RESOLUTION ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN
FRANCE AND ON OUR TASKS (EXTRACTS)
Documents The evolution of French capitalism has unfolded in the last years under the sign of a contradiction which demanded a solution: on the one hand, industry, agriculture, and even the network of commercial distribution have been modernized at a rapid tempo, imperceptibly removing the traditional image of backward French capitalism; on the other hand, France carries the burden of an old-style colonial empire, in the maintaining of which she has been bogged down in incessant colonial wars, handicapping the development of the economy and in any case doomed to defeat.
The process of modernization of the French economy was part of the more generalized development of European capitalism, and of the European economic intregration today personified in the Common Market.
The choice for this integration signified on the part of French capitalism the irrevocable decision to maintain, accelerate and extend its course towards modernization of the economy, to the detriment of the special situations and forces which placed a paralytic burden on the political institutions of the country - to wit, parliamentary democracy in the style of the Third and Fourth Republics.
Apart from the parliamentary strength of the Communist Party of France, the fragmentation of the bourgeois parliamentary forces and the influence of the different pressure groups, often representing retrograde economic gave an instability to bourgeois political power, hardly propitious to the achievement of the urgent and vital needs of big capital.
In opposition to the decision to step up the modernization of the economy, especially urgent because of the acceleration of European integration and the demands of the Common Market, there stood, objectively, from the eruption of the Algerian revolution onwards, the specitic coalition which was established between the army, the settlers and the metropolitan extreme Right.
It is in fact the army, with the overwhelming part of its strength posted outside the metropolis, in the war against the Algerian revolution, excessively the importance extreme Right in the political evolution of France in these last years, and which until the present time effectively countered the "liberal" towards which, because of a better understanding of objective conditions and its own long-term interests, big capital tends.
The army, humiliated by its previous colonial defeats, transplanted to Algeria in this frame of mind, and in alliance with the reactionary mass of the settlers, provided itselt with exceptional conditions, weighting the political evolution of the country in an ultra-reactionary sense.
every way essential; also because the political means to control the excesses of the army were lacking, even had it wished to do so. The tendency of the French big bourgeoisie towards a "strong state" corresponded to the need to accelerate modernization under way of the economy and the empire, fettered by the parliamentary institutions of the Fourth Republic and their way of tunctioning.
On the other hand, the "liberalism" of the colonial policy of big capital did not go and never can go beyond certain political reforms and concessions, without putting the fundamental interests of French imperialism in Africa in danger. In the more concrete case of Algeria, the "liberalism" of French big capital could not permit it to contemplate the loss of its effective control of the Sahara. On the contrary, its "liberalism" in looking for a political solution in Algeria is determined in reality by its concern to safeguard its Saharan interests by dint of political concessions made in time in face of the strength and tenacity of the Algerian revolution.
Finally, within the framework of the institutions of the Fourth Republic there was lacking to French big capital the practical possibility of controlling the army under the concrete conditions of the Algerian war. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUP OF MAY 13. 1958
5. May 13 signified a very grave defeat for th‹ French workers' movement. For a time it was weigher down, apart from the apathy of the masses and the demoralizing effects of their defeat without a fight, by the united strength of all the capitalist and reactionary torces, and by the threat to the legal existence of working-class organizations.
From the viewpoint of big capital, the unique success of the May 13 operation consisted in its ability, having paralyzed the masses, to transform a super-nationalist and ultra-reactionary crisis into a victory for the political power of big capital in the greatest and purest concentration ever reached in the recent history of the country. This operation was made possible thanks to the instalment in power of the Bonapartist de Gaulle and of his government of high-grade clerks, experts and functionaries, in the service of big capital.
For a whole period after the May 13 coup there was installed a sort of political dual power of the bourgeoisie that in Paris, with de Gaulle clearly representing French
12 big capital; that in Algiers, of the coalition of the ultrareactionary forces of the army, the settlers and the economically retrograde layers of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie.
