ONCE MORE ON THE POSITIONS OF THE
CHINESE CP and SOME CONJUNCTURAL
PROBLEMS
By LIVIO MAITAN
RECENT events, and expressed in editorial articles in "Re Flag" and "The Peoples' Daily" enable us
THE MOSCOW TREATY AND THE "LEADER STATE"
The Chinese have not associated themselves with the signing of the Moscow Treaty. The United Secretariat of the Fourth International has already defined its attitude on this subject (1) and it will not return to it here to consider the arguments advanced by supporters of the treaty who either underestimate or overlook the essential aspects of the subject whilst concentrating on aspects that are either non-existent or secondary. We still instead restrict ourselves to answering an argument advanced particularly in Communist circles.
It is absurd-so it is said-to oppose compromises in principle; and the Chinese by doing this, the argument runs, have arrived at an ultra-left and adventuristic position more or less of the same sort that determined Trotsky's attitude at Brest-Litovsk. If we leave aside the question of Brest-Litovsk, which too many people insist on exploiting in a dishonest way instead of studying it on the basis of historical criticism, neither the Fourth International nor the Chinese have arrived at their attitudes by using abstract criteria. Our atitude was determined by a concrete analysis, that is, by considering whether such a treaty was or was not profitable to the workers' states as a whole and to the international workers' movement. Our reply to this question was a negative one for all the reasons enumerated in the document of the United Secretariat and in particular because of the unwritten but vital clause in the treaty which implies an agreement by the Soviet Union not to entrust nuclear arms and secrets to the Chinese (in contravention amongst other things of the 1957 agreement). At bottom it is an agreement whose results have been insignificant as far as nuclear arms are concerned and dangerous or at least strongly contestable from the point of view of the nuclear balance (continuing underground tests are apparently more favourable to the USA,) dangerous with regard to the mass movements and in particular the anti-war-movement and also quite negative from the point of view of the repercussions inside the workers' states and relations, eyen at national level, between Russia and China.
Moreover, subsequent polemics have confirmed a serious implication in the Soviet position. The Soviet leaders have not only called for other workers' states to associate themselves automatically with an operation which they have carried through on their own from beginning to end, but they have declared outright that the U.S.S.R is, and must remain, the only nuclear defence of the workers' states; moreover, that the leaders of the state which has nuclear arms are the only ones competent to handle the matter. Krushchev and his ilk could not have expressed in a more brutal manner this conception of the leader-state which they have hitherto repeatedly denounced as an inheritance of Stalin's era.
Let us be clear on this point. Nobody can affirm that in principle all the workers' states should possess nuclear weapons whether they make the necessary economic effort themselves or whether they received the wherewithal from the USSR. It is necessary on each occasion to examine the problems in the given context and to weigh the advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the overall interests of the workers' states. But here a more general question is being posed: Who, and using
what criteria, is going to decide in each more they have undermined, and continue
4 instance what constitutes the real common interest?
The present writer has heard this problem debated in the Italian Communist Party. "The real difference," say the cadres, "lies in ther question of the relations between the states and a common leadership of the socialist camp." One can think of this camp as a unity which must endeavour to overcome natural divisions and in such a case it is a common organ, a form of international leadership which must decide what to undermine, the hegemony of the Soviet bureaucracy.
THE CHINESE AND THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE MOSCOW
CONFERENCES
The first of the three articles published in September 1963 by the editors of "Red Flag" and "The Peoples' Daily" contains a history of the Sino-soviet dispute which has not yet been contested by the Russians. We have, therefore, a clearly direct confirmation of our analysis, of the two conferences of the Com-
For example is best; whether one should or should not, for example, sign a treaty such as the Moscow Treaty. One can, on the other hand, by the CPSU and the amendments presented visualise "the camp" as an alliance between workers' states which remain quite separate and continue to have their own interests. In this case, one cannot pretend that the USSR decides for everybody and China is therefore fundamentally in the right to have nuclear arms if she considers them necessary.
For our part we have given a reply many times before and it is a reply which emerges from our conception of proletarian internationalism and the organisation of the workers' International. It is clear that problems such as this are raised at present at a higher historical level with practical implications more important than at any time in the past. To reiterate: it is not a question of reaffirming a just and abstract "desirable" principle but of understanding concrete necessity. Infere existing workers soltical will be more numerous-do not succeed in establishing a common leadership, a coordination on an equal level, there will be luite negative consequences for the anticapitalist forces, including conflicts, fissures and schisms. The preconditions for the resolution of this problem-and we are ready to admit that in envisaging a major solution, general rules are easier to pronounce than to ensure effective application of them— are that the hegemony of the USSR in both theory and practice should be ended and the workers states should operate as a homogeneous collectivity.
