said in its lead editorial of June 23, 1981: 'Magnificent victory, heavy responsibility...
Since Mitterand and the SP hold both the executive and legislative powers, they can't easily shift the blame onto scapegoats. It will be all the more difficult to justify manoeuvers, compromises, and the government's economic and social policy. In 1936, concessions were justified by the need to ally with the petty-bourgeoisie which the Radical Party supposedly represented, but this argument cannot be used today. The 14 Left Radical deputies were entirely propped up by the SP which holds a majority without their votes, and they can hardly duplicate the role of the old Radical Party.
One of the most paradoxical developments has been Mitterand's decision to make the fullest use of Constitutional powers of the presidency. Socialist
Party First Secretary Lionel Jospin stated that Mitterand intends to be the
President of all the French and to make a distinction between the SP and the government so that the one will not be responsible for the initiatives of the other, even though as things stand, it is hard to distinguish the SP from the
But the main way the Socialists intend to avoid being too openly exposed is through decentralization and regional reform which will be the subject of a law submitted to Parliament on July 2. The aim is to set up intermediaries between the central government and the regions, institutional mechanisms the workers. By instituting universal suffrage and proportional representation for the election of the general councils, by promoting association life and cooperatives, by immersing itself in various associations, the SP hopes to muffle direct conflicts with the government, to disperse and fragment and especially avoid struggles being directed against the government.
As Pierre Mauroy stated, transforming the relations between the state and local bodies means 'allowing the regions to handle problems'
'regions a greater capacity to intervene in the area of infrastructural equipment, failing enterprises, housing, regional control of some investments';
the development of 'regional and local plans elaborated by elected regional and local bodies' should be enhanced by 'a new distribution of the fiscal revenue of the state which would transfer a fraction of this revenue to the
Finally, by including Left Radicals and certain Gaullists on the one hand,
90 i voting pattern of Christians.
with a lead in the first round) explains the rest.
The Socialist Party in the firing line sibility is therefore clear.
government and the President.
which can act as screens, 'buffers' new territorial bodies.'
International Marxist Revieu'
', or'relays' between the government and
', giving
and Communists on the other in the government, even though their numbers are not actually necessary, Francois Mitterand and the Socialist
Party can give the impression that they share the responsibility of government and that their unitary orientation still stands. This is all the more important for them in that the economic prospect is bleak and the bosses have
The bourgeoisie didn't expect this election result. The victory of Francois
Mitterand, the triumph of the SP, and the defeat of the PCF were so many unpleasant surprises. It had underestimated the impact of unemployment, overestimated the effects of the division of the workers' parties, and on several occasions it had pursued a provocative policy towards the workers movement based on a false assessment of its margin to manoeuvre.
The bourgeois leaders explain their defeat mainly by their own internal divisions. It is as good a dodge as they can find to avoid the fact that their setback flows first of all from their economic and social policy and from the profound will for change which existed in the country. Their explanation
The workers now realize that they are strong. They feel they have won the first leg of the contest by sweeping the Right out of power, even though bourgeoisie have been twofold: on the strictly political level, the poverty of their arguments is striking. They tried unsuccessfully to create a scare and then launched a campaign against the growth of 'bureaucracy' allegedly evidenced by the hiring of more teachers, professors and nurses... Alain
Peyrefitte, the former Minister of Justice, had the gall to warn of the dangers involved in concentrating 'lawful' power (the legislative and executive) and 'de-facto' power (trade union power, the power to mobilize the masses) in the same hands... Michel d'Ornano accused the new government and Georges Filious, the Minister of the Media, in particular, of conducting a witch hunt in the television staff. After twenty three years of exclusive rightist rule, of corruption, scandals, purges and lies, such accusations were met with ridicule or indignation. Here is a sample of this rhetoric, from the management newspaper Les Echos which launched an attack on the
'Judge for yourself: out of the 289 Socialist and Radical deputies who will take their seats in the Palais Bourbon tomorrow, exactly 132 are educators
(only 49 were in the previous Assembly). This figure goes a long way in revealing the innermost inclinations of the new majority and sends shudders down the spine of many a qualified parliamentary observer.
