KERALA ELECTION SHOWS SHARP POLARIZATION OF FORCES by HIMOO KALANI
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL India
So the die is cast. The dust and fury of the months preceding the election in Kerala have subsided, even if temorarily. The post-election party alignments in this prolem state have now emerged clearly. To understand the Political situation in Kerala today as well as to anticipate possible future orientation, ones poacal sympathies indian tpaulie ear the side objective analysis of the election results,
One thing about the Kerala election that strikes us at
10 the 120 a rid the new enlie: out
will be composed, the CP has gained, together with its "independent' allies, only 29 seats, the United Democratic Front, comprising the Congress, Praja Socialist Party and the Muslim League, has obtained a crushing majority of 97 seats (Congress, 63; P SP, 20; Muslim League, 11). The other 3 seats were shared each by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Karnatac Samity and an unaffiliated independent. ' The following table shows the votes received by the major parties in the 1957 and in the 1960 elections:
TABLE I Total votes polled (1960) 8,200,000 Total votes polled (1957) 5,900,000
Congress PSP ML Combined % C P% C-PSP-ML votes votes polled polled 1960: 2,791,294 1,146,029 399,928 4,337,251 52.8 3,550,136
(43.3%0) 1957: 2,209,251 528,261 205,698 3,043,210 51.5 2,308,408
It appears from the above table the CP and its UDF opponents got 96% of the total votes polled and 123 seats out of 120. The other parties were virtually wiped out lhe whole population of Kerala seems to have dividec into two camps, supporters of the CP on the one hand and their bitterest opponents on the other hand, thus showing polarization of forces. this election and CP-supported Independents contested 125 seats, lost 96 of them and gained only 29. (In the old Assembly they commanded 65 seats) Even if we add to it the I1 seats which the CP lost by a margin of less than 1000 votes the number of CP controlled seats could not exceed 40; for an absolute majority they would still require 24 more seats in a House of 126 How can the CP explain the loss of so many such a large margin (ie more than 1000 votes)? Besides their political prestige has slumped heavily due to the defeat of 7 ministers of the old ministry; only 4 Ministers, including Premier E M S Namboodiripad, could manage to get elected. The Riddle of Increased CP votes
Political observers have already noticed an apparently paradoxical phenomena evident in this election. Although the CP's performance has been very poor so far as the gaining of seats is concerned, they have succeeded in getting not only 12 lakhs of more votes in this election (compared to 1957 election) but have actually improved heir relative position vis-a-vis the UDF parties. An ex. • amination of Table I would clearly show this. While the Congress - PSP - ML votes recorded an increase of only 1.3%, the CP votes rose by 4.3%. How to explain these two apparently contradictory facts?
69
One explanation immediately offers itself. Compared to the 1957 election, there has been a sharp increase number of straight contests in this election, due to the UDF alliance. The CP lost much of the advantage it enjoyed last time due to the splitting of the non-C P votes.
The fact that the CP had to face straight contests in 42 more seats than the last time certainly contributed subto this factor, appears to provide an oversimplified planation of a much more complicated situation.
The above assumption may be contested two very important grounds: First, it may be held that the increase in CP votes is partly explainable by the fact that the CP contested 125 seats in 1960, compared to 100 seats in 1957. Thus, the increased vote may very well indicate an actual recording of the potential CP sympathisers of 1957, and not a real increase of new adherents.
Secondly, if the CP has lost mainly because of the combination of all the opposition votes, then how to explain the loss of 18 seats (out of 34) which the CP won in 1957 by absolute majority. Another significant fact to be noted in this connection is the drastic reduction in the margin of votes, even where the CP candidates have won, except certain isolated areas like Palghat and Calicut. Some notable examples will illustrate this point. Five of the defeated CP ministers lost their seats which they held last time by absolute majority, while the Revenue Minister Mrs K R Gouri, although returned, had her margin of votes reduced by half in 1960. All the above facts testify to a serious loss of CP's influence among a substantial section of the Kerala people, even in areas that were once CP strongholds, such as Quilon, Alleppey and Trichur. The last two columns in Table III amply bear this out. They show the increase in the total votes and increase in CP votes, only for those seats which the CP contested both in the 1957 and the 1960 elections. It clearly demonstrates that the increased polling benefited everywhere the anti-C P forces; only in Palghat and Calicut the majority of the increased votes went to the CP.