Whatever may be their particular arguments and political distortions, the problems have been posed by the Chinese in objectively progressive terms and what is munist parties and particularly that of 1960. (2). The details about a first draft advanced by the CPC, confirm in particular that as far back as 1957 the Chinese were criticising the right-wing policies of the Krushchevists and that resolutions adopted were the result of a compromise-at least on several fundamental problems. But these precisely the points which raise a question: if it arises from compromise resolutions as is said in "Red Flag" and "The Peoples' Daily", , why then do the Chinese continually present them as a true charter for the Communist movement?
Let us take, for example, the debate on the roads to socialism, which involves the question of the basic validity or otherwise of the Marxist and Leninist conception of the state. The ideas of the CPC on this subject are known: but can one envisage an effective theoretical clarification and by consequence, the adoption of a line on the basis of a deliberately eclectic text, (an eclecticism whose exact genesis is not known to us), which instead of concentrating on the essential points of the problem, abandons itself to casuistry, admitting the peaceful as well as the violent path? Our question is all the more pertinent because experience has shown us that various Communist parties have made whatever use they cared or of tha to of the 1957 Gospel, repeated word for word in 1960. To our knowledge, with two exceptions only, there is not a Communist party which has declared that in the light of conditions in its own country the peaceful path is possible. Casuistry was replaced by a single pattern which essentially foresaw a peaceful and democratic path for the Italian Communist
tutional bourgeois democratic regime, for of the article is as follows: Starting with the in 20th Congress, Khrushchev has continually a completely ditterent social and political affirmed a revisionist course on a whole series
5 Party living under a more or less constithe Indian Communist Party operating context, for the French CP which has to deal with Gaullist bonapartism, and several Latin American CP's where parliamentary democracy does not cease to be a sinister Spanish CP which dreams of a cold "peace- for the unfortunate ful" funeral for the Franco regime.
A second example concerns the revolutionary struggle in the colonial countries. On this level also there are eclectic formulations and verbal concessions in the Chinese critique, but it is above all the central formula —the independent, democratic and national state-which throws light on the bankruptcy of the document. Nobody has actually explained what will be the social nature of such a state and it is quite significant, even decisive, that the 1960 text did not explicitly apply this formula to the single plausible Now, if a formula is considered to be a criterion for interpretation of the dynamic reality of the colonial world, and at the same time as a basic strategic perspective and is proved useless in the case of the two major revolutions of the sixties, then what good is it? The formula emerges as a sycophantic form of sociological characterisation —it only remains to be asked who the next national bourgeoisie will be to gain support.
In fact it is only by going further than the texts of 1957 and 1960 that one can give an answer to the major problems of the colonial revolution at the present time. The fact that the Chinese do not stand squarely on this basis is still a measure of their limitations and contradictions concerning which we will have more to say in the course of this article
ARE THE CHINESE STALINISTS?
The article of September 13 "On the
Question of Stalin" does not reveal a change of position, but the attitude of the CPC to the 20th Congress and the destruction of the myth of Stalin is developed much more fully and explicitly than in any previous article, including the Twenty-Five Points
In brief, the thesis of the official authors of major issues, the denunciation of Stalin entered into this over-all operation and its essential object was to eliminate an obstacle on the path of right-wing opportunist entanglement.
Without going into details about an article that will undoubtedly have been read by our readers, what the Chinese are unaware of is the dual aspect of the 20th Congress, which, from the point of view of the subjective goals of the Khrushchev clique is contradictory in appearance only. Our movement has emphasised throughout this period that the 20th Congress on the one hand signified a leap forward on the path of destalinisation-after the timid thaw of 1953—55—and, on the other hand, for the first timein the movement claiming to be Communist, it advanced the theory, in an open and bare a "new, co a peaceful way to socialism and conception on the question of war. It was immediateły clear that because of this second aspect of the 20th Congress there was implied a very distinct accentuation of the right-wing nature of the international Communist movement. It was at the same time clear that destalinisation, at least in the manner of Khrushchev was a movement of reforms aiming at consolidating the bureaucratic regime at a new level and by new methods; but in fact, whatever the object of the leadership, the attack on Stalin brought to the surface conflicts and contradictions hitherto hidden underground; broke a rigid situation and set in motion deep explosive forces. Hence its objectively progressive import. If right-wing tendencies-men for example such as Togliatti and Gomulka have welcomed the 20th Congress, and have generally accepted it in so far as it is an affirmation of an ultra-moderate course, with regard to the struggle of the international movement and in so far as it is a shrewed and "modern" defence of the bureaucratic system, the Chinese, in seeking to drive back the right-wing revisionist elements and fearing that the destruction of the myth of Stalin might give the green light to "revisionism" (we use quotation marks because the Chinese characterise as revisionist even those ideas and conceptions which are not revisionist, particularly in the case of political and
economic forms of the transitional period) revisionism, without distinguishing its various aspects. (3). a positive have sought to condemn the 20th Congress
The judgements and positions expressed in the article on Stalin are basically undermined by this analytical error in fact, they are intrinsically wrong. A criticism of certain analyses of Stalin's role, of certain grotesque allegations, arbitrary reconstructions, summary and essentially bankrupt acts, can now be 7-12
6 even of the Chinese variety!) then there is plenty from which to draw up balance-sheet!