Indeed, imagine the tone of political debate when these men and women fed on school dialectics will attempt to exert their oratorical skills from the podium of the Assembly! Steeped in humanism, ready to spew out a string of quotations, their brains cluttered up with general ideas, they will be seen examining the realities of everyday life with rare incompetence. They will be heard voicing definitive judgements on factory work, on the financing of
There is no need to wait before stating that the French people displayed a bizarre reflex when they replaced sixteen industrialists, six traders and ar-
France under Mitterrand: results and prospects so far been uncooperative.
Will the bourgeoisie play with fire?
confuses the result with the cause.
it is a top-down victory.
In this situation the first reactions of the educators in the new Parliament:
firms, and the recovery of the economy.
91
tisans, nine doctors, and ten members of various professions with 83 more
For how can intellectuals who are used to working only 150 to 160 days a year, who are incapable of dealing with anything except ideas, who are
These statements reflect the present crisis of the bourgeois political leadership and this is confirmed by the tensions emerging inside the UDF
By contrast on the economic and social level, the bourgeois campaign is more coherent and effective: 'The political future of the new opposition is by being an opposition: ... willy-nilly, the new opposition will be radical. We should hope that it will not answer the socialist practice with mere
The complaints of the bosses generally concern the fact that 'the government's projects threaten to further harm the viability of firms in a context of decline of industrial production; according to the INSEE, production dropped by 8.1% in one year. In these circumstances, the government will have to reconcile economic recovery through consumption with defense of the
According to Le Nouveau Journal, 'Despite aid from the government and the banks, there will only be investment and hiring if confidence and hope return.' Translation: on condition the government give sufficient guarantees of goodwill to management. This is exactly what Minister of the
Economy and Finances Jacques Delors is doing all the time and it has earned him recognition by the bourgeoisie as one of the firmest advocates of moderation in the government. The latter ceaselessly repeats that its program to reduce unemployment and social inequalities must not conflict with the need to limit inflation and keep French industry competitive and the state must show the way. The policy has found a first application in the area of public workers whose wages were increased by 3.3 per cent on July 1, which barely preserves their purchasing power. The trade union federations did not fail to protest: the CGT emphasized that it was 'continuity in
, and the CFDT regretted that 'inequalities were increased rather
On the wage issue, the employers are pressuring the government and relying on the estimates of the Bank of France which states that as of now
'worries about heavier burdens of wages and social payments outweigh the hope for improvement that the recovery measures should bring about in cer-
As of now the other two hot issues are the 35-hour week and the na-
The National Council of French Employers (CNPF) refuses to enter negotiations for a 35-hour week. It proposes instead to discuss revamping working hours in general, the utilization of machinery, and wage formulas.
Negotiations which should resume on July 6 are at a standstill.
A press war has begun on the issue of nationalisations. The explanation for the bosses offensive is twofold: the harsher the employers are, the more pressure they can exert, and the more they push the government to be
92 teachers.
walled into the ghetto of their "a priori"
and the debate over who is the better "recourse"
Giscard d'Estaing.
haphazard, incoherent and limited criticisms.' currency and control of inflation.
change' than reduced'.
tain branches' tionalisations.
problems of industrial life and international trade?'
International Marxist Revieu
', seriously come to grips with the
, Jacques Chirac or Valery
moderate, by providing a justification for necessary compromises, and its
Moreover the employers know that there is no such thing as a 'leftist' austerity or a 'progressive' austerity. They fear the workers will weaken and mobilise when they begin to want to achieve their demands - and demand 'their government stop consorting with the bourgeoisie. It is therefore not certain that the employers will leave Pierre Mauroy's government the time and means to complete its project. They may well attempt to deflect government policy and composition in a relatively short time. By pressuring the reformist leaderships to deliver the most possible guarantees, the employers hope to discredit and compromise them and weaken the mass
Everything will depend on the pace of the workers mobilisation, of the world economic situation and of Francois Mitterand's policy in this
The content of the June 23 agreement between the SP and PCF, endorsed by the PCF Central Committee is an event in itself. It is a complete capitulation and denial of the positions the PCF had defended since the
The PCF leadership committed itself to accepting a two-year truce before any policy of genuine change could be implemented. Moreover the agreement states that this change will be realised 'by stages, at a pace which takes into account the crisis situation, the fact that the French economy is open to the outside world, and the necessary economic and financial balance.'
