SINO - SOVIET CONFLICT
By LIVIO MAITAN enced successive resurgences, interrupted by tempo- lutionary movement, for whom the wave of chau-
THE Sino-Soviet conflict, which has for a number of years, and which has experrary and partial truces, has reached a new level since the month of October 1962. debate have not changed essentially: but touchstones like the Caribbean crisis and the frontier conflict between India and China have transferred certain parts of the debate from the domain of generalities of a more or less theoretical nature to the domain of burning contemporary political significance: which has inevitably rendered the polemics harder and more acute and definitively torn away certain ridiculous subterfuges. Things have gone so far that both sides have spoken openly danger of schism in the Communist movement, and the Chinese, evidently in the minority, have recalled that minorities can be in the right and that Lenin himself represented only a minority in his struggle against revisionism within the Second International
The Chinese, who found it quite natural to take the initiative in the new wave of debate, have replied, since 1959-60: the question of war and of coexistence, question of the consequences of a possible nuclear war, the question of the colonial revolution and of alliances in the "Third World" , the question of paths to socialism, the criticisms of the ideas of the Yugoslay communists (2), in short, almost all the crucial questions of the international movement, which, moreover, had been at the centre of discussion at the Moscow Conference in 1960. A significant sign of a very tense situation was the fact that the Chinese have not hesitated to take up again, obviously with regard to the Soviet Union, the matter of the birth of tendencies of great-nation chauvinism and of a narrow nationalism in the workers' movement, matters already expressed at the beginning of the Hungarian revolution, but rapidly forgotten afterwards. Nevertheless, it has been the two major political questions of the last few months —the blockade against Cuba and the minor SinoIndian war—which were at the centre of the polemics, and, moreover it has been in taking their point of departure from these concrete problems, especially the first, that the Chinese were led to correct, or to clarify at least, more satisfactorily, their ideas on nuclear war and on the methods of struggle against the menace of war on the part of imperialism. The Sino-Indian Conflict and the Caribbean Crisis :
It must be said that the attitude taken by the Soviet by other Workers' States and by a whole series of Communist Parties who took the Khrushchev line on the Sino-Indian affair was by itself of a nature such as literally to provoke the Chinese and to impel them towards a deepening of the conflict. It may be disputable whether the attitude of the Chinese leadership on the Indian question was politically correct, whether it would not have been better to anticipate the happy decision of the 20th necessity of facilitating the task of the Indian revovinism organised by Nehru has had grave con-
But, basically, no hesitation could be admitted when it was a case of a conflict, and indeed a military conflict, People's China, and a bourgeois State, more conservative in nature such as Nehru's India (4). Khrushchey forgot this completely and, whilst paying hypocritical lip service to a "brother country, in practice he encouraged his Indian "friend" by confirming at the most critical moment of the conflict, the contract to supply MIGs. It must be said that the public reaction in China to the Soviet attitude has been very moderate (5); but there ins't the shadow of a doubt that this attitude represented for Mao an extremely significant test and contributed in very large measure to the aggravation of the conflict.
On the other hand, we must not forget, when it is a question of the problems of what is called the Third World, that the Chinese cannot accept the evolution of economic aid and commercial relations in general on the part of the Soviet Union. As is emphasised in an article which appeared in the same number of our journal, underdeveloped countries led by national bourgeoisies, often very reactionary, receive from the Soviet Union substantial and increasing aid, whilst Sino-Soviet economic relations have experienced a
Once more, at least in the public polemics, the Chinese have been very discreet on this subject; but no one can ignore the fact that it is a question here of one of the most important factors in the differences. If certain remarks of Chinese origin on the duty of the Soviet Union, which has already attained a quite high economic level, to sacrifice, development to the end of assisting Workers' States to attain the Soviet level-if these remarks might appear somewhat abstract, inspired by a certain amount of idealism, and in sum-what counts for more-even from the strictly economic point of view very disputable, concerns the above phenomena it is absolutely justified, even if in principle no one contests the advantage of a Workers' State sometimes assisting even States with bourgeois governments.