But let us not harp upon the pernicious tactical implications of the Chinese attitude on the question of Stalin. It is obvious that a polemic conducted in such a manner will not have much interest for the militants and cadres of the colonial countries whose attitude is essentially determined as a result of the present actual orientation in the anticapitalist and anti-imperialist struggle.
not nly from the point of view of our novement, that of revolutionary Marxism. but also from the viewpoint of a certain CP, appeals to Stalin can only arm the rightnumber of historians and sociologists and political students who claim to be Marxists in a broader way. (4) It goes without saying that we are always ready to conduct the fullest discussion on this subject with no matter whom. It is necessary to say in passing that slanderous methods that have been used against us should be eliminated; recent cases demonstrate that in this respect there is not a great difference between the editors of the Chinese and Moscow weeklies. (5). tory is their formulations, lore cont hai We said, the Chinese texts explain to us that Stalin committed extremely grave genuine crimes, on the other hand they pre- errors, even tend that the over all balance sheet is at the same time positive and that it is correct to refer to Stalin as a "great Marxist-Leninist". We will give only one example, that even the advanced capitalist countries, particularly in the Communist parties, where nostalgia for Stalin is still alive, as in the Italian bureaucrats who are pleased represent the Chinese as backward Stalinists, stomping out everything that could burn their fingers. Finally, we do not know what basis the Chinese have for talking about "increasing affection" for the memory of Stalin in the USSR: everybody knows that the opposite is the case and that the antiKrushchev critical tendencies which are effectively growing are not demanding a return to a past era or return to a boss whose "errors" they themselves esperienced, but are showing a new anti-bureaucratic spirit far beyond the paternalistic reformism of Khrushchev.
As was to be inevitably expected, the latest Chinese documents have again brought together all those who characterise the present ideas of the CPC as fundamentally Stalinist and who pretend to explain them by the fact that the Chinese are living out their own the Chinese leaders themselves will not serious «thirties". -ly be able to consider an exception or an accident. Speaking about the Chinese experience, the article we have quoted states that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were able to avoid the negative influence of the errors of Stalin on their revolution, "From, the end of the twenties, throughout the thirties, right up to the middle of the forties." Strange indeed that such a great Marxist Leninist was mistaken in a happening of such capital importance as the Chinese Revolution at the moment when it was necessary to make the crucial choice! If one recalls the role of the same individual in Russia after February 1917 and his hostile attitude to the Yugoslav Revolution Cat a time when it was uncontaminated by
The elementary task of a Marxist analysis is not to limit itself to superficial or marginal aspects and not to lose sight of the real objective significance of a given phenomenon. (6) Our international movement which was the first to understand and emphasise the significance of the rupture between Yugoslavia and the Kremlin some fifteen years ago was equally able to understand from the outset the profound logic of the Chinese Revolution. It analysed in fact the victorious development of the Revolution against the express wish of the Stalinist bureaucracy as well as the objective effect in breaking in the monolithism of the Stalinist system which formation of the Chinese workers'
Stalinist the orientation of a party which toward a retreat.
7 would have. The latter inevitably represented a new pole of revolutionary attraction and raised the question of a certain co-leadership of the Communist movement, at least in certain spheres of influence (a fact which became clear enough as a result of the Korean
Even if for some years the Chinese seemed to accept the leadership of Stalin, and to adopt Stalinist models, the base of the system was objectively undermined. If we do not limit the meaning of Stalinism to the use of authoritarian methods or appeals to ritualistic formulas, but employ it to define a specific form of bureaucratic degeneration pushed to the extreme, whose final logic and most ruinous manifestation lay in the subordination of the most vital requirements of the International workers' movement to the needs of the Soviet bureaucracy of which Stalin was the supreme expression, then the Chinese Revolution, the formation and the progressive reinforcements of the Chinese workers' state were anti-Stalinist as objective facts as much in their genesis as in current developments which are becoming increasingly powerful expressions of the original tendency.