This is more time than the bourgeoisie needs to get back on its feet and take advantage of the crisis to begin obstructing the government's projects.
In the meantime, the PCF should display moderation.... But there is worse yet: the PCF is committed to observing the rules of governmental solidarity not only in the National Assembly but at the level of 'local and regional bodies, in the workplaces, and in conformity with the rightful functions of institutions and parties'. In other words, the PCF is committed to abide by the government's austerity measures, when the time comes, in the
The solidarity in question will be based on the proposals approved on
May 10th, i.e. Francois Mitterand's election Manifesto which is from now on the government's basic Charter. This Charter represents a retreat by comparison with the Socialist Project whose inadequacies the PCF had denounced. Nationalisations are a good example since they were the pretext for the
1977 break: they are no longer to cover the subsidiaries of the large groups nor to be extended by new additions. Francois Mitterand stuck by his initial
Another significant fact: when Francois Mitterand was a candidate in
February 1981, he proclaimed that nationalisations were to be included 'in the first batch of measures I will take after being elected'; now the discussion on nationalizations is postponed to the October session of the National
Assembly, but nothing definitive has been decided on the schedule, the pace and the technical details. A Le Matin editorial of June 25, 1981, pointed out that this could lead the 'leaders of the nationalisable firms to stop investing
On the international level, the agreement refers to France's international activity 'in conformity with its alliances': it calls for the withdrawal of
94 movement.
framework.
factories.
proposals.
class collaborationist austerity policy.
Union of the Left broke up in 1977.
until they know what sauce they will be cooked in'
International Marxist Revieu
France under Mitterrand: results and prospects
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for Poland and its people to 'be allowed to bring the process of political renewal to fruition on their own.' Both parties will actively support France's participation in the European Economic Community (EEC), and its institutions without the slightest mention of the PCF's opposition to the broadening of the Common Market. Finally the agreement
'notes the situation created by the signing of the Camp David Agreement' the most slavish display of all, 'notes' the blow against the Palestinian resistance dealt by this pro-imperialist agreement which not even the reactionary Arab regimes recognised as a serious basis for negotiations. Yet not so long ago the PCF declared in favour of inviting the main leader of the PLO
According to one anecdote, upon arriving at the SP headquarters on the evening of the negotiations, Georges Marchais said that he might as well have been asked to fill out an SP membership form. True or false the story summarises the actual situation: the PCF drank the brew to the last drop. To get an idea of the distance travelled one need only recall that the PCF had on November 1, 1986, crage Marchas prelied in
Why did the Communist Party enter the government in such a difficult situation and bad relationship of forces? On the one hand because the risk of supporting without participating, as advocated by TASS, was too risky.
'Supporting without participating' means mobilising the workers which could lead to social explosions. It means being willing to stand in the front lines against the government and centralising struggles when the government's policy becomes too unpopular. This wasn't the PCF perspective at
On the other hand, regional elections with proportional representation should be held pretty soon. Municipal elections are due in 1983. For the PCF elected officials, and the apparatus deeply rooted in the management of communes and municipalities, the decisive concern was stopping the losses experienced in the legislative elections and not losing their local power positions. These depend to a large extent on agreements with the SP. If the PCF lost Communist municipalities as it has just lost Communist voters, its crisis
Finally, if the leadership didn't agree to go into the government, it would have had to face the party with empty hands, with 15 per cent of the vote...
and 38 per cent for the SP. Even if there are only four, the presence of Communist ministers in the government is seen as a major event. For the time being this can comfort the leadership. The American government's statement that Franco-American relations would be affected by the decision can add extra credibility to the decision to participate in the cabinet.
Conversely the opponents of participation will argue that the PCF took considerable risks in entering the government to manage the crisis. It will have to account for itself in the trade unions and workplaces. Aren't these risks too substantial when compared to the second rate ministerial posts and the completely subordinate position in relation to the SP? Such is the PCF's dilemma: between Charybdis and Scylla, it doesn't have much of a choice.
to Paris!