The Caribbean which represented the greatest danger of war since the end of the war should, on the other hand, illuminate the different meaning that the policy of coexistence, in principle admitted by everyone, acquires according to the interpretations and applications to which it is subjected. If for Khrushchev it is represented by an agreement with the US, for the Chinese it consists, on the contrary, above all in a constant and imperialism, American imperialism in the first place, a struggle to inflict on it a ceaseless rain of blows, a struggle to stop it unleashing a world war.
dispute that war may be avoided, but they spell outway which is much clearer than was the case in the
If in the Soviet perspective, oriented towards the supreme goal of the preservation of peace, it is legitimate to sacrifice even the necessities of the development of a revolution-something which has already occurred in practice, even though there is naturally a refusal to admit it—according to the Chinese, it is precisely in lending impetus to new revolutions and
"uninterrupted" imperialism can be placed in conditions for unleashing a (The Chinese emphasis, of a more or less are inevitable in the contempoary international context and, on the basis of the experience of the last fifteen years, it would be difficult to refute their argument.)
In the concrete case of Cuba, the Chinese, disapproved of the withdrawal of Krushchev, insofar essentially, that a withdrawal of as they asserted such a nature would encourage imperialism, that it was virtually unconditional (for the five points of Fidel Castro had not been accepted by imperialism) that there was a failure to mobilise the masses of the whole world around the defence of Cuba and for the acceptance of the five points, and finally, that it was absurd to place any confidence in the declarations of Kennedy about the renunciation of any idea of invading the island (6).... The acceptance, on the part of Khrushchev, against the will of Castro, of UN inspection on Cuban soil was a particular target, for, it was said, it is not in asking people to renounce their elementary rights that the hand of imperialism is stayed and a true peace guaranteed.
The replies of the supporters of the Khrushchev • line, denouncing an alleged underestimation of the danger of war and of the consequences of a nuclear war on the part of Chinese communists, led the latter to a more precise formulation of their position: something which was certainly necessary, precisely on this level that in the past, various weaknesses had been apparent, weaknesses which had been cunningly exploited by their opponents. We refer above all to the very remarkable articles which appeared in the People's Daily on the 15th and 31st of December and which provided timely clarifications.
Thus, we learn that in the Cuban affair the Chinese criticised Khrushchev from a double point of view. 'The world knows" —writes the People's Daily (15th December)-"that we have neither demanded the introduction of nuclear arms into Cuba, nor hindered the withdrawal of 'offensive arms' from the country." It is thus clear that Mao and his 'offensive' supporters criticise the Soviet leaders for their sometimes adventuristic attitudes. In the same article they proclaim more generally that "the socialist countries have no need to use nuclear arms for the purpose of replying to and scaring others," whilst in the article of the 31st December, they write: "We never considered that it is a Marxist-Leninist attitude to brandish arms as a means of conducting international conflicts." From this point of view the Chinese criticism has striking analogies with the criticisms that the Fourth International has addressed on many occassions to the Soviet leadership, the fundamental opportunism of which is in no way free of the adventuristic follies already characterised. (7)
In regard to the question of war, often discussed in a scholastic way, the Chinese, as in the past, don't precisely the condition for this to occur, VIZ., stubborn and united struggle of all anti-imperialist forces, without the least illusion about any "peaceful" wing of the bourgeoisie. It is from this point of view that the repetition of the idea that "imperialism has not-changed its nature," which in itself might seem a ritualistic formula, acquires its concrete significance.
All this implies that it would be "absurd to believe that one may expect a world without war by peaceful
It is inevitable that civil wars and wars of national liberation will occur." In the final ana-
"Marxist-Leninists have always explained that it is only after the imperialist system has been overthrown, and the whole system of the oppression and exploitation of men abolished, and not before, that it will be possible to a world without war, eliminate all wars and expect
(8) This position is far more correct than the Khrushchev line which puts the emphasis on the possibility of eliminating the danger of war even if the capitalist regime continues to exist.
