A REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS COMES
TO A HEAD IN INDONESIA
By TJOKRO
The situation in Indonesia at the moment is characterized by the following fundamental features: 1) the expropriation, by the government and the army, of the Dutch concerns and of the plantations belonging to the Dutch and to Chinese members of Kuomintang; 2) the inability of the national bourgeois government to organize a planned economy ; 3) the widespread chaos resulting from this inability; 4) the increased pressure exerted by the army to seize the power and the machinery of the state; 5) the inability and the
The reasons put forward by the government in defense of nationalization were founded on a basic truth : they considered it "indispensable in order to strengthen security and defense." What the government avoided saying was that it wanted above all to defend itself against the actions of the proletariat.
It is very interesting and comforting to hear the knell of Dutch colonialism being tolled in the 4 April 1958 issue of the Volkskrant, the organ of the Catholic party in power in Holland: "No future for unwillingness of the Indonesian Communist Party to the planters." 'It is common knowledge that the part overthrow the bourgeois system and set up a workers' and peasants' government. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
The action against the Dutch colonialists started in December 1957. This action, which began as a counterstroke by the Djuanda Government as part of the campaign to liberate Irian, immediately spread beyond the narrow limits within which the government wished to confine it, and the masses themselves spontaneously took the initiative in expelling the owners and the directors and in taking over the factories and the plantations. Thanks to the activity of the Indonesian Communist Party which opposed any extra-parliamentary action by the proletariat, the workers' pressure was reduced to the formation of an official committee, the so-called Irian Committee, under the chairmanship of Premier Djuanda. During the first months of 1958, the activity of the masses was on a smaller scale, their attention having been concentrated on the military action in Sumatra and Celebes against the pro-imperialist government led by the former governor of the Indonesian Bank, Sjafroeddin. The pressure exerted on the government by the masses continued, however, compelling it willy-nilly to take steps against the Dutch and the Kuomintang Chinese, in order to prevent a fresh wave of spontaneous actions on the part of the proletariat.
During 1959, the government nationalized Dutch property worth one and a half million dollars. On 3 December 1958, this situation was legalized by an act of parliament. This law came into force retrospectively as of 3 December 1957, that is to say, from the day the workers started their action against the K PM (a large Dutch navigation company operating among the various islands). Nationalization was carried out without any compensation. A promise was made, however, to pay a certain amount of compensation to the Dutch owners after the Dutch troops had evacuated Irian — which so far has not taken place.
played by Dutch capital in Indonesia is completely ended." "It is to be expected that Java will take the road to communism." 'In Indonesia, the factories, plantations, import-export companies, and harbor franchises having a value of several thousand million florins and abandoned by the Dutch, are now in the hands of so-called 'managing committees'." (These quotations are from the newspaper.)
And this is only one of the voices in the chorus of Dutch capitalists who lament that they have been stripped. Having nationalized the major part of the economy, the present leading group finds itself called upon to organize the economic structure on another basis. Now not only are these new bourgeois incapable of solving the vast problems confronting them, but also the state machinery is already completely corrupted.
The central problem is and remains the expropriation of all capitalist property, whether foreign or native, and the nationalization of all plantations, industrial undertakings, banks, and means of transport, and the establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade. It is unnecessary to say that the national bourgeoisie is unwilling to put the rope round its own neck and pull the noose tight.
What are the results of this situation? According to the official figures there are more than twenty million unemployed in Indonesia at the present moment. These figures were published by the Indonesian Ministry for Social Affairs. Five million workers on the plantations and in industry have become unemployed since the nationalization of Dutch undertakings. The number of unemployed among the rural population was estimated at fifteen million; and it should be noted that these twenty million comprise one quarter of the total population of Indonesia, amounting to about 80 million.
Some time ago the Ministry of Education published the information that only 13.4 million people are registered as workers and employers. Of these 13.4 million
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL Indonesians with wages or fixed incomes, 3 million work in private undertakings, 1.9 millions are officials, and 8.5 millions are agricultural workers. Several Indonesian cities now have populations of over a million inhabitants, of whom the greater number came from the country. Most of the hard-pressed workers and peasants live by stealing and begging, since no social assistance whatsoever is given to them by the government. The desperate situation of these impoverished masses cannot be maintained much longer. THE FINANCIAL SITUATION
As compared with 1957, the receipts from traditional exports — with the exception of petroleum -have decreased by 35 %. The immediate result has been that imports have fallen an equal amount. During the first five months of 1958 the total value of exports of rubber, tin, tea, tobacco, palm oil, sugar, and copra was 1,760 million rupees as compared with 2,855 million for the same period in 1957. million rupees, and, according to the forecasts of competent circles and of former Vice-President Hatta in particular, the deficit for 1959 will be about 12 million rupees.
