economic order" has been bandied about for more than two years now. Nevertheless, its origin goes back to the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. During the sicond session of UNCTAD in 1968 the Argentine eci nomist R. Prebisch presented a report on the relations 'between the industrial center and the backward periphery. " He emphasized what were, according to him, the key elements of a "global de velopsion of labor in order to "ennoble" the exports of the "underdeveloped countries. " Prebisch's theses were very extensively supported by the states of the semicolonial countries, not only because they put forward a systematic defense of a certain modification of the distribution of social surplus-value between the bourgeoisies of these states and the imperialist bourgeoisie, but also because they had the merit of completely obfuscating class relations within the "backward periphery" itself. In fact, Prebisch and UNCTAD were reflecting - and sometimes anticipating or going beyond - the tendential modifications that were beginning to occur in the forms taken by relations between imperialist powers and "underdeveloped countries. " The critique of the international division of labor was directed against a form of this division that was slowly declining, just as it underscored the dislocation between the accelerated development of the impe40 rialist countries and the situation of the market and the structures of production of the semicolonial countries. In order for a negotiated debate on the theme of the "new economic order" to occur between a series of states of the "third world" and the imperialist states it was necessary to wait for the partial boycott proclaimed by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1973, the rocketing of prices of the great majority of primary products in 1972-73, the proliferation of projects of cartels of raw materials producers patterned after OPEC, and then the generalized recession of the imperialist economy, with its effects on the "underdeveloped countries." The sixth general conference of the UN in April 1974 adopted the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, " which has since become famous. In a context still marked by the boom of industrial production in the imperialist countries and the last moments of the boom of raw materials prices, the sixth general conference adopted the most "radical" demands raised by representatives of the bourgeoisie of the semicolonial countries. But the consensus was only apparent. The agreement expressed by the imperialist powers was subject to so many reservations that it had li ile meaning. The states of the "third world" have met many times since then: in Dakar (February 1975), Manilla (February 1976), Colombo (September 1976), etc.
In the context of the generalized recession, the drastic decline in the volume and price of exports of raw materials from the underdeveloped countries, and the rapid growth of these countries' debt, the imperialist powers took the initiative to readjust the terms of negotiation with the states of the "third world. " During the seventh UN conference (September 75), the conference on "international economic cooperation" (December 1975), and the last UNCTAD conference in Nairobi (May 1976) the imperialist powers firmly indicated what they considered the real objectives of this "new economic order" to be. Conditions of the new order 1. The "economic order" will be "new" inasmuch as it will guarantee the security of raw materials supplies to the imperialist countries. On the occasion of the North-South conference (December 1975) Giscard d'Estaing stated: "I think we must aim at a world economic order, that is, a system of organization capable particularly of avoiding the sudden upsets that have occurred during the past several years, which have disorganized the world economy. " The price of oil will have to be sufficiently high (hence the idea of a "price floor") to make sure that companies which invest in research on petroleum and energy substitutes will not be threatened with operating at a loss in a few years and also to guarantee the value of the energy resources of the United States and Britain (North Sea oil). As for the prices of other raw materials, they will be set at a "just level" compatible with the "law of supply and demand" (UN September 1975), the maximum level being limited in any event by the price of substitution products. The imperialist powers assert that, given this perspective, other outstanding questions can be discussed: stock regulators (such stocks of raw materials are supposed to permit a regulation of prices and thus eliminate the need for the industries of the imperialist countries to constitute costly precautionary stocks as well as facilitate a calculation of prices of manufactured goods over the medium term, etc.); the promotion of longterm contracts (credit system linked to long-term purchasing contracts for raw materials which guarantee the imperialist powers security of supplies without running any risk related to investment in the raw materials sector); appropriate financing of such arrangements, etc. 2. The economic order will be "new" if it permits a deepening of the international division of labor in order to respond to the present difficulties of valorization of capital in the imperialist countries. But it will be an "order" only if the domination of the multinationals is not challenged by any inclination toward nationalizations; the participation of the so-called national bourgeoisie and its state in these investments is the pillar of the new order. The United States, France, and West Germany consider that the declarations of the sixth UN conference could have suggested that there was some "right of nationalization" as a corollary of the "right to control natural resources." The "great powers" hastened to clarify this question during