With regard to the destructive force of nuclear arms and the consequences flowing from this, the Chinese have made it plain that their party is quite convinced that "nuclear arms imply an unprecedented destructive power and that, if a nuclear war broke out, it would be an unparallelled catastrophe for humanity" and they recalled their numerous statements of their position on the banning of nuclear arms and tests. But they add that the existence of these new arms doesn't imply, in the first place, a change in nature of war, that it doesn't justify, secondly, the catastrophic perspectives, envisaged in particular by the Italian leader Togliatti, of the total tion of humanity or of civilisation (9), and finally doesn't absolutely exclude differences concerning the means to be used to prevent nuclear war. political line based on fear and constant withdrawals, they oppose a line oriented towards the mobilisation of the masses. They add that it is necessary to inform the masses of the significance of the new arms to avoid errors of underestimation and to. press forward the struggle against the war policy of imper-
Just the same, the possibility of a nuclear holocaust is still under-estimated. The hypothesis that a nuclear war on a grand scale might lead to the destruction of human life on earth cannot be shrugged off as "revisionist" or as characteristic of frightened people. It is a matter fundamentally, of a scientific hypothesis-that the majority of competent scientific men consider plausible--and, if the Chinese are in a position to prove it false, they should do so by means of scientific arguments and not by appeals to the first principles of Marxism. At any rate, the final formulations of the People's Daily indicate that certain flippant, attitudes-which we have criticised -have been markedly corrected, and even more, that the criticisms of the alleged Chinese adventurism, which envisaged the eventuality of a war quite lightheartedly, correspond to a vicious distortion of the facts of the matter. The Attack on the Leader of the Italian CP
The logic of the conflict itself has impelled the Chinese to state their criticisms of the policy of "peaceful and democratic roads" to socialism in a
Their choice-to some extent determined by defensive necessities--fell on the Italian CP, strongest party of the advanced capitalist countries and led by a group that has put itself literally in the vanguard of Khrushchevism. If in 1959-60 criticism was limited to summary reminders of the nature of the State and the placing of emphasis on the greater probability of solutions characterised by revolutionary break throughs, now it is much more open and vigo-
The orientation of the Italian CP is gone over with a fine-toothed comb, denounced in certain of
('Italian paths", interpretation of the present Italian Constitution, structural reforms, etc.,) and characterised as social democratic etc. The Chinese in the course of this analysis even introduce a comparison between Togliatti and Kautsky, who may, quite justly, be regarded as among the ancestors of the notion of the peaceful path to socialsim. In fact, the essential points of the Togliatti orientation are very pertinently grasped: the leader of the ICP no longer believes in the necessity of a proletarian revolution, counts rather on a series of structural reforms, considers (if not quite explicitly in his declarations, certainly in his actual political line) that the contemporary Italian State is an instrument which is not necessarily of a capitalist nature, and could be, on the contrary, conquered from the inside and utilised as such by the proletariat in its struggle for socialism (10). This line-say the Chinese-stems fundamentally from an opportunistic interpretation of coexistence. The notions of class-collaboration which were worked out in regard to world politics, are here transferred to the context of internal politics.
Is there concealed behind this last criticism a more general and fundamental one concerning the relations between what may count as an international policy of a Workers' State and the policy of the communist parties in the countries itself, which should never be subordinated to the diplomatic and tactful necessities, which are transitory moreover, of a Worker's or of a bloc of Workers' States? It is tempting to reply to this in the affirmative, for Red Flag recently recalled a formulation by Mao-tse-Tung in 1946 with regard to the compromise between the USSR and the imperialist countries on the international plane. "This compromise does not imply that the countries of the capitalist world are placed in the same boat and themselves undertake compromises. The people of these countries should continue to unleash struggles on the basis of their specific conditions" (I1)
What is put in question in this passage is one of the pivots of the classical Stalinist conception. policy effectively practiced by Mao at the crucial turning-point of the Chinese situation in 1946-7 has shown without any possibility of equivocation that his assertions were not mere abstract dicta (12). The Soviet Counter-Attack
The long replies by Khrushchev to the most recent criticisms have not brought forward any essentially new element, but they have expressed with a greater clarity the significance of the contemporary policy of the Soviet leadership (13).
