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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL
ENGLISH - LANGUAGE EDITION OF THE THEORETICAL ORGAN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL
FACING THE BERLIN CRISIS
During the last months, the position of im- of an exploding situation which is still more
Number 13
Editorial perialism in the world have steadily deteriorated.
In South-East Asia, as' it may easily be understood, it is not only the future of Laos which is involved: it is a whole important part of this continent which is again shaken by a crisis. Among other things, the regime of the puppet Diem is completely rotten and nobody could wonder about its eventual collapse, whereas, elsewhere, the military coup in Seoul is only one more brilliant demonstration of the decomposition of the regime in South Korea where the mass movements have undergone a vigorous renewal. In Iran, the Shah is making a last effort through the spectacular turn he was forced to make; but it is obviously a reform from the top, of course insufficient and which will not he able to neutralize the explosive situation in Iran.
Indeed, after the long interval which followed the defeat suffered with the fall of Mossadegh, the masses are again mobilized and shall not be satisfied with the crumbs that the reformer Amini would grant them.
In Africa, while the FLN maintains and even strengthens its positions in the course of the Evian negotiations, the guerrilla has now begun on a very large scale in Angola, and in new failure of the out-dated methods which were adopted by the present majority organizations. In Latin America the pitiful failure of the aggression against the Cuban Workers' needs no comment: this is the clearest sign
Spring - Summer 1961 and more clearly developing in a number of countries of this continent.
This evolution of events could not but influence the crisis of the American leadership hich, in spite of the "innovators" of the new President, has not been overcome so far. In fact Kennedy has been faced with very heavy problems. Before having even had enough time to put some order in his own house, he has had to determine his plans in other spheres. One must not forget also that he is always facing serious internal difficulties, because he cannot rely on a stable and sufficiently broad majority and needs often to form an alliance with a "Southern" wing which may make him pay a very high price for the support he obtains from them. In a period when the African problems ire on the agenda, it is not easy to manœuver, even whit the local bourgeoisies, if concessions must be granted to people whose ideal is Verwoerd's South Africa.
Long discussions have been held about the reasons which, in the framework of the situation, have pushed Kennedy on the one hand, and Khrushchev on the other, to agree to meet at Vienna. As for Kennedy, several commentators have spoken about the necessity and of his desire to cut short the manœuvers of his own apparatus. It also seems probable that he has been willing to take, to a certain extent, an initiative through which he hoped to get out of the blind alley in which he had been visibly forced. But, on the basis of the statements made after the conference it appears that for Kennedy as well as for Krushchev, the chief aim of obtaining a direct contact was to try to un-
Concerning Berlin, such a possibility does not decades.
2 derstand more clearly the aims of the adversary and to fix one's own - brutally, if need be. Given the evolution of the relationship of forces luring the last years, it was unavoidable that Khrushchev should take the initiative and that Kennedy should be put on the defensive.
The further evolution of events has confirmed that the meeting at Vienna could not go beyond a confrontation of the respective positions aims and that considerable changes could not result from it. In fact the international tension has ever-increased since then.
Thus, the talks on Laos are going on and it is most probable that the eventual solution will basically be a formal compromise. The evolution in this country will be more determined by the political and military relationship of forces which has established itself than by agreements which are likely to be made. This, practically means that imperialism will find itself, sooner or later, in front of a dilemma, either to rush into a direct intervention (with all the consequences which can easily be foreseen) or to give up, without a real resistance, another important position in South-East Asia. Concerning the problem of nuclear tests, suspension seems in danger from now. If there are no important changes within a short period, the United States will resume their tests and the US SR will be obliged to act accordingly. The tension will consequently become greater.
But, despite the seriousness of problems such as that of Laos, or nuclear tests, the question of Berlin seems to be bound to occupy first place during the second half of 1961. "Khrushchev's statements were clear: the USSR wants to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany, and if the capitalist nations do not accept it, they will sign a unilateral agreement. That means that the question of Berlin and of Germany will once more be put in an exceptionally acute form.
The explosive nature of the Berlin question needs no demonstration. For the American imperialists, to go backwards on Laos is a bitter pill, but in the last instance, they can stand it.
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL exist: indeed a defeat in the fight for this German city would mean for the US a major defeat, of incalculable consequences and precisely in this part of the world where in the last decade they have succeded in winning rather strong support. If Western Europe was even to quiver, the world prospects of imperialism, already so deeply shaken in other parts of the world, would become catastrophie within a rather short time.
Kennedy and the imperialist leadership risk finding themselves within some months before a decisive choice and the temptation of entering into a series of actions whose final issue could be a world conflict, will be at that time very great. Even though Dulles disappeared some years ago, the world will again be placed, according to a sadly famous expression, "on the brink."
Of course, it is not excluded - and for us it is even probable — that at a certain moment, Khrushchev — whose interest it is, from all points of view, to avoid the outburst of a new World War — will find a way of escape which, while allowing him to make some gains, will not place his adversaries totally against the wall. But the situation stays and will stay serious and nobody could give a priori guarantees that the race to the brink will not end this time without a fatal fall.
Consequently, the world workers' movement, the workers? and peasants' parties of all countries, the trade unions and all the mass organizations have the duty to denounce with the greatest vigour the war plans of the imperialists. The popular masses — who would anyway pay tragically for the costs of an atomic war - must be mobilized against war, more than ever in the past. And to fight against war does not only mean to be mobilized in specific campaigns, but also, above all to fight in order to undermine everywhere more and more the very bases of the capitalist regime, which is unceasingly impulsed towards war by its very nature, in spite of the formidable blows it has suffered in the last