POLEMICS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKIN
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL Editorial Notes
Far from lessening, the polemics of the Chinese Communists against certain Khrushchevian positions, to which we already drew attention in our Spring issue, have developed in a more open and acute form. After the series of articles that appeared in different party organs and leaders' speeches, either at mass meetings or at official receptions, in June there was noted the massive attack by the Chinese delegates at the Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, held in Pekin. In both the plenary sessions and the commissions, these delegates criticized the Khrushchev line, and, despite the final formal remained practically in opposition by rejecting the idea of the report shared by the delegations from the US S R, the people's democracies, and most of the other countries. Onlly the representative of the strong Indonesian trade unions lined up on the Chinese side.
On the Soviet side, as is known, the answer to the Chinese was given by certain more or less overt articles, especially in the one devoted to the anniversary of the publication of Lenin's celebrated pamphlet, Left Communism, an Infantile Disorder. The choice could not speak for itself more clearly: basically it is of ultraleftism that the Chinese are being accused today. Finally, at the Bucharest Congress, Khrushchev increased the dose, not only by reconfirming his theses, but also by clearly proclaiming that on such questions it would not be possible to have two different positions inside the Communist movement.
Due deliberation reveals that it is an important part of the theses of the XXth Congress that the Chinese are bringing back into discussion. True, they accept the idea that, under certain conditions, it might be possible to avoid war, but they constantly stress instead the other aspect, namely, the fact that imperialism has not changed its nature and that consequently, as long as it continues to exist, the war danger will not be absolutely eliminated. But above all, they argue against the possibility that the imperialists may really accept the idea of a general "peaceful coexistence," they never believed in "the spirit of Camp David," and they condemned any attempt to present Eisenhower as a friend of peace. this last point in particular, the contrast with certain attitudes of the French and Italian Communist Parties is very clear.
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The Chinese leaders do not seem enthusiastie either about the Soviet campaign in favor of disarmament. Granted, they declare themselves completely, in agreement with Khrushcher's proposals, but they hasten to add that they are convinced that the imperialists will not accept them — which will permit unmasking them even further in the eyes of the entire world. It must be admitted that this is a very special kind of "support."
Another idea of the XXth Congress — the possibility of a "peaceful" and even parliamentary transition to socialism - is in substance rejected by the Chinese. Though they do not exclude "the extremely rare possibility" of such a transition (they pretend to be basing themselves on a quotation from Lenin), they nevertheless lay stress rather on the need for a revolutionary break, referring, among other things, to their own experience. At the same time they take, toward the national bourgeoisie of certain colonial countries, a much more critical attitude than do Khrushchev and certain Communist Parties: it suffices to recall their present hostility toward the Nehrus and Sukarnos. Nor is it possible to forget the Chinese position concerning Algerian revolution, which they now very vigorously support - at least politically. Whereas Moscow has not yet recognized the G PR A — in the hope of getting on with de Gaulle - an official representation of that same G PR A will henceforth be established in Pekin. It must also be recalled that on the question of the communes, the disagreement between Khrushcher and the Chinese — to which we have already referred on other occasions — is far from being overcome, and that it has not failed to have an influence on all the attitudes of the leaders of the Chinese CP.
The polemics apened up by the Chinese therefore have considerable scope, and in fact it is a matter of the most important polemics occurring in the workers' movement in recent years — because of a whole series of factors (the might of China and the powerful influence of its revolution, the objective context and the very terrain of the debate), it is far more important than that begun in 1948 between the Kominform and the Jugoslav CP. It is self-evident that a whole series of the Chinese criticisms are
4 drawing near the criticisms which our movement has constantly developed, and which through these new channels are being spread on a much wider scale, even though in a deformed way. We may add that the idea sometimes put forward the Chinese leaders - that, to hit at imperialism, the workers' states should try to profit more by the present favorable conditions — is fully justified.
Nevertheless, it must be said that the Chinese positions are not exempt from a certain schematism, and that many times when the grounds of their reasoning is correct, their way of proceeding is absolutely non-dialectical. There is something that recalls the old Stalinist school, in which the dogmatic form covered up a basic empiricism. Only the future will prove whether the present Chinese attitudes are not dictated by the exigencies of particular contingencies, however well-founded these exigencies may be when taken by themselves (for example, their apposition to their being excluded from summit conferences).
As for the war question, apart from any other consideration, the impression is given that in any case the Chinese underestimate the possible consequences of a nuclear conflict, which would be extremely grave also for those who emerged as victors (as we point out in the editorial in this issue, the consciousness of the extent of the danger should not necessarily demoralize the masses, but on the contrary push them to fight harder against imperialism and war).
But the most negative side of the Chinese polemics is their attitude toward the Jugoslav communists. We have for a long time now criticized a whole series of positions of the
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL "clique" are agents of imperialism, and as such must be fought. In other terms, despite all that they themselves wrote in 1956-57, the Chinese are trying still once more to explain what may be the dialectic inside the workers' movement as were determined by the doings of the imperialists or of their agents. This attitude toward the Jugoslavs must be all the more condemned in that, in most cases, when they criticize Tito, it is in reality Khrushchev they are aiming
For the Chinese leaders do not forget their bureaucratic habits: they avoid direct and frank polemics - which, in the communist movement, should be normal practice with absolutely nothing scandalous or ruinous about it — by preferring deformations, reticences, and procedures of a very Byzantine savor.
Despite all reservations, it should not be forgotten that the theses put forward by the Chinese leaders are, in the last analysis, the reflection of a profound reality. This is the reality of the Asian revolution, of the colonial revolution in general, which cannot accept positions that are not those of a fundamental fight against imperialism, and which cannot be satisfied either with yarns about « peaceful coexistence » which might from now on be possible, about the spirit of Camp David, and about an irreversible détente. What that revolution needs is recourse to the inexhaustible springs of the dialectical and revolutionary thought of Leninism; and the polemies of the Chinese leaders - despite the whole bureaucratic strait-jacket — confirms this in its own way. may be believed, in any case, that these polemies, which will continue, will have very important repercussions in the workers? movement, where they will in particular stimulate more and more critical attitudes on the part of Communist mili-
Jugoslavs about international policy, and we do not share certain judgments made at Belgrade after the failure of the summit conference.
But Marxists to aid and promote this process by their the Chinese pull the polemies down to an essentially Stalinist level, viz, that Tito and his tants and cadres. It is the task of revolutionary intervention, more active than ever, in their respective sectors of work.