In regard, above all, to the Caribbean crisis, the argument is well-known: the attitude of the USSR saved the world from a a nuclear war, avoided the invasion of Cuba, obtained a promise on the part of Kennedy not to undertake new aggressions. a more general point of view, reproach their critics with conceiving of the achievement of socialism through war, with underestimating in an irresonsible way the extreme danger represented arms and with preaching a sectatian munists, above all in the capitalist countries (14).
We have already seen that these Khrushchevite reproaches are only partially justified, if not simply
Is it necessary to recall, on the other hand, that the Khrushchev policy in the matter of the rockets in Cuba brought in its train, in the final analysis, a weakening of the defence of the revolutionary island and that Khrushchev's attitude has also been disapproved of by the Cuban revolutionary leadership for his acceptance of UN inspection on Cuban soil? Must it be recalled that Kennedy, after an initial declaration which was sufficiently vague, has explicitely refused to give any guarantee? Is it more over so wrong to emphasize, as not only the Albanian scapegoats do but also the Cubans, that in any casewe can have no confidence in declarations by the leader of American imperialism? (15)
It may be replied that, after all, the Soviet has declared itself in favor of Castro's five points, which are so warmly defended by the Chinese. all the evidence, we have here only plain hypocrisy: for, in the situation of the Soviet Union, which was directly playing an essential role, support for the five points could subordination agreement with part of the Cuban demands. On the contrary, Khrushchev withdrew not ony the missilves but also aircraft, without even trying to obtain anything on the lines of the five points which consequently have for him only a purely propaganda value.
As for the more general themes of the polemic, the Soviet has put up yet once more the idea that "even before the complete victory of socialism over the earth, while capitalism still exists in some regions of the world, there will be real possibility of eliminating world war from the life of society." (16)
Moreover, they have proclaimed that the merit is theirs if war has not broken out on various occasions, and that Soivet aid to colonial revolutions has played
Going even own defence, Khrushcher has challenged the Albanians to name a sin le example of a Communist Party which, in a revolutionary situation, was advised by the CPSU to renounce a perspective of armed
We do not know if the Albanians have as yet replied. In any cast, let us come to the aid of the Soviet leader's failing memory. That Stalin "advised against" a revolutionary line in China at the crucial moment, is generally admitted. This example alone would suffice, from the fact that it concerns a revolution by a people numbering 600 million! But, in the case of Yugoslavia, a similar
According to Stalin, the struggle of the Yugoslavs should not have had socialist aims, with the and it
13 essentially against his instructions resistance movement in Yugoslavia was fairly rapidly transformed into a movement for social emancipation. Last but not least: Moscow's prolonged control over the C.P.'s of Latin America led these parties to adopt a line bearing no relation to the needs of the Latin-American revolution—a fact made absolutely clear by the Cuban revolution, which was born, grew up and reached the stage of socialist construction not under the leadership of, but despite, the Cuban Communists, faithful to the Kremlin. need to add, for example, that in the case of the Iraqi revolutions the Khrushchev line thwarted its logical development, that the USSR Evian to recognize the GPRA and that in the critical months through which the economy of independent Algeria is passing, it has not yet undertaken to furnish the technical and economic aid which is nevertheless so necessary?
Moreover, the case of Cuba allows us to understand another disagreement bearing on policy towards the colonial semi-colonial world. when a revolution is victorious and is threatened by imperialism, the Soviet bureaucracy itself is obliged in its own interest to express its solidarity which includes economic and military aid. But the Cuban experience has changed the Kremlin's fundamental line, which remains that of seeking an alliance with the national bourgeoisies of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, a line obviously implying that one does not in any way encourage-on the contrary! —the socialist development of the colonial revolution. The Chinese, on the contrary, extol the Cuban example, considering it as no isolated or unique case, and on the other hand they do not fail to raise again from time to time the theme of uninterrupted revo-
The disagreement is thus quite evident, even if the Chinese themselves need to be clearer on this fundamental problem for the sector of the world in which, at the present stage, they have the best chance of making their viewpoint triumph.