the North-South conference. The acceleration of the trend toward shifting "labor intensive" enterprises requires above all a code of conduct of the semicolonial states toward the multinationals, and not the other way around! In a speech to the United Nations Kissinger indicated that "the outstanding needs for capital and technology will be able to be assumed, directly or indirectly, only by the vast resources of the private sector. " Hence, if private capital is to accept the "risk," its suspicions must be eliminated (which means the threat of nationalizations must be eliminated), which would then permit the World Bank to guarantee private banks a system of guarantees that would induce them to participate in "aid to development, " which they have been doing to an increasing extent for the past two years in any case. A readjustment 3. Once these two central elements of the "new order" are defined, the imperialist powers are prepared, with various nuances:
*to agree to astabilization of export receipts for raw materials financed by the IMF (this has the advantage of enabling the underdeveloped countries to continue to import manufactured products from the imperialist centers);
*to assure the maintenance - and if possible the growth - of transfers carried out in the name of "international aid" (which assures the imperialist firms a market for their export goods);
*to direct public aid to the "less advanced countries, " with the others (those having relatively large incomes because of their positions in the export of row materials) having to call upon private bank credits. Even on the level of "aid, " account has been taken of the process of differentiation that is occurring in the "third world" among countries that possess oil revenue and are thus in position to accelerate a process of relative industrialization, those already possessing a certain initial industrial base (Latin America), and those countries that are most deprived from the standpoint of both export revenues and industrial infrastructure. For them aid is decisive. Without it they would no longer exist as markets for the industrial firms. The imperialist counter-offensive (beginning in September 1975), as well as the very nature of the protagonists, moved the editorialists of The Economist to note just before the Nairobi conference in May 1976: "Unctad's dream of a 'new international economic order' will not happen without active American collaboration. " (May 1, 1976.) In fact, a "new economic order" created by the imperialist bourgeoisies and the bourgeoisies of the semicolonial countries can only be a readjustment of the relations between "center and periphery" which prevailed in the past, the readjust-
41
NEW ECONOMIC ORDER ment falling within the context of the objective modifications already initiated. President Nyerere of Tanzania offered an excellent explanation of the conception that prevails among a good part of the ruling class of the underdeveloped capitalist countries: "The Commonwealth exists because political demands for independence were not resisted too long; negotiations over transfer of power were held with nationalist leaders. ... Similar policies are required from the rich world in the economic sphere. The nationalists were happy to cooperate in arranging a smooth political transition. Equally, the leaders of the poor nations want to work with the rich in overcoming world poverty with the minimum dislocation of the world economy." (African Affairs, Vol.75, No.299, April 1976, pp. 242-250.) Thus, while there can be no doubt about the harmony between the project of a "new economic order" and "readjustment, " there are nevertheless contradictions, which may be exacerbated conjuncturally, between the interests of the bourgeoisie of the semicolonial countries and those of the imperialist bourgeoisie. (See, for example, the debates on the indexation of raw materials etc.) But these contradictions can in no way be indentified with any sort of "anti-imperialist struggle" of the peoples of the "third world. " Such a conception totally obscures class relations in the countries of the "third world" itself, glosses over the differences in concrete social relations in the various countries of the "third world," and disregards the function of the semicolonial bourgeois states with respect to the imperatives of capitalist reproduction on an international scale. In turn, this latter feature must not lead to ruling out the possibility of a state having a relative autonomy and disposing significant oil revenue of utilizing this lever, which implies increased participation in the oil revenue, for its own accumulation of capital, obviously within the limits imposed by the process of accumulation on a world scale. The major modifications of the world market and the structure of the world capitalist economy that have occurred during the past two decades (described in points 1 through 5 below) provide the backdrop for the debates around the "new world economic order" and determine its content and limits. Exports & manufacturing investments 1. Under the combined pressure of the relative fall in imperialist investment in the raw materials sector, the central role acquired in the productive structure of the imperialist countries by the equipment goods industry, and the necessity and possibility of multinational firms' reinvesting a significant portion of their profits in the "host countries, " there has been an increase in exports of equipment goods to the semicolonial countries on the one hand and a shift of imperialist investments toward manufacturing sectors on the other hand, with consequences for the relative industrialization of these countries. 42
The increases in exports of "products of the machine and electrical industries" from the Common Market countries and North America to the "developing countries" highlights the first phenomenon.
