THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION AT A CROSS-ROAD
It is sure that there exists at present no important which will accompany its victory over imperialism and
Editorial Notes
The Algerian revolution has reached a cross-roads. It is currently subjected to the joint pressure of French imperialism, of the pro-Western Bourguibist" bourgeoisie of Tunisia and even of Morocco, and of the pro-bourgeois elements of the Ferhat Abbas sort in the F LN. In addition, the defeat suffered by the proletarian movement in France will also lie heavy on its
The coming to power of de Gaulle - his overtures, initiatives, and promises in the colonial field - have unquestionably sown a certain confusion in the Algerian ranks and strengthened the "Bourguibist" wing of the present leadership of the Algerian revolution. The new constitution, with its concessions to Negro Africa and its promises of an evolution toward independence, then the example of Guinea, the Constantine speeches, and finally the measures taken in regard to the committees of the "ultras" in Algeria - all these lure some people on with the glittering possibility of a "negotiated solution" in Algeria.
Bourguiba, who has just ostentatiously broken his last Cairo ties, and backed up — there can be no doubt -by the King of Morocco, will play all his strong cards in order to aid a compromise solution between FLN and France.
Under these conditions, the "Bourguibist" - i e, the pro-bourgeois, pro-imperialist -- elements of the FLN will themselves be encouraged to propose "moderation" and "negotiation" with a minimum of pre-conditions. They will make the most of their "diplomatic" skill to put forward a "negotiated solution" in view of the fact that on the military field, properly so called, and to a certain extent also on the international field, things are marking time, if they are not indeed in an impasse.
Ferhat Abbas, premier of the Algerian provisional government, has hastened in this connection to make declarations of a "diplomatic flexibility" that is at least odd if indeed not frankly scandalous, among other things throwing the responsibility for the actions recently carried out in France by the FLN on its federation in the metropolis. What strangely rapid forgetfulness of his own quite recent declarations about "transferring the war to France"! Ferhat Abbas, however, would do well to remember that he is not the skilful diplomat of just any government but a member of the leadership of a revolution in full combat, whose admirable plebeian base of poor peasants and workers has so far had 600,000 victims from the barbarous imperialist repression. As for the praises that Ferhat Abbas addresses to de Gaulle, they now join with those that Messali Hadj never stops lavishing on that "noble" "great soldier," etc, with whom he already visualizes himself as seated at a Round Table, as a "valid interlocutor" ior a "solution" in Algeria.
But what "negotiated solution"?
sector of the French bourgeoisie that foresees slightest real independence for Algeria, and that Gaulle himself, even supposing that he can impose his will, is not in favor of such a solution, either. The most in the way of a solution would be a semblance of Algerian self-determination within 'the tramework the French Community, Algeria remaining in fact under the control of the metropolis. This control is needed both for the present interests of France in Algeria and for maintaining a grip on the wealth of the Sahara and the guarantee of the investments of the Constantine
The French bourgeoisie is too involved, has too many interests, in Algeria to be able to visualize the slightest real independence. The policy of the French bourgeoisie is centred around a stepped-up economic integration of Algeria and the Sahara into the metropolitan economy. All de Gaulle's guile will be used to promote
"Bourguibist" wing among the "Algerian satisfied with a solution that will not be even formal independence.
and Moroccan bourgeoisies, their chops at the smell of Sahara oil, are dreaming only of coöperation with a "pacified" Algeria in a pro-Western Maghreb front, able to offset the influence of the Nasserist U A R. The prospects of the exploitation of the Sahara are currently playing a dominant role both in France's Algerian plans and in Tunisia's and Morocco's foreign orientation.
It is obvious that French capitalism needs "peace" in Algeria to bring the Sahara to fruition, a precondition furthermore for any plan of investments in Algeria. For not only does the continuation of the war compromise the chances of exploitation, but also, by its economic load, it makes it impossible to carry out the Constantine Plan (which would require a minimum of 400,000 million francs [about $ 952,400,000] of annual grants by the metropolis).
It is now a matter of seeing whether one wing of the FLN, similarly tempted by the prospects of a certain association in the administration and especially in the pillage of Algeria and the Sahara, will not take the path of negotiated compromise sought by de Gaulle and his allies in the field of the Maghreb.
Nevertheless, the Algerian revolution/ is still strong on the military plane and unquestionably enjoys a deep sympathy among the Arab and colonial masses of the world. Its real weakness lies in the political orientation and structure of the leadership. To keep up the morale of its valiant combattants and of the Algerian population which, despite unheard-of sufferings and losses, the struggle as best it can, it is now more than urgent to define a daring social programme of the revolution, to deepen its social sense, to open up widely and clearly perspectives of deep-going social transformations
• the settlers, beginning with a minimum : land to the of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements. The limits
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL поот peasants who work it; emancipation of women; dustrialization and a planned economy for the country ; adherence to a Maghrebian Federal Republic.
Such a programme is all the more necessary because imperialism is putting forward its own economic plans of capitalist exploitation of Algeria and the Sahara, through which it is making an appeal to the pro-bourgeois elements of the revolution, and because it has indulged in giving the vote to Algerian women.
It is furthermore not sufficient to define clearly the political and social objectives of the revolution. Still more urgent is the real democratization of the FLN, of its army, of its political organization, of its administration, in order steadily to increase the politicization ot the masses and consciously to associate them in the conduct of the revolution at every level. Its present monolithic and bureaucratic structure, beyond the fact that it prevents real efficiency in action and wastes an enormous part of the revolutionary energy of the masses, and that it is responsible for flagrant lacunæ in propaganda, logistics, armament, and adequate military training of the revolutionary forces, politically favors the pro-bourgeois of the revolution inclined to a compromise with imperialism.
It is not only the Algerian revolution that currently runs the risk of marking time and even of falling back; it is the Arab revolution as a whole, still led by staffs of such a leadership are now appearing clearly in the light of their inability to proceed to a genuine agrarian reform and harmonious unification in an Arab federative
The be natove feisits to be and to esprop up
them without indemnization, to satisfy the peasants, and give an impulse to large-scale industrialization of the Arab countries. It is also too timorous and too tied up with imperialism to be able really to expropriate and to use the country's wealth for the development of the national economy. It also shows itself in its national fractions to be too weak and in each country too antagonistic to be able to direct a genuine unification on the inter-Arab plane.
The difficulties within the U A R between Egypt and Syria, Nasser's fear to extend the unification to include Iraq, Bourguiba's betrayal, class conflicts in Morocco -these are so many recent indications of the limits of the bourgeois leadership of the Arab revolution.
For both the Algerian revolution and the Arab revolution in general, it is urgent that, out of the mass movement, a new revolutionary socialist leadership should arise and organize itself, one that bases itself on the proletariat and the poor peasants in order to urge on the revolution and complete it.