THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT
AFTER THE REVOLUTION IN IRAQ
By MK
For all those unacquainted with or refusing to understand the situation in the Arab countries, the revolution in Iraq came like a bolt from the blue. In reality it was a natural result of the development of the national movement throughout the whole Arab world. The hirelings of imperialism around King Feisal and Nuri Sa'id were overthrown by this irresistible But the unresisted overthrow of the former rulers of Iraq was not only a heavy blow to the imperialists. It was simultaneously an important turning point for the national movement in the whole region. The political, economic, and social steps taken by the new leaders, both in the next period and for the long term, as well as the activity of the mass movement, will determine the still not yet settled fate of the new regime.
To understand the turn in the situation of the Arab national movement, we must concern ourselves with the difference between the revolutions in Egypt and Iraq, and also with the events that occurred in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan between those two events.
The overthrow of the feudal-monarchist domination in Egypt in 1952 and the coming to power of Naguib and Nasser, were the results, not of a direct mass action, but of a revolt by predominantly petty-bourgeois young officers. All the old parties were corrupt to the last degree, led by the big landowners, and tied up in one way or another with the royal court. To liquidate this rotten regime and to carry through progressive reforms, the officers' junta had to break up all the political parties. It set up a strong military dictatorship and eliminated the previously existing "parliamentary" forms.
Immediately after the new power was set up, the workers of Cairo and Alexandria tried to better their lot by means of sit-down strikes and other methods of struggle. The new holders of power reacted with death sentences and long prison sentences against the worker's leaders. The Communists and other leftists were not freed from prison; on the contrary, the jails and concentration-camps were filled still more with leftist
To what an extent an organized vanguard of the Egyptian working class was lacking - and is still lacking today — and to what a degree the former political parties and the former "parliamentary" system were — quite justly — hated by the masses, is shown by the following instructive episode. About two years after the Egyptian overturn, the differences between Naguib and Nasser reached their peak. Naguib wanted to introduce a certain parliamentary regime and a limited legalization of parties. Nasser was opposed. At this moment Nasser could drive Naguib out of power only if he mobilized the masses during the decisive days. The workers of Cairo and Alexandria and their suburbs manitested by monster demonstrations that they were opposed to any concession to the old parties and to the former "parliamentary" system. After his victory over Naguib with the help of the masses, Nasser considered that mass activity was again ended.
In the field of foreign policy several years passed before the regime went over to an anti-imperialist policy. It was only the refusal by the United States to finance the work of the Assuwan Dam, which is of very great importance for Egypt's economic development, that caused the officers' caste to set up economic and political ties with the workers' states.
Almost from the beginning Nasser and his people spoke of the "Arab nation" and the need of unifying the whole Arab East. But, as we said in our recently published 1 article, "The Unity of the Arab East," it was Syria which took the principal initiative in carrying out this idea. The Egyptian regime agreed to the unification of these two countries only on condition that political parties should be dissolved in Syria, i e, that the independent initiative of the masses was not to be allowed.
But reality produced new factors. The Syrian "ElBaath" Party certainly succeeded in stopping the spread of the CP: the Stalinist leaders fled the country and discredited themselves as a result of their negative position toward complete unification (they were for federation). On the other hand, the "National Union," already established in Egypt as the only political organization there and the all-inclusive organ of the Nasser regime, which was now proclaimed also in Syria, did not succeed, either.
In an interview after the revolution in Iraq, Salah Bittar, one of the most important leaders of "El-Baath" and a minister of the "United Arab Republic," declared expressly: it is true that the party is officially dissolved, but it still remains the most important political factor in Syria. He considers that a much looser "national unity" must be installed than in the Egyptian part of the U A R. The task of "socialist humanism"' of "El-Baath" is, in his view, "to control worrisome and dangerous elements of Arab nationalism." He does not tell us who these elements are. His state1 In Fourth International N° 3, Summer 1958. (We trust that our readers themselves corrected therein, context, a linotyper's error on p 44, col 2, para 5, where the date 1916 should of course be 1946.)
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ment can very well be aimed against revolutionarysocialist elements. But it also means that this party is not giving in to the absolute dictatorship of Nasser and that in Syria it has not been possible to eliminate all the democratic rights of the masses. In other words, state unity between Egypt and Syria has been established, but Nasser cannot impose his will throughout a very important part of the state. Developments threaten to flood over his head.
The armed uprising against Chamoun's pro-imperialist regime had no unified leadership, for it was extremely heterogeneous both socially and politically, and held together only by its aim of overthrowing President Chamoun and his close collaborators, the Nuri Sa'ids of Lebanon. But the danger for Nasser in this uprising is the fact that the masses rose up spontaneously, masses that he cannot control.
What is more, his agents can only with difficulty compete with the Lebanese members of "El-Baath" in influencing the masses. True, the insurgents hung up pictures of Nasser; he is still the symbol of the struggle for liberation in all Arab countries of the Middle East. But the spontaneous fight of the masses is alién to his ideal and his regime. On the other hand, the members of "El-Baath," which exists in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, are, at least theoretically, educated for the fight, and they play an important role within this mass movement. The spontaneous movement of the masses threatens Nasser with becoming only a symbol and finally with losing even this title as the stormy developments continue.
