CIVIL WAR
Indonesia
The present situation in Indonesia is dominated by the popular masses who had occupied the Dutch enterprises and formed committees for managing them, part of the Indonesian bourgeoisie and the semi-feudal forces sought the direct support of imperialism to protect themselves against the revolutionary wave. The ex-governor of the National Bank of Indonesia, Sjafruddin, a number of nationalists closely connected with imperialists, as well as a few local military commanders in Central Sumatra, set up a "counter-government for all Indonesia," which no longer recognized the authority of President Sukarno and of Commander-in-Chief Nasution.
This counter-government figured that North and South Sumatra, which were also in conflict with the central government but remained neutral in the conflict with Central Sumatra, would soon join the rebellion. was counting on the open support of the Socialist Party of Sjahrir, and particularly on that of Indonesia's biggest party, the Masjumi. Besides, Sjafruddin was awaiting with assurance the support of the ex-vice-premier of Indonesia and notorious anti-communist Mohammed Hatta. And, last but not least, the rebels were counting on rapid recogniton by the imperialist West, i e, first of all, the United States, which has at no moment concealed its friendliness toward the counter-government and continues to consider it a strong card in its own counter-revolutionary game. The idea of having a "govern. ment of its own" at its disposal in Indonesia is very attractive for American imperialism, not only to safeguard its imperialist interests there, but also to break up the coalition between the Soviet bureaucracy and the national bourgeoisie and to call a halt to the colonial revolution. In the period of recession in which the USA is entering, the need of reaching this goal by starting a new "Korea" has nothing frightening about it for the imperialist gangsters. The real reason for holding the Manila Conference of SEATO was not just love for Sukarno. The presence of the Seventh Fleet in Sumatra waters "to protect" the few hundred Americans was a very specific threat. And Mr Foster Dulles's announcement that the possibility of recognizing the Padang "government" as a "power ai war" would be reconsidered failed to conceal where the sympathies of the American imperialists lie. Dulles's statement at a press conference, that much would depend on the strength that the countergovernment could build up, simultaneously gives the key for understanding the hesitations that Washington is showing about going any further.
It is in reality the strength of the Indonesian revolution, hidden behind the façade of the struggle between two bour. geois governments, that has up till now prevented a direct imperialist intervention. The "counter-government" has been able to form itself only in the most backward part of Sumatra. The fighting has already shown that it cannot count on the support of the popular masses. The Jakarta government, on the contrary, feels sure of the aid of the Sumatran workers, though not much like the idea of arming them, for quite understandable reasons...
Sjafruddin, conscious of his weakness, is doing everything to stimulate more direct imperialist aid. He is demanding the "internationalization" of the conflict, and is making appeals to the imperialists by comparing his civil war—and not without reason-to the civil war in Spain.
The "neutrality" of North and South Sumatra, and of the Masjumi (whose president, Mohammed Natsir, is at Padang, and which is the strongest party in Sumatra), as well as the result of the military operations, show furthermore, as already mentioned, that the Mohammedan workers and landless peasants are not letting themselves be used by the counter-revolutionaries. Unquestionably the action of the Javanese proletariat in occupying the Dutch enterprises has deeply impressed
It is no accident that the results of the quite recent provincial elections in South Sumatra show increasing influence of the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party]. The Stalinists promised that, if they won a majority, they would distribute the land (a similar promise a year ago after the municipal elections led to the distribution of the public parks at Solo). The PKI has replaced Sukarno's PNI as the second party. The voting was
553,276 votes PKI 225,965 PNI 157,042 NU 113,555
In view of the permanent radicalization of the Indonesian masses, it is quite understandable that Sukarno hesitated thousand times before launching war against Padang. He did everything to reach an "agreement" with Hatta, which would have been the introduction to an agreement with the counterrevolutionary forces. He could not, however, accept the con. dition of giving up the support of the PKI, i e, of the masses under Stalinist control. Without this support, Sukarno would find himself disarmed not only toward the masses but at the same time toward the counter-revolutionary pro-imperialist forces.
Nevertheless, even after the break-down of the negotiations with Hatta, Sukarno resisted the launching of the war, fearing that the operation would get out of his control. It was above all the pressure of the PKI and the left wing of the PNI that forced him to begin the war. A comparison with Kerensky,
68 who also was forced to begin the struggle against counter-revolu. tionary forces (led by Kornilov), might be in order here.
The fact that the Jakarta government decided to give back the ships to the [Dutch] KPM is in the same frame of things. It wants above all to avoid definitive rupture with imperialism.
However this may be, the war launched against Padang under the pressure of the masses will have its own logic. True, the weak resistance on the Padang side is momentarily increasing the authority of Sukarno and the government. It is momentarily facilitating the opportunist (and even treacherous) policy of the PKI which is subjecting the masses to the control of the bourgeois government. It is delaying differentiation (along class lines) in the forces fighting against the counter-revolution.
But at the same time it is clear that a return to the status quo ante is excluded. During the struggles, beginning with the occupation of the enterprises, the consciousness of the masses has not stopped growing. Granted, at the instigation of the
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL PKI, they allowed the government's armed forces to take over the control of the factories and plantations. They thus took a step in retreat, of a qualitative significance-no question about it. But they do not at all have the feeling of having been beaten. They consider the launching of the war against Padang to have been their own doing. The victories over the counterrevolutionary forces, even though they increase Sukarno's prestige, they consider their own victories.
Under these conditions, the increase in maturity, the politi. cization, and the growth of self-confidence, of the masses are written clear in the new stage of the Indonesian revolution.
By launching the war against Padang under the pressure of the masses, Sukarno has in reality undermined his Bonapartist position. ( From then on, he has become more dependent on the good will of the masses than even before, even if the easy victories over Padang may temporarily work direction.
Poland