Yugoslavia:
Some questions for a
balance sheet
THE YUGOSLAV syndrome is threatening the USSR. The two federations seem to have exploded in the same way, the crises resemble each other — up to the point of having similar difficulties in re-establishing what is called a "market economy", that is to say: capitalism. From this point of view, the Yugoslav crisis illustrates what is most general in the dead-ends of "really existing socialism". In many ways, the Yugoslav experience in the last decades prefigured many of the conflicts and contradictions that emerged later elsewhere in the Eastern Europe and the USSR.
But there are also other factors in the Yugoslav case: Yugoslavia did not annex Slovenia and Croatia by force, as the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic Republics; the "Titoist" regime resisted Stalin; finally the "command economy" has not existed in Yugoslavia for decades. The fragmentation of a federation which was no longer a "prison of the peoples" must be analyzed in a specific fashion.
There should also be a specific balance sheet of the Yugoslav economic crisis: the current free-market type answers have used the failure of the Yugoslav system of self-management as their argument, seeing it as the failure of any "third way" between capitalism and Stalinism. The "market economy" must be imposed against the self-management system, it is said, because this
114 International Marxist Review is inefficient faced with the market. It is therefore important to take up this specific discussion if one thinks that the search for a third way remains in the domain of the necessary and possible: the lack of choice and thus the end of history is the worst terrorism of liberal thought. Paradoxically, it converges with the vulgar determinism of the so-called Marxism of the Stalinist world of other days, simply reversing what was black and what was white.
Of course, not everything is possible in a given context. But it was necessary and possible to consciously resist a capitalist logic which, in the conditions of Yugoslavia, meant semi-colonial dependence, backwardness and dictatorship. It was necessary and possible to challenge the domination of market relations in favour of solidarity and being conscious of regional, material, social and cultural development. It was necessary and possible to call on popular mobilizations in order to resist Stalin and to struggle against the dictatorship of a parasitic bureaucracy.
In reality, the Yugoslav experience, if we study it without simply reducing it to the last ten years, tends to demonstrate that these goals were well-founded. It progressed beyond under-development, there was an improvement in the standard of living, there was resistance to Stalin and real innovations in the search for a method of planning which left room for initiative. But there was also the final failure.
Our general interpretation of this failure can be summarized in one central idea: it was the ambiguity and the national limits of the break with Stalinism which fundamentally weakened the capacity to resist capitalism. This is the reason why it was not really a third way. But there are two aspects in a semibreak. A lot can be learnt from everything that was resistance to the capitalist logic, particularly for the self-management system. In the same way, we can learn from the resistance to the dictates of Stalin: we can, much more than with Mao's China, see some indications of what could have been the third way. The Yugoslav break with the USSR occurred earlier and in a different geo-political context from China's. Thus legitimacy for the Yugoslav rupture was claimed from the experience of the October Revolution, the soviets, the Paris Commune, and from Marx against Stalin (and not from Stalin against Khrushchev, as was Mao's case).
This is why the Yugoslav "case" has a more general relevance. This arises several times when we think about those possible turning points in history, common to all the Eastern "bloc" countries, which could have seen other scenarios take shape: the attempt to establish a socialist federation or confederation of the Balkans, 1956, 1968...
This contribution to the necessary discussion will therefore cover three
Yugoslavia: questions for a balance sheet 115 points: first of all, against the fatalist view of history, locating those key moments when other paths were open; then, a summary of the balance sheet of the main phases of the Yugoslav system in order to, in third place, highlight some characteristics of the present crisis. Turning points in history
The Stalin/Tito break in 1947 was not a question of individuals and did not solely concern Yugoslavia and the USSR. The massive purges for "Titoism", continued those that had been made for "Trotskyism" and affected the Communist Parties in power and often others as well. However, the leaders of the Yugoslav revolution had had the same Stalinist practices against their own opponents as in the USSR. Tito declared himself the first Stalinist in the world"; and, up to and including at the Fifth Congress of the League of Communists (LCY) in 1948, criticisms of the Stalinist USSR were forbidden and repressed, politically and physically, in a last attempt to avoid the break. But the revolution had in fact been the first crisis of Stalinism as the system of domination of the world Communist movement. First of all, it did not respect the limits of the Yalta agreement, and the Stalinist conception of the antifascist struggle. The AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council, organized on a federal basis by the LCY) proclaimed a provisional government in the underground on the basis of a second power created by the armed struggle, against the repeated and furious recommendations of Stalin. He saw this as sabotage of his diplomatic policy.' The evident superiority and popularity of the Partisans struggle led by the Communists imposed itself on the Allies (to the detriment of the pro-royalist resistance of the Chetniks). Stalin therefore could not deny it. But he tried by all political, economic and police means to subordinate it. The fact that the seat of the Cominform was in Belgrade was useful from this point of view.