But the essential content of the Soviet leader's reply in Pravda is revealed above all by the tion of the tasks of the Communist movement in its struggle against imperialism, namely: to develop the economy of socialist society in such a way that the socialist countries exert a more and more decisive influence on historical development; to foreign ploicy of peace that can weaken imperialism and facilitate the struggle of the peoples for their liberty and independence, avoiding any attitude that may assist imperialism in its manoeuvres to divide the forces of peace; to be vigilant in the face of imperialism and ensure the efficient military defence of socialist camp; to unmask tirelessly the war schemes of the imperialists, to organize better the forces of peace and intensify the activity of the masses for peace, collaborating also with the states which have no interest in new wars; to reintorce the ties with the states of Africa and Latin America which are striving to win or reinforce their independence, to aid the national liberation movement; to contribute to ensuring the collaboration of all the groups and organisations of the international working class.
Nothing, absolutely nothing, on the role of the struggle by the international proletariat for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, which nevertheless still represents the supreme guarantee against the danger of a nuclear holocaust!
All this shows clearly that Khrushchev clings more than ever to his conception of the passage from capitalism to socialism on a world scale, a conception that revolutionary Marxists have ceaselessly denounced. For him the principal factor, which in the last analysis is going to decide everything, is the economic development of the Soviet Union and the other workers' states; the struggle of the colonial peoples and of the proletarians of the advanced countries is an auxiliary force which will play only a subordinate role. (18) It is clear that, not just revolutionary Marxists, but the Chinese communists also, can only reject such a perspective, which quite simply wipes out the factor "revolution" and may be justly characterised as reformist—or, if it is preferred, as reformist in a new way. An International confrontation: the Attitude of the Cubans
To the extent that the Sino-Soviet polemic has widened out on to all the fundamental questions of our epoch, involving at the same time contemporary political events in which others besides the Soviet and China were directly concerned, it has become and is becoming more and more a major confrontation in the world communist movement, among the different tendencies which exist or are prefigured internationally as well as nationally. It is on the other hand clear that, despite all the bureaucratic fictions, the adherence by a leadership to one or the other orientation does not at all imply that unanimity reigns in the ranks.
Khrushchev has succeeded up to now in preserving and reinforcing his position. He has with him in fact the parties of the people's democracies and of the capitalist countries, as well as a whole important series of parties of the colonial or semi-colonial countries, which constitute a large enough majority. But hrst of all, his camp is not without cracks and differentiation in its very heart: it is clear, in fact, that Togliatti's orientation is quite different from that of Thorez, Gomulka's from Novotny's. There are some parties, even powerful ones (19) which have not wanted to declare themselves clearly, as long as knowledge is lacking on the exact relationship of forces between the different currents which effectively exist in a series of Latin-American: or African Communist Parties. This means that the party remains "open" , and it would be a gross error to estimate the strength and, still more, the possibilities of the Chinese, on the basis of the mediocre tally of their present allies.
We have repeatedly emphasized that the Yugoslav Communists represented a third international Communist movement, whose more positive contribution lies in the experience of workers' councils and the elaboration of a series of quite valid ideas on the question of organization of a
This contribution, the significance in the eyes of the small countries especially of their struggle against tutelage by the Stalinist bureaucracy, and finally the practical aid they have given to certain revolutionary movements (21), have created throughout the world wide currents of sympathy with the Yugoslavs, not to mention Titoist currents which without doubt exist in the workers'
But, for in spite of this, it is difficult at the present
Yugoslav tendency important tendency on the international scale.
the chief problems like the orientation towards the national bourgeoisie of the Third World, like co-existence and war, like the roads towards socialism which are basically the problems on which a selection of position is made, the positions of the Yugoslay League are absolutely rightwing and often plainly revisionist. On that level, moreover, they are in danger of appearing as the spearhead of Khrushchevism, being able to state earlier and more explicitly what Krushchev cannot present troops except in successive stages and in a softened
It is the Fidelist movement, by contrast, which is playing and will play in future an international
Born in a completely original form, continuously by a living revolution and stimulated by the objective situation of the whole of Latin America, Fidelism has been able to express a clear and fundamentally Marxist revolutionary line on many key-problems, calling forth a powerful wave in its favour particularly in the countries of South and Central Àmerica. It is true that the Cuban leadership has not committed itself in respect of the differences of the communist movement and that Castro has underlined energetically the necessity to maintain unity. This is logical on his part, for Cuba has need of support from all Workers States and in particular cannot compromise considerable economic aid brought to it by the S.U. (in this domain China would not be in a condition to effectively take over the replacement).
