workers by PEKKA HAAPAKOSKI When the long-awaited free-trade accord between Finland and the European Common Market was finally signed in the autumn of 1973, the Finnish bourgeoisie heaved a sigh of relief. During the 1973 international boom investments in Finland had lagged behind the international average exactly because of uncertainty about this "economic solution. " But hardly had the "golden age" opened when the black clouds of the "energy crisis" began to gather. For various structural reasons this crisis hit Finnish industry harder than most other industries in the West. The burden of increases in the cost of fuel was massive and the balance of payments worsened sharply. When the prospect of international recession began to loom on the horizon, the postaccord atmosphere of boom disappeared without a trace. The perspective for 1974 became not "progress and stability, " but the double specter of unlimited inflation and economic stagnation, that is, "stagflation. While the crisis as such was very real in Finland and made an absolutely watertight incomes policy more necessary than ever, the specific "energy" aspect (that is, the lack of fuel reserves) was more or less invented. But it was exactly this "energy" aspect that offered the bourgeoisie the necessary weapons to make the working class bear the burden of the crisis. So a tremendous campaign was started to create an atmosphere of "responsibility" and "nafional solidarity" among the working class. The battle cry of the center-Social Democratic government and the capitalists was: "No more mad springs, no more excessive wage demands; we all sit in the same boat, which the slightest rocking can sink. " This campaign was continued in ever stronger forms during the winter of 1974. In March the Social Democratic majority bloc of the SAK (the central organization of trade unions) was ready to do its part in the cause of national solidarity: to sign the fifth general agreement on incomes policy. 28
- Bolivian Trade-Union Confederation) is indispensable if such general progress is to be made. U La Paz, October 10. It can be confidently asserted that even the employers were very much surprised by the results, so easily were all their main aims achieved. First of all, the agreement covered a period of two years. (The employers had for years tried in vain to push this through.) Second, the wage increases were so "responsible" -- a total of FMk. 1.30 per hour (about US$O.33) during two years without any escalator clause -- was such that even the employers did not bother to complain about their "inflationary effects, " the way they usually do. Some promises of "indirect income increases" were connected with the agreement so as to make the workers swallow this bitter pill. These included a pension reform (to be completely in effect in the year 2002), tax reductions (more or less fictitious), and some increases in welfare payments. Before the signing of the agreement the government talked loudly about "tight price and rent control, " but hardly had the ink dried when the floodgates opened. Of course, the process was not so simple as just signing the agreement. Many things happened before that. During the negotiations massive warning strikes were launched in the key industries, and when many unions were forced to organize membership votes, the results were rather clear. The construction workers voted 81% against, the workers of the chemical industries were 67% against, and the metalworkers 63% against. Also, many whitecollar unions outside the SAK at first said "No" to the agreement. But the main organizers of the incomes policy agreement had decided that the dam would not be broken. And it was not broken -- at least at this stage. The Social Democratic controlled unions followed their usual practice, signing the agreement despite the big majorities of "no" votes. The CP-controlled unions followed a double tactic, first condemning the agreement and then signing it. The same policy was followed even by the only union controlled by the CP minority. The rebellious
white-collar unions were also disciplined in the end. The biggest strike of the spring -- the strike of television technicians -- was countered by a massive "national front" campaign by President Kekkonen aimed at the SAK leadership. A real lynch atmosphere was whipped up against the strikers by using the timing of the strike (during the world ice-hockey games in Helsinki) to accuse the workers of "ruining national prestige." Once law and order had temporarily returned to the labor market, the floodgates of price increases were opened. The biggest of them were timed to occur during the summer. When the workers returned from their holidays, they found that the prices of most basic consumer goods had gone up 15-30 percent. The average rate of inflation in Finland during 1974 has remained on the same level as in the weakest links of European capitalism -- almost 18 percent. With the help of the fictitious "energy crisis" the workers had been cheated into "bearing their share of the burden. " But the real crisis -the stagflation -- continued to escalate, and with the approach of autumn the government began to worry about whether the workers would be so eager to continue carrying the burden. Also the "windfall profit" of the companies during the summer had been so provocative that it began to threaten the harmonious continuation of the incomes policy. So the government's problem at the beginning of autumn was not only to fight against stagflation but also to do it in a manner that would appear to make some concessions to the workers. At the same time, the government's unity also began to become rather strained; basically there were as many alternative courses inside the government as there were coalition partners. The main contradiction was between the Social Democrats - - who supported more "planned" capitalism, active statefinanced investments, and some nominal "compensation to the consumers" -- and the bourgeois coalition partners, who stressed the traditional "selfregulation" of the economy and hard measures to "limit consumption. After many quarrels, a compromise was reached inside the government. Measures were taken to institute a nominal (and later repayable) tax on some exporting industries and to abolish the sales tax on some basic foodstuffs for some months (which temporarily reduced the prices of these articles by about 5% after increases of about 15-30% during the summer). A law was promised that would make possible a reduction of rents. At the same time, a plan was presented to introduce a West Germantype participatory "industrial democracy" in Finland. Finally, the government presented "a savings budget, " which in a carefully selected way attacked the weakest and most helpless social groups by reducing financial support to them. The budget also included an "investment fund" to stimulate the companies by credits financed with taxes. What has