Exports (in thousands of millions of $ fob) products of the machine and electrical industries
EEC North America 1963 2.15 2.53 1967 2.87 3.34 1968 3.41 3.84 1969 3.87 4.10 1970 4.66 4.72 1971 5.04 5.04 1972 6.02(*) | 8.50(**) 5.69 1973 7.87(*) 10.47(**) 7.37 1974 14.77(**) 11.19 (*): original Common Market (Italy, France, W. Germany, Benelux). (**): expanded Common Market (original plus Britain, Ireland, Denmark). Source: Le commerce international, GATT, Geneva 1967 to 1974-75. In spite of the effects of inflation on these figures, it is nonetheless clear that there was a significant increase in these exports: 342.2% for North America and 586.9% for the EEC (inclucing the expanded EEC). These few figures likewise indicate the interest the imperialist countries have in adjusting the complementary character of the relations between "center" and "periphery" through reorganizing "development aid" and stablizing raw materials prices, etc. As for the relative importance of investments in the manufacturing sector, the following figures provide a more precise picture of the trend. The breakdown of U.S. investments abroad has evolved as follows:
Percent of Total U.S. Investment Abroad
Ore and Manufacminerals Oil turing Industries 1929 16.0 14.7 24.0 1950 9.3 18.8 32.2 1970 7.8 27.9 41.2 Source U.S. Department of Commerce "The Multinational Corporation: Studies on U.S. Foreign Investments, " Vol. 1, March 1972, cited by T. dos Santos in Imperialismo e Empresas multinacionais, pp. 121-22, Ed. Centelha, 1975. It must be noted that a portion of investments in the raw materials sector are no longer made exclusively with a view toward exports but also with a view toward the domestic markets of a series of semicolonial countries. The investments in manufacturing are made not only as a function of the domestic market, but also with a view toward increasing exports, either to neighboring countries or to the "imperialist center."
The adaptation of world trade and the new arrangement of the international division of labor called for by UNCTAD echo these structural transformations. The multinationals 2. The development of the multinational firms is linked to these changes and intensifies the trends described above. First of all, the multinational corporations, which are more or less compelled and/or able to reinvest in the semicolonial countries, are becoming buyers of a series of products. They thus have an interest in establishing complementary enterprises or simply enterprises having a subcontracting function. Volkswagen owns a network of 1, 300 subsidiary enterprises in Brazil, most of them locally controlled. Second, the multinational firms have to invest in order to assure themselves maximum benefit from the existing and potential market of these countries. Finally, the deployment of investments by the multinational firms in the countries of the "third world" occurs with a view toward dominating the labor force on an international scale. The resistance of the working class and the high degree of organization of the workers movement in the advanced capitalist countries make it difficult to increase absolute surplus-value in these countries. Hence, the imperialist companies locate many units of production for labor intensive industries that require little professional skill in countries in which wages are very low and "social discipline" is high. Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and the northern part of Mexico are thus becoming prime locations for assembly of components or production of intermediary goods (assembly of semiconductors and various components for the electronics industry, textile production, automobile parts, electrical materials, etc.) (See The Economic Journal, March 1973. See also Teoria e prática do empresa multinacional, Iniciatives Editorais, Lisbon, 1975, article of G. Adam, "'As Empresas multinacionais na decada de Setenta. ") It is to this type of production and export that UNCTAD and the ILO are referring when they affirm the necessity of reorganizing and deepening the international division of labor in order to adapt world trade. There is a striking correspondence between the exigencies of the accumulation of capital - in the form of the requirements of the multinational firms themselves - and certain "demands" of the international bodies and semicolonial bourgeoisies which advocate "development through exports" ideologies. Thus, the most recent report of the ILO for the "tripartite world conterence on employment, international division of labor, etc." wrote: "Concurrently, in its trade relations with the developed countries, the third world would certainly be much more inclined to produce labor intensive manufactured goods for export to developed countries instead of producing them in order to replace its own imports from these countries. To some extent, the new stimulants and activities of the multinational corporations have already entailed modifications in the export structure of the developing countries. " (ILO, Problème mondial, Geneva, 1976, pp. 116-17.) Another variety of investment by the multinationals is also taking shape with greater clarity. It relates to the "refinement" of row materials in the producing countries themselves with the corollary of a new international division of pollution! The projects