But, if one recalls the basic orientation of the revolutionaries expressed in a masterful manner in the Second Havana Daclaration and their most recent formulations, it is absolutely evident that the Fidelist movement is much closer to the Chinese tendency than to that of the Soviet leadership. In connection with the solution of the crisis in the Caribbean-which involves the more general question of co-existence—the Cuban criticisms of the S.U. especially in connection with inspection by the U.N.O. and the "assurances" of Kennedy-are known. "What is of greatest interest" Castro declared to the Secretary of the U.N.O. "is not to pay a price for peace now, but to guarantee peace in a definite manner and not to pay every day the price of an imagined peace" (22)
"I wish to state in the first place", said Castro at the Congress of American Women", , that for us the Caribbean crisis has not been resolved. I wish to say that our opinion, the opinion of the revolutionary leadership of the country, is that a war has been avoided, but peace has not been won: these are two different things......We declarations, and what is more, Kennedy has declared nothing. If he made some promises, he has already withdrawn them" (23).
It is a year since the Second Declaration of Havana defined the line for the whole of Latin derived from the victorious Cuban experience. spite of some minor omissions, this was in reality a rejection of the orientation of the Communist Parties of Latin America (confirmed by the conference of the 81). To the collaboration with the national bourgeoisie in search of the creation of opposed consistent revolutionary struggle, basically inspired by the theory of the permanent revolution. To the chatter about the peaceful parliamentary roads-paradoxically indulged in by the Communist Parties in countries where there is not a shadow of a parliament and democracy is but a tragi-comical farce-was opposed the necessity of armed struggle, based in the first place on the poor peasantry. his speech to the American Women, Castro returned more explicitly than ever to all these questions by himself in a reserved manner "brother countries" in respect of the Declaration of Havana and by arguing in a very lively manner against the theoreticians of peaceful roads who have gone as far as to present the revolution itself as an example of a peaceful road. (24).
Since there are involved here for a large part of Latin America, problems of burning contemporary significance, problems which imply questions of orientation and of struggle, the break-out of which is very close or immediate, a conflict between the orientation which still dominates the leaders of the Latin American C.P.'s and the Fidelist lines is inevitable-in fact it has been developing already for a certain time more or less openly. foresee that aided by the Castro has great chances of making considerable gains, be it by stimulating almost everywhere the development of new revolutionary movements, or by pushing forward a "Cuban" wing in certain
Fidelism will appear communism, which due to its highly progressive aspects could extend its influence to other parties in the world and even to the Workers States themis the possible dynamic that Krhushchev should consider to form a more realistic picture of the different forces which are present. Is a compromise possible ?
The bureaucratic leadership engaged in the conflict-both on the part of the Soviet as well as on that of the Chinese are more and more aware of the danger which the following up and the deepening of such a conflict implies for them, beyond the conscious intentions involved. They are aware that in the long run it will even become impossible for the most shut off leaderships to impose from above a "unanimous" differences midst of each party. Hence the attempts to hide the polemics during a whole period or to use as scapegoats Tirana and Belgrade, the mutual accusations of having fired the first shot, the different propositions on the duty not to attack brother parties and not to intervene in the internal questions of a Workers' State or of a Communist among the Moscow bureaucrats were the affirmations of the Chinese concerning the minority that could be right and majorities which could be only
In a number of articles—of which those already quoted-the bureaucrats attacked with violence-as if the Chinese who after all had merely recalled a basic truism which no one would have dreamt of challenging at the time
15 of Lenin-had committed an irredeemable crime! It is true that from point of view of the bureaucracy it could be a crime to spread "dangerous" ideas, some of which might be drawn towards a generalisation of their application. (26)
All this, added to the real necessity to oppose a united front to the moves of world imperialism, creates from time to time a drive towards the seeking of a compromise. As we know, the most serious attempt in this direction was the conference of the 81, the results of which have proved in all cases shortlived. (27). Before the congress of the S. E. D. at East Berlin we thought that there would be a new attempt to redress, at least partly, a situation which had become sufficiently grave. In fact, the Chinese proposed an international congress which would decide the controversial questions while the the Soviet bureaucrats advanced the idea of an exten-