Let us be still more precise. Today the Chinese repeat as a leit-motif, particularly in the articles already mentioned, that it is not necessary that the leadership of the party and the Soviet state should impose its own interests and orientations on everybody and that it is inadmissible if the CPSU adopts at its Congress, or example, a new attitude, that the turn should automatically be compulsory for all the Communist parties. By way of commentary on the Moscow conference of 1960 where the Soviets were criticised and were obliged to back down, the article of September 6 explains this:
"Here ends one of the most abnormal situations, where criticism was not tolerated, however slightly, of the errors of
CPSU leadership, the latter only having to open its mouth for its words to be ratified. This was an event of great historical importance for the international Communist movement."
It was the very axis of the Stalinist conception of the international Communist movement that was aimed at here. (7).
Can one characterise as Stalinist or neoduring a whole period has begun to talk in terms of the majority or minority in the Communist movement, not only on an international but also on a domestic level? (8). Can one overlook that as far as the education of public opinion is concerned. the Chinese have given a lesson not only to the Soviets but also to other CP leaderships by extensively publishing in their press all the most significant documents, whereas in Moscow this has been left to the political grapevine; even the leaders of the Italian CP, who pose as champions of liberalism, are extremely miserly in their daily paper and devote less space to news from China than to the most banal things.
Let us consider, in addition, the present domestic policy of the CCP. It would be difficult to demonstrate that the economic course being followed has the traits of the Stalinist course of the thirties. It is sufficient to note the orientation based on the conception that agriculture at this stage is the basis, the prerequisite; and the realistic character of what is said about the rate of socialist industrialisation (after the exaggeration of a few years ago). We will not discuss here whether such a policy is intrinsically correct or not, nor what ought to be taken by the Chinese as their perspective in order to get out of a grave impasse and to stimulate a more substantial and more balanced economic development. We limit ourselves only to emphasising that in our opinion comparison with the Stalinist policy of the thirties will not stand up. Especially with regard to relations with the peasants, it cannot be contended that the criteria are the same as in those years of the Stalinist epoch. Unless we have been misled by actually defective information, the prices of agricultural products delivered to the government are not set to the complete disadvantage of the peasantry, in contrast to the situation existing in the USSR for a very long period. In addition, whatever malpractices occurred in the feverish campaign for the accelerated formation of the communes, and whatever the conflicts this led to, they cannot be placed on the same plane as the hecatombs and destruction under Stalin's forced collectivisation, without mentioning the fact that the Chinese moved rather quickly
In addition it is significant that whatever towards the national bourgeoisies than have the hiatus between their remarks and the reality, insisted on certain themes. the Chinese newspapers have recently "The bureaucracy," one reads, for example, in the "Drapeau Rouge" quoted by Hsinhua Daily Bulletin July 11, 1963, "has profound social, and ideological historical roots. One must work seriously to eliminate it. It is necessary to establish and apply standards and rules which can shackle and overcome bureaucracy. ( One of the most important is the rule adopted by the party which concerns the participation of functionaries in collective productive work". The theo The Canton journal already quoted gives on the other hand an echo of discussions on bureaucratic privileges: "You have also said it is logical that those cadres who have suffered greatly whilst working for the masses should have a more comfortable life. You are mistaken, Comrade. If you were to have said that, the masses would have demanded: 'Have you made the revolution for that, Comrade?' How would you have replied? I don't think that you would have been able to find a satisfactory answer." (9)
Once again it is not a question of blurring the qualitative differences that exist between the revolutionary Marxist analysis of the bureaucracy as a social layer and the Chinese criticism of the bureaucracy; but nostalgia for Stalinism does not take such attitudes nor write such articles.