of construction of steel mills in Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Brazil, Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya confirm this evolution. (See Quaderni del Territorio, No. 1, CEDUC Libri, Milan, 1976, pp. 78-88.) Obviously, oil is in the lead in this new trend toward the creation in the "developing countries" of an industry axised around the first stages in the transformation of raw materials, the bourgeoisies of these countries using their increased oil revenue to finance such investments. In this case, in fact, there is a good chance that at least a portion of the petrochemicals industry will expand in the oil-producing countries, which will imply the production of Sporaner 7, ermed, and rody 2s 5975, and enk, September 7, May 1975.) These investments constitute a central element in all the UNCTAD projects for the "new economic order. " In the present phase, this reorganization of the initial stages of the transformation of raw materials must not be overestimated; in absolute terms the participation of the advanced capitalist countries in these initial phases of transformation remains quite decisive and the resistance of the "old order" is great. In addition, the imperialist enterprises retain control of the most profitable stages of transformation. Finally, the imperialist enterprises still garner a large share of the profits, through the associations that have been set up for the initial phases (which enable them to receive international
43
NEWECOMIC ORDER
U7.9 21.4: ..:. 35.25 101.00 Sovice: 10. 60:010 credits!), which in turn enables them either to expand prospecting operations (guaranteeing long-term control over primary resources) or to export these profits in order to develop alternative products or new ore-processing techniques. Nevertheless, in the petrochemicals sector, taking account of the financial resources of the oil-exporting states and of the low prices of raw materials, important shifts of production may occur, with significant repercussions on the organization of the international market of the major intermediary products. Likewise, in the industries in which there is a structural excess productive capacity, even limited shifts of production can have real effects on the situation of the enterprises of the "imperialist center." In the steel industry, for example, the productive capacities of the installations planned in a series of semicolonial countries may have. genuine effects on the overall reorganization of this industry in the imperialist countries. The annual productive capacity of the projected new installations in Iran, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Brazil amount to 6 million metric tons, 1.6 million tons, 3 million tons, 3.6 million tons, and 12 million tons respectively. The weight of raw materials 3. While a process of relative industrialization has taken shape in a series of semicolonial countries, nevertheless "the industrial goods produced with obsolete technology remain incapable of providing serious competition on the world market to industrial goods produced in the metropolitan countries. In the semi-colonies therefore, exports continue to be concentrated in the raw materials sector more than in indigenous production as a whole." (E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, New Left Books, p. 370.) The distribution of the exports of the "developing countries" to the advanced capitalist countries during past years confirms this process. (See table "Exports of Developing Countries.") The weight of row materials in the exports of the underdeveloped countries, even taking account of the important differences that may exist among various 44
22.225011
Monoiscree 7.50 31.: countries, accounts for the central place occupied by the problem of remuneration for these products in the framework of the debates on the "new economic order. " But while the imperialist countries possess a monopoly on the sale of equipment goods on the world market, the underdeveloped countries do not hold a similar position of strength in the domain of raw materials. On the one hand, a series of primary products are produced in the advanced capitalist countries; on the other hand, the very industrialization of the production of raw materials in the "periphery" has marginalized the advantage of low wage costs and stimulated both the production of synthetic materials (fiber, rubber) in the "imperialist center" and research into alternative products in order to respond to price increases and the exigencies of inter-capitalist competition. Nevertheless, it is true that the countries of the center physically depend on a number of raw materials. The Harvard Business Review wrote: "In 1950 the U.S. Department of the Interior reported that the United States was dependent on imports for more than half its supplies of four important minerals: aluminum, manganese, nickel, and tin. By 1970 the list had increased to six, with the addition of zinc and chromium. By 1985, Interior says, the country will be dependent on limports for more than half its supplies of nine basic raw materials, as iron, lead and tungsten are added to the list. " (September-October, 1976, pp. 144-45.) The combination of these elements - very significant relative weight of raw materials in the exports of the underdeveloped countries and physical dependence of the imperialist center - partially accounts for the measures proposed in the context of the UN sessions aimed at price stabilization (in order to maintain the market of the semicolonial countries) and security of supplies (for the "dependent" countries). Aid and colonial revolution 4. The permanent balance of payments crisis since the beginning of the 1950s, an expression of the transfer of value from the countries of the "periphery" to those of the "center", makes the development of "inter-