The Yugoslav revolution had a profound regional impact, and this was undoubtedly what decided Stalin to make the break. Because — and this was the first possible different path for history — a socialist confederation of the Balkans was being negotiated directly between the workers' parties of the countries concerned, from Yugoslavia to Greece, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania. It was Dimitrov the Bulgarian who naively revealed this in Pravda, and then had to make a self-criticism. Stalin first attempted to impose his own conception of the confederation, and then preferred to ruin everything. He denounced the "Titoist-fascist clique allied with imperialism"
International Marxist Review and imposed a total economic blockade on the part of all the "socialist" countries that had been brought back into line. Yugoslavia was delivered to the enemy.
But, in the immediate post-war period, the Western powers, which were themselves doing rather badly in Europe, could hardly hope to change the nature of the new Yugoslav regime. The aid which was given aimed to encourage "dissidence" with the Soviet Union in order to weaken it, and to influence Yugoslav foreign policy. But there were no domestic agents able to change the course of the social transformations started by the LCY. Closing the Yugoslav frontiers to Greek resistance fighters and the complacent attitude to the intervention in Korea were undoubtedly support given in return for the aid received. But the Yugoslav regime also sought to consolidate its working-class social base and its capacity to resist: the policy of intense planned industrialization and the introduction of the self-management system from above at the beginning of the 1950s were in pursuance of this goal. Obviously conscious of the dangers of lasting dependence on the United States, the Yugoslay leaders rapidly re-established links with the USSR after Stalin's death (thus losing American military aid). Unfortunately, repeated experience showed them that too great dependence on the USSR would also be dangerous.
The 1956 events showed this. This was a second possible different path for history and once again it concerned all the countries of Eastern Europe. Following the Khrushchev report, anti-bureaucratic revolutions broke out in Hungary and Poland. The Hungarian and Polish workers' councils were glorified by the Yugoslav regime as the illustration of the universal socialist character of its own choice of self-management. It drew from them a legitimization of its break with Stalin. It was in this context and with this approach that the first congress of the Yugoslav workers' councils took place at this time. But, with a centrist and hesitant attitude to Khrushchev who had publicly rehabilitated them, the Yugoslav Communists allowed the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the assassination of Imre Nagy. However, these episodes were a new source of tensions: the Communist Party of the USSR did not come to the 1958 congress and economic relations were once again tense. From this point of view, the Soviet intervention pushed the Yugoslav regime towards greater insertion in the capitalist world. This process took place contradictorily with an extension of self-management rights (see following point). The developing workers' strikes against the effects of the market reforms after 1965, the self-management, socialist and internationalist demands of
the student movement of June 1968, if victorious, would have had an impact on the Prague spring. It is striking that 1968 was once again one of those dates of world importance when different possibilities confronted each other in Yugoslavia. The defeat of 1968 and the repression of the 1970s marked the deep break of the intelligentsia with the regime, but also with Marxism. The intervention of Soviet tanks in Prague had the same effect in Czechoslovakia
Some concluding remarks on these different paths for history.
• First of all the role of the Soviet Union should be highlighted — its Stalinization, the purges imposed elsewhere, its use of economic constraints on the fraternal countries — at the turning points of 1947, 1956, 1968: because this illustrates to what extent the defeat is first of all due to political causes.