L'Humanite: 'Mitterand is the one for defeat'!
Four Communist Ministers all.
would be infinitely more serious.
95
', in
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
By contrast, for Francois Mitterand choosing Communist ministers is hopefully a promise of social peace. It bears witness to the SP's desire for unity. He recalled how he had conceived the composition of a Leftist government in 1968 and wrote: 'I thought the presence of Communists would reasssure people rather than scare them. That estimate may seem foolhardy today. But I knew that neither their numbers nor their function in the leadership team should scare reasonable people who recognised that the
CGT and Seguy were the last line of defense of public order which Gaullism could no longer uphold against the heavy blows of the supporters of revolu-
Nothing here should scare the American government and its statement is mainly intended to warn other countries (for example Italy, Spain and Portugal) insofar as the taboo against bringing Communists into the government has been violated. The agreement that was signed means the CP ministers are bound hand and foot and the American government knows this perfect-
One thing remains to be seen, the mobilisation of the workers and the amount of time they will give Mitterand and his government. In the factories, the relationship of forces between the SP and PCF is not the same.
The CGT remains by far the largest trade union (despite some losses since the victory of Francois Mitterand) and the CP apparatus control is far greater than the SP's. The PCF may decide to use the CGT to campaign more openly for some of its positions in the name of trade union independence.
For the time being, the workers remain cautious. One worker said in
L'Humanite on June 24: ' We know change won't happen overnight. We have to give the government time to breathe. We won't behave the same way as when Giscard was in power. It's not the same thing and we have to take that into account. ' But this attitude can change very quickly. The characteristic of the situation is the magnitude and speed of the changes in particular in the reactions of the working class and the rapid acceleration of
Various French newspapers have recently started to ask if the new government's 'period of grace' has come to an end. The answer is probably not yet, but certainly four months after Mitterrand's election - four months during which the government has done a lot - its policies to solve the crisis, to ensure full employment and to beat inflation are met with a certain scep-
The economic programme which the Socialists advanced prior to their arrival in office was very simple: a selective boost to public consumption to act as a catalyst to industrial investment which would slowly resolve unemployment. This dodged the very nature of the crisis: a growth in consumption could partially soak up overproduction in particular sectors like household consumer durables. But to go further and create new investment requires that the bosses are confident that the rate of profit will be restored. The policy of a selective boost in consumption is not enough to reassure them on
Although they did not say so, the French Socialists probably expected a boost in the economy from the end of 1981 which, de facto, would have relegated their policies to a series of secondary measures. But, at best, there will be no growth before late 1982. Thus the very poor salary increases
96 ly well.
events.
this score.
tion' (Ma part de verite, Paris, Fayard, p. 163).
ticism, inside the working class as well as outside.
International Marxist Revieu
which the government agreed in June and July, for the minimum wage and within the public sector, do not even aim to boost public consumption. Instead, the government has sought help from outside the country.
The Mitterrand government remembered that its natural partner, democratic and Keynesian management of the capitalist system, for example the 1924 Dawes Plan and the 1947 Marshall Plan. It was with hopes of a repeat performance that Mitterrand went to Ottawa in July. But the position of American imperialism has changed. The crisis of the international monetary system and the open economic crisis of 1974 have affected the position of the dollar. Hence the so called high interest rates policy, which aims to draw floating capital to the USA and to breathe new life into the dollar. In short American imperialism has changed from being a 'protector' ready to finance and harmonise the restructuring of capital, into a cruel and
A second option existed: a very substantial devaluation of the franc would have made French products competitive on the world markets. But with the participation of the franc in the European monetary system, such a devaluation could only be carried through the agreement of the other European states. The least that can be said is that they do not look ready to agree.
