Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Crisis in the Arab Revolution

· Fourth International No. 5, Winter 1959 · pp 39-40 · 1,857 words

Middle East Britain and Ireland Soviet Union Stalinism

CRISIS IN THE ARAB REVOLUTION

ByMK

The worsening of relations between the two parts of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), the steady sharpening of oppositions between the leaders of the UAR and Iraq, a certain rapprochement between Nasser and the US A, Egyptian negotiations with Great Britain on questions pending between the two countries, and the recent visit of Italian Premier Fanfani — these developments have raised speculations about an imminent break with the Soviet Union by Nasser. We have already indicated in previous articles that such a possiblity exists in the long run, for stand up against the stormy movement of the toilers and to carry out an agrarian reform against the will of the big landowners. Therefore it called on its Egyptian class-comrades for help: thus unification came about. But this unification did not solve the problem. Not only did Nasser neglect, to the profit of Egypt the projected Five- and Ten-Year Plans for the development of Syria ; but also the workers' movement in Syria could not be suppressed. Even the Syrian CP, which because of its opportunist policy during anc after the unification had lost much of its influence.

the Nasser regime remains, despite its "anti-imperial- began to recover as a result of Nasser's anti-worker ist" struggle, a regime of the Arab bourgeoisie and cannot shed its skin. Nevertheless, the attitude of Nasser and the most recent inter-Arab crisis can be understood only if his foreign policy is considered as a of the internal situation, and not vice versa, even if the external influences are important.

The oppositions between Egypt and Syria and between the U A R and Iraq are not essentially a question of unity or non-unity, but are of a deeper social nature: Nasser is afraid of the masses. It is not only in Iraq and Syria that he fears the mass movement ; but also in his own country the masses are opening their eyes: this regime is not only dispossessing the toilers politically, but it is incapable of overcoming economic backwardness, of solving the agrarian problem, and of raising the workers' standard of living. So as not to irritate the masses, Nasser hurls demagogic phrases at them. In his speech at Port-Said on the occasion of the second anniversary of the evacuation of the Anglo-French invasion troops, which coincided with the beginning of the anti-communist repression, he said : we want a "socialist-democratic-coöperative society." He did not mention the US A in a single word, notwithstanding that he had a few days previously had a very friendly conversation with William Rountree, Eisenhower's special emissary; he dared not, because that could only have aroused the masses. On the other hand, he recalled that the Soviet Union had opposed the 1956 Franco-British invasion. And the opinion of the listening masses was clearly felt : both his remark on the coming "socialist" society and that concerning the Soviet Union received a long ovation; on the contrary, his extremely violent attacks against the Communists, which formed a large part of his speech, were received in silence. The Egyptian workers have not at all been transformed into Communists; but both the ovation at the indicated parts of the speech and the silence at others clearly show a molecular ferment.

We have already explained previously that the Syrian bourgeoisie was the moving factor in the Egyptian-Syrian unification. Alone, it was too weak to policy and suppression of democratic rights. Nasser could not simply accept the opposition of the Syrian bourgeoisie, and therefore its leader, Sabri el-Assali, was removed from the government. The danger for the Bonapartist regime, however, is not the bourgeoisie, but the movement of the people, and especially the workers' movement. That is the reason for the wave of arrests of Communists and left elements. In Egypt itself in recent weeks not only were many Communists interned, but also all left elements were removed from the apparatuses of the state and the economy. The opposition of the lower layers of Syrian society against Nasser is not an opposition against the union of the two states; it is a matter of the struggle against terror, in favor of democracy, and for the raising of the workers living levels.

The petty-bourgeois "El Baath" party has exhausted its role as a moving revolutionary factor. Its leaders, especially Akram Hauranı, , have completely associated themselves with the Nasser regime; they have attained their careerist goals and now have places in the state apparatus. Nasser now sets them against the masses, as also against the oppositional bourgeoisie. The left leader of the Syrian "El-Baath" has simply disappeared from the scene.

The Stalinists have learned nothing. They are not mobilizing the masses for a struggle for the democratizing of the UAR and in favor of a Workers' and Peasants' Government, but are seeking to create a Sy-

"national" united front with the bourgeoisie. They are not explaining to the masses that it was just this bourgeoisie that not long before called in Nasser's dictatorship to protect itself against them.

The strongest direct stimulus to unrest in Syria and to a turn in opinion among broad sectors in Egypt was the victory of the revolution in Iraq six months ago. In Iraq there now exists political freedom such as none of the Arab lands has known for centuries. The workers' movement and the workers' parties are not only legal, but also have considerable influence on social life.