Let us return briefly to another question, that of the direction of the revolutionary struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. We have often emphasised that the Chinese documents are far from being precise on the problem of the exact nature of the process of the colonial revolution. A document like the Twenty-five Points, is most equivocal regarding the norcover, social forces which must participate, and on their mutual roles. Certain specific attitudes-for example towards Sukarno -have also been criticised by our movement. But one should not forget that the Chinese have expressed the theory of the uninterrupted revolution which is not without comparison with the theory of the permanent revolution and that they have usually taken a much more critical attitude the Soviet leaders. "The proletariat", lares a Chinese journal, (10) "must unite with the bourgeoisie its support for national movements, but it must resolutely fight against positions of compromise, capitulation and of opposition revolution and to the people. Measures must be taken to prevent the bourgeoisie from monopolising revolution and putting under way a bourgeodictatorship. struggle and the class struggle of the oppressed nations are bound together. It is only when the national struggle is victoriously cluded that it is possible to speak of liberation for the oppressed classes, and only when liberation of oppressed classes is realised is it possible to achieve a nationally integrated revolution. is why the proletariat of the oppressed nationalities must not only play an active role in the movements of national liberation, but must also be in the first rank of the struggle and attempt to become the leading force. The proletariat must oppose the inauguration of a bourgeois dictatorship and endeavour to form a popular democratic dictatorship to lead the revolution in a way that will culminate in socialism and completely suppress inequalities among the nationalities and classes."
If we examine concretely the situation in Laos, insofar as accurate information is available, it could be said that whereas the Kremlin plays basically a role of compromise in the spirit of "national unity", , the line of the Pathet Lao, influenced by the Chinese, is in reality a kind of application of such orientation towards the national bourgeoisie, which in practice rejects compromises favourable to the latter.
All this being so, can the objective conditions in China today—namely its persistently backward character-bring about orientation and evolution like that of the USSR in the thirties? Such is the basis of the analogy with Stalinism beyond current attitudes and generalisations.
Above all, the extreme bureaucratic degeneration of the USSR under Stalin was the result not only of backward internal conditions but of acombination of multiple factors of which backward con-
since the death of Stalin, the bureaucracy capitalist, Poland would also be involved,
9 ditions, the international context, the conjunctural state of mind of the masses (demoralisation, social disintegration), orientation and the level of comprehension of problems-to a large extent of a new nature and even unforeseen-on the part of the cadres themselves. It is clear that if the factor represented by economic underdevelopment was in itself the only determınant, in Yugoslavia there would have Stalinist regime equal or worse than that in the necessary preconditions for the USSR and the mave been true for proportions guarded, Cuba.
In reality, in the present context, it is the international conditions which play a decisive role and, and when we speak of international conditions we include the very rich experience that the workers' movement has already had in countries where capitalism has been overthrown. In the situation of mounting revolution which by and large characterises this stage of world history and in the light of the bitter lessons of bureaucratism in the USSR and the peoples' democracies, we have the explanation for the forthright anti-Stalinism of a Fidel Castro or of the course followed by Ben Bella in the Algerian Revolution. It would be absurd to believe that in such a context the economic conditions of China might be able to determine by their own action a repetition of the Stalinist experience in its specific traits.
We say "in its specific traits" because The hange ot aspect of the problem exists. Ihe danger of bureaucratism and bureaucratisation is inherent in all societies transitional from capitalism to socialism, characterised by backward economic conditions an inadequate cultural level and the absence or the bankruptcy of revolutionary leadership and oagan fot bureaucratiation has objective base for bureaucratisation existed and exists in China, as it exists in Cuba. But one should not, however, identify bureaucratism with Stalinism.
In fact, Stalinism was historically specific case of bureaucratic degeneration which was produced under conditions that were quite particular, even unique. In the USSR under the regime which has ruled continues to dominate but under forms, with orientations and perspectives quite different from those of the Stalin era. experience, which has however, not emerged from the cycle of bureaucracy, was, and is characterised by other particular forms. The future reserves other variants and a multitude of experiences, ranging from the "Cuban" variety-where the bureaucracy is limited to types characterisession strong deformations, extreme oppression severe repression. But nothing allows us to seriously affirm that the Chinese experience actually identifies itsell, or Will have a tendency to identify itself with the form of degeneration that the USSR has known in the Stalin period. All the more significant indications permit a conclusion in accordance with an opposite argument.
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE
"BUREAUCRATIC COMPRADOR
BOURGEOISIE".
We have repeatedly condemned the summary accusations hurled by the Chinese at the Yugoslavs and their characterisation of Yugoslavia as a capitalist state. view of the latest article devoted to this question by the editors of "Red Flag" and of the "Peoples' Daily", one cannot limit oneself to denouncing inadmissible polemical methods, because this article claims to be a sociological characterisation bolstered by a whole series of arguments.