• Each of these turning points had at least a regional scope. And this was attractive by its economic and political democracy and its own efficiency,
• The Yugoslav revolution was thus closely dependent on developments around it. At the same time, it could also contribute to influencing them — which it partly did on several occasions. This is why the history of the Yugoslav regime itself should itself be studied. The Yugoslav revolution was no more "artificial" than the October revolution, although it was marked from its origins by Stalinist and bureaucratic practices: there again, internally, political factors had a central responsibility in its advances and in its failures.
• The revolution helped the potential of socio-economic progress and the realization of national rights, which is amply confirmed by comparison with the capitalist and Grand-Serb domination of the inter-war period. And this is
• This is also the point on which the capacity of resistance to capitalist pressure can be measured. When Stalin "excommunicated" the Yugoslav
Communists, he counted on the fact that, if he did not succeed in crushing them, reality would rapidly converge with calumny and that Yugoslavia would tip over into capitalist restoration. But, while pressures in this direction were manifested during the market reforms, a real restorationist dynamic was only unleashed with the current complete crisis. It was with the challenge to the standard of living, to existing social and national rights, in the context of a lack of a socialist alternative, that the era of capitalist restoration was opened. On this level the turning point in Yugoslavia was at the beginning of the 1980s where the weight of the foreign debt forced the introduction of a period of austerity. But this failure did not come from nothing.
and in the countries of Eastern Europe in general.
the scale on which a real "socialist camp"
would have been able to resist world capitalist pressure.
the reason for the failure of Stalin.
Yugoslavia: questions for a balance sheet 117.
, humanly and economically
118 International Marxist Review Therefore it should be understood as a failure of the Yugoslav system of its successive reforms and the form of Yugoslavia's insertion in the world economy. Failure of a system: what characteristics?
Obviously Yugoslav federalism and self-management can be studied separately. However, we will highlight the parallelism in the evolution in YugoSlav history. Because, once the break with Stalin was complete, they would both be at the basis of the particularities of the "Titoist" regime and have a common history.
To break with the previously glorified "socialist motherland" in 1947 was not a small affair. As has been said, self-management was introduced to consolidate the basis of the regime during a period of isolation created by the Soviet blockade. It was one of the essential and durable forms of legitimization of the "Titoist" regime. The national question was imposed on a party which could never have been victorious in its struggle for power without the federative organization of the people's army and then the new state. We can say that in general the pillars of the regime were: extended rights in self-management and for the republics, accompanied by a rise in the standard of living. But what relationship was there between self-management, republics and federal state/party in taking political and economic decisions?
In both fields — self-management and national rights — the behaviour of the Communist leaders was the same: considerable pragmatism within the limits of a single-party system which would continue until 1989 despite its growing fragmentation on a national basis. The "Titoist" answer to movements from below was always a mixture of repression and concessions. This would mean in practice banning the independent movements, whether trade-union, national or political. But, as in all these domains there was no lack of conflicts, the room for initiative and rights for the enterprises and the republics or provinces was broadened, thus moving away from the administrative planning method. But this took place without political pluralism, without confrontation of alternative programmes; without real clarity of choices, without a challenge to the monopoly of power held by a party without the tendency rights and without democratization of the state and the forms of planning. The legal powers of the workers' self-management system and those of the republics and provinces increased with all the major institutional changes up
Yugoslavia: questions for a balance sheet 119 to the death of Tito in 1980, coinciding with the economic crises. But their reality and their efficiency should be interpreted within the context of the political system and the mode of economic regulation: that is to say in the relationship of the plan/market/political system. Without going into detail here, it should be said that this relationship changed during the three main periods marked by the reforms. To recall the main features which characterized them:
From the beginning of the 1950s up to 1965, the main strategic choices were still planned, imposed on the self-management system as well as on the republics. The party/state remained very federalist, that is to say with a central regime which was imposed on the republics. It was also imposed on the self-management system (in fact co-management shared between local authorities, enterprise managements, workers' collectives and trade unions). This self-management was thus exercised within the framework of the constraints on norms, on prices or taxes and on credit which were in fact the new instruments of the plan, in place of direct orders. Other than the norms imposed on the sharing out of the surplus between different funds of the enterprise, there could be "self-financing" and decentralized choice of investment, but there were also subsidies which encouraged the choice of national sources of energy and taxes on profits which limited the capacity for selffinancing and made the enterprise dependent on central credits. These credits in turn could depend on which sectors were judged to be the priority, the banking system in this case being an instrument for implementing the plan.