national aid" to the "developing countries" necessary. Without this aid both capital movements and international trade would have collapsed.
measures of public and private financial aid proposed since 1974 fall within the same logic; even if only in their forms, they reflect such factors as the problems arising from the recession of the imperialist economy, the new financial position acquired by the oil exporting countries, the very deep crisis which underdeveloped countries that import both oil and a significant share of their primary products (foodstuffs included) have to confrort. 5. The dismantling of the 'colerial empires" under the hammer blows of the colonic rexclution, the emergence of a dependent "national" bourgeoiste, and the creation of state apparatuses in the semicalonies leads to a situation in which on the one hard these bourgeoisies assert a relative independence expressed both in the extraction of surplus-value and in the accumulation of capital) and on the other hand the semicolonial states intervene economically in accordance with the needs of the process of accumulation as determined (at least in some of these countries! by the multinational firms and, more generally, in accordance with the exigencies of the overall reproduction of the world capitalist system. In this regard one need only examine the "complementary" investments made by the semi-colonial states in response to the needs of the deployment of the investments of the multinational firms. For the moment, only the members of OPEC (the creation of which in 1960 was aptly characterized as "the institutional expression of the existence of recently developed class conscious bourgeoisies in the major oil-producing states of the third world") have succeeded in getting their bill accepted. This is the background to the developing discussions on the "new economic order," an order within which the bourgeoisie of a series of semicolonial countries would like to play supporting roles instead of bit parts. But for those bourgeoisies which are not part of the OPEC syndicate, the race threatens to be long and difficult. In this sense there is both a "new order" and a new differentiation within the so-called third world. A "turn" This was the background to the "turn" of 1972-74. It is linked to a series of factors of which the major ones are as follows: 1. The relationship between the physical dependence of the imperialist countries on a series of row materials on the one hand and the prices of these products on the other hand was sharply modified in 1972-73. The result was a conjunctural shift of the relationship of forces between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisies of the semicolonial countries, which gave rise to a series of "demands. " Only the bourgeoisies of the oil-exporting countries that are members of OPEC succeeded in more or less stabilizing the new equilibrium established in 1973, even during the reThis led the imperialist countries to attempt to restore in their favor a balance of payments which had been unbalanced by the rise in oil prices. More exactly, he mas of reporting saugemen read to the motor. of value that had occurred because of the increase in oil prices. In fact, this process engendered a partial redistribution of oil revenue which favored the imperialist countries and the industrial branches most capable of responding to the increased demand of the oil exporting countries and injured particularly the underdeveloped countries that import oil and equipment goods from the "imperialist center." 2. The intensified inter-imperialist competition during the past few years, which was forcefully manifested during the turn in the economic cycle, facilitated both the formation of certain associations of roducers of raw materials and a wholly relative nodification of their ability to make their decision prevail in the realm of prices and supplies. 3. The 1974-75 recession highlighted the fragility of the incomes of the underdeveloped countries which export raw materials and the consequently precarious character of their market function for the developed capitalist countries (which remains important nonetheless). In 1974 the group of "developing countries" had absorbed $81, 000 million in imports from the advanced capitalist countries, which represented 15% of the total exports of the advanced capitalist countries. The GATT report affirmed: "If the problems of financing had become serious enough to compel these countries to reduce the volume of their imports in substantial proportions. .... the result would ave been additional deflationary pressure on th conomies of the industrial countries from which th major part of these imports come. " (Le commerce international en 1974-75, Geneva, 1975, p. 22.)