The following table, which shows district-wise election results, gives a deeper insight into the situation, indicating how the CP lost and the PDF reaction gained in the different districts.
Number of Contestants for a single seat 2 3 More than 3 1960: 63 34 9 1957: 21 58 35
One significant feature of this election is the universal defeat of the CP candidates in all the urban centres i e in all the district headquarter towns of the above 9 districts as well as in 4 other important towns - Changanacherry, Mattancherry, Fort Cochin and Tellicherry. The relatively higher level of political activity among the urban people which generally operates in favor of the leftists and against the Congress in other parts of India, is here found to operate against the CP. In Quilon where there are many cashew nut factories and mineral industries and in Allep pey which is an industrial area, possessing numerous coir factories, the CP has suffered major reverses. In Alleppey, they lost 3 seats, including one held by the labor minister T V Thomas. This reflects undoubtedly the popular verdict on the anti-labor policies of the CP ministry. Comparatively, they have gained greater votes in rural areas.
70 This is partly due to the selfish political thinking of the rural people and may be partly due to some of the progressive features of the Agrarian Bill and other land reforms enacted by them. Brightest spot
The brightest spot in CP's election record is provided by that CP bastion Palghat. Although district, they have suffered a net loss of one seat (losing 2 old seats and gaining a new one their percentage ot votes has increased enormously from 45 of total votes to 54%, an absolute majority in the district as a whole. (See also Table III, last 2 columns.)
consider all the relevant tioned above, we come nearer to solving the riddle of CP's utter defeat in the election, matched by a higher percentage of votes. This is due mainly to two factors: contesting more seats (25 more) and intensive working of certain areas, mostly rural, as in Palghat, side by side with a uniform activity maintained throughout the state, as reflected in higher CP votes almost everywhere within the State. The 1960 election has definitely proved CP to be, still, the strongest party in the State, taken singly. In the 1951-52 election, the Congress and the PSP got 35.5% and 14.30% votes respectively; in 1960, the votes are again 34.2% and 14%. In the meantime the CP votes steadily increased from 23 to 43%. These figures sufficiently speak for themselves. Why Reaction Triumphed? Society and the Muslim League, the Catholic Church and the opportunist PS P. During this election, this alliance became more consolidated. All the reactionary forces and
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL vested interest groups in Kerala and outside combined together in a determined move to rout out the CP from the soil of Kerala. Unlimited resources financial, cracy narang communism Agaid to toe dabo cracy" against the CP's organisational performance is quite im-
But it could have been much better its criminal had not the CP planter and anti-working class polic. Even in regard to antagonized the masses the last July movement, they should have followed a dual policy, displaying an attitude of understanding and conciliation towards the masses engaged in the movement and a stern attitude towards the reactionary leaders
What the CP ministry did was reverse. Motivated by cowardice, they adopted the attitude towards their leaders for tear ot displeasure of their mentor, the Nehru Government, while in relation to the masses themselves who responded to the call of these very leaders they gave a free hand to the triger happy police, knowing fully well that the Nehru Government itself being a party to indiscriminate outrages against the people all over India, would not take any exception
It is particularly noteworthy that the constituencies where the CP suffered worst defeats are places that witnessed the most brutal police against the people. (See Table III). Thus in Trivandrum in last July, two CP ministers were defeated party could retain only case with the labor dominated districts of Allepey and Quilon. In Ernakulam a few persons died owing to firing during the July movement and look at the
In Trichur which was once a was retained out of 8. The lessons of all this are obvious
TABLE III
P SP
No. of
Congress
ML
District
1960
1957
1960
1957
1957 1960 1957 seats
Trivandrum
Quilon
Alleppey
Kottayam
10
Ernakulam
Trichur x
Palghat alicut
8
1
Cannanore
CP
Total
CP votes
1960
189,589
91,663
8
76,614
192,907
10
159,624
55,011 x
229,705
62,102
180,238
73,039
203,120
57,161
256,350
161,838
212,812
133,113
3
88,422
214,283
8
*
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