When Jacques Delors, the Finance Minister, proposed at the Franco-German summit in July and again in Copenhagen in August, a concerted fall in European rates, German Chancellor Schmidt made it known that, in his opinion,
As for the 'new world order' and 'Keynesianism on a world scale', so dear to the heart of Claude Cheysson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the present state of things, it is a subject of children's books and fairy tales. In a context where each bourgeois state and the multinationals based in each state know perfectly well how to organise beyond their own borders to pursue their own interests, and where the leading classes of the colonial countries aspire to a redistribution of world wealth, we must expect the world markets to resemble a battlefield rather than a 'new international order'
The road to real solutions of France's economic and social problems seemed littered with obstacles. This is why the government has so quickly adopted the policies of the Rocard minority in the Socialist Party: the pursuit of cheap and quick 'qualitative reforms'. Within a few months a series
Many of them are undoubtedly progressive. However limited, they contribute to undoing the spider's web which has steadily been woven by the strong state to restrict civil rights. The amnesty law has been very generous
— 6,212 prisoners were released — but it has also been extended to include sanctions taken against trade union representatives, even in the private sector. The State Security Court, a court totally controlled by whoever is in government, has been abolished. No political refugees have been extradited. The expulsion of immigrant workers has been suspended and the renewal of work permits simplified. Union rights have been steadily enlarged. Larzac will not be transferred to the Army but will remain in the hands of the peasants. A certain measure of devolution has been introduced as a
'concession' to movements of national minorities. And it is likely that in the near future, there will be other reforms removing repressive restrictions in
American imperialism, has greedy competitor.
this was a 'utopia'.
France under Mitterrand: results and prospects of measures of differing importance have been taken.
97 several times in the past financed social
the armed forces, on immigrant workers and on broader democratic rights.
All these are good measures. However, while they may have kept the press busy during the summer, when they are examined with a critical eye
The most limited reform pertains to immigrant workers. While the government has stopped expulsions, it has also reaffirmed its intention to halt immigration. The 9 August circular from Gaston Defferre, Minister of
Home Affairs, advocates 'not allowing entry on French soil of foreigners who use the benefits of a short stay to seek a job.' Furthermore, the government has already gone back on one of Mitterand's promises: to give immigrants the right to vote in local council elections. While Cheysson considered it good policy to repeat this promise when he went to Algiers to court the Algerian government he was immediately contradicted by the government in France who declared that this measure would not be applied in 1983 and as the next local council elections will not take place until 1989.
The law on decentralisation must be labelled a pretence. It is not the result of any titanic struggle between 'decentralisers' and 'Jacobins'. What is more, it contains very little progress on democratic rights and remains confused on a range of issues. The method of election of the regional councils it proposes is unclear: the division of power between the departments
(the French equivalent of counties) and the regions remains vague; the pro-
It is in other fields that clear reversals of Mitterand's promises can be seen. For example - abortion. The government has announced three decrees: abortion will be reimbursed via the national insurance scheme;
every hospital will have to perform abortions; and the required period of residence for foreign women prior to having an abortion will be reduced.
But these were not the only points in the Socialist Party programme. That document proposed that the period within which an abortion could be performed would be increased from 10 to 16 weeks; that parental consent would be abolished for minors; and that get-out clauses for doctors related to conscience would be tightened. None of these are mentioned today.
The same applies to nuclear energy. The government has stopped the construction of the Plogoff site which had become an international symbol of popular opposition to nuclear energy. But in the Socialist Party programme it was stated that 12 nuclear sites would be 'suspended' and Mitterrand repreated these promises to ensure that he won the ecology vote in the second round of the Presidential elections. To date, only five have actually been stopped and it can be safely assumed that after the debate announced for October work will recommence. With the expansion of the reprocessing plant at La Hague and the opening of the fast-breeder reactor at Malville the
Socialist Party seems set to complete the nuclear programme begun by Pom-
Even more spectacular is the attitude of the French government to the top hierarchy'. Defferre replied: "The unions have asked for heads. I refuse
As for the army, the Socialist Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu, began
98 they are at best very limited and at worst, fraudulent.
pidou.
to chop any.'