45
NEW ECONOMIC ORDER Thus, the explosion of prices of row materials in 197273, the deep price decline of 1974-75, the moderate upturn of late 1975 and the first quarter of 1976, and finally the relative stagnation of these prices highlight two necessities: a) the necessity for a stabilization of export receipts if the countries that import equipment goods are to continue to import at a sustained rate; b) imperialism's need for the creation of an investment fund - financed half and half by the oil-exporting countries and the advanced capitalist countries - in order to assure the exploitation of new mineral resources so as to counteract the reluctance of private capitalists to invest in sectors that are too fluid in terms of prices, guarantee a sufficient reserve of productive capacity and thus. security of supply, and effectuate the exploration of new zones (sea bed, Antarctica). 4. Fiom the end of 1973 to the end of 1975 "a 50% increase occurred in the massive external indebtedness of less developed countries that export no oil -the countries that are known as the non-oil LCDs. " (Monthly Economic Letter, Citibank, June 1976.) Thus, the combination of the boom period of 1972-73 and the recession of 1974-75 stimulated a gigantic aggravation of the balance of payments deficits of the underdeveloped countries. The following table indicates the evolution of the current-account deficit of seventyone underdeveloped countries that do not export oil (UDC in the table); for purposes of comparison we have also indicated the current-account surpluses of the oil exporting countries (OEC in the table).
Current-Account Balances (in thousands of millionsof $) UDC OEC 1970 -6.0 0.5 1971 -8.4 2.5 1972 -6.1 2.5 1973 -4.5 4.9 1974 -22.0 59.5 1975* -26.7 33.9 1976** -20.2 37.7 * estimates ** projections Source: Citibank The origin of these figures is clear. The underdeveloped countries paid more for oil, foodstuffs, and manufactured products, while the volume and value of their exports were falling. In 1974 and 1975 the increases in the prices of manufactured products from the "imperialist center" provoked as much of a deficit as the increases in oil prices did. In fact, taken as a whole the imperialist powers made the non-oil-exporting countries foot the bill for the 46 oil imports of the imperialist countries. They increased their exports of food products, arms, and equipment goods to the oil-exporting countries; they imported less from the non-oil-exporting underdeveloped countries. Nevertheless, in 1975 they increased their exports to the non-oil-exporting underdeveloped countries, which in turn imported less from the oil-exporting countries during the first half of 1975 than during the same period of 1974. (UNCTAD, "International Financial Cooperation for Development, " May 1976.) This sort of operation was able to work only because the the non-oil-exporting countries went massively into debt. In 1974 and 1975 these countries as a whole had to come up with $80, 000 million to finance and service their foreign debt. ("World Financial Markets, " Morgan Guarantee Trust Corporation, January 1976.) Private banks loaned out $36, 000 million of this sum. The non-oil-exporting underdeveloped countries "benefitted" from medium-term Eurocredits on the European financial market to the tune of $6, 331 million in 1974 and $8, 840 million in 1975. (Economia, September 1976.) This drastic aggravation of the debt of the underdeveloped countries explains the establishment of compensatory mechanisms of functioning by the IMF (especially for the most disadvantaged countries) and the international guarantee measures sought by the private banks, which in a period when the rate of profit is winding down in the imperialist countries seek new fields of activity in the realm of "development aid" to the underdeveloped countries (or to the least poor of them). It must be noted that the IMF system amounts to providing for a system of credits for trade partners in difficulty (interest-bearing loans). The beneficiaries will be able to resort to this system either to the limit of their quota or by resorting to a trust fund financed by sales of gold held by the IMF. (See Economie et Humanisme, March-April 1976, pp. 37-38 and Tiers Monde, No. 66, April-June, 1976, pp. 276-77.) All this does not cost the imperialist powers very much and should enable them to prop up their exports. 5. The acceleration of the crisis of the systems of neocolonial rule of the 1950s and 1960s (from Nasser to Sukarno to Perón) and the accentuation of social contradictions (the number of unemployed in the underdeveloped countries grew by 15% between 1960 and 1973) likewise stimulated the search for a series of adjustments in the relationships between "center" and "periphery. " The bourgeoisies of the semicolonial states sought economic and military collaboration with their imperialist partners in order to deal with the social and economic crisis. The regimes established in Latin America during the most recent period are one facet of the "new world economic order. " The aid accorded them by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Developnent and the IMF indicates this. 6. The end of the long period of expansion of capitalism in the "center" and above all the generalized recession of 1974-75 accentuated the difficulties of