The tensions between the self-management system and the state, and the republics and the state which were expressed in this period did not prevent one of the highest growth rates in the world (on average higher than 10%) accompanied by a real improvement in the standard of living. The victory over fascism, then the resistance to Stalin and finally the improvement of the standard of living strengthened the power of the Communists. Socialism was considered as a goal to achieve and Yugoslav society was the subject of critical Marxist studies whose influence was preponderant among the intelligentsia and the youth.
Entire regions were industrialized, but not without bureaucratic waste, prestige investments and sometimes exorbitant costs. Tensions with the USSR pushed Yugoslavia to turn more to the capitalist world to balance its dependence. But, in the mid-1960s, pressures in favour of increased market relations were expressed by the increased role of "economists". The supporters of "market socialism" were the ideologues of a self-management system freed from the constraints of the plan and the state but subject to the laws of
120 International Marxist Review competition. They were at the same time in favour of more rapid growth for the rich republics with a reduction of redistributive role of the plan which was considered to be ineffective. Finally, they used the economic boom to justify a reduction in protection in foreign trade in order to allow the pressure of international competition to have its effects on an economy which they wanted to be more efficient.
The 1965 reform (interrupted in 1971) therefore aimed at using capitalist methods and pressures on a non-capitalist economy. The self-managed enterprises were going to be more "free" but more and more subject to the logic of market competition between themselves and faced with the world market. There was to be an increase in the powers of the enterprises and the republics to the detriment of the centre (at the level of the state and the party but on the basis of an extension of market relations. Although unemployment appeared, it was not related to a reduction of the workforce and still less to bankruptcies: it was due to inadequate investment and slowing down of hirings because of the effect of market mechanisms. But the workers used their rights to hire and fire to ensure job security. Nor was there a capital market. Getting richer on the basis of the work of others was rigidly restricted to enterprises of five employees, and illicit privatization was very unpopular. The right to manage the surplus of the enterprises belonged to the workers' councils, which limited the enthusiasm of foreign investors, although these were now allowed in the context of mixed enterprises.
In general, vertical conflicts (workers/managers) and horizontal conflicts (because of the inequalities due to the market) developed between 1968 and 1971 and were expressed politically in the student movement which demanded "self-management from bottom to top", a halt to privatizations, to privileges, to censorship and to market relations, particularly in the cultural field. But, in the rich republics, national demands went in the other direction: increase in financial, economic and political autonomy. Market logic favoured the sectors in good position without the others accepting the rules of this game: inflation spread with the inequalities of the branches and regions — that is to say also according to the republics and provinces. Several different methods of distribution and income were in conflict: "according to their work" or according to the results of sales in the market, all combined with distribution according to rank in the hierarchy. The differences in the standard of living grew. Strikes spread. But there were also conflicts between the republican governments and the federal centre around the question of hard currency. This particularly concerned Croatia which enjoyed a touristic coastline.
Yugoslavia: questions for a balance sheet 121
After the strikes and the student movement at the end of the 1960s, the "Croatian spring" of 1971 was the catalyst for a final "Titoist" turn: repression of all dissidents, reaffirmation of the "leading role of the party", favoured by the electoral system, strengthening of the role of the army in the state apparatus — that was one side of the coin. On the other was the new "law on associated work" and the confederalization of the system. Once again workers' rights and those of the republics and provinces were reinforced. Workers' rights were reinforced on the basis of a new system of contractual planning between "the base units of associated work" (equivalent to workshops or small enterprises supposed to be more easily controlled by the workers), to the detriment of the technocrats' powers which had been strengthened in the previous phase. As for national questions, Tito prepared "post-Titoism" by introducing collegiate forms of leadership. These were to respect the "ethnic key", that is to say equal representation of the republics and provinces whatever their size, an annual rotation of the presidency and the right of veto.