been the effect of all these "sanitary measures"? Certainly they have not solved or even temporarily relieved the economic crisis; most likely nobody even expected that. Nor have they stopped the social polarization. On the contrary, the government is increasingly suspended in mid-air, as no social forces are content with its policies. Big capital gained quite a lot of self-reliance during the spring; in the summer it created a national coordinating organization that is on the road to creating a political reorganization of the right and a massive pressure group for "free enterprise. " It is increasingly clear that important sectors of Finnish capital no longer believe in the effectiveness of the present governmental coalition. They want to create a new political tool. In the meantime they will accept from the present government only those measures that serve their interests unconditionally. There is thus increasing sabotage in parliament of the govemment's policy of "pouring oil on troubled waters." The latest example of this was the parliamentary right's veto of the bill on rent reductions. Even worse from the viewpoint of the government is that the springtime apathy of the working class has definitively disappeared. The token price reductions did not have any real effect. It is already very clear that the Finnish workers are preparing for battles that can make the winter of 1974-75 even hotter than the "mad springs" of 1971 and 1973. The first skirmishes of the workers counteroffensive occurred in early September when a wave of local strikes broke out in key industries. In most cases these strikes took place at the strategic points of the most important industries. They had the dual aim of winning local wage increases and demanding that the SAK dump the spring agreement. The strikes were led mainly by militants of both wings of the Finnish Communist party or even by "non-party militants, " but the CP majority seemed to have an unofficial leading role in them. In general the strikes were rather well coordinated -- the "rolling strike" was used very effectively, for example. Besides these strikes there were also workers demonstrations against the agreement in the bigg, st cities during September. An interesting aspect of the autumn strikes has been the strikes in some state-owned corporations against alleged projects of cooperation with the Chilean junta. These battles clearly prove that there is a rather broad readiness to fight on issues not directly connected with "bread and butter" demands, this augurs well for the coming struggles during winter. Because of the hardened attitude of
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FINLAND the SAK leadership toward wildcat strikes and that of the employers organizations toward local wage increases, the climax of the struggles will probably be reached in the first months of 1975, just before the date of the possible renegotiation of the terms of agreement. The most probable variant is that many unions, especially the CP-controlled ones, will move to an all-out struggle, which may even approach the scale of a general strike. While the result of these struggles is dependent not only on the militancy of the workers but even more on the character and strategy of the leadership, it is very important to present propagandistically the alternative strategy of the revolutionary Marxists, however little weight it might have immediately because of the extremely unfavorable relationship of forces. The leadership of the winter struggles will be mainly the trade-union wing of the CP majority (which the minority has in vain tried to bypass by demanding half a mark more). Its main demands will be wage increases in proportion to the price increases reported by the official indexes, one-year agreements with the right to end the agreement early in case of excessive price increases, and membership votes on all agreements. This program, which the union leaders of the CP systematically present as the alrernafive to the incomes-policy line of the Social Democracy, neither takes up the objective needs of the workers nor offers them any means of achieving their goals. As for wages policy, the CP line simply creates illusions about the possibility of a "workers" incomes policy. The only correct demand is "No incomes policy under capitalism! Break all the ties of incomes policy with struggle! " Instead of merely. defending real wages, a struggle must be launched to win increases above the magic point of "increase of productivity" - increases that really expand labor's part of the value created. No right to end the ogreement early is sufficient to prevent the losses caused by price increases. Every agreement must include a clause of sliding scale of wages! Workers must not rust official "price controls" but must create their own bodies that control the prices and compile the real indexes. Instead of every 30 union fighting for itself, a united front must be built between strong and weak unions, and this front must raise the demand of equal increases for all workers independently of their industry and equal wages for women! Only real solidarity among all workers can bring results.
In view of the growing threat of recession, a central issue in the coming struggles will also be the struggle against factory closings and layoffs. The capitalists must be made to pay for their own crisis. If there is no work at all, the workdays must be shortened without any loss of pay and the work must be shared among all workers with no layoffs! No secret cooperation with the Chilean butchers: workers must demand the opening of the books of suspected corporations! A decisive factor for the success of the strikes will be their organization. A mere membership vote is not sufficient to guarantee democracy in the unions. The leadership must be controlled by the rank and file on every level. Down with the bureaucracy in the unions! While the bureaucracy will remain for a long time to come, it is absolutely necessary to organize even outside the union structures. On the local level democratically-elected strike committees must be established and they must be under the control of general meetings of the strikers! Any sort of revenge after the strike must be prevented beforehand. Demand an absolute commitment not to use blacklists or trials by "labor courts" against the strikers! Set up a control body to sec that they are not used! The right to strike must be unlimited! Every maneuver aimed at making the workers responsible for the profitability of capitalist enterprises by offering "participation" is nothing but a cheap trick! The workers do not want to become "partcapitalists. " Against the "participation" we call for control by the workers over the enterprises, control won by their own struggle. For the right of workers to impose their own decisions on the capitalists and to prevent them from taking measures not agreed to by the workers! D
soldiers