King Hussein of Jordan (leaving aside the backward part of the population, the nomad Bedouins, alone cannot constitute a serious guarantee for Hussein and his regime) has no real support other than the bayonets of the British Army. The masses of all layers of society in Jordan are more than ever ready to seize the first passing opportunity to throw out Hussein and his clique. It is the calm before the storm. And here again, Nasser does not control these masses who are ready for the fight.
At the time that the Hashemite kingdoms - Iraq and Jordan — agreed to link themselves federatively in order to make a concession to the irresistible necessity and tendency of the Arab states to unify, Nasser appealed to the Iragi and Jordanians to drive out the imperialist hirelings. The answer soon came back. The terrorist regime of Nuri Sa'id collapsed like a house of cards at the first blow. The most important bastion of imperialism in the Arab East no longer exists. The authority of the "symbol" of the Arab national movement - Nasser — has waxed greater.
But what next? Has Nasser's dictatorial regime been strengthened by the fall of his powerful adversary in Iraq?
Whereas the Nasser regime, right from the, beginning, repressed in blood every independent movement and granted not the slightest democratic rights, the
47 opposite occurred in Iraq. The revolution freed the immense forces of hitherto illegal political parties and organizations. All of them, from the left to the right, began lively activity: the rightist "Istaqlal," the liberal-
"National Democrats," the petty-bourgeois "El-Baath," and the Communists, who have emerged from their ten-year-long illegality as the best-organized
From various parts of the country revolts of the fellahin against the big landowners have been reported The government did not stand behind these revolts, but told the peasants that they must get on in a peaceful way with the effendis, for soon a decree about agrarian reform would be published. It threatened the big landowners with fines if they broke a law promulgated just after the revolution concerning a limitation of the amount of rents while awaiting the promulgation of a law on agrarian reform. It would be naive to imagine that, without an active resistance from the peasants themselves, there could come about a real improvement in the lot of the fellahin. But on the other hand, nothing is heard of brutal threats by the regime against the revolting peasants, as was the case in an analogous situation in Egypt after the coming to power of Neguib and Nasser. Vice-President Abdul Salem Arif went to the villages, talked with the peasants, but remained cool toward the effendis.
'All the political prisoners were set free. The masses poured jubilantly into the streets. The political refugees came back to their country. The Kurdish minority was invited to coöperate on a basis of equality. The new regime immediately established diplomatic and trade relations with the workers' states.
The government, in which it is true that the army officers played an important role, is not as in Egypt dominated by an officers' caste, but is a coalition of the various political parties. The true character of the new regime still remains unclear. The law of Nuri Sa'id forbidding parties has been annulled, and all have so far been active with impunity. None of them has dared to take openly and clearly the leadership for itself, and nothing is yet known about the future form of the government.
The contrast between the political constellations in Egypt and Iraq is not an idealization of the one and condemnation of the other. That would be to pay no attention to the social reality. Nasser's dictatorship and the "democracy" in Iraq arise from the same social motives: liberation from the chains laid on the capitalist development of these countries by the imperialists and the native big landlords and compradores.
The dictatorship in Egypt has destroyed the remnants of feudalism, is seeking to develop industry, and has carried through many reforms in many fields. There is in Egypt, further, the strongest proletariat in the Arab East, both in numbers and in experience in earlier class struggles.
On the other hand, it is still questionable how Iraqi
48 "democracy" will solve the currently most urgent problem, agrarian reform. In the conditions of Iraq, even a moderate reform can produce great conflicts. Without a mobilization of the fellahin against the big landowners in the southern part of the country, the question can hardly be solved. But there does not yet exist the subjective force to lead the masses into struggle in the present revolutionary situation. What is more, the urban proletariat is numerically very weak because of the lack of industry.
It is not a question of the abstract facts of lack of democracy in Egypt and the "right of parties" in Iraq. The question is: in what direction is the face of the Arab revolution turned under the given conditions?
From this point of view, the freedom existing — at least up till now — for parties and mass organizations in Iraq, unlike Egypt, is of the greatest importance and can potentially bring forward a revolutionarysocialist leadership.
The unity of the Arab countries is, even for the capitalist development of this region, an absolute necessity. But unity under the foregoing conditions is a mortal danger for the Nasser regime. It is therein that lies the turn in the Arab national movement. Egypt is the the most important factor in the development of the Arab East. But any independent workers' moveis suppressed. The freedom of political parties in Iraq, the opposition in Syria within the tramework of the U A R, and the spontaneous mass
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL movements and uprisings in all the Arab countries — these cannot fail to have an effect on the Egyptian proletariat, especially not while there exists a general tendency to unification.
In this situation it is no accident that Nasser has made certain retreats alter the revolution in Iraq. The clearest among them are : 1) the very compromising resolution proposed by the Arab countries to the UNO General Assembly, and adopted by it; 2) the seating of Chehab as President of Lebanon after a secret agreement between Nasser and the Americans. (Chebab is only one degree less an imperialist agent than Chamoun.) The American magazine Newsweek reports that Nasser, during his secret conversations
Eisenhower's special representative, Murphy, described the new Iraqi leaders as "hotheaded." Granted, the news in this magazine must always be taken with caution. In any case it is certain that Nasser cannci be vrry enthusiastic about the current regime in Iraq.
The fate of the Arab revolution depends on whether the Nasser regime can repress the mass movement or whether the action of the masses in recent months in the Arah lands will flood over Nasser's head, whether there will arise a revolutionary leadership which bases itself on the organized masses. 11 September 1958