AFTER THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS The results of the general elections held on May 25th in Italy brought out no serious change on the level of relationship of class forces, but they nevertheless deserve to be weighed for what they tell about the political situation in the The party that has governed Italy since the end of the war, the Christian-Democracy, marked an advance compared to the 1953 elections, of 2.2 %, but this was at the expense of the extreme-rightist parties (monarchists, neo-fascists) whose fell off pretty much everywhere, reducing them henceforth, on the national scale, to very low percentages. This shift of rightist votes toward the so-called "democratic" centre was in any case the most considerable element of the May 25th polls. As for the centre parties (Social-Democrats, Liberals, Republicans) who have been for long periods the allies of the Christian-Democracy, even on the governmental level, they more or less marked time, which means that their weight, even on the parliamentary level, will still be rather weak.
parties in general consolidated their positions. The CP remained stationary (it increased its vote only 0.1 % on the national scale), while the PSI of Nenni advanced somewhat (1.5 %) by absorbing, among others, those votes which in previous elections had gone to the two pro-socialist formations that are now integrated in the party itself. All this confirms particularly that, despite the difficulties of 1955-1956, which were years of comparative stagnation continue to place their electoral trust in their parties. That also means the failure of all the manœuvres of those who tried to make the crisis caused by the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR result, not in a renewal of the workers' movement, but in its weakening for the benefit of the class enemy. It must be specified that the national average. sults achieved by the workers' parties involves in reality a regional differentiation. provinces of the South, the CP and the SP advanced, sometimes quite sharply, while in the industrial circumscriptions they either merely held their own or even fell back. ticular, if the three great industrial zones (Milan, Turin, and Genoa) are considered, the CP obtained only a relative success in Milan, while it was in trouble in Genoa and especially in Turin. Let us emphasize : in no case is it a question of considerable shifts, but, especially in certain cases (Turin), of a tendency that has persisted for several years and that therefore must not be underestimated. It is the symptom of an uneasiness which has quite deep roots and which it is ridiculous to try to reduce simple organizational questions (as the CP seems to be doing).
in any case the perspectives in the period now beginning? On the level of bourgeois political leadership, there must be emphasized the failure of an operation that
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL cost the big Italian bosses a great goal in the elections was to strengthen the Liberal Party in such a way as to make possible a bi-partisan government (Christian-Democrats and Liberals). In this government the Liberal Party, being the most direct spokesman of the big economic organizations of the bosses, would have had an even more conservative role. More particularly it would have had to stop the so-called tendencies toward a statified and directed economy, especially on the part of certain sectors of the majority party. Now the Liberals advanced a lot in the Milan region, but very little or not at all in the rest of the country: in consequence they have not a number of seats sufficient to constitute a government with the Catholics. What is more, the relations between the two parties worsened as a result of electoral polemics, which renders collaboration problematic, at least within a short time. There is no doubt but that, even on the purely governmental and parliamentary planes, to experience serious difficulties. The instability begun by the 1953 elections has not been overcome; in have not gone backward, namely, to the "equilibrium" of the Nevertheless, the advance we have mentioned offers the Catholics rather better chances than before in the following sense: whereas, prior to May 25th, if they wanted to form a centre government-excluding either the workers' parties or the extreme right—-they had to combine all the others (which was becoming more and more difficult, now they can choose a centre-left alliance (with the Social-Democrats Republicans) or a centre-right alliance (with the Liberals certain Monarchists). But it will not be the alchemy of parliamentary combinations that will determine developments in the next years. once more be the mass movement that will have the decisive If we judge on the basis of votes, we must conclude-we the workers' kept their forces intact. But it would be profoundly erroneous to consider only this element. Behind these votes there are concrete workers whose state of mind may be quite different, even if their ballot does not change. Compared to 1953—not to speak of 1945-1946—the evolution has been unquestionably negative. The workers continue to vote for their parties, but they have lost confidence in the possibility of effectively changing the basic situation. They are still voting, but they are much less active in either the parties or in the trade unions. Those who would like to ignore this fact might have some bitter surprises. But in the five-year period from 1953 to 1958 the process has not always been in the same direction. In 1955-1956 the situation of the mass movement was worse than it is now. We have been for some time now in a stage of recovery that is the element to consider, which the simple confrontation of election data does not allow us to grasp. The latest months have been characterized by broader and more vigorous trade-union struggles than in the preceding
Furthermore, in the factory committees the CGT (CP-SP) has had unquestionable successes at the expense of the Catholic and Social-Democratic federations. The gains have generally been limited but-what is important-they show a reversal of trend. That means that the situation in the mass movement has grown somewhat better. There is an objective possibility of preparing, organizing, and launching struggles, and this possibility will be increased if the coming months confirm the economic difficulties which, for the first time in have just appeared in the first half of this year The editorial of the June issue of the organ of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari, of the Fourth International, draws the following conclusions :
this situation the workers' has as its task to develop a consistent class opposition against the bourgeois Christian-Democratic regime.
We clearly affirm that all other possibilities that are being more or less openly canvased, are either just plain fantasies or involve very dangerous illusions. It is a fantasy, for example, to believe that the Christian-Democracy can be moved by the fact that the workers' parties have consolidated their positions and hence propositions of the CP leadership. It is an illusion to bring up the possibility of a government "with a new political majority, of which the left parties, without discrimination, would form a part" (according to the terms of Longo, reporter at the
CP's Central Committee session following the elections).
The task of the workers' movement is above all to determine clear perspectives for economic and social struggles. The objective situation is driving in this direction, and will drive even more so if the symptoms of recession increase. The struggle of these past months, the recovery (even though partial) of the CGT in the factory-committee elections, show that there exist concrete possibilities of success, that the masses will answer if concrete perspectives are set, if adequate methods of struggle are adopted.
To fight in the factories to defend living standards, to reaffirm the workers' political rights, to make the working class's specific weight felt more every day-there is what is possible and necessary. To struggle in the rural regions so that technical progress does not fall on the peasants' backs, so that the very grave unemployment, of agricultural workers is not further increased—there is another concrete goal. To fight on the general political plane in such a way that the dominant class has a daily feeling of the proletariat's strength, chance on reactionary measures, and is forced to loosen the vise of repression.
that means class opposition, revolutionary opposition: an opposition that aims not especially at parliament, at more or less clever manœuvres, and more or less illusory combinations, but that aims at deepening class contradictions, at winning positions of strength for the proletariat, at węakening the adversary's front by sharp struggles and broad mobilizations, at aiding the later maturity of the masses, even the most backward