THE COUP D'ETAT IN IRAQ of General Kassem was a final confirmation - both of the Bonapartist character of his power and of the total bankruptcy of his actions during the five years following the overthrow of the reactionary regime of Nouri Said. Remaining in power essentially by leaning on dissimilar social and political forces which he utilised one against the other without ever being the consistent defender of any one of them, Kassem, when he was threatened, tound no one prepared to defend him. On the other hand, it was impossible for him to count on any mobilieven of certain sectors of the masses, because his failure to solve the fundamenta! oroblems for which the masses had opposed Nour Said. had divested him of all popular support.
At the base of the revolution of 1958 there had been three essential demands: Arab unity, emancipation from the tutelage of imperialism represented in Iraq also by the Petroleum Trusts, and radical agrarian reform. Nasserism at the start, his vehement threats, his promises to the peasants, Kassem turned his back on Arab unity in breaking with Cairo, was incapable of removing the economic stranglehold of imperialsm, and carried out only a pretence of agrariar
In addition, by refusing any autonomy to the Kurds, he endangered the unity of Iraq itself.
conditions, the most he could do was to prolong his power by means of severe repression and by exploiting the heterogeneous character of the opposition that arose to him. However, his fate
At the time of writing this note, we are not yet in possession of all the necessary information on the precise nature of the new ruling group and of the exact composition of the coalition which has formed the new Government. Certain interpretations and
certain stands taken appear to be founded above all on repression against the Communists and on the speedy diplomatic recognition on the part of a series of countries. These are however factors that are absolutely insufficient or partial. We shall return to the first point. As to the second, it is clear that, in a very fluid situation, everybody (the United States as much as the USSR, and Egypt as much as Jordan for example has desired to preserve the possibility of exercising an influence, which would have been much more difficult if not impossible in case of non-recognition of the new regime.
The press of certain Communist Parties in particular have spoken of the coup d'etat as having a reactionary and pro-imperialist character. It is possible that, in the situation that arose after the fall of Kassem, there was a reactionary component and it is even probable that there were forces which tried to exploit the situation to gain positions, to renew the threats of imperialist intrigue and to introduce their own anti-popular repression. But in the first place, there is no question of this being the principal tendency, and further it is very unlikely that reactionary elements should be on top, such an outcome not being a viable one in the Iraq of today.
There has also been talk of a preventive coup d'etat. Without entering into detailed analyses, it is evident that a prolongation of Kassem's regime implied the growing likelihood of sudden outbreaks, of a real revolt of the masses on a large scale. The organisers of the coup were not unaware of this possibility and they were probably concerned to forestall such an eventuality by a change.
They belong to different nationalist and socialistic currents, among which pro-Nasser elements (Aref) and supporters of the Baath party are the best known and probably, at the present moment, the most influential. Their programme is basically to push towards the realisation of the programme that Kassem himself had accepted at the beginning, but which he had subsequently abandoned. matter, by what forms they are hoping to achieve success where Kassem had failed, whether they have a real possibility of attaining effective results. Regarding this, the weeks to come will provide significant pointers; but in any case it is clear that henceforth the new leaders of Iraq will face basically the same problems as those of all the other countries of the Middle East. shell, this means that there will be posed for them once again the problem of Nasserism-in the broadest sense of the word.
In the Middle East, the national bourgeoisie remains weak and sometimes almost non-existent. It is wedged between the forces of the feudal past and imperialism on the one hand, and the pauperised masses of the towns and villages on the other. It has followed what has happened in Egypt where, in the ultimate interests of the preservation of the bourgeoisie, Nasser has undertaken a fight against the stranglehold of imperialism and against the old ruling strata, by outlining an agrarian reform of a certain importance and by instituting state control over a number of important industrial sectors, with the result that he has secured the support of the masses and the fervent sympathy of the broad layers of people in all the Arab countries. But in smaller and weaker countries, let us repeat, where the bourgeoisie is restricted and has no solid base, a Nasser-like operation becomes much more difficult and risky (the masses being capable of swiftly going beyond the timid reformist leaderships). That is why flowing from this weakness on the one hand and the need to expand of the Egyptian bourgeoise on the other, there has arisen the idea of Arab unity: indeed, if this unity were realised in the economic and political sphere, the bourgeoisie of Egypt and the Middle East would appear to have perspectives that are less ephemeral and would be able complish a historically progressive task in a manner similar to what other bourgeois parts of the world have accomplished earlier,
But intrinsic weaknesses and conflicting interests hinder the realisation of Arab unity, resulting even failure of efforts already realised. one hand, bourgeoisie in fact would desire to make sure that the movement inevitably engendered by a real fight for Arab unity will stop at the stage desired by it, while such a guarantee simply does not exist. On the other hand, the bourgeois layers of the countries that are at an advantage in regard to petrol-like Iraq-have little desire to share with other countries-like Egypt-the royalties which they receive from the exploitation of their lands, and they fear besides that, as happened in the case of Syria, Arab unity might be cover for Egyptian hegemony. These are powerful obstacles, which can only be partially eliminated in case Nasser himself proposes forms of unity which are more supple and mindful of specific interests than that which led to the Syrian failure.