International Marxist Review blem of the distribution of resources is not dealt with.
his term in office by stating that Mitterrand's promise to reduce military service to six months could not be implemented. He went on to say that he would 'try and ensure that the soldiers' committees (democratic organsiations of rank and file soldiers) are dissolved'. Information inside the barracks is still censored — nine papers, including the French Trotskyist weekly, Rouge, are forbidden. Finally the government has carefuly avoided in-
With the summer over, the government is now faced with a worsening economic and social situation. Prices have risen considerably, some as a direct consequence of government decisions: 14 per cent on Parisian transport; 10 per cent on the railways; 17 per cent on electricity; and 15 per cent on gas before the government announcement of a limited prize freeze in September faced with the threat of inflation passing 15 per cent by the
In July there were 1,849,000 unemployed. The present rate of increase of unemployment is 26 per cent per annum as compared to 20 per cent in the last months of Giscard. By the end of the year unemployment will top 2 million. No serious policy has been applied to deal with unemployment and once again electoral promises have been forgotten. Mitterrand has promised the creation of 210,000 new jobs per year, of which 150,000 would be in the public sector. But in 1982 the latter figure has already been reduced to
65,000. At least the government could have forbidden lay offs and closures.
In fact since 10 May redundancies, liquidations and closures have occurred in quick succession. Mitterrand's '110 proposals' promised the right of veto to factory committees on issues of 'employment, redundancy, work
Mauroy declared: "The government does not intend to question the right of the owners to make decisions. There is no question of instituting a right of
The government invited the unions and owners to negotiate. The result was an agreement on 17 July in which the reduction of the working week by one hour to 39 hours was accompanied by a whole series of question marks against previous gains of the working class. It is clear that unless the workers intensify their pressure on the government there will be no ad-
The Socialist programme included the nationalisation of nine industrial groups, steel, nuclear armaments, space technology, banks and insurance.
The government has adopted a nationalisation bill dealing with only five groups and then only the parent companies. The economic experts of the
Socialist Party write: 'The bank and finance sector is probably the only one in which it is not possible to allow any private industry' and even here 136 foreign and 35 regional banks escape nationalisation. The business interests of the banks will be ceded to the private sector. Mauroy continually repeats that compensation will be fair. This news has been so well received that in dustrial and financial groups are purchasing large amounts of shares in potentially nationalisable firms. For example between 20 and 27 August share values in PUK rose by 12.8 per cent and by 38 per cent in CGE.
In this context it should come as no surprise to find that the government's foreign policy remains largely dependent on the American alliance. The
Franco-Mexican declaration on El Salvador which recognised the FMLN and
France under Mitterrand: results and prospects tervening against the bosses' private police.
end of the year compared to 13.6 per cent in 1980.
organisation, education schemes, and new technology' veto over redundancies.
vance on this agreement.
99
'. But on 6 September
100 International Marxist Revieu' FDR liberation organisations as 'political and representative forces' must not blind us. Far from representing a first step on the path of an authentic anti-imperialist policy it is firmly anchored in the constant preoccupation of the Socialist Party and the Socialist International lest the inflexibility of Reaganism should lead to a mass radicalisation and the extension of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.
In all other respects we see a foreign policy more and more aligned with Washington. Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Social Democrat, declared that: 'French foreign policy as regards East-West relations is harder than that of West Germany and closer to that of Reagan.' The Americans confirm this.
France may now use more diplomacy and less military interventions, especially in Africa, but deep down little has changed. On 21 August JeanPierre Cot stated: 'France will maintain its troops on the territory of its African allies until they are capable of ensuring their own security'. Did the government give a green light to the intervention of Senegal in Gambia? Did it back General Kolingba's removal of David Dacko in the Central African Republic? There are 1,200 French soldiers in Central Africa equipped with anti-tank weapons and heavy mortars. And like the other 12,000 French soldiers in Africa they are there to represent French 'African diplomacy' which, as before, mostly consists of creating and destroying governments. France remains an imperialist and colonial power. The government persists in regarding the French East and West Indies as Overseas Provinces and no steps have been taken in the direction of democratisation. French troops are still stationed there ready to break strikes while the media and press remain in the hands of the worst reactionaries.
So far neither its pro-American foreign policy nor 'gifts' in the class struggle have been enough to change the attitude of the ruling class to the government; investment will decline 12 per cent this year and 4 per cent next. The bourgeoisie does not consider the Mauroy government as its own nor as one it could use for its own benefit. It is a government born in the defeat of the bourgeois coalition and a victory of the workers' parties. Its origins mean that it will have to make some concessions to the workers. This is not what the ruling class wanted in its attempt to restructure the economy. Its own project is clear: to make the working class pay for the crisis by increasing unemployment, lowering the standard of living of the masses and attempting to reconstruct a more competitive economy at their expense. To do that a decisive defeat has to be inflicted on the working class. Obviously the Mauroy government is not a good instrument for this sort of venture.