The 1970s were the last period of economic growth. But this was a growth based on considerable foreign and domestic indebtedness. At the moment that the capitalist world was going into crisis, the countries of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia received, as did the "underdeveloped" countries, abundant credit to pay for massive imports. The Yugoslav regime, in this last turn before the crisis, moderated its dependence on the capitalist world by increasing trade with the COMECON countries. But this was essentially balanced by barter exchanges, even if these were quoted in convertible currency. Yugoslavia easily exported to the East, but found less to import. The bulk of the debt was to countries with convertible currency, particularly after the oil crises. Relying on the world prices of the 1960s, Yugoslavia had largely given up using its own coal. It found itself obliged to undertake slow and painful reconversion. Its economy was extremely compartmentalized. All the margins of unlimited financing for investment were used. Contractual planning, which had replaced the market competition of the previous phase, meant in practice a banking system subordinated to the indebted enterprises and local and republican governments. An each-for-their-own attitude developed without any accompanying mechanism for re-absorbing waste. The regions with traditional industries moved further away from those without and turned more and more towards trade with Western Europe.
The debt was the price to pay for growing internal inefficiency. It got worse at the beginning of the 1980s with the rise in interest rates and the dollar in the context of international trade concentrated among rich countries.
122 International Marxist Review
The self-management system continued to protect bankrupt enterprises from closure and redundancies. It was therefore judged responsible for the inefficiency of the system by the free market experts. But for them and, behind them the creditors, the laws of the market meant a strong federal state capable of imposing these laws not only against the self-management system but also against the republican and provincial governments. These latter tried for their part to consolidate their base by playing on nationalist feeling. The crisis
The crisis was thus a crisis of the self-management system and of federalism at the very moment that austerity and debt repayment became the main goals of the government. Because the pillars of the regime were collapsing, there was of course a crisis of "socialism", ", a political and moral crisis deepened by corruption and careerism in the party/state apparatus. The apparatus had repressed its most prestigious intellectuals during the 1970s. During the 1980s, the workers left the party en masse.
Up to 1989, the Yugoslav crisis was first of all the product of its own contradictions. The Gorbachev reforms were seen with relative disinterest from the country where, in many aspects, they had already been applied. Slovenia introduced a certain democratization of political life sooner than the others with the development of democratic movements tolerated by the reforming Communists. But the final explosion of the party/state(s) and of pluralism were stimulated by the upheavals underway in Eastern Europe at the end of the decade.
Capitalist restoration turned out to carry the threat of socio-economic regression in Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia) as much as it did in Poland. It involved changing governments which tried to modify the state and behind that the relations of production and property. But at what level (republican federal?) and to the benefit of which state power and which social layers was this restoration taking place? These are same questions as in the Soviet Union. The elimination of self-management rights and the appropriation of property by the republics are for the moment taking the form of rather fragile "statization" projects: nationalism is likely to run into conflict with new a domination coming from the multinationals or powerful capitalist neighbours. But, in the immediate, the socio-economic questions are pushed into the background (except partially in Slovenia) by the war which is spreading without being declared. It has several causes.
Yugoslavia: questions for a balance sheet 123 The crisis stimulated trends to recentralization and to fragmentation, behind which lie questions of power. These trends have continued with the process of capitalist restoration and given rise to several types of conflicts which exist simultaneously. The wars within the war
The first is between the free market government of Ante Markovic and the (also free market) governments of the Croatian and Slovene republics. When the federal army intervened in Slovenia in June 1991, it had the support of the Markovic government and, de facto, of the Western powers. But they were confronted with the resistance forces of the republics and the logic specific to the army.
The second type of conflict puts all the republican governments affirming their sovereignty or their independence against the federal army, whose reason for being and privileges depend on the continuation of a Yugoslav state. As the central government of Ante Markovic had no support from the republics, the only force defending a Yugoslav (be it a "Serboslav") state remains the Serbian government. This is why the army tended to support it, thus losing its characteristics of a plurinational army.