Thus, in the given world context, the Arab bourgeois (or bourgeois-type) ruling classes between an aspiration for Arab unity and attempts to find temporary solutions in the framework of the existing national states, between an understanding of the need for a reformist policy of the Nasser type and the fear that the mass movement once unleashed will rapidly go beyond them. profound instability which has already lasted for years and is destined to continue longer and even
In such a situation the orientation of the revolutionary poses extremely difficult problems: because it is a question really of understanding the real nature of Nasserism, of denouncing its real aims, of not identifying oneself with it but at the same time of not isolating oneself from the deep-going mass movement which wants a real Arab unity, a radical agrarian reform, a complete political ana social emancipation, while following the Nasserite leadership which, in its eyes, represents the guide towards these objectives. More generally, it is a question of understanding the inevitably permanent character of the revolution in the Middle East too, and of rejecting all fictitious Stalinist and Kroshtchevist conceptions on a so-called necessary bourgeois-democratic stage and on an alliance with the national bourgeoisie.
The case of the C.P. of Iraq is a dramatic example of the consequences that can flow from a false line. It goes without saying that we join in the protests of the international working class movement against the persecutions aimed at the Communists of Iraq,
with whom we express in this matter our solidarity. But this does not prevent us from saying that it was to a large extent a case of veritable political suicide.
In the revolutionary crisis opened by the overthrow of the regime of Nouri Said, the CP of Iraq deliberately refused to exploit the real possibilities that it had to fight for power and for a socialist solution of the country's crisis. Giving way to the pressure of the Soviet bureaucracy which was aiming above all to establish an alliance with Kassem, duped by its own opportunist formulae, it rejected the criticisms of its own left wing and accepted the perspective of becoming a prop of Kassem, namely to fight for a 'national democracy. When conflict arose between Kassem and the Nasserites of Iraq, the CP opposed an orientation towards pretext that, in a united Arab republic, there would be less democracy than in an independent Iraq, and that then there would be less
By this attitude and by its irresponsible participation in the ferocious repression of Kassem against the Nasserit cut itself off from very important sectors of the masses, while at the same time by giving up a perspective of struggle for power and for a radical agrarian reform, it had weakened, instead of strengthening, its.ties with other sectors of the people. As had to happen, given the nature of Kassemism, their support of the Government against the Nasserites led to their following the Nasserites into the prisons and their being illegalised once again. It is an attitude such as this that not only led to the between the CP and the nationalist current that was the most advanced, but today exposes the cadres and militants of the party to the vengeance of all those who wish to exploit the memory of the
We hope that there will be at least one positive gain, namely, that the tragic experience of these weeks will stimulate among the Communist militants of Iraq critical reflections on the line of their party and will impel them to condemn the opportunism of their leaders, tied to the Soviet bureaucracy.
It is in the interests of the Arab revolutionary movement that this process of differentiation should develop and that the conscious cadres should in growing numbers understand on the one hand the permanent character of the revolution in the Middle East and on the other hand the necessity to appear as the most consistant supporters of the fight for Arab unity, in the conviction that it is in the course of this struggle that all the more or less timid reformist leaderships will be left behind by the mass movement which, by its own logic will evolve towards a solution of a socialist character.
21 February, 196B.
COMING INDEPENDENCE IN KENYA: