THE CONGO CRISIS
When the Belgian Congo attained independence on 30 June 1960, the Belgian bourgeoisie prided itself on an outstanding achievement of transition from direct to indirect rule. Barely three years ago there were in the Congo -norwithstanding a good rate of industrialization and the fact that one third of all adult males were already wage. earners -- not a single political party, not a single trade union, and not a single university graduate. With breathtaking speed, fifty years of deliberate stifling of the Congo peoples' democratic rights and intellectual potentialities •were undone - in order to prevent a revolution and to safeguard more than £ 1,500 million ($ 5,750 million) of fixed capital investment. And all signs seemed to point out that this audacious manœuvre — granting independence as a means of preventing a growing political consciousness will heed this sound appeal. or even a revolutionary outburst of the masses be successful.
Nevertheless, scarcely one week after the 30 June rejoicings, it became evident that the experiment had failed. The central government, which had been elected before the transfer of power, did not succeed in immediately imposing its authority on many areas filled with tribal strife. The Belgian-led mercenaries of the Force Publique
- the very pride of Belgian imperialism, thought to be the most solid armed force in all Negro Africa - broke down through a series of rebellions, of quite a diversified nature, but powerful enough to break the central government's only hold on the country.
And the most aggressive faction of Belgian capitalism profited from these events to attempt to carve out of the
mained attached to the tradition of the movement and sensi- as the months went by, it turned out that the rank and
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL Congo a new "faithful" empire under its stooge Tchombé, prime minister of the rich Katanga province. Ostensibly Belgian paratroopers were sent to the Congo in order to defend Belgian women against rape and violence; but, as if by accident, most of them were dropped around the rich copper, uranium, and diamond fields of South and South-East Congo.
The most important reason for the failure of "peaceful" transition from direct to indirect rule was the absence of a nationally united party or at least a united national movement in the Congo. In the short time during which the African population had been allowed any legal political activity whatsoever, such a party had not yet emerged. All the existing formations which gained the biggest number of seats in the first general elections were based on one single tribal group, or a coalition of a few tribes. Even Patrice Lumumba's "National Congo Movement" (M N C), the only party to put up candidates in nearly all provinces, won its essential successes on a tribal basis.
This situation led to the formation of a coalition government among nearly a dozen tribal "parties," disunited from the start and nearly powerless to act quickly against the outbreak of tribal strife, some of which clearly was encouraged by Belgian settlers or colonial companies. This strife spread to the Force Publique and was one of the main causes of the mutiny. It should be noted that, contrary to what was stated in the imperialist press, the mutiny was directed at the start against the Lumumba government, and that it became the decisive factor in the breakdown of the unity of the country - the biggest blow yet against the unfolding African revolution.
One should of course not draw the hasty conclusion that the revolt of the Force Publique was a purely reactionary affair. It was a very mixed kettle of fish. In some places it was openly tribal and anti-national; in some other places, it was purely economic and had been triggered off by the demand for more pay and shorter working hours. In still other places — especially at Thysville, where it first broke out — it had a clearly revolutionary trend, putting forward the demand for removal of all Belgian officers and for the election of the officers by the soldiers.
But nowhere did it become integrated in a broader mass movement merged with the toiling people. The reason for this is again typical: everywhere the locally stationed Force Publique was formed of different tribes from the local
11 population, and no national party was able to overcome this gap.
A powerful wave of strikes had at the same time spread over the country, the workers demanding big wage increases, and asking for "independence for themselves and not only for the parliamentarians" (who had served themselves exceedingly well, granting one another annual pay of $ 13,300 or £ 3,500!). But except for one small incident, nowhere did the strikers and revolting soldiers join ranks; on the contrary, there were many clashes between them Permanent revolution was present only in an embryonic state; it never was born.
While the Brussels government wavered under the conflicting pressure of the aggressive right-wing tendencies of the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and of the working-class organizations on the other, the military and the "strong men" of some colonial companies started out on their Katanga adventure. As a result of the general breakdown of administration, they hoped, not only would the cause of freedom and independence become discredited in the whole of Negro Africa, but it also would be possible to "save" the richest part of the Congo itself. Around the Quisling prime minister of Katanga, Tchombé, some other provinces of the country were to be grouped, and to be opposed to the "communist-led" government of Patrice Lumumba.
This project is born out of a completely wrong estimate of the relationship of forces, in the Congo as well as in Belgium and in the rest of the world. It could very rapidly involve Belgium in a full-scale colonial war which would become the very motor of political consciousness and revolutionary mobilization of the Congo people which Belgian capitalism had wanted by all means to suppress. It would run up against overwhelming opposition from nearly all great powers, capitalist and workers' states alike. It would arouse the violent opposition of the Belgian working class, which, after a first moment of disorientation, stood up surprisingly well under chauvinistic pressure.
Under these circumstances, the most probable variant will be a gradual retreat of Belgian imperialism from these "extremist" schemes, and a slow process of reunification of the Congo, under military occupation by the United Nations, which will shield it from both Belgian intervention and the first rumblings of revolution.