It will be necessary to examine these arguments in detail in a special article. question, in any case, of a deplorable construction, where arbitrary, conclusions are drawn from certain actual facts, the facts are grossly distorted, sociological notions are introduced which are at the very least odd; essential points on which one would wish to know not only the criticisms made of the Yugoslavs, but also the conceptions of the Chinese themselves, are but lightly touched upon, for example, it is true that a very high percentage of the land in Yugoslavia is still privately owned; well, in the first place, the proportions change enormously if we consider, not the surface area, but, as is necessary, commodity production. In the second place, if private ownership of the greater part of the land were sufficient criterion for characterising a country as
even though so far the Chinese do not appear Yugoslavia in every way, and that it is to have contested its nature as a workers' state (or socialist, according to their terminology. If the Yugoslavs have in effect allowed the laws of the market to operate too freely, it is untrue to say that there is no more economic planning, and it is on the other hand evident that the phenomenon of private enterprise affects a very limited part-from the quantitative as well as from the qualitative point of view-of the national economy. If the undoubted excessive autonomy allowed to the enterprises has given birth to a whole series of dangerous phenomena, it is only on the basis of arbitrary extrapolations that they can be compared to genuine capitalist enterprises. We know very well that the powers of the workers' councils are quite simply, limited, so that a distribution national income very favourable to directors, managers, etc., is not completely avoided. But the authors of the article-who forget, among other things, that in the time of Stalin the extreme centralisation and the absence of workers' councils did not prevent the hegemony of directors and their crystalisation as a privileged layer—should tell us if, in their view, the remedy consists in the abolition of any form of workers' council and of autonomy of the enterprise, or, on the other hand, in the creation of organs of workers' management and of collective leadership to a qualitatively superior level.
Finally, what then is this strange "bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie" transferred from the sociological reality of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and which they apply to a completely different social and economic context, to a country where the qualitative leap of the socialist revolution has in fact taken place? This concept, which undoubtedly has claims to originality, is a curious mixture of reminiscences of analyses developed in the past on an entirely different subject, and of an actual reconciliation with the outworn conceptions of some ultra-left groups. Yugoslavia, is in effect, according to the actual words of the Chinese editors, "State capitalism of a particular type."
The worst is that at the end of the article on Yugoslavia there is a disquieting allusion: "We have no alternative but to state that the leadership of the CPSU imitates
10 course." In the article of September 6th, committed to a particularly dangerous the programme of the CPSU is, moreover, characterised as a "revisionist programme for the maintenance and restoration of capitalism." Is it necessary to emphasise that, if they dared in effect to transfer the new sociological characterisation of the Yugoslav scapegoat to the Soviet addressee, the Chinese communists would commit a monumental theoretical and political error, which from a tactical point of view, would put them in an untenable position.
THE CONFLICTS OF THE EPOCH OF TRANSITION
The Sino-Soviet conflict, preceded moreover by the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict and, even if only for a very brief period, by the conflict between the Soviet and Polish leaderships, prompts some considerations of a general nature. In fact, we have now entered into a relatively advanced phase of the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism and a whole series of phenomena so broad and complex appear, that differentiations, conflicts, contradictions, are inevitable. A certain superficial agreement emerges on this point; for example, arguments of this kind were recently developed by the leadership of the Italian CP. However, this is too often limited to a very general reminder about the "specific conditions," which at bottom is only a loophole for avoiding having to deal with the heart of the matter, Moreover, the issues are discussed in such a way as to give the impression that it was thought that the specific conditions themselves provoked tactical, political and ideological differences, without there being any underlying conflicts of interests. Now those who avail themselves of the Marxist materialist method of analysis know very well that, even in societies of transition from capitalism to socialism, the conflicts and contradictions (12) are precisely determined by divergent or opposed interests, and that it is necessary to set out from this basis not only to understand them but also to decide upon a political orienta-
Not the least of the havoc wrought by Stalin and his school was Marxist method in the analysis of postcapitalist Soviet society by mechanical casuisry, vulgar empiricism, by apologetics pure und simple.
mic concessions to their own masses (the detriment of normal economic development.
11
Whereas in the Stalin epoch the methods of construction of a workers' state were conceived on a rigid model, , the present-day panorama, fifteen years after the victory of the Chinese Revolution and a few years after the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba, is seen to be extremely differentiated and tends toward greater differentiations. Indeed, according as the collectivist system broadens out on a world scale, a tendency develops, as in previous historical epochs of transition. That is to say: in the first place, the qualitative leap may be accomplished under different forms and conditions as a result of the entanglement of multiple factors; secondly, at least in the initial stages with which we are acquainted, very different basic structures finally, the political structures, themselves take on differing show themselves susceptible to increasingly pronounced differentiation (we are thinking here of the short and medium terms). All this inevitably involves frictions, conflicts and contradictions. There is not necessarily a single solution, or one recognizable a priori to the various problems which are posed; different solutions can appear, as a function of specific conflicts of interest or even following errors of judgement which are always possible.