Profiting from his Bonapartist power, de Gaulle for a whole period avoided a direct conflict with the power in Algiers. On the contrary, strong in the support given series of deep-s gog enmint te for ed home, ancil.
and social reforms, accentuating the grip of big industrial and finance capital on the life of the country, tending to sweep aside the obstacles which stood and still stand in the way of its capitalistic modernization.
Thanks to this de facto alliance between the two powers during the whole of the first phase of the Gaullist régime, above all against the Communist Party and paliamentary democracy à la Fourth Republic ("the system"), the "operation Pinay" could be forced through, hat is to say, a sharp and very considerable lowering of the standard of living of the masses. Integration into the Common Market imposed on the bourgeoisie the immediate necessity for such an operation.
Unable to support at the same time the colonial war, the modernization of the economy and the standard of living conceded to the masses, big capital decided on a first recovery at the masses' expense (the Pinay devaluation). To carry through this operation at a minimum risk, it had largely to weaken and paralyze the workers' organizations and eliminate for a whole period all forms of parliamentary opposition (plenary powers). doubt and confusion into the "integrationist" biguity, by introducing equivocation, Algeria, de Gaulle has at the same time little by little undermined the basis of this policy, fragmenting, isolating and paralyzing the ultra-Rightist forces.
In the concrete French conditions which resulted from May 13, the way de Gaulle has proceeded, macchiavellian and cowardly as it may seem, was determined not least by the relationship of forces between the two centers of bourgeois political power, as much as by de Gaulle's concern not to wound or alienate the army by the background pro-
De Gaulle's "cunning" is the way taken by the conscious big bourgeoisie to settle accounts inside the bourgeois and pro-bourgeois camp, and attain its aims in the minimum time and cost, without having provoked the intervention of the masses at any time. THE TURN OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1959
The new Algerian policy announced by de Gaulle in his speech of September 16 corresponds to the views of French big capital in this matter. It reflects, moreover, the increase in the latter's political power by comparison with the second power in Algiers. Confronted by the strength and tenacity of the Algerian revolution; by the failure and impotence of military "pacification"; by the worsening prospects for the whole reformed African empire and for the economic interests of French imperialism in the Maghreb which continuation of the Algerian war represented; by, finally, the serious economic and financial handicap which this war constituted for the plans for modernization and European integration of French capitalism, the latter is now hurrying to put forward its "liberal" solution for Algeria.
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL
This solution - whatever it may be - would not sacrifice the economic interests of French capitalism in the Sahara. Moreover, it would not ignore, in the concrete conditions which still prevail in Algeria, the reactions of the settlers and of a considerable part of the army staff, with eventual repercussions in Rightist circles in France itself. It has on the other hand to take into account the difficulty, greater than ever, of finding, in the present state of mind which characterises the rank and file of the Algerian revolution, trained and matured in bloody struggle, its morale strengthened by recent military and diplomatic successes of the revolution, any treachery to the revolution.
Under these conditions, the effective cessation of hostilities will imply concessions to the Algerian revolution which de Gaulle is still far from having formulated, and which still appear unacceptable not only to the settlers but to a considerable section of the army general staff.
Whence the prospect of difficult negotiations, long drawn out, extended eventually over ever some years to come, opening on a solution still uncertain, in the midst of an armed struggle which is holding out, and of violent crises inside the bourgeois camp in France.
7. Through these crises it will be possible at least in part to overcome the present apathy of the metropolitan masses and to a certain extent to set them against the most reactionary forces, but without in this eventuality minimizing the danger of a fresh prolonging of the popularity of de Gaulle and his régime.
Helped by economic developments in the sense that the recession has been left behind, and a new recovery of European and world capitalism, the popularity of the Gaullist régime will certainly be reënforced in the event that it can announce a successful solution of the Algerian question.
On the other hand, in the case of the war being prolonged in the absence of sufficient concessions to the Algerian revolution through de Gaulle's own resistance or that of the army before which he would have bowed, the setting of the masses in motion once again, against those resistances and for immediate peace in Algeria could, under certain conditions, on the contrary, make the Algerian solution appear as a victory of the masses themselves against de Gaulle.