the valorization of capital in the imperialist countries. One of the responses to this crisis was to increase capital exports to regions in which chronic unemployment and political conditions permit maximum gains to be reaped from an abundant labor force. This trend was expressed not only in the "old branches" (like textiles) and the assembly sector (electronics), but also in an industry like automobiles (and not simply assembly). Significant protions of production in this industry were shifted to countries like Brazil, Iran, etc. The shifts in this branch were also part of the employers' response to workers struggles (Fiat is a case in point). Serious limits The debate around the "new world economic order" has often been viewed in the one-sided light of the. demands of OPEC. On this point it ought to be noted that it is improbable that any other cartel of producers of raw materials will be able to successfully duplicate the OPEC operation. (Phosphates are an intermediary case.) This is a result of the heterogeneity of the producers (which comes to the fore during recession periods), the well-chosen counteroffensive of the multinationals (limited delocalization of certain stages of the process of ore transformation, technological and financial control, exploration and prospecting), the differing objective situation of the other products, the slowed rate of industrial expansion in the future, and other factors. Most important, however, is the fact if there is a tempestuous increase in prices, a law of the capitalist system will inevitably come into play. It will become profitable to accelerate research and production of alternative products, to exploit the vast potential of the ocean floor, to utilize radically new techniques to exploit mineral ore that is less rich but is controlled by imperialism, etc. For example, a study of the threshold at which exploitation of the ocean floor would begin indicated that an increase of only 6% in the price of nickel (compared to the 1973 price) and of only 21% for copper would make it profitable to develop extensive seabed exploitation of four products simultaneously: copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. (Kylos, Vol. 29, 1976, facs, 2, pp. 292-309.) This sort of project also accounts for the confrontations over the question of control of the ocean floor. Another example: the Harvard Business Review asserts that "substitutes are already being sought for chromium, gold, platinum, palladium, and tin, and within two decades substitutes will also have to be found for helium, mercury, turgsten, vanadium, silver, and zinc." There are also a series of limits on the shift of manufacturing production. While one response to the difficulties of the valorization of capital is to export capital to reserves of cheap labor power, another is to accentuate the automation of production in the imperialist countries themselves in order to reduce the weight of wage disadvantages. This neutralizes at least a series of shifts if account is taken of the problems of transport, the proximity and dimension of markets, and the vertical integration of production. Further, the weight of the labor intensive industries in the productive system itself is on the decline, which restricts the relative scope of these "delocalizations, " even though their absolute scope in the case of some semicolonial countries must not be underestimated. In addition, in this entire process of the shift of a portion of labor intensive manufacturing industry from the "center" to the "periphery" those who appropriate on the world market the superprofits of the enterprises exploiting this "low cost" labor force are none other than the imperialist proprietors. Hence, if a "new order" is being established, it is an order between the Swiss watchmaker who keeps his investments in Switzerland and the Swiss watchmaker who shifts his investments to South Korea. In fact, the redistribution of extracted surplus-value is occurring much