This is so much the more plausible and inevitable in view of the fact that the workers' states which exist at present—with the partial exception of the Cuban workers' state-are not led by revolutionary Marxist leaderships, democratically thrown up by the proletarian and peasant measses, but by leaderships which are bureaucratized in different ways varying degrees and which, consequently, view all problems, not trom the point of view of the real interest of the masses and of the development of the revolutionary movement on a world scale, but from the point of view, in their eyes more important, of the interests of the dominant bureaucratic
Let us take a few examples. The Soviet pureaucracy, at the present stage, is above all else interested in finding a modus vivendi with imperialism which would allow it to envisage less "explosive" and more "controllable" processes on the international scene, to partially reduce the vast military expenditure and thus to increase the economore so since they are not prepared to make mportant concessions on the more strictly political plane). They may be interested in concentrating their efforts of economic aid to the national bourgeoisies of the "Third World" always of course within the framework of the same strategy, even to the detriment of aid to a workers' state such as China which, on the one hand, would require aid on a gigantic scale (which in any case would pose a tough problem) and which the Soviet bureaucracy on the other hand has no interest seeing strengthened at an accelerated rhythm. They may be interested in propelling in the peoples' democracies economic development of a certain type, in stimulating, for example, an agricultural sector instead of an industrial one. The experience of the first post-war years and even the first experiences of Comecon (see the conflict with the Rumanian leadership) demonstrate that there is no guarantee that the Soviet bureaucracy strives to find solutions corresponding not to its own particular interests, but to the general necessities of harmonious development of an international plan, of a rational international division of labour.
In the field of economic development, more generally, the Soviet leadership is preoccupied above all with the further economic growth of the country which they lead, relegating to second place the needs involved in rapid porgress of the system of workers' states as a whole. If it can be said in very general and abstract terms that the two things are not contradictory— in principle, further development of the Soviet economy can be profitable to the system as a whole and vice-versa—a more balanced development of the system creates more favourable conditions for Soviet growth; it is otherwise with regard to concrete decisions: conflicts are always possible, likely, and have in effect arisen. (13). To return for a moment to the quarrel about atomic weapons, the Soviet Union could abstractly be justified in saying to China: there is no need for you to make heavy sacrifices, we will shield everybody. But, in practice, as we have seen, the Chinese leaders could have a thousand reasons for believing that, if atomic weapons are not destroyed, the only real guarantee for China is to have them, even to the partial
Finally, to touch upon a central point in misplaced, arbitrary and false quotations the conflict which has been emphasised from Stalin (made, moreover, while forgett-
12 several times in our documents, given the level attained the USSR and taking into account the incidence of the factor of "defence of bureaucratic interests." one can see why Khrushchev has established more and more his fundamental strategy, in which the decisive element in the historical struggle of the two systems on a world scale will be the victory of the USSR in economic competition with the US. But one can see at the same time that the Chinese leaders, who control an economically backward state, who have undergone and are undergoing the most direct and brutal imperialist pressure, who are forced to note the serious consequences for their economic development of the geographical limitation of the collectivist system, emphasise above all the element represented by the revolutionary struggle of the masses; and they have been lately pushed in this direction even by their inferiority in regard to the most decisive armaments.
The Chinese leadership is also a bureaucratic leadership with its own specific interests. For us this is ABC and we have never been reticent on this point. But objectively the important thing is that the bureaucratic Chinese leadership is impelled by different forces than those which condition the Khrushchev leadership and that, thanks to these forces, objectively they take more progressive stands, closer to positions corresponding to the real needs of the defence of the workers' states and of the development of the international working class movement. There is the essential reason for our attitude on the Sino-Soviet conflict.
18th October, 1963
Our article was already finished when the Chinese published a new editorial in "Red Flag" and the "Peoples' Daily" concerning the policy of the leaders of the USSR toward the colonial revolution.