In all cases it was, in the concrete context, much less the case of an attempt for a tactical compromise than that of tactical skirmishes directed above parties that the responsibility for the tension which has arisen will fall
To be sure, it is possible that there are other possibilities which are more serious, even ones followed by a truce as we have already experienced. But once again, every solution that would be sought along that road would be only temporary-utterly temporary. The problems under discussion, let us repeat are fundamental problems of this historical stage: no convenient veering away is possible in the long run: especially so since our analysis of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, of the Workers' States and of the advanced capitalist countries lead conviction that in all domains there will be generally more and more sharp conflicts, more and more open conflicts and nobody will be able to escape from the decisive choice. In the final analysis the result of this whole period of internal crisis of the communist movement, which has already come into the open for a number of years and which is not near its conclusion, will be a regroupment of forces and positions— the necessary prelude to the powerful renewal of the whole of the international labour movement. bureaucrats of various denominations will be less and less in a condition to block this process to which they had contributed against their intention by their contradictions own differences. Fourth International has already on many occasions defined its attitude: in the conflicts in which the Chinese C. P. is opposed to the Soviet leadership, it is the former which, on a world scale, defends the most progressive positions which are more akin to the revolutionary Marxist positions (28). but confirm this evaluation the Chinese have further clarified certain important
All the same the Chinese are hamstrung by sufficienly grave handicaps.
Here we do not refer so much to the material handicaps which do not permit China to do what the U.S.S.R. can do on the level of economic and technical aid-this tactor plays a part, as we have seen-but rather to certain positions of the Chinese which are an obstacle to the penetration of their ideas.
We have said a few words on their further definition of their line on the character of destruction by nuclear war. With reference to the colonial revolution they are far from having the clarity of Fidal Castro and they are also inclined towards casual flirtations with the national bourgeoisies. As for the capitalist countries-in spite of articles like that against Togliatti they limit themselves too often to summary analyses, in which the economic situation appears to be judged by completely general schemes rather than by a minute knowledge of the
But their fundamental weakness which Khrushchev and his supporters exploit to the full, is their alliance with Albania and their ties with Stalinist groups in the Soviet Union (the Molotov--Kaganovitch Group) When the Chinese press publishes every day dithyrambic eulogies of Enver Hodja, who openly declares himself a Stalinist, they offer the opportunity to their opponents to accuse them of being nostalgic followers of the "cult of the personality": appear so much more justified since on the problem of de-Stalinisation generally the Chinese have not ceased to maintain silence. At the same time their manner or argument against the Yugoslav communists which recalls stereotyped forumulas now fifteen years old are not only of a nature to convince nobody, but, what is worse, discredits those who use it (29).
All this has explanations of which we ourselves have spoken. But the contradiction springs from the fact that the Chinese have in reality not at all a Stalinist orientation, either in international politics or in internal politics (especially economic), even though the country was and still is passing through a phase of an undeniable bureaucratic tightening
With even more reason, will the Chinese be constantly driven towards a clarification of their positions on this question also the importance of which within the very scope of the current conflict. they could not underestimate. In the overwhelming majority of the Communist parties, those which would tolerate being considered Stalinists, without reacting can have no success at all. This is even more true for the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. If in the final analysis, the internal process in the C.P. of the S.U. itself, will play a part of the first importance in the outcome of the controversy, those who give free rein to doubt concerning their positions in the face of de-Stalinisation, go forth defeated in
Not retarded Stalinists but "reformers" consistant that Khrushchev eventually toll the bell for Khrushche's clique.
We are, besides, convinced that here too, the future has other spectacular events in store for us.
FOOT NOTES
(1) See the article in the People's Daily, repro- (3) See the article in Red Flag, Hsinhua Daily duced by Hsinhua Daily Bulletin of the 15th
December 1962.
On the first stage of the conflict see our article in the Quatrieme
Internationale, October-
November 1960,
Bulletin, 17th November.