more between these two Swiss capitalists than between the Swiss bourgeoisie and the South Korean bourgeoisie. Finally, such shifts engender social contradictions within the imperialist countries themselves, which slows the shifts down. They also require the establishment of "adequate" political conditions in the semicolonial countries, and this remains precarious in the medium and long term, even in the regions that are "favorable" today.. While it is true that for some oil-exporting countries a process of industrialization large ly controlled by indigenous capital is being initiated (with consequent modifications in the specific forms of dependence), and while it is true that more generally a process of relative industrialization is going on in many semicolonial states (and further deepening the difference with a series of others), and while it is true that various measures are being taken on an international scale along with this "turn" in the structure of the world economy, in the final analysis all this simply means "a change in the forms of juxtaposition of development and underdevelopment, or more correctly: new differential levels of capital accumulation, productivity, and surplus extraction are emerging, which although not of the same nature are still more pronounced than those of the 'classical imperialist epoch. '' (Late Capitalism, Ernest Mandel, p. 65.) Finally, even if the international reorganization of labor takes on the scope desired by Professor Tinbergen (see the latest UNESCO report), which is out of the question anyway, unequal exchange on the world market, a result of the differences in the average productivity of labor in various countries, would continue to function, regardless of the material quality of the products produced and exported by the semi-colonial countries. Thus, the essence of the imperialist order would be maintained. In fact, a "new world economic order" can be brought into being only by the workers and poor peasants of the entire world, for it presupposes a genuine socialization of resources on a world scale. November 3, 1976
47
WITH THOSE STRUGGLING
On October 6, 1976, the army of Thailand established a new open military dictatorship. For an entire year, the Thai general staff and the American secret services had been stepping up acts of provocation or terror and had been waging an intense intoxication campaign, creating paramilitary far right movements for this purpose. They had to put an end to the rise of activity of the student, worker, and peasant masses that followed the advances of the Indochinese revolution and the fall of the previous dictatorship under the pressure of the October 1973 popular up-
The massacre of students at Tammassat University on October 7 and the severity of the measures taken since then must leave no doubt as to the intentions of the dictatorship and its imperialist masters. Dozens of students have been lynched, murdered, sometimes hanged and burned alive.
Arrests now number in the thousands. The press is muzzled and all the democratic rights won by the masses in three years are drowned in blood. Part of the Vietnamese population living in Thailand has been rounded up into concentration camps and is in great danger. The objective of the coup is clear: to break the urban. and rural mass movement; to halt the rise of worker and peasant struggles in a lasting manner; to prepare a sweeping offensive against the Communist party guerrillas; to make Thailand a more effective base of action for imperialism and a bastion against the
The importance of the evolution of the situation in Thailand need not be demonstrated. After
American imperialism's defeat in Indochina and the opening of a period of growing social agitation in the rest of Southeast Asia, the stakes in the struggle now going on in this country are considerable. Active solidarity must be developed with those who are continuing the fight against th dictatorship under extremely difficult conditions. Such solidarity can save the lives of many of those imprisoned and stay the criminal hand of the new dictatorship. The greatest publicity must be given to these events and to the responsibilities of the imperialist powers - in particular the
The Fourth International calls for stepping up worldwide solidarity, for an immediate halt to the torture and acts of terror, for the immediate release of all political prisoners, and for support to rising.
Indochinese revolution.
U.S. and Japan - in this coup.
the struggle against the dictatorship.
October 17, 1976
Editeur responsable : René Groslambert, 34 rue Nothomb, 1040 Bruxelles
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