In 1951 the total amount of money in circulation was 5,000 million rupees; in 1958 it had already risen to 21,000 million ; and according to a government financial memorandum it will reach a total of 34,000 million in 1959.
On the free market the value of the American dollar is nine times higher than the official rate (11.40 rupees). In the past, receipts in foreign currency from exports always amounted to about 9,000 million rupees. In 1958 they did not even reach the figure of 6,000 million. Imports of raw materials have ceased completely because of the shortage of foreign currency. Even when the import licences are granted it is often impossible to conclude the deal because of the unfavorable rate of exchange of the rupee.
Trade with the "people's democracies," the US S R, and China is expanding. Most of the economic and military aid received by Indonesia in 1958 came from the Communist countries. From these countries Indonesia received rice on the one hand and jet planes and warships on the other. THE POLITICAL SITUATION
What makes the situation in Indonesia so tragic is that the Communist Party is not ready to intervene and place itself at the head of the proletarian movement in the towns and the country in order to crush the Bonapartist government of Sukarno. Thanks to the part played by the Stalinist party, this government is still able to keep itself in power in spite of the overwhelming superiority of the workers' forces over the bourgeoisie and its army. This army, besides being completely divided, is far from being fully loyal to the government.
The Communist Party, in accordance with directives issued from Moscow, limits its activity to a show of opposition on parliamentary lines. This policy consists in maintaining the status quo between the East and the West in the Indian Ocean area. The Soviet bureaucracy is afraid of a revolutionary victory of the
Indonesianed petati are to descue to i mily scaf
ing and begging. In fact these are already the signs that the revolution is losing momentum and that there is a proletarian revolutionary process without any conscious revolutionary leadership. At the same time these are symptoms of a fatal disease, forerunner of the end of the capitalist system.
The Sukarno clique is ruining both the economy and the people. That is why the fate of the generals, the corrupt ministers, and the whole system is already sealed. The slogan "A free Irian," although correct, arouses that much, the less national enthusiasm among the people as their stomachs grow emptier.
There is also a struggle inside the Sukarno government. Sukarno, supported by the National Council under the leadership of Roeslau Abdulgam, is striving to change the electoral law because he fears another victory of the Indonesian Communist Party. This is something he wants to prevent at all costs. That is also the reason why the 1958 elections were postponed to 1959. He fears, and with good reason, that the Communist Party will become the largest party. The changes to be made in the electoral law mean that only half of the 260 members will be elected by the people, the other half being appointed by "functional groups."
The political parties have informed the government and the National Council that they do not agree with this change. Under "functional groups" are to be understood : the army, the women's organisations, the intellectuals, the merchants, the ex-service men, the workers and the peasants, etc.
The National Council is likewise composed of these "functional groups." Through their second secretary, Loekman, the Stalinists have stated that they have no objection to the change in the electoral law provided that the representatives in parliament are elected democratically. They do not raise any objection to the "functional groups."
The whole plan for changing the electoral law is aimed at combating the influence of the workers' parties. This is a new step towards the "directed democracy" which Sukarno would like to set up with the help of the army commanded by Nasution. It should be noted that Sukarno and Nasution, who have always been agreed on a "middle-of-the-road" policy (that is, Bonapartism), have been in open conflict since the end of December 1958. At a military conference in Bandoeng, Sukarno stated that the heads of the army must confine themselves to the restoration of peace in the whole country. Sukarno thus advised Nasution to maintain order in the army and nothing else.
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Colonel Soeprajogi, who is also the Minister for Economic Stabilization in the present government, immediately retorted : "We have listened most attentively to the speech of President Sukarno and we are in agreement with most of this speech. But it should never be forgotten that the political aspirations of the army must also be taken into account."
The. conflict between the leaders of the army and Sukarno is only of secondary importance; however, it does illustrate the repeated wish of a certain section of the Indonesian bourgeoisie to abandon the "middleof-the-road" policy and to go over openly to an attack on the masses. What would be of capital importance would be a decision by the masses to exert pressure on their leaders so that the latter should seize the
The tasks of the Marxist revolutionaries in Indonesia are to assist and facilitate this process. They must explain to the masses the situation in which they find themselves and show them what road they must
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL take. This is the task of all Marxists inside or outside the Communist Party. in the course of this development nerv • a new revolutio tion gains the upper hand in a larger and larger part of the world, the part played by Stalinism will diminish. A victory of the Indonesian proletariat will be a very serious blow to the Stalinist bureaucracy and to world imperialism. The victory of the revolution in China has opened a new chapter in the . history of man. At the same time it has eliminated an entire Stalinist generation in the US S R. Every new victory won by the proletariat, even when gained under Stalinist leaders, brings nearer the hour of the defeat of the Stalinist bureaucracy and world imperialism.
It is in this light, that we must consider our task in Indonesia; it is in Indonesia that this task is on the verge of being fulfilled more rapidly than anywhere else. January 1959