With regard to the official position of the
(4)
Fourth International on the Sino-Indian conflict, see Quatrieme International, December
1962.
(5) See, for example, the already cited article of the 15th December and the address of the Chinese delegate at the East Berlin Congress. (6) See especially the articles from Chinese sources reprinted by Hsinhua Daily Bulletin of the 31st October, of the 1st, 5th and 30th November. An article of the 15th November contains the following passage: "The perience of history shows that the more resolute the struggle against imperialism, more the peace of the world will be safeguarded. On the other hand, if one draws back, if one bends over backwards and even begs for peace from imperialism at the expense of the revolutionary people, imperialism to develop fashion its politics of aggression See the resolution of the International Secretariat on the Caribbean Internationale, December 1962) and on the Berlin Crisis (In November 1961). (8) See in particular the article of the 31st December already cited. In part the Chinese hold to the position, defended also in a passage in the Moscow Resolution (1960), according to which, war broke out, the general result would be the destruction of capitalism. On the other hand they advance the suggestion of an agreement to exclude the use of nuclear arms on the pattern of the agreements reached in past with regard to chemical and bacterioloThe article against Togliatti is that of the 31st December published in full in the Chinese bulletin of January 1st 1963. See the text in the Hsinhua Daily Bulletin, It is now known that Stalin advised the Chinese to come to terms with Chiang-Kai-Shek at any price, and that it was against his advice that the Chinese Communists adopted the perspective of civil war. See in particular the text published in Pravda on 7-1-63 and the address by Khrushchev to the Congress in East Berlin. In East Berlin the Soviet leader spoke of nuclear war in a particularly dramatic tone.
in tact. Irreparable destruction and carnage in the event of war. According to the version appearing in l'Unita, organ of the Italian CP, Khrushchev said in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 22: "If we did not believe in Kennedy's we would then have to acknowledge that humanity has mutual destruction." my the perspective
The perspective of the revolutionary struggle first to paralyse and imperialism here quite simply forgotten! They are repeating a passage from the Moscow Conference Declaration A text considered fundamental by those concerned-the Moscow Declaration of 1960is visibly embarrassed by the Cuban phenomenon, which eludes its arbitrary scheme of the so-called state of national and ignorance of the true nature of the Castro revolution and its fundamental lesson, which implies a striking confirmation of the theory of permanent revolution. The new program of the CPSU-which moreover has pretentions to being an organic historical and theoretical synthesis-does not breathe single word about the Cuban revolution, that is to say, about the historic event of the first socialist revolution on the American continent ! The clearest expression of Khrushchevism to be found in the following passage from the report by Khrushchev himself on the 81Parties Conference :
'The victory of the USSR in the economic competition with the USA, and the victory of the socialist system as a whole over the capitalist system, will mark a radical turningpoint in history, will exert an even greater influence on the workers' movement throughout the entire world. Then it will be clear even to the most undecided that socialism alone brings all that man needs for a happy life, and they will make their choice in favour
To win time in the economic competition with capitalism: that is today the most important thing." In prime position the Indonesian CP, on the one hand can hardly escape China's other follows a policy of extreme collaboration bourgeois-national Soekarno in the The present line of the South African CP, for instance, comes closer to the Chinese orientation than to that of the CPSU. Latest example: the quick and important aid in tractors to the new Algerian state, at a moment very critical economically. It is indicative of his attitude towards the masses-that Fidel Castro read on television the shorthand text of his talks with U Thant. We are quoting from the text published by Hsinhua Daily Bulletin, 18th January, 1963. One has heard of "Theoreticians" of such a kind, for example in the Italian C.P. Besides, it is necessary to recall that after the talk of Mikoyan to the 20th Congress even the Chinese revolution would be an example of a peaceful road. In his quoted speech Castro brother countries or having one up in a drawer the Declaration of Havana
As regards the roads transition (''we are not dogmatic ") he emphasizes that until now there is not one example of that, that in any case the revolutionary road imitself on Latin America. The events of March 1962 (the sacking d'Escalante) and Castro's speeches time indicate that the Cubans have placed
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