In this case, the internal divisions in the bourgeois camp and the blows which the Algerian revolution would inflict upon it could modify the relationship of forces anew somewhat in favour of the working-class forces, without this modification permitting the rapid overcoming of the effects of the defeat of May 13 and opening up revolutionary prospects in France itself.
This, naturally, is the prospect which it would be necessary to work to achieve in redoubling the mass political campaign for the immediate opening of negotiations with the G P R A with a view to a swift solution guaranteeing the free self-determination of the Algerian masses and their right to independence. In this campaign, the number one task of the present phase for the French proletarian vanguard, our organisation must play the rôle of pioneer at the level of activisation and coördination of the campaign.
he new period. in which the Bonapartist régime o e Gaulle is obliged, to reach a solution of the Algerial question, to place itself in opposition on this very question to that reactionary wing which bore it into power
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL on May 13, offers in this respect better objective possibilities for the workers' struggle both on the economic plane and on political problems (beginning with the Algerian question.)
The danger lies, above all, in the "Left Gaullism" of the traditional leaderships, whether proclaimed openly as in the case of Guy Mollet, or having become so de facto, as in the case of the Thorez. leadership since the prospects of a summit conference materialized and since Khrushchev lent his support to the proposals of September 16. This "Left Gaullism" merely aims at support for de Gaulle with a view to reaching a "liberal" solution on Algeria, independently of any struggle against the régime - being, in fact, opposed to any struggle against this régime.
If this treacherous attitude of the traditional leaderships is perceived with greater difficulty by the broad mass of militants on the level of the struggle against the Algerian war, the consequences of this policy of indirect collaboration with the ruling power will be, on the contrary, all the more obvious, above all to the trade-union rank and file. THE LONGER-TERM PROSPECT
8. As to the more long-term prospect on the morrow of the Algerian solution which French imperialism will be forced to find, the latter will then attain a degree of relative stability greater than in the past, in the context of the relative stability which European capitalism in general has known for some years.
The Algerian solution will permit French imperialism to lessen the tensions within its African empire, to acquire in the process an elasticity in its reform of the latter, to open for itself the prospects of exploitation, with the countries of the Maghreb, of the riches of the Sahara, to recuperate the economic and financial resources wasted in the Algerian war, to facilitate the process of modernization of its economy integrated within that of the Common Market.
In the event, however, that the Algerian revolution
43 but should drive forward with élan as a permanent revolution extending over the entire Maghreb this would enteeble, trom the beginning and very considerably, the African colonial outposts of French imperialism. It is, among other things, the fear for this eventuality which compels de Gaulle to seek out a compromise solution
In any case, in the circumstance where the compromise on Algeria does not signify a de facto capitulation of the Algerian revolution - this latter eventuality appears extremely improbable - the important victory for this revolution which this compromise would anyhow represent will anyway stimulate the revolution in all the solution of the Algerian problem, while they will The problems of French capitalism immediately after not be absolutely identical with those of the other advanced European capitalist countries, will tend to become similar. The traditional image of a French capitalism much retarded by comparison with that of countries like Germany, Britain, Belgium, Holland and north Italy will no longer be valid. France, especially now under the Gaullist régime, is in process of attaining, in her turn, the level of advanced European capitalism, with some points, some branches and certain sectors being among the most modernized.
Consequent on the ultra-opportunist and class-collaborationist policy of the reformist and Stalinist leaders, the revolutionary crises which French capitalism experienced immediately after the war and during the colonial wars in Vietnam and subsequently in Algeria, could not be exploited to the full by the proletariat to put forward its own solution in the form of a workers' government, of a coalition of workers' parties, applying a radical program of transition.
Modernized French capitalism is now progressing, in the phase of the Gaullist régime and the solution sought in Algeria, towards a greater stability than in the years which have passed since the war, and will pass in years to come through the same twists and turns as the whole should not halt for long in a quasi-Bourguibist phase of European capitalism.
II.