The criticisms expressed in 1960 in a veiled and partial form (see our article published at the time in "Fourth International") are formulated in the new text much more clearly and organically. Obviously one could never accept all the arguments which are put forward or forget that certain serious deficiencies in the Chinese position remain, or let pass without comment the once again completely ing the practice of the same Stalin, in the first place with regard to the Chinese revolution). Nevertheless, the criticism of the Khrushchey conception of coexistence, of the subordination of revolutionary struggles to the policy needs of the leaders of the USSR of Khrushche's babbling about UNO about the possibilities of collaboration with imperialism (including American imperialism) in the matter of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries etc., is fundamentally correct and pertinent and draws close to the criticism made by our movement. To this must be added that the Chinese also give concrete examples, by speaking also of Khrushchev's policy towards the Algerian Revolution-whose government was not recognised till after Evian!-and above all of the treachery of the French CP which Pravda and the Soviet press praise even for its attitude to the Algerian people. The criticism of the French CP was accompanied by the publication, almost on the same day, in the Chinese bulletin, of a speech of the Algerian leader Ouzegane to the Chinese students on the opportunist atitutude of the French CP. The Soviet press is hardly to be expected to report these same criticisms!
It should be remarked, moreover, that in their polemics on the role of the colonial revolution-which the Soviets reproach the Chinese with exaggerating through considering it to be fundamental and decisive—the Chinese document says that today the revolutions of national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America deal direct blows to imperialism. The contradictions of the world are concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It adds afterwards: 'The centre of world contradictions, of the world political struggles, is not fixed, but changes in relation to changes of the international struggles and of the revolutionary situation. We believe that with the development of the contradiction and the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Western Europe and the United States, the day of the decisive struggle will come also in the citadels of capitalism and imperialism. When that day comes, Western Europe will straines, of thorid contraditiond, political
FOOTNOTES (1) See the September 1 declaration of the United Secretariat. particular it was stated: (8) compromises thers the solution consists of adopting o epeating sufficiently elastic formulas, an on others, the Chinese communists are rediscipline of the majority." (3) The Chinese seem moreover to forget or to be unaware of one central point: even in the
Staplied an ora nation off emmacist roads
applied an orientation of the " even if they did not explicitly theorise about it. Is it necessary to judge if Stalin's policy at least as right-wing as that of his successors, who were nevertheless on occasions obliged (4) For a reply to some of the arguments in the article on Stalin sce issue No 3. of World Outlook (by E Germain). (5) We allude here to passages in the Chinese articles of Sep. 6 and 13, 1963 and the article accusations about Trotskyism can grotesque and paradoxical, but they are in reality the reflection of the bureaucratic character common to the two leaderships both of whom consider Trotskysists as their (10) enemies, guilty of expressing a revolutionary Marxist criticism of the phenomena of bureaucratic degeneration in the workers' states.
(11) We are not referring here to the critics of Khrushchev and Togliatti who whilst posing (12) as opponents of Stalin have fluctuated not a little in their judgements and even since 1956 themselves used the description "great Marxist-Leninist" for Stalin, and have a record which despite everything is negative. We have in mind certain affirmations in the analyses of authors like Baran and even Sweezy, and ideas current in the Italian CP, for example. A good many leaders of the Communist parties have not in fact ceased to be Stalinists in substance despite their Khrushchevism, for they have automatically aligned selves with the leadership of the CPSU in accusing the Chinese of high treason.
One could say that the Chinese were the last to drop the slogan, "The Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union" reflection of the bureaucratic ideas also held by the Chinese leaders it likewise demonstrates at the same time that it is always necessary to seek the reality hidden behind the slogans. Paradoxically sought to act as disciplined members of the socialist camp" at the very moment when
"In normal conditions the positions of the majority are the base on which we are ted by the majority."
The same journal returns to the problem of the majority and the minority when it envisages the possibility of a secretary placed in a minority and thus forced to apply the decisions of the majority of the committee of which he is a member. March, 21, 1962: "Who has the Final Word?" "The Communist's Outlook on Material hans, hat in 1960 the Chinese, deed that their experts in Guinea would be paid the same as the local experts. V. Kuo-Chin-Jun: "Proletarians and Oppressed Nationalities of the Whole World, Unite!" July 25, 1963. The English text reads "in every way". Mao Tse-Tung, as is known, has used the formula of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions in order to distinguish the contradictions of a society characterised by class exploitation from those of a socialist society or a society of transition to socialism. Leaving aside questions of terminology, we would say that it is a question of contradictions of a historically new type, with a new social content. The Soviet leaders have made a great noise against the Chinese assertions that a socialist country must above all count on itself, and have sung the praises of the international division of labour. Unfortunately for them, it is not a question, as we have seen, of stating an abstract principle, but of ascertaining the reality of USSR policy on the question. This is emphasised in an important passage of a speech by Liu Chao-chi at PyongYang: "Everyone knows that to rely on one's strength does not mean a 'closed-door' policy, or a refusal of foreign aid. But in its revolution and construction, every country should rely principally on its own strength,
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