A premature confrontation with the government, however, would be fatal for the ruling class; it is not a question of paralysing the government but rather of making life difficult. Rather than a test of strength the bourgeoisie is trying to show how the government is incompetent.
As far as the unions are concerned there has seemed to be a competition between them as to who could applaud loudest in the face of successive government capitulations. The CFDT (originally a Catholic union and now generally aligned with the Socialist Party) seemed to have seized the advantage by signing the agreement for the 39 hour week. Since then the CGT (the union dominated by the Communist Party) has made up lost ground and in the background of general praise for the Mauroy government it is difficult to
France under Mitterrand: results and prospects 101 see any differences between the unions.
In this context it is easy to understand the lack of new recruits. The rank and file are not happy. In the CFDT, many branches disapprove fo the 39-hour week agreement, while in Force Ouvriere (a right-wing, classcolaborationist union) many branches have voiced their opposition to the national position against inclusion of Communists in the government.
Government policies have also provoked a response within the mass working class parties. The Communist Party leadership, never one to do things by half, having been given four minor ministries in the government. now supports the party's complete integration within governmental structures. On 26 August Communist journalists received an internal memo stating that Socialist Party policies must be considered as 'globally positive that it has now become a question of 'enriching government policy and that they must abandon 'the tone of the past, that of an opposition part! Onviously these about-faces can make the membership sea-sick especially when it was only recently that they were being told that the Socialist Part! programme was 'globally negative' and that 'Mitterrand would perhaps he worse than Giscard.'
The Socialists themselves have not been spared the consequences of the Mauroy government. The party's strength lies in its tens of thousands of new members and its large number of new deputies but they also represent its fragility. The new members want change. The young deputies feel a responsibility to their electorate for the promises that were made during the electoral campaign. More and more often Mitterrand is being forced to use the authority given him by the bonapartist institutions of the Fifth Republic both to smooth over the difficulties arising from the differing opinions of various Socialist ministers and to avoid the spontaneous amendments being put forward by the young Socialist deputies.
The major problem facing the Socialist Party is the relationship between the party and the government. If the party became a simple transmission belt for government decisions it could lose its fundamental identity as a mass workers' party. But many Ministers are fearful of the 'subversive idea' that the party might determine governmental decisions. The Socialist leaders have attempted to set up commissions to harmonise the trio: party, parliament and government. The leaders of the party are all ministers and they never lose an opportunity to explain to their troops the necessity of solidarity with the government. Party conferences are normally presented with a range of counterposed resolutions representing the positions of the various long-standing political currents/tendencies within the party. This year the leaders of all currents have agreed to the production of one common text for the forthcoming congress in Valence with the aim of limiting the scope of discussion. The rank and file, who are unlikely to get the change to speak at the congress, do not share these views.
For the most part the workers believe in the Mauroy government which they elected. They see the government as an ally against the bosses and obviously demand much more from this government than they ever did from Giscard. As a consequence the traditional forms of militancy have been put in abeyance. Apart from an increase in membership of the Socialist Party there have not been any major shifts or movements within the working class. But the level of class consciousness remains quite high and it would be
102 International Marxist Review wrong to say that the class is passive - they are just waiting.
The workers still believe in the government - even more so since the unions keep repeating that 'the inheritance is heavy' and that they must 'wait'. Examining the most recent opinion polls it is clear that working class confidence is slightly shaken. There has been a 6-12 per cent fall in the popularity of the government but this has not been accompanied by a similar rise in the support for the bourgeois leaders. In all, 94 per cent of respondents were in favour of attacks on large personal fortunes, 74 per cent were for price controls, 21 per cent felt that the government was going too far, but 33 per cent considered it did not go far enough. It is clear that Mauroy would not lack public support if his government took more radical
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Poland and the Bureaucracy
Ernest Mandel
SPRING 1982• VOLUME1 NUMBER1
£1.25