That is to say that the third conflict, that which is at the front of the stage, pits the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic (supported by Montenegro) against its own provinces and against all the other republics. The project of bringing together all Serbs in the same state, which is now put forward by the Serbian authorities, supported by the federal army, challenges the integrity and identity of the other republics. This nationalism is different from the others in that it is supported by the army, which gives it the means to have an expansionist policy. This has been able to develop using a strong lever: the denunciation of threats of "genocide" against the Serbs coming from the independent Croatian state, wrongly identified with the Ustashi state of 1941. The real uprising of a section of the Serbian village population is accompanied by terrorism against all the Serbs who "collaborate" by wanting coexistence. The redoubtable propaganda of the official Serbian media, exploiting the memory of the Ustashi state's crimes in 1941, is based on the existence of real Ustashi groups and the initial vulgar nationalism of the Tudjman government.
The equilibrium of national rights established in the last constitution of Tito's time, that of 1974, was first broken by the Slobodan Milosevic govern-
124 International Marxist Review ment in 1986: this reaffirmed the sovereignty of his republic to the detriment of the rights acquired by the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The demonstrations of support for the Kosovo Albanians, in Croatia and Slovenia, were quickly abandoned in favour of each republic withdrawing into its own cause. The changes in the republican constitutions and then the unilateral declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia were in their turn violations of a constitution which only accepted the dissolution of the Yugoslav framework by common agreement (this is the legality which the Yugoslav army and the Serbian authorities claim). An artificial Yugoslavia?
But, in the end, does not the collapse reveal the artificial nature of Yugoslavia? Is not democracy the end to the enforced collaboration of different nations and nationalities? Should not the independence of each one be imposed unilaterally as a step forward?
On the contrary, the close intertwining of nations and nationalities on Yugoslav territory (and in the Balkans) justifies a federation or confederation as a better answer to the national question than an impossible ethnically pure slate or an assimilationist nation/state like the first Yugoslavia. The common search for a federative response, cohabitation and mixed marriages were a reality for several decades, despite the atrocities of the Second World War. Only the Albanians of Kosovo were reduced to having to accept falling back on the Yugoslav state structure after the failure of Balkan confederation. And even up to the summer of 1991, the predominant answer was a new union of sovereign states and not simple dissolution. This remains a necessary answer because the territory is ethnically mixed. But it would also be a lesser evil for dealing with the big differences in economic development in a context where the free-marketeers' drive to a unified market will deepen them further. But it would only be a progress if the sovereignty of the state meant democratic control by the populations concerned over the major questions affecting them. The nature of the regime, its form, pluralist national rights, links with other communities and socio-economic changes are thus not simple whims. A self-determination which discriminates against minorities or other nations and nationalities is hardly progressive. We are faced with a historical situation which is not the liberation of Yugoslav from the colonial yoke, nor forced annexations, nor Yugoslavia dominated by one nation, but a new specific situation.
The present fragmentation is not the product of democracy. It is the doing of non-democratic governments on the one hand and the result of deep socioeconomic crisis which is deepening differences on the other. Some (the richer) think that they will be still richer if they do not have to carry along the other "incapables". They hope to cling on more easily to capitalist Europe while the ship sinks, and the others feel offended by the arrogance of the first and harmed by a division of labour which made them the suppliers of raw materials at prices lower than the world rate. The threats of recentralization by the totalitarianism of the market of by a Great Serb regime allied with the army are the immediate causes of a fragmentation fed by other deeper reasons.
The reality is that the lack of openness in the system, the lack of control by those concerned over choices and results — the lack of self-management of the plan in the strategic questions — have undermined all solidarity. The market regulations have only made this lack of openness and disaggregation worse. It is however impossible to do without a certain market, relations with the world market, a certain call on private capital. The whole question is: to do what? So, who decides, who controls, who judges what is the efficient way of doing something (from the point of view of the communities con-
See Histore des democraties populares de Francois reto, as well as the accounts by tr fficial historian of the Yugoslay regime, V. Dedijer, and those of Milovan Djila suda Breche, Paris and Note astor Study and Resence amsterdam.
3. See in International Viewpoint, articles by Michèle Lee and Catherine Verla on Yugoslavia, cerned) or not?
Notes ud/La Brèche
No 8/9 "Plan, market, democracy"
especially Kosovo. See also IMR No 9 (Vol 4 No 2).
Yugoslavia: questions for a balance sheet 125
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