In the first period after the victory, Nasser expressed

38 (though with many reservations) much praise for "our brothers in Iraq." When Iraqi ex-Vice-Premier A'rif did not succeed in making Iraq fall into step with Egypt but indeed was arrested in Iraq, the Cairo dictator felt a chill run down his spine. It is not first of all a question, as many people like to consider, of his wish to dominate Iraq; it is a question of the deadly danger for his regime in the UAR through the political relationships existing in Iraq and the potential danger of a revolutionary socialist development. State unification with Iraq he can postpone for a long time. But he must announce immediately the sharpest fight against the possibility of legal existence for spokesmen of the toiling masses.

The Iraq CP, which is already the numerically strongest party in Iraq and the strongest of all the GPs in the Arab lands, recently published a short statement and a long resolution of its Central Committee. Both documents are shot through with the most deeply opportunist and nationalist spirit. The statement was not addressed to the toiling layers of the population, but began : "Citizens! Sons of our great people!" Two places in the statement show us the true character of the party :

Our country possesses much natural wealth. It is necessary to seek the way for its exploitation and investments of its income on the basis of the guarantee of the most necessary requirements of the popular masses, of the development of the national economy and finances, and a coöperation with the countries of our Arab brothers for mutual interest. The idea of unification with the

U AR frightens the popular masses, for the unification of the national economy and the national finances does not sufficiently guarantee the sibilities of this development and unfolding ; nor does it guarantee equal conditions for economic coöperation between Iraq and the U A R, in view of the difference in the phases of development of the countries. [Our translation.]

It does not occur to the Iraq CP that a union on the basis of equality does not work out to the disadvantage of either of the partners, but can be economically, socially, and politically very positive for both. What is more, the demand for such a unification on the basis of a democratic regime would unmask the Nasser regime, would aid the Egyptian and Syrian masses to overthrow the Bonapartist dictatorship, and would give a concrete content to the slogan of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. But when we tind in the statement of the Iraq CP the following point among the programmatic points : "Solidarity of all classes lour italics and groups of the people, of all patriotic parties and forces," then we have before us the whole particularist swindle, just as with Khaled Bakdash, leader of the Syrian C P. Not all classes are interested in Arab unity, and the CP is in favor not of the class struggle but of the "solidarity of all clas-

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

In the resolution of the C C, we find the following :

It [the party] struggles consistently against

"left" ideas, which take the form of the minimization of the significance of the National Front, of the tendency to create sectarian fractions among the masses, and to follow the spontaneous and adventuristic actions that can arise from the

For the Stalinists the spontaneous activity of the masses and the rejection of the "solidarity of all classes" is adventurism. This passage is a proof that the Stalinist bureaucrats are foreseeing serious opposition by revolutionary elements inside and outside the party.

The retreats of Nasser, the opportunism of the Stalinists, and the lack of a revolutionary Marxist leadership threaten the firmness of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal development. The helplessness of Hussein's regime in Jordan did not lead, contrary to our expectations, to his fall after the withdrawal of the British. There Nabulsi's "National Socialists" and "ElBaath" stand on Nasser's side, and the Communists particularism. The previous existing united front is broken. The Nasser regime is interested in having peace and quiet there, for an upsurge would again develop spontaneous forces as in Iraq.

On the same grounds there exists in Lebanon a curious situation. The government comprises only four ministers: two are leaders of the uprising that overthrew the Chamoun regime, and the other two are militant supporters of Chamoun. This dirty coöperation corresponds entirely to the spirit of Nasser.

Lastly, the regime of terror in Sudan. The Sudanese "Nuri Sa'id," Halil, had to fall, because his pro-imperialist and anti-Nasser domination was anachronistic.

satisfied that the remarkable militant workers' movement of the Sudan by illegalization, murder, and concentration

This overall situation explains Nasser's turn toward US imperialism, the financial agreement with Great Britain, the rapprochement with Italy and even with France. On the other hand, it is impossible for him to turn wholly away from the US S R. First, because the economic, technical, and military development of the U A R in these last years is closely tied up with the Soviet bloc. A sudden reversal would be catastrophic for Nasser's whole system. Second, because a full turn away from the Soviet Union and a rapprochement with the United States would unmask him not only in the eyes of the masses of the Arab countries, but also in the eyes of the national and social movements of Asia and Africa.

Never so urgently as now has the history of the Arab revolution put on the agenda the creation of a revolutionary Marxist party in the Arab East. It is the most important task in the present situation. 20 January 1959

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